Constructing a neoliberal exclusionary state: the role of far‑right populism in economic policy change in post‑war Austria

How and to what extent does far-right populism impact the nation-specific implementation of neoliberal policymaking? While scholarship convincingly demonstrated the importance of ideas and the political agents propagating neoliberal ideas in policy paradigmatic shifts, there is little investigation of the role that far-right populists play in economic policy change. Exploring the ideational power and impact of far-right populism in neoliberal policymaking provides an important insight into how neoliberal political economies enact nationalist cultural exclusion. The paper traces the process through which the Austrian Freedom Party’s ideational trajectory evolved in post-war Austria and how it impacted the political mainstream. The analysis draws from the party’s discourse in manifestos, interviews, and other publications in the period 1956–2006. The results show how the specific far-right populist actor, the Austrian Freedom Party, played a significant role in rendering neoliberal ideas viable as policy option early on and ultimately constructing the neo-liberal exclusionary state. By empirically showcasing how political actors from the fringes of the political spectrum can impact economic policy change, this presents an important contribution to the study of paradigm shifts, which predominantly focused on major national political actors. In light of the recent rise of far-right pop-ulism in Europe and beyond, this raises important questions for the continuity and change of the global paradigmatic dominance of neoliberalism.


Introduction
This paper explores how, and to what extent, far-right populist actors impact the nation-specific implementation of neoliberal policymaking.The 1970s rise of neoliberalism has led to a growing body of literature seeking to explain the institutional context and consequences of the economic policy change away from the Keynesian policy paradigm.Studies on the institutional response to processes of globalization and Europeanization assumed a neoliberal convergence across cases (e.g., Ohmae 1990;Parker 1998;Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988).More recent literature, however, emphasizes diverging factors across cases to explain the variety of neoliberal outcomes (e.g., Carstensen and Matthijs 2018;Fabry 2019;Hay 2004Hay , 2016)).Such accounts highlight how policymakers' ideational power enables a reinterpretation and redefinition of the dominant neoliberal understanding.The authors thereby make an important contribution by showing how different actors' agency can lead to varieties of neoliberalism (Carstensen and Matthijs 2018, 439).The emphasis on the political nature and actors' ideational power in explaining differences in the adoption of neoliberal policies allows capturing some of the nation-specific dynamics at play in different European countries.The "political" in this approach, however, is reduced to economic policymaking, in which economic policies are assumed at the forefront of voter preferences.This neglects other political issues that may drive economic policy change and thus misses the sociopolitical and cultural specificity that neoliberal countries with far-right populist parties in government depict.
In 2000, the far-right populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) was set to enter the Austrian government in coalition with the conservatives after gaining 26.9% of votes.Europe's member states issued diplomatic sanctions against Austria to "break off political contacts with any Austrian government that includes the farright Freedom Party" (Washington Post 2000, paragraph 1).European leaders condemned the party's xenophobic and racist views, which do "not abide by the essential values of the European family" (ibid, paragraph 5) and even suggested to exclude Austria from the European Union (EU) altogether (The Guardian 2000, paragraph 4).Soon after, the sanctions were lifted (The New York Times 2000) and toward the end of their governing term in 2006, the coalition was praised for making Austria one of Europe's most competitive economies due to the liberalization of trade and capital flows as well as the reduction of corporate taxes (Hermann and Flecker 2012, 121).Studies investigating the governing outcomes with far-right populists in office have been primarily concerned with anti-immigration sentiments, its impact on integration (e.g., Akkerman 2012) and policies that clash with "fundamental tenets of liberal democracy" (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013, 343).There is, however, little examination of the Freedom Party's role in economic policymaking, which shifted toward the neoliberal mainstream during their governing period.
