Peter I and Modern Historiography: Reflections on the 350th Anniversary of the Great Reformer

Some features of the historiography covering the rule of Peter I are considered. The criticism of Petrine transformations that influenced the activities of merchants and the development of foreign trade and estimated judgments about the founding of St. Petersburg and its capital status is analyzed. A statement is put forward about Peter’s reforms as the starting point of Russia’s New Age.

This issue of the journal Rossiiskaya istoriya is published at the time of Peter the Great's 350th anniversary. Such a significant date could not fail to become an incentive for an exchange of views and judgments about the activity of Peter I and its consequences, a presentation of the research results, and an analysis of the modern historiography of Peter the Great's time. Several articles of this anniversary issue are devoted to topical problems connected with the history of transformations made by Peter the Great. This inevitably involves considering general trends in modern historiography of the Petrine times, which became the purpose of this essay. The scope of this article does not allow for a full consideration of the topic but provides an opportunity to address issues that seem the most relevant and interesting.
Peter I is one of the most prominent figures in Russian and world history; the scale of his personality and accomplishments can hardly be overestimated. The mere biographical characteristics of his life and activities are already worthy of attention. Peter was born on a short summer night, at 0:48 a.m. on May 30 (June 9), 1672 in the Moscow Kremlin. 1 He was the youngest son of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. In April 1682, as a 10-year-old child, Peter ascended the Russian throne and remained on it until his death on January 28, 1725, taking the title of emperor in 1721. By the length of his reign (43 years), Peter Alekseevich surpassed other rulers from the Romanov dynasty, yielding from Rus-sian monarchs only to Ivan the Terrible who ruled for 51 years. True, Ivan Vasil'evich accepted his father's legacy when he was less than four years old, and he was crowned with the Monomakh's hat only upon reaching adulthood, so that he held the royal title for 37 years (and here Peter I in Russian history turns out to be the first). 2 With regard to the time when Peter really ruled the country (since 1689), his term in power was almost 36 years. According to the duration of his reign, he is on par with several prominent European monarchs of the New Age-King Louis XIV of France, Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria-Hungary, and Queen Victoria of England. Tellingly, the authors of numerous works on Peter I practically ignore this circumstance. This could be explained by the fact that his reign gives the impression of transience, even evanescence of the flashing events. The researchers of Petrine times and readers of relevant books inevitably gain a lasting impression that time itself in that period went much faster than over the previous century. Numerous events and changes were taking place, but they could have been much more numerous if time had permitted. Moreover, on evaluating the reign of Peter the Great, it is important to take into account not only what he managed to do, but also what he had planned.
There is a paradoxical dichotomy in assessing the legacy of Peter I, the consequences and results of his activities, the ways and methods of achieving them, and the motives in the historical consciousness, as well as in science. It is not worth talking about how right or wrong Peter I was, by violating the original course of Russian history, trying to instill in Russia a supposedly alien "European" way of life. Discussions on this issue are more philosophically than scientifically meaningful. In modern historiography, the problems, contradictions, consequences, and results of Peter's transformations are considered and evaluated from a different angle. Two main approaches can be distinguished. Many historians, recognizing the major achievements of Peter I in the direction of modernizing the country, sharply criticize the social, domestic political consequences of his reforms. A different trend is manifested in doubts about the significance of Peter's reforms and their life-changing nature.
The first direction has a longer history. A critical attitude to the social consequences of Peter's activities was expressed by V.O. Klyuchevsky and his followers. Klyuchevsky pointed to the despotism of power, relying on which Peter I fought against the inertia of the people, hoping to establish European science and public education through the "slave-owning nobility." However, the "political squaring of the circle" represented by the joint action of "despotism and freedom," and "enlightenment and slavery" remained, according to the historian, an unsolvable task. 3 At the same time, the issue of the "price paid for the reforms" arose within the critical approach. The most definite, although overly categorical, answer to this question was formulated by P.N. Milyukov: "At the cost of ruining the country, Russia was elevated to the rank of a great power." 4 In Soviet historiography of the second half of the 20th century, the deeds of Peter I were rated higher than those of all other Russian monarchs, although mass deprivations and hardships, growing absolutism, and the tightening grip of serfdom were taken into account.
