Approaching the legitimacy of self-appointed representatives: from responsiveness to reflexivity

The paper offers an extensive theoretical discussion of and a contribution to the highly relevant, controversial, and normatively charged debate on the legitimacy of interest groups as non-elected, self-appointed representatives. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the paper juxtaposes two diverging approaches on legitimacy of interest groups, namely responsiveness as a means to achieve a congruence of interests and reflexivity as the structural facilitation of evaluative judgements conducted by the constituency. Second, the paper proposes a framework on institutional instruments generating reflexivity suitable for empirical research. To corroborate this concept-specification of reflexivity, this paper debates several empirical studies on and theoretical approaches to institutional mobilisation mechanisms enabling a structural facilitation of contestation. Eventually, three distinct attributes of the concept of interest group reflexivity are established. An interest group’s forums for exchange and education, its decision-making system and its grassroots involvement ought to ensure internal structural reflexivity towards its constituency. When combined, they can mitigate the potential for undemocratic representation due to a lack of or skewed mobilisation and empowerment.


Introduction
The act of political representation renders a constituency of represented as politically present insofar as they become 'perceptible and relevant for consideration in deliberation and decision-making' (Montanaro 2018, p. 7). Consequently, broad, diverse and inclusive representation contributes to the overall quality and legitimacy of a democracy. However, the validity of this premise depends on the democratic quality of each representative act. Determining the democratic legitimacy of representative claims becomes somewhat intricate regarding non-elected, self-appointed representatives, such as interest groups. These formally composed, membershipbased associations help forming latent groups of interests within a society into manifest actors within the political spectrum and thus promote the articulation and representation of a diverse spectrum of interests beyond the topographical structure of democratic polities. As such, they serve as significant tools of popular influence on local and national legislation. Yet, the most prominent measure to assess questions of democratic legitimacy, election results, is evidently not applicable to them.
In much of the contemporary literature on the legitimacy of non-elected, selfappointed representatives, scholars refer to the concept of responsiveness as indicator for legitimate representation. It can be traced back to Pitkin's now mainstream approach on substantive representation (Disch 2010, p. 20) as 'acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them' (Pitkin 1967, p. 209). A prominent model of responsiveness is the so-called 'transmission belt function', which describes the transmission of information between constituency and policymaker via interest groups as intermediate institutions. By scrutinising the congruence (or lack thereof) between interests held by a constituency and those transmitted into the policy process by its interest group, the legitimacy of said interest group is to be evaluated. This normative conception continues to be the hallmark within the research on democratic political representation and is almost ubiquitous to normative interest group research (Disch 2010, p. 6). Much of the contemporary empirical literature builds on and investigates the normative concept of responsiveness (Fossen 2019, p. 834).
The argument pursued in this paper is, however, that the relationship between representative and constituency is in fact much more complex and impenetrable than the concept of responsiveness would imply. To corroborate this view, the paper draws on Michael Saward's constructivist approach on the representative claim. Saward, amongst others, neglects the assumption of exogenous interests held by constituencies, since a representative claim constitutes, shapes, and determines the interests of their constituencies in the first place (Saward 2010). Hence, the latter cannot serve as independent benchmarks for evaluating interest group's actions. In order to assess an interest group's legitimacy, scholars should instead scrutinise whether and to what extent representatives a) empower the represented to act and be recognised as political subjects, especially when the constituency includes marginalised and dominant subgroups, and b) facilitate the active mobilisation of all constituents to receive, judge, test and contest the representative claim (Hayat 2020, p. 131).
The term reflexivity as the structural facilitation of the contestation and renegotiation of political power builds on this conception of representation as mobilisation: Reflexive structures allow for the 'inclusion of the represented as conscious agents, able to gain enough visibility and agency through representation to put to the test the power relations that subject them' (Hayat 2020, p. 137). Thereby, legitimate representation, as a political and contextual achievement, becomes democratic (Disch 2015(Disch , 2020. This reflexive approach on representation as a systematic capacity ought to apply to the whole representative system of a society as well as its self-appointed representatives. However, '[i]n case of unofficial or self-appointed representation, reflexivity is difficult to mandate' (Disch 2011, p. 111) and a conceptual framework for its scholarly analysis has yet to be developed (Thomassen 2020, p. 180).
