Was the 1958 Reform Ruinous for Collective Farms?

The state of collective farms after the 1958 Reform is considered. Radical reconstruction occurred in the agricultural sector of the Soviet economy. The collective farms turned out to be the owners of machines and agricultural tools, but without the necessary infrastructure for their work and without any experience in the organization of tractor operations. The equipment procurement turned many collective farms into debtors of the State, and in the future their expenses for production needs only grew. The Government tried to solve the problem of economically weak collective farms by combining them with the strong farms and converting them into state farms. In the new economic conditions, collective farm production did not have sufficient resources for development. The first years of the work of collective farms in the new conditions showed the need for a serious adjustment of the State agricultural policy.

The most important factor in the preservation and development of national statehood has always been the ability to respond to the challenges of the country's internal and international security. The inability of the leadership to ensure the political stability of society at the turn of the 1980s-1990s led to the destruction of the Soviet state. Among the unresolved socioeconomic problems, the provision of food for the population occupied a central place. Maintaining food security requires not only the political will of the government and administrative support for the agroindustrial complex, but also significant material, technical, and financial resources. However, the Soviet leadership always did not allocate enough of these, and those allocated were spent inefficiently and poorly stimulated the rural worker.
The scientific novelty of this article lies in the rethinking of the 1958 Reform on the reorganization of machine-tractor service stations (MTS), identifying its main contradictions and consequences. The source base of this study consists of both published and archival materials. Among the first, it is necessary to highlight the basic documents that determined the content of the reform: the Law of the USSR of March 31, 1958 "On the further development of the collective farm system and the reorganization of machine and tractor stations," 1 as well as the joint resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 18, 1958, 2 developed on its basis. They contain the formulation of the goals and objectives of the Reform, the directions and mechanisms for its implementation, the social component of the project, etc.
Of great interest are the notes, speeches, and articles of N.S. Khrushchev, published in a multi-volume edition. 3 This source is underestimated by researchers; meanwhile, it reflects the era of the "thaw" and its contradictions. The leader of the country tried to solve agrarian problems by directive methods, criticizing party and state workers in the center and in the localities for mistakes, while glossing over the truth, and assessing the state of affairs. The memoirs of one of the most authoritative party and state leaders of agriculture of the post-war period, I.A. Benediktov, 4 were also used in this article. His characteristics given of Khrushchev, the level of his knowledge in the field of agriculture, and the assessment of the results of the reorganization of MTS are very interesting.
The development of agrarian historical science at the present stage is impossible without the involvement of previously inaccessible documents of the CPSU Central Committee, stored in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI). These are the funds of the agricultural departments of the Central Committee for the Union Republics and for the RSFSR. This study is largely based on the materials of these funds, which include analytical notes of party and government officials at all levels, reports from the field, certificates of economic performance, and various kinds of statistical materials. The implementation of the 1958 Reform on the ground gives an idea of the documents of regional archives: the State Archive of Lipetsk Oblast (GA LO) and the State Archive of Recent History of Lipetsk Oblast (GANI LO). They contain information about the situation in the region, district, MTS, RTS, and collective farms.