This paper explores Austria as a single case study based on the exceptional circumstances by which neoliberalism was introduced and implemented by the FPÖ, an epitome of far-right populism.Process tracing the role of the FPÖ in economic policy developments in post-war Austria from 1956 until 2006 is particularly fruitful not only due to the FPÖ's long-standing dominance on Austria's political landscape, but also as the FPÖ was the first far-right populist party in government in post-war Europe.Based on their party programs, other publications, and speech transcripts, I analyzed their economic ideas in discourse over time pinpointing the different narratives promoting economic neoliberalism.I use an inductive "explaining outcome" process tracing approach (Beach and Pedersen 2019) to explain how political actors from the fringes enforced long-term paradigmatic change resulting in Austria's neoliberal exclusionary state.This is of particular relevance in light of the renewed rise of far-right populism across Europe, the USA, as well as countries such as India and Brazil (Norris and Inglehart 2019;Hopkin and Blyth 2018).
The results of this analysis show how the FPÖ was a key player in the construction of the Austrian exclusionary neoliberal state.As the first political party in postwar Austria to bring neoliberal ideas into Austria's party competition and subsequently into government, the FPÖ rendered neoliberal ideas viable as policy option long before its implementation.The adoption of neoliberal ideas allowed them to divert attention away from their nationalist ideological core and their nationalsocialist founders in the context of post-war Austria.This discursive shift toward neoliberalism did not only function as a tool to become societally acceptable for the public, but also acted as signal for coalition building toward other political parties, which culminated in the 1983 entrance into government as junior coalition partner of the socialists, which have lost their majority in the face of rising inflation and stagnating wages.Despite their low electoral support with only 5%, their governmental participation marks the gradual shift of the ideational context, in which neoliberal ideas start to become an acceptable policy option, while the Austro-Keynesian dominance faces mounting criticism.Throughout the 1990s the FPÖ gained electoral popularity.Radicalizing their nativist and neoliberal position led to their 1999 electoral breakthrough with 26.9% and their subsequent second office actively shaping Austria's exclusionary neoliberalism.Finally, the FPÖ's governmental participation and role in constructing Austro-neoliberalism mainstreamed far-right policy positions on immigration as well as normalized far-right populism in government in the European context.
The view from the margins shows how policy paradigm change requires a longterm, discourse-intensive process, which carries an often-overlooked agency in shifting the ideational context.This contributes to the literature, which has identified the complex interplay of macroeconomic conditions, political agency, and ideational power within policy change and offers an understanding of what happens if the neoliberal turn is heralded by far-right populist actors.In addition, this paper contributes to the literature on populism, which often neglects the political-economic dimensions within the institutional and ideational power of populist actors.The insights of this paper therefore holds wider implications for the study of the more recent rise of populist political forces.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the first section reviews the literature on policy paradigmatic change, authoritarian neoliberalism, and far-right populism.The second section describes the theoretical framework, methodological approach, and data used to develop the argument of this paper.The third section presents the longitudinal narrative analysis of the FPÖ's economic program and its relationship with the developments of Austrian economic governance over time.The final section offers a brief conclusion and notes for prospective research.

Varieties of neoliberalism, authoritarianism, and far-right populist actors
In light of globalization and Europeanization, accounts have identified various structural constraints on global and the European level as the main driver of the adoption of neoliberal policymaking across countries.Scholarship on globalization has argued that the increasingly integrated world market leads to higher capital mobility and international labor market competition, which in turn allegedly forces individual countries to adapt to these pressures (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988).As a result, countries are assumed to deregulate labor markets and lower corporate taxation to remain competitive on a globalized market (Hay 2004, 234-235).Even though these accounts offer important insights on how processes by which globalization and Europeanization pose similar political-economic challenges for different countries, such "input-weighted convergence models" do not account for the contingent and political nature of integration processes sufficiently (Hay 2004, 231-233).Political actors may mobilize for convergent tendencies as well as countertendencies, which may result in variable paces and divergent outcomes (ibid, 231).