Building on the constructivist approach, this paper will attempt to do so by specifying the concept of reflexivity. To conduct this concept-specification, the paper will debate empirical studies on and theoretical approaches towards institutional mobilisation mechanisms enabling a structural facilitation of empowerment. Most prominent contributions to this conceptualisation are works by Albareda (2018), Johansson and Lee (2014) as well as Andrasik and Mead (2019). Eventually, three distinct attributes of the concept of reflexivity are established: Forums for exchange and education, a decision-making system and grassroots involvement. If implemented by interest groups, the risk of undemocratic representation due to a lack of or skewed mobilisation and empowerment can be mitigated and they could be considered legitimate, which would positively affect the legitimacy of the overall representative system. In other words, the employment of all three attributes elicits a coherent overall meaning of reflexivity as proxy-indicator for the legitimacy of interest groups. The proposed concept-specification of reflexivity aims to become a resource for empirical research on the interactive, dynamic, and evolving relationship between representative and constituency.

The dispute over the process of 'interest formation'
The core difference between the two prevailing concepts on representation, responsiveness and reflexivity, can be traced back to the question of how individuals form their subjective interests. By presupposing this process of interest formation as exogenous or endogenous to the representative claim respectively, responsiveness and reflexivity construe the act of representation quite differently (Urbinati 2020, p. 183).
Responsiveness is derived from the so-called 'standard account' on representation and inherently assumes an a priori set of interests held by the constituency, which is then represented by the representative. Individual political interests exist relatively autonomous from the representative process. Hence, the standard account describes representation as reflection and transmission of interests and demands held by a constituency and consequently ascertains its democratic legitimacy by assessing the degree of responsiveness by the advocate towards their constituency. Essential components of a responsive relationship are the criteria of authorisation and accountability: Representative acts are 'legitimated by the accountability of leaders to their constituency and the authorisation of leaders by their constituency' (Halpin 2006, p. 928). Through these mechanisms, a 'congruence of interests' between constituency and representative was to be achieved-and with it, legitimacy. This unidirectional, causal understanding of a transmission of interests between a citizen-representative relationship substantiate the paradigmatic 'transmission belt function' of interest groups.
The term reflexivity on the other hand, which was first introduced by Disch (2010) and builds on the constructivist turn in political representation (Saward 2010), neglects the assumption of exogenous interest formation and instead accentuates their context dependency. The formation of individual political interests is therefore, to some extent, determined by the act of representation itself (Disch 2011(Disch , 2020. The constructivist turn thus describes representation as a performative claim-making event which constitutes both the representative and the represented constituency by transferring a latent constituency into a manifest one (Saward 2010). Claim-makers must necessarily, due to the pluralistic nature of constituencies and their diverging, possibly opposing interests, 'pick and choose, propose and fabricate, a distinctive and limited vision of, or set of interests […] as an unavoidable precondition' (Saward 2010, p. 44). Building on this understanding, Saward introduces the following definition of the representative claim: 'A maker of representations (M) puts forward a subject (S) which stands for an object (O) that is related to a referent (R) and is offered to an audience (A)'. (Saward 2010, p. 37). The subject is said to embody a proclaimed set of interests, a merely constructed, selective idea of the reality concerned, which is yet the object of the claim. The object nevertheless relates to that reality-a referent with its actual empirical makeup and interests (Saward 2010, p. 37). In other words, the articulation of representation, albeit a constructive, performative act, is not able to construct what is represented ex nihiloinstead, it relates to already existing representations, referencing existing meanings, practices, structures, and identities by rearticulating, or re-representing them (Thomassen 2019, p. 336). To conclude, the claim making event anticipates what constituents ought to care about, thereby constituting a specific and distinct set of interests in the first place. To reduce the process of representation to a mere principal-agent relationship, with homogeneous sets of interests on each side, which only need to align, does not do justice to the rather complex dynamics of representation. Consequently, to use a 'constituency's interest' as benchmark for legitimate representation results in a somewhat negligent fallacy.

A constructivist approach on legitimacy
The constructivist approach on representation takes the dyadic relationship between constituency and representative out of its centre and instead focusses on representation as figuration and mobilisation, thereby emphasising 'how acts of representation work together with political practices to configure the social field and to frame the terms of conflict within which the pertinence and cogency of arguments are judged' (Disch 2011, p. 110). In turn, scholars ought to focus on the quality of the deliberation that produced the representative claim. Disch's concept of reflexivity describes the systematic capacity to mobilise both express and implicit judgements, contestations, and objections from the represented towards the representative claim. The representative ought to not only encourage contestation, but also provide 'regular, structured ways of taking objections into account' (Disch 2011, p. 111). Put simply, the represented should gain and not only retain agency in the representative process (Hayat 2020, p. 131). Therefore, for an interest group to produce legitimate representative claims, it has to be structurally reflexive in order to (a) mobilise objections and (b) systematically take these objections into account.
