The Soviet Home Front during the Great Patriotic War: Modern Historiography about the Nature and Evolution of the Mobilization System

This review examines the latest historiography of the Soviet home front during the Great Patriotic War. The focus is on investigations into various aspects of the problem of the limit state of the Soviet mobilization system. Aimed at the super-intensive use of the country’s resources in the interests of the front, the maximum mobilization gave rise to numerous contradictions that required prompt resolution. For this reason, its integral feature was a complex of adjustments of a private and fundamental nature, to which the system was subjected consciously (from above) or spontaneously (from below). It was in this altered state, which enhanced its effectiveness, that it ensured victory in the war and had a significant impact on the subsequent evolution of the Soviet Union.

This review does not purport to cover systematically the significant and dynamically developing historiography of the Soviet home front during the Great Patriotic War. 1 Its task is to identify some of the new aspects, which would allow studying the phenomenon of the limit state in the Soviet mobilization system. 2 Aimed at the ultra-high use of the country's resources in the interests of the front, marginal mobilization gave rise to numerous contradictions that required prompt resolution. For this reason, its integral feature was various adjustments of a private and fundamental nature, to which the system was subjected consciously (from above) or spontaneously (from below). It was this altered state enhancing its effectiveness that ensured victory in the war and had a significant impact on the subsequent evolution of the Soviet Union.
Resorting to the history of the Soviet home front as an integral part of the change in the development model during the war period is a characteristic feature of modern historiography. This approach underlies the new generalizing work prepared by two specialists with generally recognized achievements in research on the socio-economic history of the Soviet period in general and the Great Patriotic War in particular, and reflecting modern achievements in the historiography of the issue. 3 The publication of this significant work prompted me to prepare this review.
Traditionally, investigations into the issue of the Soviet home front involve topics such as evacuation, economic development, launched restoration of the liberated territories, regulation of the labor sphere and training of personnel, the people's life and standard of living, propaganda and mass sentiments, etc. 4 Recent historiography not only expands the list of topics but makes the analysis of each one more profound. This is due to emerging new sources, primarily archival. The book by W.Z. Goldman and D. Filtzer is just one of them. It is based, in addition to a thorough generalization of the research results obtained by their predecessors, on a significant set of new documents identified during long searches in the archival funds belonging to the party-state structures of the war period. Various sources of personal origin were also used extensively. Owing to this, the authors shifted the focus of the study from the institutional and structural aspects of the problem to the specifics of the preparation and implementation of directives and the results brought about by the work of numerous mobilization mechanisms.
This approach is becoming increasingly popular among researchers. Its potential is demonstrated already by the first chapter of the book dedicated to evacuation. The rescue of millions of people and material values from a rapidly advancing enemy, unique in scale and pace, is the most important event at the initial stage of the war, which largely laid the foundations for future victory. The historiography of the evacuation went through the same stages as the historiography of other aspects of the Soviet home front. It began with a review of policy documents and the introduction of some reporting data. 5 In recent decades, based on new archival materials, there has been an important turn towards the investigations into practices of evacuation and its economic and social aspects. In accordance with the general socio-cultural turn of humanitarian research, the living conditions and fate of the evacuees, their interaction with the population of the eastern regions of the country, cultural exchanges, etc., 6 were studied.