These ideas are summarized and developed in the modern historiography, including the generalizing works of E.V. Anisimov, currently the most prominent specialist in the history of Peter the Great, the author of fundamental works on the history of finance and taxes and public administration, as well as an impressive series of generalizing scientific and popular science works about Peter and his successors. It should also be noted that Anisimov has compiled a complete biographical chronicle of the Tsar's life. In his recent popular work, the scholar modeled a dispute about Peter I on the main directions of transformations between the tsar's "admirer" and "disparager." 5 In the works of modern authors, the contradictory results of the reforms are emphasized and their negative consequences are described. At the same time, Peter I is paid tribute as a great figure. It is stressed that many of his reforms were necessary and useful, while it is shown that the tsar did not shrink from the most brutal violence and paid no regard to the costs and sacrifices, while many of his undertakings turned out to be questionable, useless, and even harmful. Anisimov in one of his recent books pointed out that the reforms of Peter I by no means resulted in the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the country or the strengthening of their rights and freedoms, but brought about the strengthening of autocracy, serfdom, and the consolidation of bureaucracy with all its vices. The economic development also appears contradictory as the growth of industry and the multifold increase in the number of enterprises was based on the expanded use of forced labor. 6 Such assessments are generally fair or at least have a solid justification. It is pointless and counterproductive to refute or revise them. The matter is differentsuch criticism sometimes appears overly one-sided and radical, while the objective situation in which Peter acted is not always taken into account; there is a shift in emphasis, and the undoubted achievements of Russia at the beginning of the 18th century go by the wayside. In the present essay, I will focus on this issue.
Indeed, is it worth bringing an account against Peter I for the all-round strengthening of the autocracy and the system of serfdom? This had been a general trend in the socio-economic and political evolution of the country over several centuries. Supporting this trend, Peter used it to modernize the country. These phenomena became a problem for Russia one or two centuries later, which caused the Great Reforms, the Great Revolution of 1917, and other impressive events. As for bureaucracy, abstracting from the negative connotations of this concept, one cannot but admit that a modern state and society cannot exist without professional managers. The degree of Peter's responsibility for the aggravating negative qualities of the Russian bureaucracy is a debatable question.
Taking into account the critical assessments of the transformations made by Peter I, let us consider some historical aspects of the economy, trade, and related problems of domestic and foreign policy. It is often emphasized that the transformations at the beginning of the 18th century had a serious impact on the position of the merchants, and that Peter the Great's efforts in the field of commercial entrepreneurship should be regarded as extremely destructive for the merchant people. This was due to a sharp increase in tax burdens that were imposed on all those engaged in trade, as well as coercive measures against the merchants, their forcible resettlement to St. Petersburg, restriction of trade in Arkhangelsk, and the forcible organization of merchant companies. Obviously, there is no denying the above-mentioned facts. It is apparent that the increase in taxes during the war inevitably affected the position of the merchants (this is a typical consequence of the wars at that time characteristic of different countries). The question is how heavy this burden was and how much it contributed to the ruin of the trading people. This usually refers to the ruin of merchant families and the reduction in the number of merchants who belonged to privileged corporations. Anisimov cites the data of A.I. Aksenov, according to which in 1705 members of 27 families were representatives of a privileged merchant corporation, and by 1713, the number of such families had shrunk to ten. According to N.I. Pavlenko, out of 226 tradesmen of the privileged merchant corporation, by 1715, only 104 retained their trades and businesses. 7 However, the instability of merchant capital and the absence of long-term continuity over generations is a characteristic phenomenon of the 17th and 18th centuries. It is unlikely that the reasons for this can be reduced solely to the increase in the tax burden at the initial stage of the Northern War. Moreover, this is all about privileged merchant corporations created back in the pre-Petrine era, and at the beginning of the 18th century they ceased to exist, similarly to other "ranks" that arose before Peter I (boyars, dyaks (clerks), zhiltsi (leaseholders), etc.). Under Peter, the practice of awarding the rank of "privileged merchant (guest)" came to naught: only three such cases are known, which could not compensate for the natural loss of the corporation members. Nevertheless, during the entire reign of Peter I, among the merchants there were such "ranks" as "the guest's son" and "the guest's grandson," which indicates the preservation of the trading business in the descending generations of the privileged merchants. According to N.B. Golikova, the "merchants' hundred," the second most important privileged merchant corporation, in the period 1701-1725 included 914 people. Certainly, many families had lost their status, but for many families continuity was retained. There appeared 177 new families and 208 were preserved. 8 On the one hand, this reflects the instability of merchant capital characteristic of that time, on the other hand, we see that there were prerequisites for developing activities of merchant families that came to the place of the ruined.