By moving mechanisms of authorisation and accountability to the back row, Saward and Disch aim to transcend the 'most familiar basis for normative judgments regarding when representation is democratically legitimate' (Disch 2015, p. 488; see also Saward 2010, pp. 146-147). Mechanisms of authorisation and accountability still heavily focus on a simplified linear and dyadic relationship between a constituency (usually only the membership base) and its representative: To focus on their degree of congruence (facilitated by authorisation and accountability) implies not only a homogenous constituency, but also obfuscates inherent power struggles between dominant and subaltern subgroups of a constituency that always accompany the process of its subjectification (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Here, another fallacy becomes evident: Congruence of interests ought to cast suspicion towards the claim-maker, not indicate its legitimacy, since it may result from the neglection or erasure of plurality and diversity within a constituency (Hayat 2020, p. 134).
Reflexivity surpasses a rather monolithic conception of 'the represented', by instead highlighting the power dynamics inherent to the representative system: The process of interest formation is influenced by diverging, perhaps antagonistic conceptions of the object and its interests. Different subgroups of a constituency themselves shape the representative claim-some in a more hegemonic sense than others. 1 Reflexivity consequently advocates for a second-order judgement not by assessing the congruence between (supposed) interests held by the represented and interests represented by the representative, but by scrutinising the systemic conditions under which representative claims are formed, received, judged and contested. In other words, the conditions that enable all members of the constituency to partake in the multidirectional, multicausal process of interest formation ought to be in the centre of evaluating the legitimacy of a representative act (Hayat 2020;Thomassen 2020). The actual, first-order judgement of the representative claim itself can only be conducted by the 'appropriate constituency' and not by independent theorists, since '[t]here is a serious level of presumption involved in ascribing to oneself the tools and the position from which […] to reach secure independent judgments of legitimacy' (Saward 2010, p. 146; see also Urbinati 2020, p. 186).
Whilst Saward does not specify the term 'appropriate constituency' any further, one can turn to Montanaro to do so. Building on the representative claim, she argues that, by establishing their claim, a maker of representations creates the 'claimed constituency', whose interests are affected or potentially affected by the (supposedly) pursued collective decisions (2018, p. 9). Montanaro refers to Young in conceptualising the term affected interests, thereby 'defin [ing] interest as what affects or is important to the life prospects of individuals […] [and] as self-referring' (Young 2000, p. 134). For example, Oxfam aims to 'make the poor visible and audible as an affected constituency' (Montanaro 2012(Montanaro , p. 1097. The poor are here identified as affected (by poverty at the very least) and aimed to be constituted publicly in the constructivist turn's sense. Importantly, the claimed constituency does not necessarily coincide with the formal membership of interest groups. To subsume 'the represented' under the umbrella of membership constitutes another common fallacy in interest group research building on the standard account.
The term reflexivity is far more comprehensive as it is not limited to the relationship between 'the' represented and 'the' representative, but instead scrutinises the power dynamics within a representative system. Thereby, this focus opens up questions much more valuable to analysing the democratic legitimacy of a representative claim: Who is addressed and who is empowered by the claim, which particular portrayals of a constituency are selected and privileged over others, who has (more or less) access to judging the claim and how? (Saward 2010, p. 42;Disch 2015, p. 488;Celis et al. 2014, p. 152). The focus on reflexivity connects well to the literature on what types of societal groups generate political representation in the first place (Grossmann 2012), as well as on the representational bias adversely affecting marginalised subgroups within a constituency (Strolovitch 2007;Squires 2008;Celis et al. 2014).