In "agrarian" historiography, the question of the cost of the Reform and its impact on the collective farm economy is still relevant. In the Soviet period, the assertion dominated that MTS had fulfilled its historical mission and the Reform had a positive impact on the development of the collective farm system. 5 Modern "agrarian" historians consider its consequences more critically, pointing out that, as a result, many collective farms were on the verge of bankruptcy. 6 However, some economists believe that the negative consequences of the reorganization of MTS are greatly exaggerated.  'skogo khozyaistva (1945-1964 gg.) [Party Organizations of the Central Chernozem Region in the Struggle for the Development of Agriculture (1945Agriculture ( -1964 out equipment "could not have ruined any significant number of collective farms, especially given the availability of a long-term loan, which the collective farms successfully used." This scholar calls the question of the ruin of collective farms by selling MTS equipment a myth. 7 This researcher did not use the archives, and this conclusion is based on the data of statistical collections on the national economy of the country. However, they were compiled in such a bizarre way that for a number of positions it is impossible to find a specific indicator in them, so additional calculations have to be made. In the second half of the 1950s, the Soviet leadership actively tried to give impetus to the development of agriculture through administrative measures. In March 1958, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the law "On the further development of the collective farm system and the reorganization of machine and tractor stations," according to which MTS were reorganized into repair and technical stations (RTS). At the same time, tractors, agricultural machines, and tools that belonged to MTS, as well as those newly produced by industry, were subject to free sale to the collective farms for cash or with the involvement of credit funds. The provisions of the law were specified by the joint resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 18 of the same year "On the further development of the collective farm system and the reorganization of machine and tractor stations." In the main agricultural regions of the country, the reorganization of MTS took place in [1958][1959]8 and by the early 1960s, there were none left at all. At first glance, there were "facade" changes: new signs appeared on office buildings, but at the same time, management personnel, engineering and technical specialists, repair workers, drivers, and maintenance personnel remained. In reality, however, a radical agrarian reform took place, which brought the relationship between the collective farms and RTS to a qualitatively new level.
In the previous period, work was carried out within the framework of the production system "MTS-collective farms," in which the former were the backbone structure: state-owned enterprises that determined the entire procedure for agricultural work, from planning to harvesting and fulfilling the grain procurement plan. 9 Then, the situation changed radically: the col- lective farms had to manage independently. The ideologists of the reform hoped for the growth of agricultural production as a result of the connection of the agricultural producer with the means of production. However, the collective farms had to restructure their work radically. Many issues that were previously in the zone of mutual responsibility with MTS now had to be resolved independently, both technical (ensuring the operation of machines and tools, their maintenance, prevention and repair, delivery and storage of fuels and lubricants) and social (organization and remuneration of the labor machine operators, their food, rest, etc.).
The problem of the machine operators was not solved even under the conditions of MTS activity, but now it had only become aggravated. Not all the machine operators agreed to go to work on collective farms. In particular, at the beginning of 1960 in the collective farms of Lipetsk oblast, 4265 tractor drivers and 2034 combine drivers were required, and there were 3785 and 1684 of them, respectively. 10 In 1963, the shortage was already 1732 tractor drivers. 11 The first year of work in the new conditions turned out to be especially difficult. In the collective farms of the Yelets district Novyi Mir, 12-i Oktyabr', and Imeni Maksima Gor'kogo, not only were broken tractors idle, but also those suitable for work. It was not possible to organize two-shift work; the machines were idle due to a lack of tractor drivers. The machine operators, who nevertheless had transferred from MTS to the collective farms, to the great bewilderment of their chairmen, did not become a model of discipline and order. Moreover, they infected the collective farmers with their apathy. "We have a bad situation with the labor discipline of the machine operators," Skvortsov, chairman of the Pobeda collective farm, lamented. "At MTS, they regularly went to work, but at our collective farm they are absent for two or three days. There are old machine operators who worked well at MTS for decades, but now at the collective farm are showing indiscipline." 12 The attitude to work changed due to the fact that, at MTS, the machine operators were used to getting paid regularly, and at the end of the year they were due additional payment from the collective farms in kind and in cash. The collective farms, on the other hand, had developed a practice of paying for workdays based on the results of the economic year, only a few of them could pay for the work of the tractor drivers on a monthly basis. In accordance with the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 18, 1958, the collective farms were "recommended" to set the level of remuneration for the machine operators not lower than that which they had in MTS for the production rate at the guaranteed minimum.
