because they have failed to detect or discern the lack of shock in the initial sections of the runway. But *the only objective basis for the claim that the rats have failed to make the discrimination is the persistent self-punitive running that is itself attributed to the failure to discriminate.*

Dreyer and Renner have also failed to specify the details by which the acquisition of a "discrimination" becomes transformed into action. With human Ss, verbal reports are commonly used as the criterion for asserting that they "know" when a response will be followed by punishment. But paradoxically, the possession of such "knowledge" does not always lead to "rational" actions or to the abandonment of behaviors that eventuate in pain. Granting this, what possible reason can be adduced for supposing, as do Dreyer and Renner, that a rat will *necessarily* give up self-punitive running as soon as it gains insight into the response-punishment contingency? Clearly, Dreyer and Renner's theory is vulnerable to the same criticism that Guthrie (1935) leveled against Tolman for his neglect of the problem of how *realizations* (sign-Gestalt-expectations)

are translated into *action*. By likewise failing to bridge the gap between *knowing* and *doing* in the rat, Dreyer and Renner have left it, as did Tolman, interred in thought.

On the present view, to say that an organism is discriminating is to say that it is reacting differentially either to the presence and absence of a stimulus or to two different stimuli. Discriminating stands firmly in the position of a dependent variable. Rats that travel slowly through the initial shock-free segments of a runway and then accelerate in the shock zone are undeniably discriminating, by this definition, but they are also behaving self-punitively. The Ss of this experiment, by virtue of their differential reactions to the two CSs, were discriminating the set of shock-forewarning conditions from the set of safety-indicating conditions. Still they persisted for many trials in running from a safe region into, and across, shock. Moreover, in a dramatic reversal from predictions based on an overly simplistic human analogue, they started more quickly and ran more rapidly in the presence of the CS_{sk} than in the presence of the CS_{nsk}. These findings strengthen the suggestion (Brown, 1970) that

self-punitive behavior may even be enhanced, on occasion, by changes in the environment designed to make the contingent relation of shock to response patently unambiguous. Our findings also raise serious doubts as to the utility of purely ad hoc mentalistic interpretations of self-punitive behavior.

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ERRATUM

BOSSOM, J. The effect of lesions in caudate nucleus and superior colliculus upon adaptation to prisms in monkey. *Psychonomic Science*, 1972, 26, 255-256. On page 255, col. 3, 7 lines from bottom—123 mm should read 12.3 mm; 6 lines from bottom—166 mm should read 16.6 mm. On page 256, col. 1, line 7—13 mm should read 1.3 mm; 11 lines from bottom—245 mm should read 24.5 mm; and 7 lines from bottom—87 mm should read 8.7 mm.