All in all, this paper argues that the contemporary interest group literature utilising or building on responsiveness and the transmission belt paradigm would benefit from a more comprehensive theoretical conceptualisation of representation and its implication on legitimacy. The standard account rather simplifies the complex dynamic processes entailed within representative systems, by primarily focussing on a dyadic, linear representative-represented relationship. Reflexivity allows for a more substantial approach as it a) builds on existing empirical research on interest formation as a multicausal and multidimensional process (Disch 2011(Disch , pp. 100-101, 2020, b) emphasises power dynamics between subgroups of constituents as well as between representative and constituency in the (re-)construction of the object of a representative claim and c) advocates for 'the democratic way' of determining legitimate representation by leaving the judgement of the claim itself to the claimed constituency and assigning the second-order role of scrutinising the conditions of that judgment to the scholar. Yet, criteria regulating reflexive structures (whether and how different subgroups of a claimed constituency are mobilised and empowered to judge and contest a claim) are not optional for democratic legitimacy. In the following segment, this paper will propose three core attributes of reflexivity, which in turn can be utilised and further operationalised in future empirical research.

The concept-specification of the reflexivity of interest groups
In the following, existing literature on the relationship between constituency and representative will be examined and incorporated to derive a sufficient, yet parsimonious concept-specification of the reflexivity of interest groups. By taking into account the, albeit limited, catalogue of research on the institutional design facilitating deliberation processes within interest groups, this conception will generate some degree of overlap with literature on responsiveness and the transmission belt function. This paper will draw from the work conducted by several researchers: Miller (1994), Day (1999), Halpin (2006), Panda (2007), Kohler-Koch and Buth (2009), Mosley and Grogan (2012), Berkhout (2013), Fraussen et al. (2015), Leardini et al. (2017), Fraussen and Halpin (2018) and Fraussen et al. (2021). However, the key contributions relevant to this conceptualisation will be those of Albareda (2018), Johansson and Lee (2014) and Andrasik and Mead (2019). This is because all three specifically concern themselves with aspects of interest groups' basic infrastructure of interlocking sites of opinion formation and decision making necessary for reflexive representation. And although their research was conducted under different conceptions of representation and their theoretical implications, these conceptions and the (empirical) conclusions obtained from them will nevertheless provide crucial insights and guidelines for the conceptualisation of structural reflexivity.
First off, Albareda (2018) argues that the organisational structure of civil-society organisations (CSOs) in form of membership involvement and organisational capacity functions as an instrument for generating calculable and predictable control over an interest group's performance. That performance entails the capacity and ability to interact and speak with two main audiences: the constituency and policy makers. With a quantitative cluster-analysis of CSOs active within the EU, he operationalised the CSOs' capacities to function as transmission belts by measuring membership involvement and organisational capacity to handle information adequately. His study of institutionalised membership involvement is of great importance to this paper, as he distinguished three formal elements tethered to the collection of information of constituents, namely interaction, decision making and local chapters. Second, Johansson and Lee (2014) investigated how pan-European CSOs define their constituencies, how they acquire legitimacy through internal representation and involvement of members (especially of marginalised subgroups) and what challenges they encountered in building internal representation structures. With a qualitative cross-case study of five EU-based CSOs, they developed key insights on formal representation, membership structure, participation and authenticity practised by the five groups they examined. Third, Andrasik and Mead (2019) developed a theoretical and conceptual approach on substantive representation among non-profit organisations. Their legitimacy and the accuracy of representation were measured vis-à-vis three institutionalised substantive representation mechanisms. Their proposed framework encompasses the client engagement (asking), client assessment (studying) and client immersion (experiencing) and will provide further crucial impulses for this concept specification.
Building on these and other theoretical and empirical insights, the next three segments will substantiate the term reflexivity by scrutinising and tethering to it three attributes, namely forums for exchange and education, a decision-making system and grassroots involvement. This concept-specification puts special emphasis on empowering and mobilising marginalised subgroups within a claimed constituency, since a representative claim can only be considered legitimate, if prevalent power structures between different subgroups of a constituency are actively acknowledged and addressed by reflexive structures. Otherwise, the potential for biased representation affirmative to dominant subgroups jeopardises not only the legitimacy of a certain interest group, but of the overall representative system. Following this concept-specification, this paper will provide further insights on its applicability in terms of the types of interest groups that can and should achieve reflexivity in the first place.