If we turn to other data on the development of trade, certainly, there will be no evidence of flourish-ing development in this sector of the economy, which could hardly be expected during such a bitter war. Nevertheless, there is little evidence of the devastating effects of Peter's reforms on Russian trade. B.B. Kafengauz, the author of the last generalizing work on the history of trade at the beginning of the 18th century, stated that, in the Petrine era, the decline in domestic trade began to show only in the first years of the Northern War. Thereafter, until the end of Peter's reign, neither weakening (nor a rise) was observed. 9 Nevertheless, it was precisely in the time of Peter the Great that, in connection with the construction of St. Petersburg, the domestic grain market rallied with the start of bread delivery from the interior regions to the banks of the Neva. This process continued to gain momentum in the decades that followed. 10 At the same time, foreign trade, which was an object of Peter's constant attention, received a new impetus to development during his reign, which was primarily due to Russia's gaining access to the shores of the Baltic Sea. However, the historical literature sometimes shows a skeptical attitude towards such changes in Russia, questioning the timeliness and significance of the war with Sweden, 11 and assessing skeptically the construction of St. Petersburg, which required huge expenses and sacrifices.
The access to the Baltic and the founding of St. Petersburg are such significant achievements of Peter I that they cannot be ignored, at least in relation to foreign trade and economic history. Yes, Sweden, which by the end of the 17th century dominated the Baltic, did not at all strive for war, since it was quite satisfied with the situation in northern Europe. However, this was unacceptable for Russia. Moreover, this was not only about the global strategy and about military security. In the early modern age, the development of world trade was assuming increasing importance, becoming almost the main source of initial accumulation, an essential factor in the prosperity of states that succeeded in this field. Maritime trade became especially important, since sea vessels enabled transporting the largest volumes of goods.
For the Russian market, which was of key importance for the exchange of goods between the West and East of Europe, access to convenient sea routes was of paramount importance. A powerful exchange of goods between these regions passed through the Baltic Sea, and control over it and, consequently, the extraction of income was of particular importance for the state that owned the ports. This was all the more important for Russia, as the Russian market was a vast area, from which masses of goods destined for Western Europe came. However, the ports through which this traffic passed were in the hands of another state, Sweden, which had all the means to derive revenue from it in the form of duties and to control the entire process.
The issue of access to the Baltic became relevant for the Russian state long before Peter I, back in the 16th century it was one of the causes of the Livonian War. Having completely lost access to the Baltic during the Troubles of the early 17th century, Russia repeatedly made diplomatic and military efforts to regain the lost territories and always met with stiff resistance from Sweden, which was at the zenith of its military power. Throughout the 17th century, Russia sought to develop foreign trade in the western direction through Arkhangelsk. At the same time, Sweden, which controlled the trade turnover of Russia through the Baltic, was not interested in this, and applied all kinds of measures to redirect the flow of goods from the Russian market to the Baltic harbors. 12 According to the registration of ships passing through the Eresund (Sund) Strait, which connected the Baltic and North seas, the number of vessels leaving the ports of the Eastern Baltic in the 1680s-1690s increased significantly compared to the previous period. While in the 1660s, there were 130-140 of them per year, in the last two decades of the 17th century their number regularly exceeded 400-500. In 1699, 610 ships passed westward, most of which were loaded with goods from Russia. Even more convincing evidence of the growth in exports to the west through the Baltic is the data for Narva. In the last years of the 17th century, exports through this port rapidly expanded: in 1696, 196 ships left Narva; in 1698, 309; and in 1699, 392 ships (or almost twothirds of those that left the ports of the Eastern Baltic). 13  by their large carrying capacity but the ships that sailed from Narva to England and Holland through the Sound were not small either, and their number was several hundred. Even without accurate data, we can confidently speak about the rapid development of Russian exports, primarily through Narva and other ports of the Eastern Baltic. Consequently, in the last years of the 17th century, the objective advantages of the Baltic direction of trade became more and more obvious, and the efforts of Peter I to gain access to the sea here appear timely and justified.