The work of Hay (2004, 243) highlights how ideational mediation is a key factor of such divergent tendencies.Carstensen and Matthijs (2018) similarly highlight the importance of political agents' ideational power to instigate policy change within established paradigms by highlighting "how key policymakers were able to employ their institutional and ideational power to reinterpret and redefine the dominant neoliberal understanding of the economy to match their own specific ideas and policy priorities" (ibid, 431).Based on this, the authors describe varieties of neoliberalism (ibid, 439) depending on the political agent instigating the policy change.While these accounts capture how case-specific neoliberal outcomes vary based on different ideational mediation of political agents, there is little empirical examination of cases beyond so-called vanguard states of neoliberalism such as the UK (Fabry 2019, 165).
Recent political and economic developments in cases such as Hungary, the USA, and Turkey to name but a few, prompted a number of scholars to revive the term "authoritarian neoliberalism" (e.g., Bruff 2014;Tansel 2017;Fabry 2019).The concept describes "the growth of coercive state forms and practices limiting the possibilities of democratic political deliberation and decision-making" in combination with neoliberal policymaking (Fabry 2019, 166).A number of accounts convincingly show in what ways neoliberalism can be seen as inherently authoritarian.Taylor (2002, 46) critically analyzes the case of Chile arguing that Chilean neoliberalism was "implemented within an environment of systematic repression under the Pinochet régime."The British case has been similarly described in terms of authoritarian statism as the "state seized new powers to impose its policies," which gradually eroded "the democratic aspects of political life" (Gamble 1988, 181).Peck and Tickell (2002, 395) complementarily highlight the "process of punitive-institution building, social surveillance, and authoritarian governance" in the course of the neoliberalization of cities across the USA and Western Europe.Scheiring (2022) describes a national-populist mutation of neoliberalism in the case of Orbán´s Hungary.Fabry (2019) suggests that there is a varieties of authoritarian neoliberalism, which combine "some of the central tenets of neoliberalism (maintenance of balanced budget, introduction of a flat tax system and the pursuit of regressive social policies) with 'ethnicist-populist' measures that seek to co-opt, coerce or manufacture consensus among subaltern groups in society against alleged 'enemies'" (ibid, 165).These accounts make an important contribution in describing some of the undemocratic and socially exclusionary features of the neoliberal state.There is, however, little investigation of the ideational mediations underlying those authoritarian varieties and its political agents.
Political actors from conservative (e.g., former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher) and far-right political camps (e.g., Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party) are being subsumed under the wide banner of authoritarian policymaking.This suggests that regardless of the political actors in power and the various conditions of party politics, the expected outcomes converge toward authoritarian neoliberalism.Wilder and Howlett's (2014, 194) intervention in the literature on economic policy paradigm change suggests that it is crucial to understand "who the central actors are in paradigmatic and quasiparadigmatic change processes, what they do, and the circumstances and processes under which ideas may be activated."This perspective highlights the importance of identifying who the political actors are.This includes political actors, who are perceived to be irrelevant to the institutional contingency due to their position at the political fringes (ibid, 191).They may directly or indirectly "influence the ideational context that defines the range of possibilities for others" (Hogan and Howlett 2015, 309).
The ideational combination of neoliberal and authoritarian policy positions has been initially identified as the "winning formular" of far-right populist parties (McGann and Kitschelt 2005;Betz 1993;de Lange 2007).The winning formular describes how such parties combined "opposition to immigration with free-market economic and socio-cultural conservativism" (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, 148).Particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, these parties experienced electoral gains "in countries where the established parties converged to the center and where the political economy is based on a strong clientelist/paternalist relationship between the political elites and the electorate" (de Lange 2007, 417).Even if many of these parties did not enter government during this period, with the important exception of Austria, party competition analysis provides rich evidence of how party programs from the political fringes impact the broader ideological landscape.Wagner and Meyer (2017) show how mainstream parties accommodate conservative and authoritarian party positions from the populist right such as "cultural concerns of immigration, law and order and social liberalism" (Wagner and Meyer 2017, 86).These accounts provide important insights in how far-right populist parties ideationally mediated the rise of neoliberalism as well as their ideational power in mainstreaming authoritarian sentiments.Yet, little attention has been paid to whether and to what extent far-right populist agents carry ideational power, which impacts paradigmatic economic policy change.