Forums for exchange and education
First, members shall be provided with a forum which enables them to interact with each other and with the representatives. This notion echoes Young's vague hope that constituents would start looking for each other once a representative claim is issued (Young 2000, p. 130). Yet, instead of relying on the constituents to take the initiative, interest groups ought to ensure such interaction not only amongst members of a claimed constituency, but also between them and their representatives. Such participatory venues for members of the claimed constituency function as deliberative forums, where representative claims can be received, debated, and controversially discussed in reciprocal communication and interaction (Albareda 2018(Albareda , p. 1218). These forums are not necessarily restricted to physical venues, like (local, regional, national, or general) assemblies, executive committees, plenary debates, etc. but also include practices reflecting on the perspectives of the represented and the claimed constituency and may therefore encompass demonstrations, public protests and direct actions as well as organisational or policy-related documents like newsletters, magazines, etc. Utilising a multiplicity of platforms in turn broadens the possibility to reach, inform and engage with a plurality of diverse subgroups within the claimed constituency (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 411;Mosley and Grogan 2012, p. 844;Berkhout 2013, p. 235;Fraussen et al. 2021, p. 119).
Moreover, to further mobilise its claimed constituency, an interest group may also actively engage with it by asking for and obtaining their opinions and by assessing the complex socio-economic contexts and cultural environments they may be situated in. The proposed forums for exchange and education thus further include the active gathering and allocating of opinions through opinion-, performance-and exit surveys, suggestion/ complaint boxes, feedback books, focus groups, interviews etc. (Andrasik and Mead 2019, pp. 43-44). Digital infrastructure, and more specifically, interest groups' websites, social media channels, intranet, mailing-lists, and so on are intricate and wide-ranging mediums of interaction that develop an increasing appeal to interest groups due to their potential for inclusive deliberative exchange (Andrasik and Mead 2019, p. 44).
Furthermore, E-mail alerts and newsletters can also include a spectrum of information about relevant, contemporary topics as well as convey methods for taking direct action in the form of suggested arguments, argumentative strategies, and on how to take individual actions on a local level and coordinate activist and grassroots campaigns, thereby providing individuals with more concrete pathways to engagement. This might be especially benefiting in terms of empowerment and inclusivity of marginalised subgroups within a claimed constituency (Fraussen and Halpin 2018, pp. 30, 32-33). Andrasik and Mead reach a similar conclusion and extend this take by emphasising the possibility of digitally transcending two-way communication between singular constituents and interest groups, by instead including potentially countless participants within ongoing, multi-layered conversations, regardless of physical locations (2019, p. 44). Yet, whilst digital innovations may have a beneficial effect on increased, more dynamic and inclusive interaction between representative and claimed constituency due to low access barriers largely independent form resources and physical location of constituents, these innovations may bring with them a decrease in breadth and quality of interaction as well as the overall connection between claimed constituency and representatives (e.g. 'subscriber-mentality') (Fraussen and Halpin 2018, p. 33).
All of these interactive forums for exchange and education function under the precept to enhance the overall visibility of the representative claim, to disseminate political information leading to sophisticated and well-informed constituents and to activate and mobilise the wider claimed constituency to position themselves to the claim. This reflexive structure thereby enables the inclusion of additional, possibly new perspectives on an issue, whilst mitigating the possible risk of undemocratic representation. This is especially relevant and unfortunately at the same time especially difficult concerning marginalised subgroups of a claimed constituency. Johansson and Lee include an interesting quote by a policy officer of the European Disability Forum (EDF) regarding this issue: I think it is really a challenge to ensure really everybody is heard.
[…] Some disability groups are badly organised for various reasons. So that is our struggle. How do you represent those people, to bring their issues into the light if they are not really that well organised? […] We try to get them as much visibility as possible, to help learn to try to keep their members and views on board. (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 420) Internal participatory venues ought to function as platforms where marginalised subgroups can share their perspectives in order to strengthen an interest group's internal reflexivity (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 422). These venues further benefit from membership surveys, meetings and conferences with special emphasis on marginalised subgroups and their views and stories. Johansson and Lee provide an empirical example: The European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) on a regular basis organises so-called 'people experiencing poverty meetings', where people affected by poverty are provided a stage and an audience, which includes relevant stakeholders of this interest group, to talk about their experiences (Johansson and Lee 2014, pp. 419-420). These meetings do not only serve to widen their membership base, 'but also to change the ways by which the people represented can have 'a say' with regard to the national networks' activities' (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 420).
Needless to say, institutionalising these forums adequately comes with certain obstacles: The numerous venues and forums may be predominantly accessed by well-resourced, well-organised and well-educated individuals and in turn 'privilege articulateness and established discourses' (Warren 2017, p. 46). Furthermore, language barriers and the tendency towards the need for expert knowledge may additionally prevent individuals from joining these deliberation-processes (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 416). These obstacles may determine some degree of dominance of advantaged subgroups, who may generate skewed representation to their favour (Montanaro 2018;Strolovitch 2007). As illustrated, there are some mechanisms to mitigate this effect, yet it remains questionable whether those can actually negate it entirely. Nevertheless, it is crucial to again emphasise, that these mechanisms ought to be systematically implemented by interest groups, in order to achieve reflexivity towards all subgroups of their claimed constituency.