Already in 1703 (three years after the beginning of the war), when access to the sea was obtained, the Russian fortress St. Petersburg was placed on Hare Island at the mouth of the Neva. There has been a lot of talk about the huge sacrifices that it took to build this city on a swamp. However, were these sacrifices (their scale is still unknown) and efforts in vain? Firstly, access to the sea had to be reliably protected, and the construction of a fortress on the swampy islands of the mouth of the Neva was necessary, as was the construction of the Admiralty. In addition, since one of the main incentives for seeking access to the Baltic was the need for the development of foreign trade, a large commercial seaport was required. As for the unfavorable geomorphological and hydrological conditions for the construction of a fortress and a port, in the history of Russia, which has developed vast expanses over the centuries, the construction of fortresses and stockade towns in the desert steppes, dense taiga, and on permafrost has become commonplace. Here Russia is no exception: one recalls the example of Venice, Amsterdam, and most of Holland lying at the bottom of a sea drained and pushed aside by dams.
More justified are doubts about the advisability of concentrating power on the banks of the Neva and turning St. Petersburg into the capital. Perhaps the tsar should have limited himself to a fortress and port as was pointed out by N.M. Karamzin. 15 However, Peter I had his own reasons: the desire to be closer to foreign Europe as well as his love for the sea and fleet. Ardor for renewal and the idea of a "regulatory state" called for founding a capital anew, "from scratch," when nothing hinders the implementation of a certain ideal plan. Explaining the transfer of the capital, researchers often emphasize some special "dislike" by the tsar for Moscow. In my opinion, the tsar's negative attitude towards the ancient capital should not be exaggerated: such thoughts were not expressed either in his statements or in his letters. Peter I treated Moscow with at least due reverence and respect; he appreciated its historical role and sacred status. In Moscow, he solemnly celebrated the victory at Poltava in December 1709 (on the same days, his daughter Elizabeth was born there, who later reigned in St. Petersburg but repeatedly and for a long time came to Moscow). At the turn of the 1710s and 1720s, there were repairs and restoration of the royal palaces near Moscow. 16 In 1724, at the request of Peter I, the coronation of his wife Catherine took place in the Moscow Kremlin in the Assumption Cathedral, the first imperial coronation in Russia. In the course of the reform of the central administration in the 1710s-1720s, a number of central institutions were located in Moscow, and offices of most collegia were set up there. It was during the reign of Peter I that a "two-capital" system, rare in the world and characteristic of imperial Russia, arose. Until 1917, Russia officially had two capitals.
In the Modern Age, the transfer of the government residence from the medieval center to the new regular city was a pan-European phenomenon. This happened, for example, in Spain when the kings moved from Toledo to Madrid. In most cases, there was no real spatial movement, a new regular city was created on the outskirts of the old medieval one. It was so in Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and London. Kings and rulers did not destroy ancient fortresses and cathedrals but erected new squares and avenues nearby, on a free territory. Paris expanded along a favorable "wind rose" in a westerly direction from the Ile de la Cité and the Tuileries Palace to the new city in the Champs Elysees area, and London, from the Tower and the City to the monastic gardens of Covent Garden and Westminster. The same thing happened under Peter I in Russia, with only one difference: the medieval part of the capital and its "regular" continuation of the Modern Age are located at a distance over six hundred versts. In this regard, Moscow and St. Petersburg can be considered as a single metropolitan center, and the transfer of the "residence" from Moscow to St. Petersburg is considered as a pan-European trend, and not a whim of the royal reformer.