On impoverished collective farms, the machine operators had been looked at with envy since the days of MTS: they worked for money and even got bread. Similar sentiments persisted even after the reorganization. The collective farmers considered the work of the machine operators to be easy and well-paid and did not associate it with higher labor productivity. The chairman of the Yelets regional executive committee, Skorikov, demanded that such sentiments be overcome: "Why do we treat the machine operators incorrectly? We used to nod at MTS, and now we have the same attitude. The tractor driver asks for straw -they do not give it. They do not create any interest for the tractor drivers. And if the tractor drivers leave the collective farm, what will the collective farm do then?" 14 The organization of tractor work left much to be desired. The collective farms did not provide the machine operators with hot meals; as a result, the tractor drivers had to go home for dinner on tractors 5 km away. Savings on food for the machine operators "ended up costing"; there was a huge overrun of fuel (in 1958 alone on the collective farms of the Yelets district, it amounted to about 100 tons). According to the figurative expression of the chairman of the regional executive committee Skorik, "fuel flows like a river." The key to the successful operation of the machine and tractor fleet is timely and correct maintenance. On some collective farms, they managed to establish competent maintenance and operation of equipment, in others they "wrote this off," and tractors worked from breakdown to breakdown. Huge losses were brought to the collective farms by the improper storage of fuels and lubricants and the lack of order when refueling cars. Refueling was carried out "without a pump, manually, through the bottom tap. As a result, unsettled fuel, often with water, gets into the tractor's fuel tank, and the fuel equipment fails." For these reasons, in the incomplete 1958, the Yelets RTS spent twice as much on spare parts for the repair of fuel equipment as in the entire previous year. 15 The specificity of agricultural production determines the seasonal nature of the operation of machines and units. Most of them work for a short period of time: from a few days to one or two months a year. The rest of the year they are idle. Therefore, the service life of agricultural machinery largely depends on the correct storage. In 1958, after the completion of the season of field work, out of 20 collective farms in the Yelets district, only three managed to organize the storage of equipment. On the rest, the situation turned out to be depressing: the equipment was "scattered in disorder, most of the machines were not cleaned of dirt and plant residue or lubricated." Using the example of the tractor brigade of the Kommunar collective farm, one can assess the consequences: "In this bri- gade, two corn seeders had not been cleaned since the spring sowing. The chains are rusted, and there are remains of corn in the openers and jars. The self-propelled harvester was not cleared of crop residues and dirt, and one slope was lowered. The silage harvester, monitor harvester, and grain seeders are in a similar condition." Many collective farms, in order to save money, tried to manage on their own, or even without repairs at all. RTS workshops were idle. So, as of October 20, 1957, 37 tractors were repaired in the MTS of the Yelets region, and only six in the RTS on the same date in 1958. 16 The management of the RTS faced the unwillingness of the collective farms to conclude contracts for repairs. The chairman of the district executive committee Skorik spoke about the importance of solving this problem. He urged the chairmen of the collective farms to delve deeper into the work of the machine and tractor fleet. "Some heads of the collective farms do not want to take equipment to the RTS and expect to repair it on the spot. Such a collective farm chairman," he warned, "will cry in the spring." 17 Study of the results of the work of the collective farms in the first period of the Reform on the example of the Yelets district shows great difficulties in building a new model of production relations. Being placed in more stringent conditions, many collective farms of the region were unable to conduct independent economic activity. The regions of the non-Chernozem zone of the RSFSR found themselves in a particularly difficult situation. One of the measures aimed at "reanimation" of economically bankrupt collective farms was their enlargement. In practice, this meant the union of weak farms with "strong" ones, while their debts were also combined. Many regions of the country have followed this path. In Lipetsk oblast as of January 1, 1959, there were 400 collective farms. Over the year, their number decreased to 271, including 119 enlarged and ten transformed into the state farms. 