A decision-making system
The second attribute this paper will tether to reflexivity is the decision-making system and the position the constituency inhabits within it. Decisions on agenda-setting, for example, are of high significance to an interest group's lobbying activities as well as its overall performance and hence, claimed constituents ought to assume an influential function concerning issue-prioritisation. The claimed constituency therefore has to have the ability to participate actively in decision-making processes by being provided structural opportunities to assert influence via vote, involvement in executive boards (or bodies/committees that serve similar functions), working groups, and so forth (Albareda 2018(Albareda , p. 1218Fraussen et al. 2021, p. 120). The equal and easy availability of a corresponding infrastructure to all members of the claimed constituency determines the depth of participation and thus of the reflexivity achieved thereby. Scholars acknowledge and affirm the positive effect of incorporating members of the constituency into executive boards both in terms of the embodiment of views held by the constituency as well as in terms of increasing the constituency's trust towards the interest group (Leardini et al. 2017, pp. 48, 61;Mosley and Grogan 2012, pp. 851, 853).
A general decision-making structure may encompass a membership structure and a representative composition of leaders in executive boards, secretaries etc. which are authorised by members (who ought to be part of the claimed constituency) through formal elective arrangements, their participation, and their vote (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 411). Hence, such a reflexive decision-making structure enables and mobilises the claimed constituents to become members and exercise their right to vote, to obtain executive positions allocated through board member appointments and to collaboratively interact on strategic issues, like, for example, the allocation of grant funds through participatory grant making (Andrasik and Mead 2019, pp. 39-41).
To empower the claimed constituency and especially marginalised subgroups within it, interest groups may apply different tools. In this regard, a stratified membership structure may help in preventing instances of undemocratic representation: To ensure the empowerment of the claimed constituency and to avoid surrogate representation, interest groups may grant full memberships rights only to those with affected interests. Those who are not affected by a claim in turn do not belong to the claimed constituency and are thusly not eligible to the same membership rights (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 412;Halpin 2006, p. 935) To provide an example, Halpin refers to the Royal National Institute of the Blind (RNIB), since it only grants full membership rights to the blind and partially sighted as well as their families and carers. Thereby, the RNIB provides only those with affected interests a say in the decision-making process, 'by involving them and giving them a chance to vote and stand for election' (RNIB in Halpin 2006, p. 935).
Just like for the forums for exchange and education, institutionalising an adequate decision-making system also entails its own obstacles. Membership is often connected to fees, which may entail excluding effects. Furthermore, centralised decision-making and voting procedures within interest groups generate exclusion by their very nature as their respective demoi are necessarily pre-formed and exclusive. Inclusivity is highly reliant on their electoral system's design, which may or may not empower marginalised subgroups to some extent. However, well-resourced subgroups may nevertheless exert skewed influence over decision-making processes (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 416).

Grassroots involvement
As a 'most tightly knit connection' (Albareda 2018(Albareda , p. 1219, grassroots-initiatives, like local chapters and decentralised offices, help facilitate long chains of representation and ensure an uninterrupted deliberative exchange between an interest group's leadership and its diverse, pluralistic constituency (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 416;Kohler-Koch and Buth 2009, p. 13;Fraussen et al. 2015, p. 574). These reflexive platforms can ensure local interaction and involvement with the constituency regarding more context-specific problems. Local engagement thereby facilitates effective grassroots education as well as organising efforts, which help maintain and reinforce the claimed constituency in their empowerment (Miller 1994, p. 16;Panda 2007, p. 266). Of course, grassroots involvement serves the interests of the representatives as well: Not only does it help to recruit and aggregate new members as well as strengthen group's embeddedness in local/regional communities (Miller 1994, p. 10;Fraussen et al. 2015, p. 574), it additionally ought to be considered a resource ready to be activated to pursue indirect lobbying efforts. Local chapters are an integral part of successful outside (or indirect) lobbying strategies (Victor 2007, pp. 828, 836).
