

## A transatlantic religious alliance? American and European protestant encounters, 1945–1965

Hans Krabbendam\*

*Roosevelt Institute for American Studies, Middelburg, Netherlands*

After World War II American and European Protestants linked up at various organisational levels to discuss and defend their common interests. On the American side this was far from a unified action. Disagreements between liberal and conservative Protestants in the United States meant that each side reached out to Europe in different ways, resulting in a variety of transatlantic religious alliances. The liberal representatives tried to draft a common platform for European engagement as part of their ecumenical objectives. Conservative Protestants on the other hand, feared this liberal effort and courted European souls with informal evangelical networks and joint US-European revival campaigns. Neither effort to shape new alliances was as successful as anticipated. Both suffered from Europe's strong national religious interests and from the incongruity of a US presence in transatlantic political formations. As well, neither group could easily transcend the ideological divide created by the Cold War. In the end American evangelicals had greater success in drawing citizens on both continents in viable transatlantic relationships. Though the religious connections surfaced publicly only on occasion, they contributed to a lively transatlantic religious exchange.

**Keywords:** religious relations; evangelicals; world council of churches; Cold War

On Wednesday 26 March 1946 the mayor of Glasgow, Hector McNeil, a personal friend to Franklin D. Roosevelt's special envoy Harry Hopkins and former US Ambassador John Winant, hosted six American evangelists who had come to Europe on a commercial flight for an impromptu evangelism campaign. McNeil applauded the evangelists' efforts to capture the souls of young Scots, whom he believed were eager for moral leadership.<sup>1</sup> As far as McNeil was concerned this campaign fit the moral climate of the 'good war' so recently concluded. Cooperation in a transatlantic exchange between civic and religious authorities would become a growing concern in the years ahead.

At the same time as the evangelists' visit, representatives of the major Protestant denominations travelled to Europe to offer their assistance and relief. In the winter of 1947, the American Board of Foreign Missions commissioned its Secretary for Europe, the Presbyterian minister Charles T. Leber, to travel the Continent for six weeks to assess the needs of European churches. In his report he emphasised spiritual needs,

---

\*Email: [h.krabbendam@kdc.ru.nl](mailto:h.krabbendam@kdc.ru.nl)

The people of Europe are hungry, cold and mentally and spiritually sick ... All eyes turn to America for healing. America cannot do it. But Jesus Christ can. As important and necessary as political and economic programs may be, it is far from sentimentality to insist that the essential issue in Europe today is moral and spiritual.<sup>2</sup>

### Religion in transatlantic relations

These two stories sound similar, but in fact harboured a deep fissure between two opposing plans of action for American Protestants in post-war Europe. Snippets of these stories have filtered down in Cold War studies, but there has been no systematic attention paid to transatlantic religious engagement. The category 'transatlantic religion' does not even exist in the expanding field of transatlantic studies. A worldcat or Jstor search will not generate hits for this term and most articles in the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* use it only to deal with bilateral relations.<sup>3</sup> Largely ignored until now, post-war religious interchange has recently begun to arouse interest in the field of international relations. A fine example of this is Andrew Preston's book *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*. Here Preston convincingly argues that in their immediate plans for post-war peace and prosperity, America's political leadership was convinced that religion occupied a crucial place in Cold War policy. In reality, religion became a weapon in the Cold War. Diplomats such as John Foster Dulles and George Kennan actively supported this use of civic religion and President Truman too, believed that religious forces would unite against Communism. However, they underestimated the fact that religion in America was a divided house. Among Protestants a deep canyon divided liberals and traditionalists. Meanwhile both liberals and traditionalists shared a concern about Catholic dominance. It would take Vatican II (1962–1965) to break through this Protestant-Catholic divide. The impact of all of these multiple tensions thwarted the geopolitical aim of strengthening transatlantic unity.<sup>4</sup>

Wolfram Kaiser argues the European perspective in his excellent book, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*. His view is that the transatlantic exchange of religious ideas, organisational systems, aid, and vision played a minimal role in shaping the European community. By way of explanation Kaiser points to the disinterest in a transatlantic relationship among Roman Catholics on both sides of the Atlantic, but especially in Europe. The Christian Democratic parties, in which the Catholics dominated, advocated European integration, Kaiser says, but they had no political counterparts in the United States pursuing the same goals. Furthermore according to Kaiser, the mutual distrust between Catholic and Protestants on both continents, their institutional differences, and the limited imagination for successful cooperation among Christians prevented a lively transatlantic political relationship.<sup>5</sup>

National churches in Europe maintained connections with their kin in the United States, but these were mostly bilateral and incidental, lacking an overall European scope. Both the US and the European nations were more concerned with global ideas and colonial ties, and more involved with the UN than they were with transatlantic relations in matters of religion. As well, the new European institutions, spurred by the Marshall Plan and NATO, opened no new windows for transatlantic religious work. The efforts to weave a religious strand into the transatlantic tapestry appear as if they had reached a dead end.

And yet, this first impression only provokes more curiosity. Why was there this apparent dead end if the European-American religious relationship had historically been strong and in fact religion had become an increasingly important concern in international

affairs? And how could the discussion be stuck in a cul du sac when the apparent contrast between secular Europe and religious America is currently such a hotly debated sociological topic? In thinking about divergence and convergence, is there sufficient common ground to add the religious relationship to the slate of transatlantic studies?