18 The transformation of the collective farms into state farms and the expansion of state farm land use by joining the collective farms was seen by local authorities as another way to attract additional resources (including financial ones). However, state opportunities did not allow satisfying the demands of the regions. In 1958 alone, the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR considered the proposal of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR on the organization of 51 new state farms and the expansion of land use of 364 state farms at the expense of the lands of 871 collective farms. As a result, consent was given to the organization of only one state farm in Kostroma oblast and expansion of land use of 264 existing state farms. 19 The Consolidation of the collective farms in Lipetsk oblast did not improve their situation fundamentally. The financial situation was negatively affected by the debts of past years, which were formed, among other things, due to miscalculations of government policy, for example, the implementation of the "plan for the transformation of nature." The Lipetsk authorities saw a way out in "cutting off 271000 ha of land from 46 economically weak collective farms to the existing state farms." In addition, it was proposed "to organize 23 new state farms on the basis of the former estates of MTS and branches of RTS and to reorganize, with the expansion of land use, two branches of state farms into independent state farms on an area of 51400 ha of 80 economically weak collective farms." The issue price was 282.7 million rubles. On average, the debt of an "economically weak collective farm" amounted to a colossal amount for those times, over 2.24 million rubles. They could not get out of this situation on their own. The government satisfied the request of the leadership of the region: by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 28, 1961, it was allowed to transform 121 collective farms into state farms. 21 The first results of the reform in another central region of Russia, Bryansk, also did not inspire optimism. As of January 1, 1961, only 76 collective farms out of 375 (20% of the total) had a "satisfactory financial situation." Thus, 131 collective farms (35%) experienced "temporary financial difficulties" and needed additional assistance from the state. In a particularly difficult situation were 168 collective farms that would not have been able to pay off their debts in the near future, even "provided that all production and financial plans were fulfilled." For this group of collective farms, payments transferred from the previous 1960 alone amounted to 15.7 million rubles or 39% of the planned income of the current year. 22 Every second collective farm in the region by the beginning of the 1960s turned out to be economically unsustainable.
The first results of work in the new economic conditions showed the presence of a large number of "economically weak collective farms." In 1958, there were 8505 such collective farms in the RSFSR, or 25.5% of the total number. 23 The regional executive 20  committees and councils of ministers of 22 oblasts and autonomous republics asked the government to transform 1465 economically weak collective farms into state farms. The approximate price of this event exceeded one billion rubles. This money would be used to cover the debts of these collective farms, as well as capital investments and an increase in the working capital of the state farms. At the same time, local authorities asked to write off the debts of the collective farms in the amount of 875.9 million rubles, to defer the payment of debts to the State Bank of the USSR and the Agricultural Bank of the USSR in the amount of 1.1359 billion rubles for 3-5 years, and to write off in-kind debt on seed and fodder loans in the amount of 344800 tons of grain. As one can see, the emergency assistance to the collective farm economy amounted to a colossal amount, more than three billion rubles. The Council of Ministers of the RSFSR did not support this request due to a lack of funds. 24 Urgent measures were required for rehabilitation of the collective farms. The Council of Ministers of the RSFSR asked the country's leadership to take a number of measures to financially support them: to defer the payment of debts to the State Bank of the USSR in the amount of 750 million rubles for three years and to the Agricultural Bank of the USSR in the amount of 800 million rubles for five years; to write off the debt for the work of MTS in the amount of 200 million rubles; to write off the grain debt (seed and fodder loans, payment in kind for the work of MTS) in the amount of 300000 tons. However, these were halfmeasures, because even with installments and partial cancellation of debts, the "lying" collective farms would not be able to rise. In order to prevent the disruption of spring field work by the collective farms, the government of the RSFSR proposed that the State Bank of the USSR issue a loan for the purchase of petroleum products, spare parts, seeds, and mineral fertilizers and for paying RTS and MTS bills for work performed and repair of equipment "regardless of the state of settlements on previously issued loans for a period until the sale of the 1959 harvest." It was also proposed to increase the credit plan of the Agricultural Bank of the USSR by one billion rubles in 1959 for issuing long-term loans for the purchase of new equipment. 