One could argue that grassroots involvement is merely an additional forum for exchange and education and could therefore be subsumed under the first attribute. However, local chapters perform functions that go beyond mere forums for exchange and education. They a) provide an opportunity for the immersion in regional or local lobbying activities and further the educational purpose such involvement serves for particular local constituencies. Furthermore, grassroots involvement b) functions as a precaution to avoid losing touch with grassroots concerns-a circumstance which may actually culminate in decreased levels of participation and an impairment of interest groups representing disadvantaged subgroups (Miller 1994, p. 5). And finally, local chapters c) facilitate grassroots involvement through assessment and immersion via political socialisation, bonding, and exposure to heterogeneous value systems. All in all, grassroots involvement transcends mere interaction, but emphasises the local embeddedness of an interest group, its local work and visibility (Day 1999, p. 219). All three arguments are of significant relevance with respect to marginalised subgroups. As illustrated above, both preceding attributes are prone to favouring the empowerment of advanced subgroups of a claimed constituency, as these institutional tools may be more easily accessible to them. Grassroots involvement gives prominence to the inclusive, active outreach by interest groups-to go where the (marginalised) claimed constituency actually is. Expanding to these local milieus provides further insights to their reality and corresponding issue-priorities, whilst lowering the barriers for these constituencies to receive, judge and potentially contest the representative claim issued in their name. That is why, grassroots involvement has to be considered an autarkic and necessary attribute in determining an interest group's reflexivity and thus legitimacy.

On the applicability of reflexivity
As mentioned above, this conceptualisation of reflexivity is significantly corroborated by earlier research on interest groups' organisational infrastructure, which was conducted under the conceptions of the standard account on representation. The key distinction, however, lies in the distinct function or purpose these organisational aspects ought to fulfil. Under the standard account, and, more precisely, the transmission belt function, these organisational attributes ought to enable the transmission of interests between constituency and representative. Hence, the researcher scrutinises the degree of congruence between constituency's interests and representative's interests, which was to be achieved through these organisational attributes. Reflexivity, however, calls for a shift in scholarly attention from an uncorrupted transmission of interests to the quality of deliberation itself. Researchers are encouraged to scrutinise the quality of deliberation, not only by checking the presence of such organisational attributes, but by scrutinising whether, how and to what degree they enable an inclusive mobilisation of the claimed constituency to contribute to and to contest an interest group's representative claim and its overall performance, especially regarding marginalised subgroups. Organisational reflexivity serves an interest group's demand for internal democracy as it provides access points for claimed constituents to join, to contribute to and to contest an interest group's performance. It can therefore be concluded that all three attributes mitigate the possibility of undemocratic representation, since all of them offer several tools and mechanisms for the claimed constituency to oppose and contest undemocratic practices of representation and thereby counter and adjust misguided, selective, or even harmful representative claims.
However, whilst all interest groups issue a representative claim and thereby create a claimed constituency, not all interest groups are able to mobilise it through reflexive infrastructure. Halpin, building on Pitkin (1967) andO'Neill (2001), puts forth the intriguing argument that, in order to determine an interest group's potential to function as legitimate representatives, one has to determine the constituency represented (Halpin 2006, p. 923), hence, the claimed constituency. A first crucial distinction ought to be made between interest groups acting in solidarity with their claimed constituency and those actually representing it: Whilst typical interest groups representing human interests (based on a specific economic role, social and/or cultural identity, or experiences (Halpin 2006, pp. 927-928)), are capable of mobilising and representing their claimed constituencies, interest groups with non-human claimed constituencies (e.g. nature, culture heritage) or those claiming to represent future generations, cannot function as legitimate representatives since they are simply unable to mobilise their claimed constituency. These groups instead conduct their advocacy-efforts through a form of solidarity, not representation. These groups may nevertheless exhibit a reflexive infrastructure, yet it stands in no relation to its legitimacy (Halpin 2006, pp. 925-927). Whilst this differentiation is quite straight-forward, a few distinct types of interest groups require a more elaborate examination, again determined by their constituencies: • Public interest groups with an overly ambiguous claimed constituency (e.g. consumer protection organisations, taxpayer unions): Halpin refers to Pitkin's conception of unattached interests as 'interests to which no particular persons were so specially related that they could claim to be privileged to define the interests' (1967, p. 210). In these cases, justifying a representative claim becomes a matter of epistemic considerations such as scientific competence, or experiential knowledge (Halpin 2006, pp. 924, 933). • Interest groups with claimed constituencies that are difficult to reach (e.g. development aid, human rights, child welfare organisations): Whilst in these cases determining a claimed constituency with attached interests is possible, mobilising it might not be feasible. These groups might have the potential to pursue representation yet are practising solidarity. Halpin refers to these groups as 'representational aspirants ' (2006, p. 933). Similarly, Montanaro argues that international, development aid or human rights groups, such as Oxfam, would have to empower and mobilise its claimed constituency through reflexive structures in order to achieve democratic outcomes. While they fail to do so, they nevertheless produce surrogate outcomes as they still act solidary in the interest of the claimed constituency-just not as 'legitimate' representatives (2018, p. 94). • Associations of organisations (umbrella organisations): In this case, the claimed constituency, albeit non-human, can still be mobilised and empowered through reflexive infrastructure. And whilst the conceptual framework of reflexivity is equally relevant to representative systems on different levels of government, some scholars argue, that with increasing levels of governance, interest groups have to become more professionalised and more autonomous, which in turn may constitute possible obstacles in achieving reflexivity (Kohler-Koch 2010;Kröger 2018). Other empirical studies, however, negate such an effect (Poletti et al. 2016;Berkhout et al. 2017).