Such questions lend themselves to a consideration of how religion interacts with civic debates. The nature of the exchange is at issue, and it is still to be determined whether or not religious interchange helped constitute a transatlantic sense of community and shape the American empire. If the religious connection had any vibrancy at all it should help us understand more about the political debates that pitched America-offering-protection against Europe-claiming-autonomy.<sup>6</sup>

### **Transatlantic religious networks**

Sharing transatlantic piety had a long tradition. In the 1730s-1740s the first wave of Anglo-American evangelists, including George Whitefield and the Wesley brothers, held transatlantic revivals in the UK and in the North-American colonies. Their emphasis on personal conversion crossed the boundaries of space, race, age, and gender, and it transcended the boundaries of the older churches. While the forces against this innovation were stronger in continental Europe than they were in the Anglo-American world, this ecumenical appeal continued into the nineteenth century. As faith became real in action, a list of causes embraced in these transatlantic endeavours eventually included missions, abolitionism, education, temperance, and anti-prostitution. In the late nineteenth century evangelists like Dwight Moody and holiness preachers such as Robert and Hannah Pearsall Smith reached European audiences. They were followed in the early twentieth century by evangelists Frank Buchman of the Moral Rearmament Movement and peripatetic Canadian preacher, Oswald Smith. By the 1920s, however, modernist-fundamentalist polarisation had disrupted the unifying trend of Protestant cooperation.<sup>7</sup>

A close inspection, the religious networks that spanned the Atlantic after World War II, reveal at least four sets of Protestant connections. First, national denominations in Europe maintained official ties with the same denomination in America to which their émigrés had flocked. They shared ministers, immigrant programmes, educational centres, and financial aid. But this type of connection did not tend to cross internal European borders. From the American side, American Protestant churches in European capitals functioned almost exclusively for American diplomats, businessmen, and military personnel.

Secondly, ecumenical Protestant churches set in motion the World Council of Churches, the organisation for global unity that they had prepared after World War I. While Protestant churches in the United States provided the first leadership, the Council did not explicitly seek to bolster regional networks. Their aim was to tie the west to the majority world. In practice the World Council acknowledged Europe's leading role in spreading Protestantism around the globe and seeking contacts with the Orthodox and Catholic Churches.<sup>8</sup>

Thirdly, the US government and many European nations used religion as a foil against the threat of Communism within the context of the Cold War. They created networks of organisations that were involved in disseminating public information, but were not apparently religious in and of themselves. Some religious organisations joined this campaign in defense of their beliefs.<sup>9</sup>

Fourthly, there were numerous private transatlantic contacts that facilitated religious exchange, mostly under the rubric of education, music, communications, and art. In this mixed bag of religious connections one could find translations of inspirational books from Norman Vincent Peale to E. Stanley Jones to Billy Graham, hymns, and even sermons intended for radio broadcast.

But the question of whether these strings were strong enough to connect religious communities on both sides of the northern Atlantic remains open. Looking back at the period of the formation of the European Union, one can begin to formulate an answer, as the EU project triggered transnational reflections on religious exchange in the midst of Cold War tensions. The result of these reflections provides us with a picture that transatlantic religious exchange moved from personal contacts to institutions and networks. The personal contacts got the motor started, ignited inspiration, and developed a relationship in which one side valued what the other had to offer. The next step – creating institutions – insured continuity, and expanded the network. The combination of personal attachments and rational forms fostered a collective sense of belonging. The crucial communication growing out of this collective effort reached a wider geographical and cultural audience, and provided channels for borrowing, learning and drafting frameworks of understanding and interpretation. Thus a common discourse came into being in which many participants from both sides engaged, even if their contributions were not always equal and there was still disagreement over priorities.

A recent collection of essays on *International Religious Networks* describes this process of rapprochement.<sup>10</sup> The essays explain that a network uses social communication to strengthen cooperation among a cluster of organisations. The network allows the organisations to use each other's resources to create the conditions for a common discourse. In turn, the essays explain, these clusters form connections to other networks, but still remain distinct from the other clusters because they are working towards different goals.<sup>11</sup> Religious organisations were part of a cluster that used the resources of the state. The relationship being reciprocal, however, the states could then call upon the private religious networks to support the government's political goals, such as consolidating an alliance against Communism. Despite the usefulness of the cluster and network concept, it still does not capture the full pattern of transatlantic religion, which could never have thrived without cultivating a sense that it was a community pursuing the common purpose of spiritual growth.

### **Personal relations**

There were many inspiring personal relationships that crossed the Atlantic involving religious leaders and lay persons. Historians have reconstructed the crucial importance these personal bonds played in creating international ecumenical cooperation centred on a transatlantic core. The internationalist leaders of American Protestantism pushed for a global organisation. They actively sought out representatives of European churches during the war realising that their joint concerns could give rise to post-war plans for a dedicated group of transatlantic clergy who would cooperate and could trust each other. The founding fathers of the World Council of Churches in Europe already knew and trusted one another from their student days. Their shared experience in the Resistance during the war had solidified the bonds of trust and they became determined to use international contacts as a vehicle for post-war

peace and reconciliation. All of this prepared the way for the WCC, which took shape as a top-down organisation of religious institutions, despite efforts on both sides to include lay people.<sup>12</sup>

Historically speaking, Anglo-American religious relations were strong due to the dynamic institutional ties of Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Methodists, and their shared tradition of revival and reform. This bilateral mode obstructed a fuller continental European participation in the transatlantic religious interchange taking place. Still there were definitely people on the Continent who saw the value in transatlantic work. A key figure for continental extension was the Dutch theologian Willem Adolph Visser 't Hooft (1900–1985), the future Secretary General of the World Council of Churches. Visser 't Hooft had become part of the transatlantic connection in the interwar years, when he was an organiser for the international Student Christian Movement and the YMCA. In 1928, he finished his doctoral dissertation on the Social Gospel movement in the United States, a project that helped him penetrate America's religious fabric. In his doctoral thesis his argument refuted the European bias that America had no authentic religious thought of its own, but had borrowed everything from European sources. Visser 't Hooft became the most important transatlantic networker from the European continent.<sup>13</sup>

A song that his siblings sang at his wedding mocked Visser 't Hooft's love for America in contrast to the 'stagnant' fatherland, 'But the only people that are real OK, that's the crowd that lives in dear old United States. My own country makes me weep. When I'm in Holland I'm asleep.'<sup>14</sup> He had positioned himself to express the tensions in transatlantic theology and to appreciate the reciprocal value of transatlantic exchange. On the one side he admired America's optimism and idealism, but warned against over simplification. On the other side, he appreciated Europe's ability to thoroughly reflect, but also castigated Europeans for their pessimism. In his memoirs he wrote,

I tried to convince the Germans that faith in the Kingdom as God's gift should not lead to a passive attitude with regard to the great issues of social justice and world peace and I tried to convince the adherents of the social gospel that the Kingdom of God was something more and different from a world without war and exploitation.<sup>15</sup>

He proved a model mediator between the two approaches and drew strength from both sides.<sup>16</sup> Just before the German army surrendered 't Hooft explicitly called for American involvement in post-war European reconstruction, The Americans responded positively. The Federal Council of Churches commissioned its secretary Samuel Cavert to set up the WCC, and meet with German Protestants, to seek reconciliation and restoration of their churches. For all these purposes Calvert was given a free hand by the US military authorities.<sup>17</sup> Thus American Protestants, acting through their churches, became part of the enormous transatlantic humanitarian effort to feed, clothe, and shelter the poorest Europeans.