At the same time, mass evacuation turned out to be an important part of the Soviet mobilization system 4 Barber, J. and Harrison, M., The Soviet Home Front, 1941Front, -1945 and determined many of its characteristic features. The earlier emphasis on the centrally organized nature of evacuation and the priority appeal to the activities of the Evacuation Council and other similar institutions are now clearly insufficient for understanding the essence of this phenomenon. As shown in the literature, including the above-considered book, withdrawal to the rear in many cases occurred in conditions of panic and was accompanied by significant losses. There is still no generally accepted quantitative and qualitative assessment of the evacuated resources. Goldman and Filtzer used the preliminary estimates of historians studying the Soviet economy made many years ago. According to them, about 37% of industrial capacities were evacuated from zones that fell under occupation. 7 Under those circumstances, that was a lot. In addition, it should be taken into account that the proportion of salvaged military factories could be even higher due to the priority of their evacuation. All these questions, however, require further research. The relocation of enterprises to the East and their development in a new place required a significant reorganization of production, the merger of factories and their re-profiling, and all this had to be done in extremely difficult conditions and in the shortest possible time. 8 Such tasks could not have been accomplished only by orders from above. As ample evidence has shown, the evacuation has inevitably proved to be both a centralized and a centrifugal process, in the success of which delegation of authority and the initiative of grass-roots performers played a significant role. A typical example is the regulation of "documentless cargo" accumulated as a result of an emergency mass export of resources. With no destination or designated use, such cargoes were transported in great quantities from West to East. As early as July 15, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the creation of bases for their unloading and storage. 9 The procedure for the sale of these material assets established by a government decree of September 20 assumed the independence of regional authorities and sectoral departments in their use. 10 This unexplored regulatory mechanism (along with other similar phenomena) shows that the evacuation led to a forced decentralization of the resource allocation process, an increase in the role of grassroots management structures in it, which turned out to be "a contradictory mixture of planning and improvisation, timely dispatch, and hectic loadings at the last minute. The process, which relied on centralized commands and complex coordination, but at the same time on the determination and initiative of workers and local activists, was hardly perfect but it worked." 11 This characterization is quite applicable to other components of the Soviet military mobilization system. Studies show that the formal and de facto autonomization of economic management had become increasingly important in adjusting central planning. An important role as intermediaries and coordinators of interaction between departments was played by the regional authorities, either receiving additional powers from the center or taking them on their own to fulfill the ever-increasing tasks of military production. 12 Equally complex and multi-layered was the system of rationing the supply of food and industrial goods to the population, which played a key role in mobilizing resources for military needs. Introduced as early as in the first months of the war, it relied on the experience 9 GA RF, f. R-5446, op. of ration card distribution in the 1930s. 13 At its peak, rationing covered the vast majority of the country's population (except peasants, who traditionally had to feed themselves). At the end of 1942, about 62 million people received bread cards, and by the end of 1945, 80.6 million. 14 The authors note the fundamental importance of rationing as a stabilizer of the socioeconomic situation in conditions of an acute shortage of resources. The presence of ration cards, despite interruptions in their real provision, allowed the state to maintain the priorities in the development of the military economy at the expense of nonmilitary industries and the social sphere. At the same time, even a relatively guaranteed minimum supply was an important and understandable method for the population to purchase food (primarily bread), instilling hopes for the stability of the state system in extreme conditions.
Examining these aspects of rationing as a mobilization tool does not, however, negate the importance of understanding the mechanisms for the distribution of food and manufactured goods. Goldman and Filtzer focused on this under-researched issue 15 and showed that the card system as a method for centralized management of state funds was significantly adjusted by grassroots practices that went beyond the formal prescriptions. Amidst the scarcity of resources, local administrators often redistributed ration cards and meals in factory canteens based on their own understanding of expediency. Party-Soviet and economic workers gained additional opportunities from the common pool. Those segments of the population who, for various reasons, did not receive sufficient rations and were on the verge of starvation were put on allowance. Often such actions made rationing more flexible, adapted to the realities of life. At the same time, the line between positive "transfers" of funds and abuse turned out to be thin. The "self-supply" of executives at various levels, their fairly generous semilegal provision at the expense of other consumers, became widespread. The negative consequence of such actions was growing public discontent. It should be noted that study of various aspects of these issues, which could provide some insight into the nature of 13  the mobilization system, also attracts the attention of domestic researchers. 16 A particular case involving the violation of the state monopoly on the bulk of food stock and industrial goods was repeated theft in the apparatus of card distribution and trade. In recent years, this topic has been studied based on a wider range of sources. 17 Numerous examples testify to the significant scale of the "black market," although they do not allow us to determine the total volume of turnover of stolen resources. Goldman and Filtzer show that distribution crime lowered the consumption level of the general population and exacerbated the shortage. 18 This statement appears convincing although it requires further substantiation.