Conclusion
Building on both theoretical and empirical research, this paper developed a concept-specification of the term 'reflexivity' as indicator for the scholarly evaluation of interest groups' democratic legitimacy. The legitimacy of interest groups is of pivotal importance to the overall democratic substance of representative systems. The representation of latent constituencies is not automatically achieved by the mere existence of respective interest groups, even regarding those with exceedingly large membership bases. Rather, each interest group ought to deploy reflexive internal processes to mobilise and facilitate deliberation, contestation, and negotiation in order to arrive at common positions, that can reflect the diverse perspectives of its claimed constituents-and this is especially true for the ones representing the least powerful. The presence and interaction of all three organisational attributes (forums for exchange and education, a decision-making system, and grassroots involvement) provide interest groups with such a reflexive organisational structure, as they facilitate an inclusive deliberate exchange, systematic opportunities for the claimed constituency to assert influence, and the immersion of local or regional lobbying activities, especially regarding marginalised subgroups. They are the systematic conditions under which representative claims are formed, received, judged, and contested by a heterogenic claimed constituency. In combination, they ensure a continuous internal structural reflexivity towards it, thereby substantiating the legitimacy of representative claims made by interest groups as non-elected self-appointed representatives. This approach on the study of legitimacy in non-elected representation provides numerous incentives for future research. First, empirical research is needed in order to operationalise this proposed conceptualisation of reflexivity in order to test and enrich the reflexive mechanisms. The empirical assessment of the occurrence of the three organisational attributes may then be related to interest groups' characteristics in form of more in-depth case-oriented comparative studies. Such exploratory analyses may provide fruitful insights on potential sources of variation between the reflexive potential of different types of interest groups.
Second, further empirical research should embed an interest groups aspiration towards organisational reflexivity within interest groups' overall lobbying performance: This approach on reflexivity primarily addresses the normative linkage between the mobilisation of claimed constituents and the organisational infrastructure of interest groups. It does not include considerations beyond this linkage, including, for example, the effect reflexivity may have on an interest group's precise lobbying behaviour as well as its access to and influence on policymaking. The quest for success-in form of access-may oppose an interest group's inclination to assure legitimacy through reflexivity. Some scholars postulate that the biggest obstacle of achieving legitimate representation is the credo for effectiveness and with it, an increased professionalisation of interest groups (Albareda 2020;Maloney 2012Maloney , 2015Halpin 2006Halpin , 2010. This indicates a potential tradeoff between reflexivity and thus enhanced legitimacy on the one hand, and professionalisation and access on the other. Such a potential dilemma elicits troublesome implications not only for the proclaimed beneficiary role interest groups may play in democratic legislation processes, but also for the democratic quality of the whole representative system. To empirically assess this dilemma is thus of core normative and empirical interest (Table 1). Table 1 The standard account on and the constructivist turn in political representation The 'standard account' on political representation The 'constructivist turn' in political representation

Concept of interest formation
Exogenous interest formation Unidirectional flow of causality A performative and mobilising act A systematic capacity to mobilise contestation by providing regular, structured ways of taking objections into account

Determination of legitimate representation
Responsiveness: to evaluate the congruence of interests between constituency and representative; authorisation and accountability function as legitimising acts of representation Reflexivity: to assess the systemic quality of the deliberation producing the representative claim as well as the continuous process of its reception and judgement