### **Ecumenical initiatives**

The picture changed in the period beginning in the late forties through the mid-1950s. Europe had been rebuilt, Germany was brought back into the family of nations, and the urgent humanitarian needs moved from Europe to Asia and Africa. Additionally, Cold War tensions strengthened transatlantic harmony, but also triggered dissent,

forcing the World Council of Churches to take a position. The Council was torn between a desire to unite Christians in all countries, even Communist ones, and the ambitions of the leadership of churches in western democracies to clash with Communist regimes. The WCC tried to postpone the choice in this dilemma. It declined an invitation to meet with other Christian leaders to condemn Communism in a meeting at the White House.<sup>18</sup> The WCC did not want to become a spokesperson for Washington politics overlooking the dark side of capitalism, and denying Communism's valid critique. With regard to Europe, the Council was not ready to accept the division into East and West as definitive.<sup>19</sup>

These two sides found expression in a number of initiatives that played out in Europe and it is interesting to explore how these initiatives affected the transatlantic relationship. The first initiative came from the UK. British churches had strong ties with the United States thanks to the lively exchange of Anglican, Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist ministers and other visitors, and they were in the best position to bridge the Atlantic. In January 1948, the British Foreign Secretary for the Labour government, Ernest Bevin, himself a lapsed Baptist, turned to the concept of a 'spiritual union' as the basis for European cooperation. In a speech in the House of Commons he explained that the word *spiritual* referred to 'the basic freedoms and ethical principles for which we all stand'. The term remained purposely vague, as religious values were elusive and bound to provoke quarrels among churches. Its use, however, proved to be far from vague. It was an invitation for the churches to take the lead. Bevin believed that the state was not in the position to instigate the spiritual union of which he spoke, and that governments' best interests were served by maintaining the illusion that the churches had taken the initiative. The churches for their part, based themselves on the idealised view of the Middle Ages. In this view Europe was bound together under Christian values cemented by one church.<sup>20</sup> The British Council of Churches advocated European cooperation and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, chaired the first meeting of the United Europe Movement in 1947 emphasising the religious foundation of Europe in contrast to a godless Communism. The generalised use of religious references was meant to revive an awareness of a common European identity. A public lecture campaign throughout the country by high-ranking Anglican clergy, organised to build support for European cooperation, called for Christian action in public affairs as well as in the effort to reconcile with Germany.

In the course of 1948 the British government backed away from this call for spiritual unity, because it felt that the Marshall Plan supported European unity more effectively. In addition, the UK disliked the federalist direction of the cooperative framework that was coming into being. Even though the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) backed the Christian Movement for European Unity, it remained a mainly European affair involving churches that persisted in their pro-Europe campaign. The British historian Philip Coupland has concluded that the churches were in a position to overcome national separation by utilising the idea of a common faith that had the potential to transcend national interests. But in the UK, political support for Europe proved flimsy and the churches withdrew from the effort when they found that they could not avoid partisanship or particularity. By 1950 British organisations realised that they had failed to capture the public's imagination for a unified Europe. The rank and file had nothing with which to identify.<sup>21</sup> 'Christian cosmopolitanism was no less susceptible to being overridden by national sentiment than

the internationalism of secular groups', according to Coupland.<sup>22</sup> He adds that the Church of England represented more people outside Europe than inside and therefore their interests lay in keeping Europe at a distance, despite the spiritual ties that did exist.

The British government's efforts to use the churches to advance and restore the idea of a Christian civilisation in Europe failed. But it was more of a cross-channel than a transatlantic project. The British Protestant churches tried to advance spiritual cohesion in Europe, but underestimated that the national mood in the UK would choose to keep the mainland at arm's length. British and American authorities wrestled with the question how to assuage each other's suspicions about capitalist and socialist dominance and invoked religious tradition to strengthen the transatlantic bonds.<sup>23</sup>

A second initiative to strengthen transatlantic religious exchange came from the WCC leadership that asked the American Baptist minister Paul Abrecht, Secretary of the Study Department of the World Council of Churches, to think through the process of European integration. He assembled a group of Europeans in Paris in September 1950, and yielded leadership to them. The result was the Committee on the Christian Responsibility for European Cooperation (CCREC), which subsequently passed a statement on November 7, 1953 called 'The Future of Europe and the Responsibility of the Churches.'<sup>24</sup> This group of 21 Protestant individuals represented the six core countries of the European community. Its chairman was the Dutch Labor MP, Connie L. Patijn. The Committee's statement proposed to work towards real political unity in Europe, including working with the European Defense Community, and negotiating with the USSR. The statement warned that economic distress, political anarchy and social unrest could lead to despair, something that could be prevented by the formation of European unity. The CCREC sought a solution in a just distribution of Europe's surplus wealth that they felt would result from cooperation among the various classes. Again the British representatives differed and stood apart, wanting to maintain their own position on all questions. The Committee acknowledged the political distance with Britain. It also warned that good intentions were not enough and action was needed. Above all the CCREC thought the churches should inculcate their members with the sense of responsibility outlined in their statement.

The Committee on the Christian Responsibility for European Cooperation feared that Protestants were left in a minority position in Europe due to the disengagement of the British and the isolation of East Germany. They asserted that this situation increased the need for a closer cooperation. They hoped to advance religious liberty and diversity by fighting any religious monopoly. The CCREC was certain that cooperation was essential for European survival, and that cooperation would lead to a reorganisation of national and international arrangements.<sup>25</sup>

The transatlantic aspect of the Committee was strong. The CCREC firmly believed in a positive role for the United States, and saw the United States as the most important Atlantic ally. They maintained that the United States had a serious responsibility for Europe's well-being. The Committee warned that the United States should not turn its back on Europe by embracing isolationism, nor alienate its European partners by treating them arrogantly. But the Committee was also critical of American involvement; a united Europe was more than a bastion against Communism, it was a positive idea, they insisted. The CCREC perceived that the hysteria

against Communism was as unfruitful as the support for the Franco regime. They preferred Western Europe to seek contact with Eastern Europe.