25 Indicative information on the collective farms of Tambov oblast should be added to the materials already analyzed. As of January 1, 1961, they owed 621 million rubles to various creditors. There were 292 collective farms in the region; therefore, the average debt for each was more than 2 million rubles. If we assume that some of the farms were still economically viable, then the real debts of the "lying on their side" collective farms turned out to be much larger. At the same time, the actual debts for the agricultural 24 Ibid, fol. 17. 25 Ibid, fols. 17-18. machinery purchased amounted to 68.2 million rubles, or only 11% of the total amount. 26 The scale of additional expenditures of the collective farms for the purchase of tractors and agricultural machinery is given in the note of the Perm Regional Committee to the Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSFSR. It says that, over the past three years, the cost of MTS for the operation of equipment on average per year amounted to 150.5 million rubles. At the same time, the amount of actual payment in kind for work at procurement prices amounted to about 35.2 million rubles. The remaining expenses (115.3 million rubles) were covered by the state. Consequently, the gap between the costs of maintenance and operation of equipment and the cost of payment in kind amounted to about 77%. Only now, the state had completely shifted these additional expenses to the collective farms. In this case, this meant an increase in expenses for the maintenance and service of equipment by more than 115 million rubles, and even then only if we assume that the efficiency of MTS and the collective farms is the same. In fact, the organization of work and the material and technical base of the collective farms were worse than in MTS, and therefore, the costs of production only increased. In order to rehabilitate the collective farms, the regional leadership asked the Central Committee to raise state procurement and purchase prices for agricultural products, "the cost of labor and funds for the production of which is much higher than procurement and purchase prices." 27 The "Note" of the regional committee provides a breakdown of the average prices and actual costs of the state for the production of products delivered by the collective farms as payment for the work of the MTS (see Table 1).
As one can see, payment for collective farm products did not cover production costs. If we recognize real prices for products received by payment in kind for the work of MTS, then procurement prices for grain and meat accounted for only 20% of them; milk, 31%; and wool, 57%. The collective farms could not develop without changing the pricing system. That is why the leaders of the region proposed to raise tariffs for grain by 3.8 times; for meat, by 2.3 times; for milk, by two times; and for wool, by 1.3 times.
Perm oblast did not belong to the main agricultural regions of the country, but the discrepancy between the costs of producing agricultural products and the rates of their public procurement is obvious. The situation was the same on the collective farms of different regions (see Table 2).
State purchases covered approximately 90% of all marketable products of the collective farms, so purchase prices were of decisive importance. There was an absurd situation in which an increase in production turned into additional financial losses. In particular, Agricultural policy, even in successful years, showed inefficiency. As a result, regional leaders at various levels sought to embellish the state of affairs. It had become commonplace. Khrushchev knew about the scale of the falsification of reporting, but reacted sluggishly: "Employees holding high positions, up to regional and republic leaders, themselves participated in postscripts or indulged it. And postscripts, fraud-this is a deception of the party and the state, this is a crime against the people." 28 Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that the country's leadership did not have information about the situation in the collective farm village. Information came from various sources. Of particular interest are the memos to the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, prepared by the Central Statistical Office of the USSR. The implementation of the Reform brought many collective farms to the brink of complete ruin. The government took the path of their partial nationalization. In 1960 alone, the number of collective farms in the country decreased by 9600 (to 43900), largely due to their transformation into the state farms (5100). The location of "economically weak collective farms" was determined not by their zonal differences, but by general economic conditions. A particularly large number of those were in the RSFSR: in the regions of the Far East, 39%; the Center, 23%; the Chernozem Center, 16%; Eastern Siberia and the Northwest, 13%; the Urals, 12%; and Western Siberia, 11%. In Belarus, this figure was 13%, and in Estonia, 10%. 29 The transition of collective farms to state farms meant an increase in government spending and was accompanied, as a rule, by an improvement in the material situation of the former collective farmers. Therefore, most of the villagers reacted calmly to this procedure. The government hoped in this way to increase food production, the demand for which exceeded supply (see Table 3).