Political actors, who wish to promote policy change, have to engage in discursive articulation and construction of policy anomalies, to which they seemingly offer solutions (Wilder and Howlett 2014, 190).Ideational power is here understood as the ability of political agents to offer a crisis narrative, which fosters an "actual perception of crisis" and "explains what went wrong and how the problem can be solved" (Carstensen and Matthijs 2018, 437-438).Even though Wilder and Howlett (2014, 189) suggest that "it would be erroneous to assume that influential actors always or even typically represent state authority," the existing body of literature has identified the function of those crisis narratives exclusively for mainstream political actors, who attempt to induce policy paradigmatic change.
Crisis narratives are, however, a significant feature within populist discourse (Wood and Ausserladscheider 2020;Moffitt 2015).Building on the insight that crises have to be discursively constructed, Moffitt (2015, 190) argues that "populist actors actively participate in the 'spectacularization of failure' that underlies crisis, allowing them to pit 'the people' against a dangerous other, radically simplify the terms and terrain of political debate and advocate strong leadership and quick political action to stave off or solve the impending crisis."Moffitt (2015) thus argues that populist politicians perform crises in their rhetoric by seemingly identifying failures, contextualizing these failures in a wider framework by adding a temporal dimension and who is responsible for these failures, how this is detrimental to "the people," and finally how their leadership would stave off this crisis (Moffitt 2015, 198).While the identification of the significance of crisis narratives in populist mobilization strategies presents an important contribution, the specific role of far-right populism in neoliberal policy paradigm change has been neglected.This begs the question of how and to what extent far-right populism impacts the nation-specific implementation of neoliberal policymaking?

Studying the role of far-right populist actors in constructing exclusionary neoliberalism
In order to answer this question, I provide an in-depth single case study analysis of the far-right populist FPÖ and its impact on Austrian economic policymaking.The FPÖ and the Austrian context present a non-positivist case study selection as it provides an inherently interesting case of intrinsic importance (Gerring 2007, 42).Compared to other countries, which only recently experienced the rise of far-right populist parties (Hopkin and Blyth 2018;Norris and Inglehart 2019), the FPÖ presents a long-standing dominant force on the Austrian political landscape.By holding a governmental office as early as 1983 and again in 2000, the FPÖ is a particularly relevant case for the study of far-right populist parties, granting a historically rich repertoire of data.
I employ an inductive "explaining outcome" process tracing approach, which allows to explain "a specific outcome in a single case" (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 18), in combination with descriptive methods performing an explanatory function (Gerring 2012, 724).In the case of Austria, the paper seeks to explain how Austria has become a culturally exclusionary neoliberal state.Instead of testing the conceptual fit of Austro-neoliberalism within the category of authoritarian neoliberalism, I use the descriptive term "exclusionary neoliberal state" to specify the ideational impact of far-right populist actors such as the FPÖ on processes of neoliberalization.While the exclusionary neoliberal Austrian state, which was fully implemented in the early 2000s, is the outcome of the process I seek to describe, this paper takes a historical perspective (Abbott 1990).Since "policy change, and especially paradigmatic policy change, may be much less sudden and all-encompassing than originally surmised" (Wilder and Howlett 2014, 187), the analysis starts in 1956, the founding year of the FPÖ.I thereby descriptively account for the FPÖ's impact on "background ideational processes" (Carstensen and Matthijs 2018, 437) in post-war Austria until 2006.
Despite offering a descriptive account, this paper remains analytical by building on framework of studies that sought to complement Hall's (1993) seminal work on economic policy paradigm change.This analysis is thus couched in Carstensen and Matthijs (2018) conception of ideational power and agency and Wilder and Howlett's (2014, 187) take on policy paradigmatic change as "gradual, hermeneutic and discourse-intensive activity."To highlight this discourse-intensive process and the FPÖ's role within it, I used a multitude of different historical and political sources of secondary data such as manifestos,1 transcribed speeches, and interviews, other party publications from the FPÖ's website and institutions closely associated with the FPÖ, such as the think-tanks FPÖ-Bildungswerk and Attersee Kreis, and other sources such as newspaper articles, academic journals, and books.