At the same time, even if the rationed distribution system had worked without failures and abuses, it still would not have been able to provide a full-fledged level of consumption. By the end of the war, it had fallen by 40% compared to the troubled prewar years. From this semi-starvation ration, according to the authors' calculations, the state could provide about three-quarters of the required calories. 19 These data, like any generalized estimates, do not capture the full complexity of everyday life. The most obvious gap is between the normative and real security in case of ration card supply.
The drastic deterioration in the material situation forced the integration of specific foreign elements into the mobilization system represented primarily by public procurement. Contrary to ideological prejudices 16 Tverdyukova, E.D., "'Nemedlenno otmenit' vse nezakonnye formy snabzheniya': obespechenie sovetskoi regional'noi nomenklatury tovarami shirokogo potrebleniya (1943)(1944)(1945)(1946)(1947)  against private economic activity, during the war years, the personal farms of collective farmers and the private subsidiary lots of townspeople played an increasingly important role. There was an increase in private initiative in the production of consumer goods and services, and it was so significant that, immediately after the war, the heads of financial authorities proposed to legalize this market in order to increase tax revenues. 20 Collective-farm markets, where part of the goods produced by private households were sold or exchanged, provided an important increase in the calorie content of the average diet and partly made up for the shortage of clothing, footwear, and household supplies. It should be noted that the issues of interaction between centralized supply and the free market and private initiative in the sphere of consumption are an important part of the Soviet model of mobilization and require further research.
In general, neither the use of various internal resources nor the food aid of the allies was able to provide the country with the necessary level of food supply. The main problem was created, first of all, by the aggravation of the crisis in agriculture. No matter how the relevant issues are considered, from the viewpoint of the voluntary sacrifice represented by the efforts of the peasantry or its merciless exploitation by the state, a sharp drop in agricultural production during the war years is a generally recognized fact. 21 As shown by numerous testimonies and documents that have become available in the archives, hunger and increased mortality caused by exhaustion and disease became widespread during the war years.
The general decline in the standard of living significantly limited the possibilities of economic stimulation of labor activity and the reproduction of the labor force. Wages and working and living conditions often could not keep workers in a particular enterprise, which potentially increased the threat of staff turnover. This was already observed during the period of the prewar industrial leap accompanied by famine. As a result, noneconomic methods of both stimulation and coer- cion to work had become extremely widespread and are now seen as a multi-pronged phenomenon. 22 For decades, the main attention of Soviet historians was occupied by the issues of patriotic labor movements, socialist competition and moral incentives, the training of qualified personnel and workers in mass professions, etc. 23 Such studies were highly ideologically biased and were compromised after the opening of the archives and relaxed censorship. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these problems have lost their importance. Representing a significant part of the labor force motivation in the mobilization system, they require further study. The problem, as in other cases, lies in the degree of deformalization for such studies and in the departure from clichés and descriptiveness. It is obvious, for example, that various types of competition deserve attention as a method of organizing labor, an element of the social organization of enterprises, the interaction of various groups of workers and engineers, labor collectives and administration, social lifts for young workers who filled enterprises during the war years, etc. 24 However, without referring to real facts, it is impossible to understand and evaluate these phenomena.
The opening of the archives stimulated growing interest in the state mobilization of the work force. Being the cornerstone of any military mobilization system, it had a unique significance in the USSR. As Goldman and Filtzer note, "Never had such control over the labor force existed either in the Soviet Union or in any other country in times of peace or war." 25 Indeed, labor mobilization was virtually universal, often reaching even those segments of the population that could not be used for the stated purposes in production. Historiography studies the channels for attracting and redistributing labor and regulating labor duties. 26  known. The realities of labor mobilizations and their consequences have been studied worse.