The phenomenon of two capitals in Russia, which arose under Peter, is also indicated by the fact that there was no official decree on the termination of Moscow's capital status. The general opinion is that the change of the capital took place without a special decree of the tsar but also without prior arrangement, when in 1713 the court and the Senate moved to the banks of the Neva. P.A. Krotov tried to clarify this issue, noting that St. Petersburg was first publicly declared the capital in the "Calendar or Monthly Book" for 1714. The publication of the calendar is dated May 8, 1714, and since this is an official publication, this date, according to the author, should be considered the day when St. Petersburg was proclaimed a capital city. 17  witty version, I should note that the date of a calendar publication is not identical to an official decree or manifesto. The calendar for 1714 only reflected or fixed the actual state of affairs: the real capital status of St. Petersburg was determined no later than in 1713. Let us return to the foreign trade aspects of the emergence and early years of St. Petersburg's existence. Having founded the city, Peter I, as always, was in a hurry, hoping to see the realization of his dream as soon as possible, which A.S. Pushkin expressed with the line: "Ships of all flags will visit us." For the first ten years, due to the dominance of the Swedish fleet in the Baltic, foreign ships practically never entered St. Petersburg. The appearance of a Dutch ship in 1703, which the first Russian newspaper Vedomosti did not fail to report, turned out to be, in fact, accidental. Actually, this ship had been headed to Nienschanz, until very recently owned by the Swedes. The situation somewhat improved in the 1710s. In 1713, four ships from England and one from Amsterdam arrived in St. Petersburg for the first time. In 1714, when the Russian fleet won a victory at Gangut, 15 ships came from London alone, ten from Amsterdam, and some ships from Spain and France also appeared. 18 In 1713, the new Gostinyi Dvor (merchant center) on Troitskii Island was rebuilt and expanded after a fire. 19 Based on these achievements, Peter I took well-known tough administrative measures to restrict the trade of Arkhangelsk in favor of St. Petersburg. However, we must give the government its due: as soon as it became clear that these measures were premature and unrealizable in the conditions of military operations in the Baltic, they were significantly adjusted towards mitigation, so that Arkhangelsk continued to be the main foreign trade port of the country until the end of the Northern War. Starting in 1721, a series of strict decrees followed prohibiting the supply of goods to Arkhangelsk from the entire territory of the country (with the exception of the Northern Dvina basin). Everything had to be taken to St. Petersburg. This literally brought down the trade of Arkhangelsk. Peter I, it must be admitted, did not uphold the principle of free trade, which did not correspond and even contradicted the rules of mercantilism, which at that time naturally dominated the economic policy of Western European countries. He sought to develop exports in every possible way, and he needed the more convenient St. Petersburg port as quickly as possible. Thus, measures for restricting trade in the North corresponded to the objective course of events; they only accelerated the replacement of Arkhangelsk by Petersburg as the country's main port on the Western European direction. Already by 1725, in terms of trade volume, the capital was equal to the harbor on the Northern Dvina. 23 This hardly might have been possible if the Russian merchant class due to the reforms of Peter I had been on the verge of ruin. After all, it was the Russian merchants who ensured the contacts of St. Petersburg with the domestic market using the Vyshnevolotsk water transport system built with the support of the tsar. Yes, the foreign trade operations of the port of St. Petersburg remained in the hands of foreign merchants but the same situation had previously been observed in Arkhangelsk. Setting up and development of the St. Petersburg port under Peter ensured the further deep involvement of Russia in the world market system. England accounted for about half of the trade turnover, but St. Petersburg during the 18th century, in accordance with the precepts of Peter the Great, expanded the representation of merchants from other countries, including the German lands, the states of Denmark and Sweden, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and finally the North American colonies (later the United States). Russian merchants were also involved in this process: for example, in the 1760s their share in the trade turnover of St. Petersburg exceeded 20%, while under Peter I in Arkhangelsk and St. Petersburg, it was only 1-2%.