The Executive Director of the (American) National Council of Churches, Walter W. Van Kirk, who had met the members of CCREC group in Willingen, West-Germany, reassured the Europeans that his organisation supported efforts to secure an international commitment from the United States. Van Kirk explained that the National Council of Churches maintained close contact with US authorities, that they supported the UN, and that they approved of negotiations with communist regimes instead of a crusade against them.<sup>26</sup> Time and again Van Kirk underscored the necessity of internationalism.

A third impulse came in 1951 from a circle of laymen in the World Council of Churches. Up to that time, the WCC Division of Inter-Church Aid and Service to Refugees had spent most of its American resources in Europe. Now it began to turn to other parts of the world. European laymen involved in the ecumenical ideal, discovered that if they wanted to contribute to world politics, they should begin from their regional perspective. This soon led them to seek out a dialogue with believers behind the Iron Curtain. In 1955 a few church leaders from East and West Europe met to discuss ways to bridge the ideological gaps that had been caused by the Cold War. These efforts resulted in a series of conferences in 1959 and eventually led to the institutionalisation of the Conference of European Churches (CEC), which included churches both in and outside of the WCC. The CEC remained largely a council of clergymen, but it famously signalled the WCC's desire to break out of Western parochialism.<sup>27</sup>

A fourth group of Europeans hewed much closer to American anti-Communism. The Comité International de defense de la civilisation chrétienne (CIDCC, the International Committee for the Defense of Christian Culture) was a European organisation founded in 1949 by conservative Christians independent of the ecumenical movement. Their goal was to counter Communist propaganda by printing opinion bulletins against Communist claims. The Comité corralled representatives on the right in various European countries, and even had an American chapter, which never gained visibility. The American chapter's finances depended too heavily on German contributions, and with the withdrawal of this support in 1970 it folded.<sup>28</sup>

Though these organisations effectively brought together church leaders and various government representatives, none of them succeeded in creating a lasting or robust transatlantic alliance with substantial contacts. In fact, the contradictory strategies of the various groups prevented the unity that the ecumenical movement hoped to achieve. In the end it was the Christian Democratic Parties that would bridge the gap and create supranational European cooperation, but they had no counterpart in the Anglo-Saxon world.<sup>29</sup>

This survey shows that transatlantic religious relations set in motion by ecumenist organisations were certainly important, but that they did not reach a broad constituency. The official organisations dealt with here, though not an exhaustive list of all the religious contacts working on both sides of the Atlantic, nevertheless shows that the hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of the movement restricted its leverage, and its official stance on the necessity to negotiate with states, had a sclerotic effect on its work. Clergy and top officials met and talked; major humanitarian relief efforts came and went. In the long run, however, new, private initiatives proved more effective in creating lasting bonds than the official ecumenical

consultations had been able to do. All during this period there were other religious groups in action that were able to build a strong network. Evangelical agencies and churches were much more efficient than the established churches. The organisational form of the interdenominational association allowed a greater flexibility and the growing number of American agencies in this field provided feet on the ground.

### **Evangelical alternatives**

This alternative initiative began in the United States. The Federal Council of Churches threw its support behind the Marshall Plan and accepted its anti-Communist overtones.<sup>30</sup> Not all American Protestants rejoiced over this line of action. Revivalist expectations and anxiety over growing theological liberalism encouraged evangelicals to distrust the World Council and its plans for Europe. Evangelicals have recently been characterised in cultural terms as people who take their faith as ‘an individualistic and quantitative project’ in contrast to those who see their religion as a ‘communal and qualitative project’.<sup>31</sup> This newer definition challenges the creedal one that emphasised the conversion experience, the high regard for the Bible, a belief in the atonement by Jesus, and a faith that results in action. Evangelicalism became a brand, a label that people easily adopted because it provided a sense of reliability and orthodoxy outside the official churches. It was exactly this quality of evangelicalism – a reliable source of spirituality – that made it accessible for individual believers everywhere and made it a good export product. Yet it maintained the aura of respectability that the new religious movements, such as the Mormons or Jehovah’s Witnesses lacked. Recognisability and orthodoxy enabled American evangelical missionaries to make connections in Europe and to enlist continental Europeans in a global evangelical community. Its practicality or pragmatism was very much results-driven; it was looking for numbers and ways to grow.

Recently historians have begun to describe the evangelical community as a consumer community. Whether this characterisation gives a full enough description of their network of relationships is too complex for this paper. But it is helpful to explore the networks operating in the transatlantic evangelical community: the churches, humanitarian aid societies, missionary agencies, educational institutions, and mass communications, all using corporate structures to bring Europeans to what they called a ‘living faith in Christ’. The evangelists had a global agenda, but they needed to bring in Europe first as a strategic step. In doing so they mounted an ambitious challenge to the ecclesiastical structures in Europe and provoked a fair share of resistance. Their efforts to preach an individualised religion worked better in the post-war decades than they ever had before because that style of religion matched the evident religious and moral crisis that had grown out of World War II. The evangelicals proved to be an antidote for the times, and their work resonated with the grand reorganisation schemes like the Marshall Plan that promised growth in productivity, and reconstruction of wartime devastation.<sup>32</sup>

To the variety of American evangelicals Europe conjured up four images. Europe was first of all the cradle of the religious traditions to which they felt attached. Secondly, once they discovered the contrast between Protestants in the United States and those in Europe, they concluded that Europe was the ultimate evidence against theological liberalism, which they despised, and which was their go-to label for all opponents. Thirdly, evangelicals became greatly concerned about the fate of Europe

in both the religious and political spheres. They did not simply want to spread the gospel. It was also their intention to reorganise Europe's religious infrastructure. They believed that if they could garner massive response, it would be evidence of the truth of their position. Fourthly, they were determined to go global from their beginnings in Europe, and thus invested money and personnel in the new transatlantic network, the World Evangelical Fellowship (WEF).