Ideas in discourse are understood to play a mediating role between the political actors and the (economic) institutional context (Hay 2016, 526).The institutionally situated actor-voters as well as politicians-orient "themselves toward their institutional environment through a series of subjective and intersubjective understandings, cognitions and normative dispositions" (ibid).This allows political actors to convey seemingly "inevitable, necessary and non-negotiable" political and economic imperatives (ibid, 520).In this context, narratives present a specific form of ideas, which actors use to shape a particular understanding of events (Schmidt 2014, 191).The ideas analyzed in this paper are thus understood as narratives that are firstly, contextualized in a particular institutional environment at a given moment in time and secondly, seek to strategically mobilize a specific understanding of this environment.
The FPÖ's political discourse has thus been explored using a narrative analysis, which is sensitive to the temporal sequences, in which people purposefully provide "accounts about themselves or events" with an intended effect (Bryman 2012, 582).The intended effect is interpreted as the attempt to mobilize voters and legitimize political paradigmatic change (Widmaier et al 2007;Carstensen 2011).The narrative analysis as employed in this study thus seeks to pinpoint the forms and functions of specific narratives over time (Abbott 1990).To conceptualize the legitimation of policy paradigmatic change in discourse, this study builds on Hay's (1996, 253) insight on narration of crisis as a "moment of decisive intervention."I systematically coded each document based on the crisis narratives and the economic ideas it presents as crisis inducing and problem solving.I subsequently categorized the economic ideas into traits of exclusionary neoliberalism (Table 1 summarizes these in appendix).While the analysis is based on a wide array of textual data, some documents do not allow for citation due to copyright laws (e.g., Attersee Kreis explicitly states that the writing must not be cited or quoted anywhere else).Therefore, the empirical section only presents a small fraction2 of the analyzed pool of documents.
This study is limited to the ideational impact of a specific actor on policymaking and therefore does not claim to explain causes for the rise of Austro-neoliberalism or the electoral dynamics that presented favorable conditions for the FPÖ in post-war Austria.Instead, it provides an interpretative lens on the role of political powers that are perceived at the political fringes in economic policy paradigmatic change.In this case, the paper lends insight to the way in which the FPÖ was able to become politically relevant through shifting background ideational processes and ultimately influence the nation-specific articulation of neoliberalism.

The construction of an exclusionary neoliberal state
The FPÖ was founded based on its predecessor the "Electoral League of Independents," a party, which symbolizes Austria's intricate relationship with its National Socialist past.The party, founded in 1949, provided refuge for "former" Nazis, who were unwilling to join the other two parties, the socialists and the conservatives (Sulzbacher 2019, paragraph 4).The Electoral League was described as pan-German nationalist and liberal camp wanting to establish an "economically liberal counterweight" to socialists and conservatives (ibid, paragraph 3).The government, consisting of a coalition between the conservatives, the socialists and the communists, nationalized Austria's largest banks, and key industries during the late 1940s (Zöllner 1990, 553).In contrast, the Electoral League promoted economic ideas appraising and defending private property, advocating for a frugal management of nationalized companies, and fostering export markets by extinguishing trade barriers.Even though the League gained 11.6% in the 1949 and 10.9% in 1953 general elections (BMI 2021), the party dissolved little later due to its internal conflicts between its "liberal fraction" and the "national camp" (Sulzbacher 2019, paragraph 4).Out of its ashes, the National Socialists Anton Reinthaller, Klaus Mahhnert, and Otto Scrinzi founded the FPÖ.All of them enjoyed a steep career within the Third Reich and to clarify their ideological positioning, Scrinzi stated "I was always right-wing, also within the NSDAP" (Sulzbacher 2019, paragraph 8).