Certainly, the position of the Russian merchants in the first quarter of the 18th century should not be idealized. Its fate, like that of other estates, was not easy. Under Peter I, the previously existing privileged groups of merchants disappeared. A reform was planned related to the introduction of guilds in cities, which provided for the consolidation of a new privileged status for the top of the merchant class. However, in reality, everything came down to classifying merchants as payers of the poll tax within the framework of the entire urban community. The emergence of merchants as a social group with special rights and privileges, including in the field of taxation, remained the testament of Peter I to his successors, implemented by Catherine II who actually created the estate of the guild merchant class.
In this regard, it should be noted that the Peter the Great's transformations in terms of design and execution could be divided into three groups. The first is the timely and necessary measures implemented. The second is the activities that were implemented but were set aside or terminated when their inefficiency, impossibility, or even uselessness became clear. The third, and this is a very important group, is rather not measures, but plans formulated under Peter but implemented by his successors, which can be seen not only in the policy towards trade and merchants, but, as one might assume, in any other sphere of transformations introduced by Peter I. Another significant problem of modern historiography is associated with an underestimation of the significance, depth, and actual novelty of Peter's reforms. One way or another, the question arises whether Peter's reign signified the beginning of a new era. This question reflects the long-established opinion that much of what Peter I did had taken place already in the 17th century. Indeed, in the second half of the 17th century, Russia was moving along the path of transformation, useful borrowings were made from the West, reforms were carried out in local and central government, the army was improved, and the deeds of Peter looked like a continuation of the previous era. But absolutizing this idea, one can come to the con-clusion that the transformations of Peter I do not create a significant milestone that opens a new era in the history of Russia; they are, so to speak, inside the process of changes that had begun earlier. Moreover, a number of works emphasize that in the 17th century the process of transformation was gradual and consistent and changes in the field of management, social policy, and the introduction of elements of European culture appeared more promising than the hasty and ill-conceived measures of the early 18th century. Peter appears to bring mess and confusion into this systematic process, to make vain sacrifices for the sake of goals that would have been achieved without his zeal. 24 There is even a certain "confrontation" between specialists in the history of the 17th century who tend to downplay the significance of Peter's reforms and those who study the 18th century and emphasize the fundamental novelty and significance of Peter's deeds. These trends are discussed in the article by O.Ye. Kosheleva about the modern historiography of Russian history of the 17th century. According to this researcher, normal study of the history of the seventeenth and early 18th centuries is hampered by the barrier separating these centuries and existing only in the heads of historians. 25 One should agree with the author's conclusion: clarity will only be achieved by a comprehensive investigation into the second half of the 17th century and the first quarter of the 18th century. However, in my opinion, such studies will make it possible to see quite definitely that the boundary between the Petrine and pre-Petrine eras lies by no means only in the heads of historians. A clear designation of the boundary between the above-mentioned epochs is hindered by several circumstances. Firstly, there is the inertia of historical processes, which is especially noticeable in the current everyday life. Any researcher immersed in the paperwork of closely standing decades of pre-Petrine and Petrine times feels the unity of style in writing and handwriting, language, and practice of document exchange, so that the feeling of some significant boundary between epochs is erased. Secondly, Peter I and his entourage once in power did not have any transformation program. As historians of several generations have noted, during at least the first decade of the 18th century, all innovations in the financial, administrative, and military spheres were subject to the mobilization of all means and resources to fight 24 Bogdanov, A.P., Konets "Tret'ego Rima" i utverzhdenie imperskogo samosoznaniya nakanune krusheniya Moskovskogo tsarstva [The end of the "Third Rome" and the Establishment of Imperial Self-consciousness on the Eve of the Collapse of the Sweden. Hence, there was inconsistency, randomness, and a temporary nature applied to many established institutions. This was clearly manifested in the first governmental reform. 