However, over the three post-reform years, the production of the main agricultural crops decreased: cereals and potatoes, by 12%; raw cotton, by 3%; sunflowers and vegetables, by 15%; and hay, by 20%. This could not but be affected by the decrease in the number of collective farms. If we take into account a comparable range of farms, then the dynamics of production in many positions turned out to be positive. Based on 100 collective farm households in 1960, the gross harvest of sugar beets increased by 37%; of sunflower, by 40%; of vegetables, by 8%; and of silage crops, by 30%. At the same time, the surviving collective farms experienced "oxygen starvation." Based on 100 households, they produced less grain by 3%, fewer sunflowers and vegetables by 7%, and fewer potatoes by 8%.
The same contradictory situation was observed in public animal husbandry. In particular, the number of cattle in 1959-1960 decreased from 36.9 to 36.3 million, while that of sheep and goats, from 77.3 to 72.4 million. 30 The decrease in the number of cattle is insignificant, mainly due to the partial transformation of collective farms into state farms; at the same time, the number of cows was kept at the same level. The decrease in the number of sheep and goats was associated not only with a change in the form of ownership, but also with an increase in the case, sale, and slaughter of a large number of sheep with low fatness. Despite all the difficulties and turmoil, the country's collective farms increased the production of livestock products (see Table 4).
The data show a slight decrease in the production of pork, milk, and wool in 1960 as a result of the mass transformation of the collective farms. If we take the yield of livestock products per 100 ha of agricultural land (a comparable range of the collective farms), then positive dynamics was observed everywhere in all 30 Ibid, fol. 137.  positions. In particular, in 1960, compared to 1959, the production of meat and lard increased by 10%, and that of milk and wool, by 3%. 31 In noting the positive dynamics, one should pay attention to a number of important circumstances. Firstly, economically weak collective farms, which had low production indicators, turned out to be transformed into state farms, so they could not "spoil" the generalized indicators. Secondly, the increase in the production of meat, milk, eggs, and wool occurred not only at the expense of raising communal livestock, but also at the expense of livestock bought from the population. Thus, in a number of regions of the Soviet Union in 1960, the number of cattle sold for meat in live weight exceeded the number of cattle reared (see Table 5).
Most of the cattle were sold by the collective farms of the Ukrainian SSR, 49000 tons more than they raised themselves. In absolute terms, the difference is impressive, but the share of such livestock is small, about 4%. In the collective farms of Belarus, almost 12% were bought from the population; in Uzbekistan, 25%; in Georgia, 13%; in Azerbaijan, 15%; and in Moldova, 14%. In the RSFSR, these figures did not exceed 4%.
The financial situation of the collective farms in 1958-1960 almost did not change and did not allow for expanded reproduction (see Table 6).
The dynamics of monetary income growth was weakly expressed at only about 1%. If we take into account the comparable range of the collective farms, then their incomes increased by 9% over three years. In 1960, most of them were received from the sale of 31 Ibid, fol. 138. agricultural products, almost 94%, among which income from agriculture dominated (58%).
The Reform did little to change the financial situation of the collective farmers. For three years, per household, their income increased by 10%. At the same time, it should be noted that records were kept for all collective farms, including economically weak ones, which were later transformed into state farms. If this category is excluded from the calculations, then the growth per household will be much lower.
The collective farms did not have enough funds for farming (see Table 7).
The production and general economic expenses and deductions from the collective farms exceeded their income. At the same time, the expenses covered by loans and debts grew from year to year in both absolute and relative terms. If in 1958 they amounted to 192 million rubles or 6% of current expenses; then in 1959, to 446 million rubles (13%); and in 1960, to 592 million rubles (16%).
The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union of April 18, 1958, recommended that the fund of working capital of the collective farms be increased to the amount necessary to ensure normal production activities: the creation of permanent stocks of petroleum products, spare parts, and repair and other materials associated with the use of equipment, as well as covering the costs of performance of mechanized work for the harvest of future years. In two years, these deductions decreased by 15%.