During the 1950s and early 1960s, when communism was still a relevant force in Austrian politics, the FPÖ's discourse engaged critically with socialist and communist economic ideas and advocated for a nativist self-understanding of Austria as part of the German people and the Germanic cultural community (FPÖ 1957).With the beginning of the 1960s, however, the communist forces in Austria declined.The "left bloc" and the communists dropped out of the national assembly in 1959 (Zöllner 1990, 543).Simultaneously, the socialists distanced their program from their Marxist understandings of societal reality, the nature of capitalism, the compatibility of class interests and of socialism as an alternative to capitalism (Schulze 1973, 18).The socialists' ideological shift proved successful as the socialists held governing majority from 1970 until 1983.With the decline of the communist forces and the socialists' move toward the center, the FPÖ also shifted its discourse on economic ideas as well as its nativist identification.This programmatic change is what marks the FPÖ becoming a relevant political force and is therefore the subject of the following section.

Constructing the Crisis of Austro-Keynesianism 1970-1983
"A few billion Schillings more debt gives me fewer sleepless nights than would a few hundred more unemployed" Austrian Federal Chancellor 1970-1983, Bruno Kreisky (Kreisky in Obinger and Tálos 2010, 106) The so-called Kreisky era, named after the Austrian socialist chancellor Bruno Kreisky was shaped by an 'Austro-Keynesian' strategy that became the dominant policy paradigm during the 1970s and the early 1980s (Ausserladscheider 2021, 207).Just like conventional Keynesianism, Austria prioritized full employment through counter-cyclical budget politics.While pursing and achieving full employment in 1971, policymakers went "the Austrian way" and decided revaluating the Schilling3 as tool to stabilize prices, which was described as "unorthodox utilization of tools of exchange rate policy" from the perspective of the "prevalent economic theory" at the time (Kernbauer 2018, 9).
Despite the international economic turmoil in the 1970s and the worsened macroeconomic performance in the wake of the oil shocks, "Austria outperformed most Western democracies in terms of macroeconomic and labor market performance" (Obinger and Tálos 2010, 106).Kreisky's policy response is perfectly captured by the famous quote at the beginning of this section, which he stated in the run-up to the 1979 general elections.Obinger and Tálos (2010, 106) summarize the "political strategy to cope with the repercussions of the oil shocks" with "coordinated wage policies, labor hoarding in state-run industry, labor shedding via early retirement benefits, anti-cyclical deficit spending and public promotion of investment" as well as increasing social security contributions and raising "contribution ceilings for all professions and insurance branches."One consequence of Kreisky's political strategies was that the "level of debt skyrocketed from 20.4 percent in 1970 to almost 50 percent of GDP in 1985" (ibid).
Mobilizing the window of opportunity of rapid international and domestic change, the FPÖ presented its new program, which was later self-narrated as "taking the liberal direction" (FPÖ 2017, 5).It was based on a conference on "liberal market economy" and took the Free Democratic Party of Germany, a liberal party, as role model for its program (Steger 1991, 63).Their new program and discourse signaled a brief "pause" in FPÖ's nativist and nationalist discourse, while strengthening FPÖ's (neo)liberal agenda.The party leader at the time, Norbert Steger, later describes how this new program was a direct response to Kreisky's Austro-Keynesian strategy and explicitly aimed against the socialists' political economy, and in particular, its fiscal policy (ibid).Indeed, confirming Moffitt's (2015, 198) observation of populist "performance" of crisis, the FPÖ "identifies failures" in rising governmental debt, counter-cyclical spending, welfare state spending, trade tariffs, nationalized companies, and individuals' freedom to thrive on the market.While it is less surprising that neoliberal ideas enter the political debate at that time, mirroring international political developments in the UK and the USA, the significant insight of the analysis presented in this section is that the neoliberal ideational agent in the Austrian case was a far-right populist party at the political fringes.