In contrast to the official, top-down, small-scale ecumenical mainline initiatives to engage with European elites to think about intellectual and organisational challenges, the evangelicals began a public campaign with mass meetings involving lay people in Europe's urban centres. The first such meeting took place in the UK in the fall of 1946 and soon meetings were held all over the continent. This practical approach raised the visibility, productivity, and democratic participation of this subculture and created grand ambitions. A tour by Billy Graham's Youth for Christ in Europe connected European Protestants directly with American evangelicals. The European pioneers experimented with American models. They sent trainees to American bible schools, adopted evangelical music and literature, and connected with each other and their American sponsors at several big conventions.

But before the evangelical transfer – from United States to Europe – could succeed, a number of obstacles had to be removed. First the name *evangelical* had to be explained. In Protestant countries, evangelical referred to the Reformed or Lutheran traditions; in Catholic countries the term was taken as a cultish label. In the UK there was an Evangelical Alliance with international members, but it was UK-oriented, and its activity only amounted to a yearly prayer week. With these well-established traditions in place, it was hard to promote the nondenominational nature of evangelism as an asset.<sup>33</sup>

But the principal obstacle in the way of clarity about evangelical intentions was the competition with the fundamentalists. Few Europeans were aware of the fundamentalism-modernism debate in the United States and they had a hard time understanding it. In the United States evangelicals had distanced themselves from the diluted and divisive word: fundamentalism, leaving that label to various separatist groups and churches. But when fundamentalist organisations used their ethnic/national connections in Europe to challenge the orthodox claims of the evangelicals, the evangelicals had to respond.<sup>34</sup>

American evangelicals had to win over Europeans unfamiliar with evangelism if they were going to reach out effectively, coordinate many small initiatives, and strengthen the position of non-traditional, persecuted Protestants. The WEF, a federation of national churches and organisations that laid no claim to authority over its members, was modelled after its American mother organisation, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE).<sup>35</sup>

The process of European expansion began for the evangelicals in 1948, when an American delegation travelled to Clarens, Switzerland, to discuss with their European counterparts whether founding a WEF would be a good idea. One hundred delegates from twelve countries met for three days. Their quartermaster was the NAE's Secretary of Public Affairs, Clyde Taylor, who recommended to the organisers that they minimise the American model in order to keep the Europeans on board. Taylor thought that Europeans might be alienated by an appeal for more evangelism, which he felt could be seen as an implied criticism of their traditional approach.<sup>36</sup> His cautionary note was taken well, but not with any urgency. Traditional European

Protestants welcomed American support of their activities because it made up for their lack of funds, staff, and joint communications channels.

The WEF offered the small free churches and more cosmopolitan national denominations an international umbrella for cooperation. Their informal structure coupled with American financial support made it easy to forge a link. National representatives of the free churches and denominations connected with Americans and strengthened the networks needed to prepare action. During this same period the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA), a British organisation with international connections, worked in much the same way. The WEA held onto nineteenth century ecumenical objectives, and sought spiritual unity growing out of prayer meetings. They displayed more sympathy for the World Council of Churches and wanted to give that body the benefit of the doubt. The WEA also gave full support to the Billy Graham campaigns of the mid-1950s.<sup>37</sup>

### **European responses**

It should be pointed out that it took American evangelicals about two decades to consolidate their landing in Europe. There was nothing particularly easy about it. The Americans along with some Dutch Protestants familiar with British evangelicals hosted a conference to establish the WEF in August 1951. The conference was a partial success with only Spain and Britain really committing themselves to its future. Other continental European representatives at the conference found the infallibility clause in the WEF's constitution too legalistic and too restrictive. They were also not taken with the Americans, finding them too combative, too separated from church communities, and too self-assured. These continental representatives went on to found the regional European Evangelical Alliance (EEA) in Hamburg in September 1952. The British, not wanting to choose between their American and European friends, decided to take on membership in both organisations. The Dutch became observers in the EEA. American evangelicals had succeeded in a limited fashion.<sup>38</sup>

This response from European sympathisers revealed that they did not want to fully endorse the oppositional framework of the American evangelicals. Meanwhile the Americans were frustrated that the EEA had stalled the momentum of active evangelism in Europe. This situation remained in limbo till 1968 when the Europeans finally decided that they had too much in common with the American evangelicals to continue to justify a separate organisation. And American evangelicals for their part, accepted the European's argument against being separate.<sup>39</sup>

One could draw the conclusion from this organisational history that evangelicals on both continents acted as rivals rather than as allies, but that overlooks their engagement in actual cooperation and their shared goals. A real community was found in the occasional mass meetings, which were dynamic, well attended, and cohesive. It was found as well in the permanent presence of American missionaries in European cities and suburbs. Those missionaries helped to expand and solidify contacts and to exchange practical ideas. European evangelicals resisted conforming to American theological constructions, but were eager to invite them for joint action. As most of these actions were locally organised, American-European exchanges on the ground allowed both sides to know one another.

The Billy Graham crusades enjoyed a great deal of success in building a shared religious experience mainly due to American-European cooperation that proved to be quite efficient. The reach of Graham's campaign was extensive. 'I am a Pilgrim Father in reverse', admitted Graham during his British Campaign in 1955. His organisation estimated that during that five-month crusade, four million Europeans had heard him speak and one hundred thousand responded to his call for conversion.<sup>40</sup> European daily newspapers covered his performance on a regular basis. By 1970 he had visited 55 European cities on the two tours in 1954 and 1955, the six tours in the 1960s, and the four in the 1970s. The term evangelical circulated widely by the mid-1960s, and was unmistakably associated with Graham.<sup>41</sup>

These European campaigns also received wide media coverage in America, and the growing number of American missionaries in Europe informed tens of thousands of readers of Graham's success in their monthly newsletters, annual reports, articles in their presses, and in their letters requesting funds. At least once every five years missionaries showed slides and told their stories when they had furlough at home in the United States. For the faithful, being able to visualise these stories helped cement the transatlantic religious relationship.<sup>42</sup>

In the first years of this newfound success, the evangelicals met with competition from the separatist wing of the fundamentalists, who rejected any connection to a grand ecumenical or liberal scheme. The fundamentalists were united in the International Council of Christian Churches (ICCC). While this rival organisation initially harmed the evangelical progress in Europe, the ICCC soon moved its focus to South-east Asia where they found a more sympathetic ear among the new political elite, many of whom had been educated by conservative missionaries and feared the role of China.

