

Erratum to: Efficiency based strategy spreading in the prisoner's dilemma game

S. Weber^a and M. Porto^b

Institut für Festkörperphysik, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Hochschulstr. 8, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany

Eur. Phys. J. B 69, 599 (2009)

Received 22 July 2009

Published online 17 September 2009 – © EDP Sciences, Società Italiana di Fisica, Springer-Verlag 2009

In the course of extending our recent work [1] to more general game matrices we identified an inequality different from equation (4) of reference [1] for the payoff per interaction case. If the parametrization of the prisoner's dilemma is chosen, the correct threshold condition for the cooperation strategy to be an ESS_N on a vertex with degree k is instead

$$b < \frac{2k - 4}{2k - 1}. \quad (1)$$

As the temptation to defect parameter b is always greater than 1, this condition is never fulfilled in the prisoner's dilemma game. Nevertheless, the main argument given in reference [1], that the vertices with the largest degree in the network lose their ability to support cooperation at a certain temptation to defect parameter value b_c , is however correct and supported by the numerical data. This can be seen by considering the second moment of degrees of cooperators κ^2 in the stationary state as shown in Figure 1. Our analysis reveals that the second moment κ^2 , which is dominated by vertices with a large degree, declines rapidly as b gets larger than b_c . This indeed shows that the largest degree vertices cease to be cooperators for $b > b_c$, and successively vertices with smaller degree do so as well as b further increases.




Fig. 1. Second moment of degrees of cooperating players κ^2 for the payoff per interaction case. Shown are the results for scale-free networks with scaling exponent $\gamma = 3$ and 4000 vertices. The horizontal line indicates the second moment $\langle k^2 \rangle$ of the whole network.

We acknowledge helpful discussions with Christian Kexel.

References

1. S. Weber, M. Porto, Eur. Phys. J. B 69, 599 (2009)

^a Present address: Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS), University of Freiburg, 79104 Freiburg, Germany.

^b e-mail: porto@fkp.tu-darmstadt.de