The work of Goldman and Filtzer contributes to filling these gaps. Of particular interest is the chapter on the centralized management of labor resources based on the documents of the Committee for the Accounting and Distribution of Labor under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. A comparison of the decisions and the results of their implementation and study of the interaction between the Committee and various departments showed that the centralized mechanisms of mobilization were eroded and, at the final stage of the war, found themselves in a state of crisis. The country's labor resources were practically exhausted. Attempts to satisfy the growing demands of industry at the expense of the peasant population met with opposition from the depopulated village and local authorities. Plans for the movement of people across industries and regions were significantly underfulfilled. There were irrational counter exchanges of labor between regions. In response to failures, spontaneous informal regulators were triggered, for example, agreements on the distribution of personnel between departments, enterprises, and regions. "The labor mobilization system, one of the most powerful weapons, ran out of human ammunition," which led to it becoming "increasingly chaotic." 27 However, one might add, at the same time it became more realistic and effective.
An important method for consolidating the labor front is the adoption and implementation of emergency labor legislation. 28 Special attention of researchers is attracted by the well-known decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 26, 1940, and December 26, 1941, which provided for criminal penalties for absenteesm and tardiness. Starting with an analysis of these statutes and a study of judicial statistics reflecting the extent of the decrees' enforcement, historians have focused on their application. As a result, the contradictions were identified that were characteristic of the Soviet mobilization sys- 26  tem. On the one hand, in the years 1941-1945, about 7.7 million sentences were passed according to these decrees and for violations in transport. 29 This adversely involved a significant part of Soviet workers and employees. On the other hand, the scope of the decrees was constantly shrinking, and there was a slowdown at every level. In far from all cases, violators of discipline and "deserters from the labor front" were held accountable. A significant number of initiated cases were eliminated at the level of the prosecutor's office, and then terminated in court. Many defendants were sentenced on probation or under more lenient articles. Finally, due to the widespread practice of hearing cases in absentia, several hundred thousand convicts were not found and escaped punishment. Economic managers in the conditions of an acute shortage of labor, despite the risks, willingly hired fugitives or hid violators from the court, often finding support from local authorities. As a result, the scale of ignoring "labor decrees" turned out to be as significant as the scale of their application. 30 At the end of the war and immediately after its completion, the state granted a series of amnesties for convicts on "labor" cases. This clearly demonstrates the limits of applying emergency measures in the regulation of the labor sphere.
The presence of limiting values in the tightening of the mobilization system was also evidenced by the development trends of the GULAG economy as an extreme form of forced labor. The main elements of this system had been preserved since the pre-war period. The camps and colonies of the NKVD still played a significant role as a supplier of labor. During the war, the kulaks exiled during the period of collectivization were replaced by those deported according to the national principle. They were widely used in various jobs, in particular in "labor columns." 31 As a result, during the war one could expect an increase in the role and scale of this sector of the economy. This appears to be definitely confirmed by some decisions taken during the first days of the war. The release of prisoners stopped, the regime in the camps became tougher, and repressions intensified. 32 At the same time, it quickly became clear that the preservation, and even more so the expansion of the huge network of camps and colonies in the emergency conditions of the war, was no longer possible. First, the imprisonment of more than 2 million people, including former servicemen, contradicted the need to compensate for the losses of the army and personnel of the national economy. Secondly, the usual defects of the camp system, combined with the declining food supply, caused a spike in mortality. According to official data only, more than 1 million prisoners died in camps, colonies, and prisons. 33 Mass mortality and the deterioration in the physical condition of the camp labor force sharply reduced the possibilities of its use. Thirdly, further tightening of the regime was contrary to the interests of the NKVD economy since it led to significant losses when convoying prisoners to work, restrictions on their holding administrative positions that required qualifications, etc.
As a result, the mobilization of the GULAG as a military resource was actually carried out through its partial dismantling. Contrary to the initial guidelines for tightening imprisonment, there was a mass release of prisoners to be sent to the army. Even more significant was the "unloading" of the camps from invalids and the disabled. 34 Even some of the "political prisoners" were released. Finally, regime rules regarding prisoners had to be violated. This was expressed in work release, withdrawal from the zone, permission to hold administrative positions, etc. 35 The annual average of prisoners in the camps, colonies, and prisons was 2.4 million people in 1941 and in 1946, after the military liberations and post-war amnesty, 1.4 million. 36 Judging by some internal materials of the NKVD, its leadership considered the new situation in the camps as a justification and prerequisite for a significant change in the penitentiary system as a whole. It was conceived as a compact network of camps, in which the production was to be carried out mainly by able-bodied prisoners receiving the necessary supplies. 37 To a certain extent, such plans were revived by Stalin's death.