In 1960, there were 356 rubles of working capital of the collective farms per worker. To assess the proportionality of this indicator, it should be compared with the corresponding indicator for the state farms. In 1958, the standard for one average employee was 1267 rubles. If we consider the indicator achieved by the state farms to be conditionally optimal, then in 1960, 3.6 (!) times more funds should have been allocated per collective farmer. 32 The unsatisfactory financial situation of the collective farms was reflected in a decrease in capital investment costs (see Table 8).
The reduction in capital investments amounted to 391 million rubles (9%). After the purchase of machines and tractors, it was necessary to form an appropriate on-farm infrastructure, so the cost of new construction was constantly growing. In 1960, it amounted to 28% of the total investment. Expenses for the purchase of tractors, combines, and other agricultural machines decreased in comparison with 1958, when MTS were mainly reorganized. However, an 32 Ibid, File 348, fol. 72. alarming symptom was the reduction in investments for the purchase of new equipment in 1960 compared to 1959.
Self-sufficiency of collective farms was out of the question. At the beginning of 1961, Khrushchev held a series of zonal meetings with the agricultural workers in Voronezh, Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Akmolinsk, and Alma-Ata and could feel the anxieties of the villagers. In a note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee of March 31, 1961, he pointed out: "With the current level of technical equipment for the state and collective farms, it is impossible to harvest very large areas in a short time and at the same time increase plowing. As a result, the harvesting of grain is delayed until winter, straw is not harvested, and fallow land is not plowed. And in the spring they hurriedly burn straw, start plowing and immediately sow. What kind of culture of agriculture  can we talk about in such a situation?" 33 The acquisition by the collective farms of a large amount of agricultural machinery already in operation, as well as high depreciation loads in the field season, led to an accelerated increase in funds for capital repairs. They almost tripled and in 1960 amounted to 12% of total capital investments. The Reform radically changed the life of the collective farms and the collective farmers. However, its effect was far from expected: there was no breakthrough in the increase in food production. By and large, the financial situation had not improved either. In 1958, wages accounted for 4760 million rubles, and in 1960, 4946 million rubles; i.e., the increase amounted to 186 million rubles or 4%. At the same time, tax deductions and other payments increased by 37%. The striving of the leadership of the USSR to "freeze" the standard of living of the collective farmers and at the same time increase the income from the collective farms was striking. It seems extremely 33 Khrushchev,N.S.,Stroitel'stvo kommunizma… Vol. 5,p. 320. immoral and unethical. When analyzing the incomes of the collective farmers, attention should be paid to the fact that their wages had to be paid in money and products. In 1960, only 7756 collective farms (18%) in the Soviet Union paid for work in cash only. Therefore, it seems important to determine the ratio of the two forms of payment and the total income of the collective farmers in terms of money (see Table 9).
Thus, the share of money in wages increased from 4743 to 4993 million rubles, or from 59 to 68%. But at the same time, the dynamics of the issuance of money and products turned out to be negative: in 1960, 849 million rubles were issued, which was almost 12% less than in 1958. Moreover, during this time, cash wages increased by 250 million rubles (5%), and wages in products decreased by 1099 million rubles (33%). The same tendencies can also be traced if we consider aggregate payments per collective farm household or per average annual worker. For three years, payments per household decreased from 477 to 425 rubles, or by 11%, while their monetary part increased from 57 to 69%. The total average annual wage of a collective farmer decreased from 358 to 327 rubles (9%). The financial situation of the collective farms was aggravated by debts, which in 1960 amounted to 6205 million rubles. Most of them were owed to the state on bank loans for capital investments-2841 million rubles (46%). The second part (1601 million rubles or 26%) was nonpayment to the collective farmers for their work. If we take into account that, in 1960, 7264 million rubles were issued in total for payment for labor in money and products, then 22% of this amount fell to nonpayment.
Wages calculated per day of work varied both across the union republics as a whole and within them (see Table 10).
In half of the country's collective farms, the payment for a working day of a collective farmer was 1-2 rubles, only one collective farm out of ten was able to pay more. On 3027 collective farms of the Soviet Union (7% of the total), the payment for a worker's day was of a "symbolic nature" at less than 50 kopecks.