26 Thirdly, it is impossible to deny the presence of essential prerequisites for the transformations of Peter I that accumulated in the 17th century. Finally, the pre-Petrine and Petrine eras are united by a commonality of socio-economic and political development: the strengthening of royal power (the rise of absolutism), the formation of a feudal system, the subordination of the Church to state power, the strengthening of the role played by the nobility, and other significant processes. In general, there was no change in the social and political system under Peter. In addition, if his deeds can be described as a revolution, this is only possible with regard to the means, methods, and pace of reforms and violence, to which the state resorted or, as Klyuchevsky put it, "based on methods and impression." 27 So where does the boundary between the pre-Petrine and Petrine eras lie? It is still present and manifests itself in at least two moments. First of all, this is a whole series of major innovations that complete the processes that have been going on since the pre-Petrine era. For example, with the disappearance of the Boyar Duma and the abolition of patriarchal power in the Church, the last attributes of the estate monarchy became outdated, and autocracy began to triumph in full measure. With the publication of the decree on single inheritance and the introduction of the Table of Ranks, formal differences between the clan nobility and the mass of the service nobility disappeared. In tax policy, the authorities took a decisive step so that the subject of taxation was the personality of the subject, and not the "homestead" or "living quarter" (measure of arable land). In the customs business, there was a fundamental transition to the introduction of a tariff, that is, to the taxation of specific goods, which opened the way for a policy of protectionism. These and many other significant events in almost all areas of politics mark the end of the transition period and the beginning of the New Age.
The novelty of Peter's reign is by no means limited to phenomena in the social and political sphere. Even more important is the ideological boundary, which always marks the transition from one era to another. The Renaissance and the Reformation meant the transition from the Middle Ages to the New Age in Western Europe. In Russia, this transition took place during the period of a spreading rationalistic worldview, which led to the onset of the Enlightenment. Peter I was resolutely and consistently guided by these principles, introducing rationalism and "regularity" into all spheres of life, rebuilding the state apparatus on this basis (especially from the middle of the second The triumph of the "ratio" in the era of Peter the Great is evidenced by the recognized achievements of culture: the infrastructure of science and secular schools (Kunstkamera (cabinet of curiosities), libraries, printing houses, professional schools) was practically recreated, the Academy of Sciences was opened, scientific expeditions across Russia were launched, there was the grandiose Kamchatka epic of V. Bering and the removal of barriers to scientific and cultural contacts with foreign Europe. All this gave a powerful impetus to the development of education in the broadest sense, causing Russia quickly to join the ranks of European countries with the highest level of development of science and culture.
The victory in the Northern War drastically changed the international position of the country. Russia had become one of the leading powers on the world stage. The horizons of foreign policy had sharply expanded. As evidence of this we can mention the Caspian campaign, plans to penetrate into India, the intensification of contacts with China, and Russia's entry into the system of alliances in Europe. Peter's adoption of the title of Emperor meant the proclamation of Russia as an empire, which, in fact, it had been since the 16th century. However, the Act of 1721 meant the proclamation of an empire in the language and in the status accepted in Europe of that day, which now was unable to ignore this. This is again a new quality. One cannot fail to mention the creation of a navy in Russia and the country's transformation into a maritime power.
There can hardly be any doubt that it was with Peter the Great that the era of the New Age began in Russia. This is manifested both in the completion of the processes of a transitional nature that began as early as the 17th century, and in fundamentally new shifts in the sphere of culture and domestic and foreign policy observed in the first quarter of the 18th century. At the same time, Peter I initiated many processes and changes in Russia; his transformations should be considered the beginning of a long period of irreversible reforms that spread throughout the entire 18th century. A similar approach to understanding the history of the entire century has already been used by researchers, 28 and it seems to be more proactive than comparing the acts of Peter to the slackness of his successors, which also used to be and still is popular in historical thought. In fact, the 18th century is the age of reforms, which opened with the transformations of Peter I and had a profound impact on the further development of the country up to our time. This should be seen as the main merit of the great hero of this anniversary.

OPEN ACCESS
This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.