Historian Markku Ruotsila correctly points at the relative ease with which the fundamentalists got various nationals to collect ideas, share information, and adopt resolutions. But, Ruotsila adds, this did not lead to transnational action.<sup>43</sup> America's national interests overshadowed any transnational agenda of the ICCC. Carl McIntire, the independent Presbyterian minister, and militant anti-Communist held what many view as extreme ideas. Few European sympathisers, for example, endorsed McIntire's call for massive armed interventions to roll back communism, neither were they charmed by his aggressive style and exclusive defense of free market capitalism. He alienated everyone who disagreed with his interventionist strategy. The transatlantic network linked to the ICCC dissolved in 1970, when the American chapter ousted its founder and left the organisation.<sup>44</sup>

Evangelicals benefitted from a historically strong Anglo-American connection, but to make truly transatlantic bonds, they needed to expand their network to continental Europe an idea that did not win British support. American religious spectacles in the UK attracted continental Europeans who were captivated by the attractive presentations, the smooth and professional organisation, the wide publicity, and the quick results. Americans tried to transfer this expertise by organising training sessions, sending young Europeans to American evangelical colleges, and by founding bible schools inside European countries. Additionally, the Americans established new evangelical churches and strengthened small existing ones. Perhaps most importantly, they fanned a missionary spirit, introduced popular religious music to church youth, established radio stations to relay their message, and taught European believers how to

explain and express their faith. From the Europeans, American evangelicals learned to expand their views on cooperation.

American evangelical missionaries arrived in ever growing numbers to live in Europe among Europeans. They established new churches mostly in urban centres, and in doing so introduced Europeans to new recruiting techniques, educational programmes, and communication channels. They were able to build strong personal relationships along the way. Periodically, Americans and Europeans met in mass conferences that assured them that they were not destined for a marginal existence, but were part of an expanding subculture. At these conferences they applied their lessons directly through active evangelising. As the evangelicals' focus was the local church, it continued to be difficult to create formal transatlantic alliances. Their preference for freedom over united activity prevented the formation of a strong and authoritative organisation. Nevertheless the informal network proved to effectively tie transatlantic believers together within a global network.<sup>45</sup>

## **Conclusion**

There are sufficient grounds to include the religious relationship in the field of transatlantic studies. American religious representatives interacted with European civic dignitaries immediately after World War II. The nature of that exchange was broad and included American Protestants from various traditions, including a number of competing factions. Seemingly all at once, American Protestants realised the important part the European side of the Atlantic could play in creating global stability and making room for the churches in the post-war world. Religious initiatives paralleled the American government's political and economic aims because religious groups, too, framed the relationship between the two continents in terms of protecting against Communism and secularism. These patterns having remained under the political radar, have gone mainly unnoticed by researchers in transatlantic studies.

After World War II, leaders in the ecumenical movement quickly recognised the need to understand the new political reality in Europe. They built up their already existing personal networks and brought thinkers and politicians together to map out a way to strengthen transatlantic unity. The task turned out to be more complex than anticipated as the America's call for Atlantic solidarity against Communism conflicted with the European desire to reach out to pro-Soviet regimes. This tension and top-down approach limited the ecumenical movement's influence to the political-religious elite. Moreover, these transatlantic bridge builders found that their networks in Britain, though they promised to share values cross-channel, could not overcome their suspicion of continental Europe. The result was a failed effort and a gradual waning of the involvement of the elite. The gap that opened up was eventually filled by other organisations, such as the transatlantic peace movement.

Ironically, it was the same ecumenical interest in Europe that triggered the activity of American evangelicals who sought to create a track in Europe parallel to that of the official Protestant denominations. Their work, however, came from the bottom up in response to the Communist threat, and they preferred action to merely seeking unity and reflection. These American evangelicals were not as charmed by Europe as their liberal coreligionists. They feared Catholics even more than the liberal believers, and they made significantly less effort to please Eastern European authorities.<sup>46</sup>

What did religious ties mean for transatlantic relations? The first two decades after the war reveal a number of initiatives bringing American and European Protestants closer together from the top down and from the bottom up. Amidst disagreements about priorities and the best strategies, Protestants managed to increase the number of contacts and to discover common causes in a transatlantic religious alliance. Yet, there were also limits to their effectiveness; they had to acknowledge the perniciousness of traditional religious and political institutions imbedded in national structures, and they could not transcend the ideological divide of the Cold War. The evangelicals meanwhile had the advantage of informal networks that tied intra-European revival campaigns to transatlantic structures. These highly visible joint activities created a sense of mutual respect and of a common cause. While American evangelicals entered the mainstream, European evangelicals became acceptable in the 1960s, and remained in a favourable position until the rise of the Religious Right in America in the 1980s chipped away at this positive reputation.<sup>47</sup>

This survey is far from exhaustive, but I hope has proven that religion deserves a larger place in transatlantic studies. The study has revealed that active religionists on both sides of the Atlantic held definite ideas on religion's place in society, and even saw it as a guidance system for geopolitical decisions. Encompassing a religious category in the field of transatlantic studies will prove fruitful for future investigations into the connection between religious regimes and the circulation of ideas and practices across all national boundaries. In this way the study of religion in the Atlantic context has the potential to effectively open up needed research on immigration, humanitarian action, decolonisation, and postcolonial relations, all issues facing a globalised world. The field may then begin to provide answers to the most current concern in the West: the response to Islam.<sup>48</sup>