In an effort to show the success of his policy, Khrushchev often took the data of 1953 as a starting point. But comparisons were not always in favor of the reformer. In this case, this concerns the income of the collective farmers from the public economy. In 1953, wages per workday (for all the collective farms in the USSR 34 ) in terms of money was 1 ruble 88 kopecks, and in addition in kind, 1.6 kg of grain and 0.24 kg of potatoes. 35 From this we can conclude that after the 1958 Reform, the incomes of the collective farmers decreased even in comparison with 1953.
The controversy continues to this day: was the 1958 Reform ruinous for the collective farms? Changes in the macroeconomic indicators of the collective farms for the first three post-reform years have already been considered: in a number of important positions, the dynamics turned out to be negative. During the Reform period, economic expenses were possible. The question is what was their price and who incurred them. At the same time, the interests of the workers 34 In the collective farms of the RSFSR, the payment for a person-day has always been below the average for the Soviet Union.
In 1954  should first of all be taken into account. Let us consider wages at the collective farms of the RSFSR on the eve of the Reform and three years later (see Table 11). Obviously, the Reform dealt a strong blow to the financial situation of the collective farmers. The average payout per workday (excluding the workers of tractor teams) in 1957 turned out to be four times higher than in 1960, while in the years 1958-1960, the number of collective farms was more than halved. If the economically weak collective farms had been preserved, the indicators of 1960 could have been even worsen.
In 1957, the average cost of a workday in monetary terms was 2 rubles 97 kopecks and 2.1 times exceeded the issuance of food and money per person-day in 1960. It should be noted that 1957 was not particularly successful for the collective farms of the RSFSR. A year earlier, the average monetary value of a workday was 49 kopecks higher. In 1957, at the collective farms of 38 oblasts, krais, and autonomous republics of the RSFSR, the wages per workday were reduced. The Minister of Agriculture of the Republic Benediktov, in a note "On Wages on the Collective Farms of the RSFSR in 1957," sent to the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee of the RSFSR and the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, wrote "Although there was some success in improving the wages of the collective farmers in certain areas, in most districts of the republic, the wages of the collective farmers have decreased and in many collective farms they continue to remain at a low level." 36 However, even the level of wages on the collective farms in 1957 for 1960 appeared unattainable. 36 Ibid, File 168, fol. 170.
The grouping of the collective farms according to the size of their issue testifies to a significant decrease in wages per workday. In 1957, in the RSFSR, only slightly more than 1% of the collective farms issued up to two rubles in kind and money for a workday. The rest were economically more successful and provided better labor incentives. Three years later, the collective farms with a similar distribution of food and money per person-day turned out to be almost 90%, i.e., such farms began to dominate. In 1957, 36% of the collective farms issued from two to four rubles for a workday, but in 1960, 11%. In 1957, 36% of the collective farms ensured a payment of four to seven rubles to the collective farmers, but in 1960, only 0.1%. In 1957, almost 20% of the collective farms paid from seven to over 20 rubles. In 1960, there were no such collective farms left. Thus, in 1957, almost 99% of the collective farms of the RSFSR paid more than two rubles. Three years later, the situation changed to "exactly the opposite": almost 90% of the collective farms paid up to two rubles.
The largest number of collective farms with a low level of income from the public economy (less than one ruble per workday) in 1960 was in the regions of the Northwest, the non-Chernozem center, and the Volga-Vyatka. More than half of these collective farms were in Pskov oblast and in the Mari, Chuvash, and Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (more than 60%). In Ivanovo, Smolensk, Kaluga, Gorkii, and Ryazan oblasts, they accounted for 60 to 51% of the total number of collective farms. In the Mordovian ASSR, Kalinin, Bryansk, Yaroslavl, Arkhangelsk, Novgorod, Kaliningrad, and Tula oblasts, from 49 to 40% 37 (see Table 12).