These and many other trends developed as a result of the complex interaction of the central authorities, the executors of directives from the prosecutor's office and the NKVD, economic administrators, local authorities, and Soviet citizens. Analyzing them, we can say that, during the war, the limits of repression as an element of the military mobilization system became increasingly evident. 38 Investigation into individual elements of the Soviet mobilization system during the war years makes it possible to identify its characteristic features and development directions. At the same time, no less important is the study of integral parameters, i.e., indicators of economic development and assessment of the country's moral and political state.
Widely known data show that, despite a sharp drop in the output of products in the basic industries (fuel, metallurgical, electric power) and transport, the output of military products grew at a significant pace and exceeded the corresponding German indicators. 39 This major achievement testified, first of all, to the ability of the system to concentrate resources on key areas. In recent years, historians of the military indus- try have been studying the mechanisms of mobilization priority. Studies show that the predominant development of the leading industries occurred as a result of overcoming numerous gaps: between the needs of military production and the possibilities of the resource base, between high quantitative plans and the quality of products, etc. 40 Formal and informal methods of ensuring the highest possible priority in war conditions and the results of this policy (including long-term ones) require further study.
An equally important result of mobilization and at the same time its support is the moral and political consolidation of the front and rear. A characteristic feature of the latest historiography is an intensive and, to varying degrees, comprehensive consideration of the propaganda efforts made by the state, the suppression of dissent, the living conditions of the population, and the dynamics of mass sentiment. Significant results have been achieved in studying every aspect of the problem. Based on new documents, the evolution of Soviet propaganda and the activities of its institutions are traced. At the same time, attention is drawn to reviving values of traditional patriotism, the widespread use of the moral experience of the pre-revolutionary military past, etc. 41 Significant literature has focused on the role of the religious factor in the mobilization of society against the enemy as a fundamentally new element of State policy during the war. Moreover, this phenomenon is being studied as a complex interaction between S758 HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 92 Suppl. 8 2022 KHLEVNIUK the state, religious institutions, and believers, in which each of the parties acted in accordance with its own interests. 42 New sources make it possible to solve the problem of the effectiveness of official propaganda and the media, the shortcomings of which contributed, in particular, to the widespread rumormongering. 43 The most difficult object of study is the public sentiments and political attitudes of Soviet citizens. The importance of this sphere of social life has been repeatedly emphasized in the literature. 44 Numerous examples of patriotism, heroism, self-sacrifice, and hatred of the enemy, as once again shown in the book by Goldman and Filtzer, played a crucial role in achieving victory and ensuring the stability of the state in emergency conditions. 45 At the same time, the picture is significantly complicated by other, no less real phenomena: the spread of collaborationism, 46 the presence of anti-government and defeatist sentiments, and an increase in the number of convicts (both on a political charge and for desertion). Suffice it to say that the courts, tribunals, and extrajudicial bodies in 1941-1945 passed more than 16 million sentences, the vast majority of which were for violations of wartime labor decrees, military crimes, and anti-government statements. 47 At the same time, many evaders of the mobilization laws avoided prosecution. Obviously, the public sentiments and attitudes of Soviet citizens were complex and diverse. They might have had a pronounced situational character 48 and changed under the influence of personal and social factors. For example, as progress was made on the fronts and awareness of the crimes of Nazism increased, defeatist sentiments weakened, illusions about possible anti-Nazi sentiments and international support for the German working class were eliminated, attitudes towards Western allies changed, and so on. 49 The study of such issues has become possible due to the expansion of the documentary base of research. Along with traditional sources (the press, reports on the political work of the party, Komsomol, trade unions, etc.), new sets of materials are used. The number of available war diaries and memoirs has increased dramatically. Interviews collected by the Commission on the History of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR Academy of Sciences have come into common use. 50