## Notes

1. Report second week, page 2. The Papers of J. Stratton Shufelt, 1930–1979. N.D. Box 1, folder 17 'Youth for Christ, European Teams: Letter and Reports; March–April, 1946; May–June, 1947', in Wheaton College, IL, USA, Billy Graham Center Archives, collection 224.
2. Charles T. Leber, *Report on Europe*, 20 January 1948, 5, in Philadelphia, Presbyterian Historical Society, United Presbyterian Church, collection 161B, box 3.
3. Worldcat nor JStor generate a limited result for the search term transatlantic religion. Almost all of the six articles in recent issues of the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* cover bilateral relations. See Dianne Kirby, 'Anglo-American Relations and the Religious Cold War', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 10, no. 2 (2012): 167–81; Amanda Villepastour, 'Two Heads of the Same Drum? Musical Narratives within a Transatlantic Religion', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 7, no. 3 (2009); John Anderson, 'Dreaming of Christian Nations in the USA and Russia: The Importance of History', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 10, no. 3 (2012); Marie Gayte, 'Cold War Triangle? The United States, the Vatican and Cuba', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 11, no. 1 (2013); Barry Vann, 'Irish Protestants and the Creation of the Bible Belt', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 5, no. 1 (2007); David Michael Green, 'Are Europeans Made in America? Identity, Alterity and the United States as Europe's "Other"', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 10, no. 1 (2012). Most articles in the special issue 'Transatlantic Representations of Religion' of *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 12, no. 3 (2011) deal with the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with special attention for the American War of Independence and slavery.
4. Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 342–600. Other books that cover aspects of religion and US foreign policy are Dianne Kirby, ed., *Religion and the Cold War* (New York:

- Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Jonathan P. Herzog, *The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America's Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960: The Soul of Containment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Heather A. Warren, *Theologians of a New World Order: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Christian Realists, 1920–1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Samuel Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); David A. Hollinger, *After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Protestant Liberalism in Modern American History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). See Dianne Kirby, 'Harry S. Truman's International Religious Anti-Communist Front, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the 1948 Inaugural Assembly of the World Council of Churches', *Contemporary British History* 15, no. 1 (2001), 35–70.
5. Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Lucian N. Leustean, 'Representing Religion in the European Union: A Typology of Actors', *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 12, no. 3 (2011), 295–315.
  6. Valérie Aubourg, Giles Scott-Smith, Gérard Bossuat, eds., *European Community, Atlantic Community?* (Paris: Soleb, 2011), 8–15.
  7. Mark Hutchinson and John Wolffe, *A Short History of Global Evangelicalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); R.H. Martin, 'The Pan-Evangelical Impulse in Britain 1795–1830: With Special Reference to Four London Societies' (Ph. Dissertation, Oxford, UK, 1974). Jonathan Strom, Hartmut Lehmann, and James Van Horn Melton, eds., *Pietism in Germany and North-America, 1680–1820* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009). Nicholas M. Railton, *No North Sea: The Anglo-German Evangelical Network in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2000).
  8. International Missionary Council, *Minutes of the Enlarged Meeting and the Committee of the International Missionary Council, Willingen, Germany, July 5th to 21st, 1952* (London: International Council, 1952), 83; Norman Goodall, *Missions under the Cross: Addresses Delivered at the Enlarged Meeting of the Committee of the International Missionary Council at Willingen, in Germany, 1952; With statements issued by the Meeting* (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1953), 178–81, 224.
  9. Such as International Christian Leadership and the Moral Rearmament Movement. Jarlert Anders, *The Oxford Group, Group Revivalism, and the Churches in Northern Europe, 1930–1945, with Special Reference to Scandinavia and Germany* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1995); Philip Boobbyer, *The Spiritual Vision of Frank Buchman* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 2013); Daniel Sack, *Moral Re-Armament: The Reinventions of an American Religious Movement* (New York: Palgrave, 2009).
  10. Jeremy Gregory and Hugh McLeod, eds., *International Religious Networks* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press/Ecclesiastical History Society, 2012).
  11. There are many similarities to the US State Department's foreign leader program that is described in Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire: The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain 1950–1970* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008), 422–3. For more conceptual ideas about political networks, see Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Michael Gehler, eds., *Transnational Networks in European Governance: Governing Europe 1945–83* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 10; Carsten Daughjerg, *Policy Networks under Pressure: Pollution Control, Policy Reform and the Power of Farmers* (Farnham: Ashgate, 1998), 21.
  12. Björn Ryman, 'Bureaucratic or Personal Networks? Formation of the Ecumenical Movement During the Second World War', and David M. Thompson, 'The Ecumenical Network, 1920–48', in Jeremy Gregory and Hugh McLeod, eds., *International Religious Networks* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press/Ecclesiastical History Society, 2012), 272–3.
  13. T. Willem Adolph Visser 't Hooft, *The Background of the Social Gospel in America* (1928; repr. St Louis, MO: Bethany Press, n.d.) 2–3.
  14. W.A. Visser 't Hooft, *Memoirs* (London: SCM Press, 1973), 16.
  15. *Ibid.*, 18.
  16. Even though he questioned the necessity of unconditional surrender, because this decision annulled the contribution by the German resistance. Jurjen A. Zeilstra, *European Unity in*

- Ecumenical Thinking, 1937–1948* (Zoetermeer, The Netherlands: Boekencentrum, 1995), 333.
17. Samuel McCrea Cavert, *The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement, 1900–1968* (New York: Association Press, 1968), 197–9. Cavert was joined by the Anglican bishop of Chichester, George K.A. Bell and the French president of the Protestant Federation, Marc Boegner. One of his famous quotes is: ‘The temptation of Protestantism has always been to magnify freedom at the expense of unity. The temptation of Roman Catholicism, on the other hand, has been to magnify unity at the expense of freedom.’ See for more information on the religious aspect, JonDavid K. Wyneken, ‘The Western Allies, German Churches, and the Emerging Cold War in Germany, 1948–1952’, in *Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective*, ed Philip E. Muehlenbeck (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012), 18–43. German church leaders resisted denazification and care for displaced persons carried out by the Allies and considered it a harsh measure that would drive the German population in the arms of the Communists. Especially the Protestants feared a split in their church between an Eastern and Western part. The Catholics, who were less numerous in the East, were more likely to support the Western occupiers. Americans believed that the call of EKD leaders for neutrality and against rearmament of West Germany, in the hope to get to unification. Americans tried to use the (until 1961) united church for undermining communism in the East.
  18. Visser, *Memoirs*, 222–7; Preston, *Sword*, 479–84.
  19. Kirby, ‘Anglo-American Relations and the Religious Cold War’, 167–81.
  20. Philip M. Coupland, ‘Western Union, “Spiritual Union,” and European Integration, 1948–1951’, *Journal of British Studies* 43, no. 3 (2004): 366–94, quotes on 368 and 371.
  21. *Ibid.*, 379, 382, 386.
  22. *Ibid.*, 392.
  23. Kirby, ‘Anglo-American Relations’, 172.
  24. Zeilstra, *European Unity*, 353–81. ‘Church and Society: Ecumenical Perspectives: Essays in Honour of Paul Abrecht’, special issue *Ecumenical Review* 37, no. 1 (1985). ‘The Future of Europe and the Responsibility of the Churches. A Statement Passed by the Committee on the Christian Responsibility for European Cooperation, London 7 November 1953’, esp. p. 4, Philadelphia, Presbyterian Historical Society, NCC RG 6 box 18.12, Christian Study Group for European Unity (hereafter PHS NCC).
  25. H.H. Walz, ‘The Political Task of Protestantism in Europe’, *European Issues* 4 (25 May 1954): 7–17. PHS NCC RG 6 box 19. ‘The specifically Protestant task in politics will always be a contribution to the political ethos.’
  26. Letter Van Kirk to the Committee, 29 January 1954. PHS NCC RG 6 box 18.12, Christian Study Group for European Unity. This confirmation by the American churches to support American commitment to European cooperation was published in the Committee’s bulletin called *European Issues* 4 (25 May 1954), 4–6. PHS NCC RG 6 box 19.
  27. Hans-Ruedi Weber, ‘Out of All Continents and Nations: A Review of Regional Developments in the Ecumenical Movement’, in *A History of the Ecumenical Movement, volume 2, 1948–1968*, ed. Harold E. Fey, (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1968), 65, 82–5.
  28. Johannes Grossman, ‘The Comité International de defense de la Civilization chrétienne and the Transnationalization of Anti-Communist Propaganda in Western Europe after the Second World War’, in *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activists, and Networks*, eds. Luc van Dongen, Stéphanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 251–62. For precedents of religious anticommunism in the 1930s; see Stéphanie Roulin, ‘A Martyr Factory? Roman Catholic Crusade, Protestant Missions and Anti-Communist Propaganda against Soviet Anti-Religious Policies, 1929–37’, *Twentieth Century Communism* 7, (2014): 153–73.
  29. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy*, 184–5 and 191–252.
  30. Zeilstra, *European Unity*, 338–9.
  31. Timothy E.W. Cloege, *Guaranteed Pure: The Moody Bible Institute, Business, and the Making of Modern Evangelicalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 13.
  32. Mara Einstein, *Brands of Faith: Marketing Religion in a Commercial Age* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

33. Ian M. Randall, 'American Influence on Evangelicals in Europe: A Comparison of the Founding of the Evangelical Alliance and the World Evangelical Fellowship', in *Religion in America: European and American Perspectives*, eds. Hans Krabbendam and Derek Rubin (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2004), 263–74.
34. Markku Ruotsila, 'Transnational Fundamentalist Anti-Communism: The International Council of Christian Churches', in *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks*, eds. Luc van Dongen, Stéphanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 235–50.
35. R.L. Decker, *Confidential Report and Confidential Resume and Report of Trip to Europe, July 30 – August 30, 1948*, Wheaton, IL, Wheaton College Archives, Collection SC 113, National Association of Evangelicals, box 1, file Clarens 1948.
36. Hans Krabbendam, "'The Harvest is Ripe": American Evangelicals in European Missions 1950–1980', in *American Evangelicalism and the 1960s*, ed. Axel Schäfer (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013), 231–54.
37. J.B.A. Kessler Jr., *A Study of the Evangelical Alliance in Great Britain* (Goes, the Netherlands: Oosterbaan en le Cointre, 1968), 90–4.
38. Frank Hinkelmann, 'Die Glaubensbasis der Europäischen Evangelische Allianz', (unpublished paper, Theological University Apeldoorn, April 2005), 4–6. Kessler, *Study of the Evangelical Alliance*, 97.
39. Clyde W. Taylor, 'Implementing our Evangelical Unity', *United Evangelical Action*, December 1963, 27. Kessler, *Study of the Evangelical Alliance*, 99–100.
40. George Burnham, *Billy Graham: A Mission Accomplished* (Westwood NJ: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1955), 16, 151.
41. Billy Graham, *Just As I am: Autobiography of Billy Graham* (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1997), 736–9.
42. Allen V. Koop, *American Evangelical Missionaries in France, 1945–1975* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 61–8.
43. Markku Ruotsila, *Fighting Fundamentalist: Carl McIntire and the Politicization of American Fundamentalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 118–21.
44. It is telling that the demise of the CDICC also happened in the late 1960s.
45. Hans Krabbendam, 'The Transformers: Continuity and Change in the European Campaigns of American Evangelists Frank Buchman and Billy Graham, 1920', *Journal of Religion in Europe* 7, no. 3–4 (2014), 223–45, and 'Opening a Market for Missions: American Evangelicals and the Re-Christianization of Europe', *Amerikastudien* 59, no. 2 (2014): 153–75.
46. Evert Van de Poll, *Europe and the Gospel: Past Influences, Current Developments, Mission Challenges* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 110–3. At present the EEA claims to represent 15 million European evangelicals from 35 countries in the European Union [http:// www.europeanea.org](http://www.europeanea.org).
47. See the argument in Axel Schäfer, 'Introduction: Evangelicals and the Sixties: Revisiting the "Backlash"', in Schäfer, *American Evangelicalism*, 3–16.
48. A recent (2014) initiative to revive conservative Christian European-American ties is the Transatlantic Christian Council, see <http://www.tccouncil.org/>.

### Notes on contributor

Hans Krabbendam is the Director of the Catholic Documentation Centre of the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, after working for the Roosevelt Study Center. His publications include *Freedom on the Horizon: Dutch Immigration to America, 1840-1940* (Eerdmans 2009). He edited twenty-some volumes on European (Dutch)-American relations, most recently with Derek Rubin, *American Responses to the Holocaust: Transatlantic Perspectives* (Peter Lang, 2017). He is completing a monograph on American Protestants' efforts to rebuild the religious landscape in Western Europe between 1940–1975.