Investigating their discourse, I found that the FPÖ construed a crisis of Austro-Keynesianism through narratives framing the issue of governmental debt as problem of how much power "the state" exerts, especially in terms of welfare state spending.In these narratives, the state is depicted as "anonymous administrator of power" (FPÖ 1970, 2) or the "omnipotent state" with its "stiff bureaucracy" (FPÖ 1979, 5).The narrative suggests that this state thus hinders individuals, who want to be self-reliant and refuse to be "equalized" (ibid).This critique is closely linked to the welfare state and welfare state payments, which is suggested to lead to a "levelling down of society" (FPÖ 1971, 1), and "prescribed standardized luck for society" (FPÖ 1983, 4).The "custody of the state" (FPÖ 1971, 1) promotes "thinking in class and status groups" (FPÖ 1970, 2), which is suggested to suffocate a free individual unfolding and ambition.Another narrative frames the welfare state as "abuse of economic power" (FPÖ 1971, 3), which promotes class war, hinders social progress and a betterment of living conditions, as well as threatens social peace and the social order (ibid).Through this framing of the welfare state, classes, and equalization, the FPÖ introduces the idea of individualism and performance.This allows a distinction between the hard-working and well-performing Austrians and those dependent on welfare state payments (FPÖ 1971, 1).
Similarly, Kreisky's strategy to strengthen state-run industries through public investments has found strong critique within the FPÖ's discourse.The FPÖ identifies failures in the government's regulation of nationalized companies, trade tariffs, and exchange rate policies.The FPÖ narrates the context for Austria's domestic industry as uncompetitive and artificially shielding from external influence.This, in combination with the allegations of rent-seeking of the governing parties, there is a suggestive link of nationalized companies being at an advantage due to their proximity to (socialist) political bodies.This would distort natural competition and create an environment, in which necessary imports are "hindered because of protectionist, competition-hostile or traditional reasons" (FPÖ 1971, 7).The hostility toward competition also frames the FPÖ's discourse about free trade and Austria's export industry, which "must be expanded" (ibid).Relatedly, such policies "shattered the otherwise resilient and crisis-resistant small and medium-sized enterprises," since their "profits are being made impossible or are largely being taxed away" (FPÖ 1979, 13).Finally, this would hinder the creation of "enough capital for investment to discover new markets and develop new processes" (ibid).
These identified failures are attributed to the allegedly problematic governing periods of the socialists, by which the FPÖ elevates "the level of crisis by linking it into a wider framework and adding a temporal dimension" (Moffitt 2015, 198).Additionally, it frames "the people" versus "those responsible for the crisis" (ibid): the 49.9% of citizens versus the conservatives and the socialists (FPÖ 1975, 1).Especially "the absolute socialist majority" is suggested to "abuse its power" and leaves Austria with "shattered state finances, drastic tax increases and threatened workplaces" (ibid).This complements the populist crisis performance, which identifies the failures of Austro-Keynesianism and the responsible socialist politicians, who act to the detriment of "the people."

Making neoliberal a viable policy solution in the run-up to the 1983 elections
Presenting similar political-economic developments as in countries such as the UK (e.g., Hay 1996), Austria's rising levels of debt and the increasingly deteriorating economic situation "also increased skepticism concerning the welfare state, particularly among employers associations" (Obinger and Tálos 2010, 106).Leading representatives have argued that the welfare state has reached its limits and was to be blamed for financial instabilities (ibid).Obinger and Tálos (2010, 106) speak of a time when "[M]ounting anti-welfare rhetoric in combination with increasing economic difficulties triggered a trend reversal in social policy."The FPÖ strategically mobilized these welfare-skeptical sentiments with their crisis construal of Austro-Keynesianism.This "trend reversal in social policy" that Obinger and Tálos (2010) describe, presented the window of opportunity for the FPÖ to offer an alleged solution to the crisis of Austro-Keynesianism in advocating for a policy paradigmatic shift toward economic neoliberalism as the following shows.
In response to "growing unemployment," "economic pessimism," and "exploding governmental debt" as the party leader at the time, Steger (1991, 63), writes, the FPÖ suggests that its leadership would solve the problems that Austro-Keynesianism and its socialist proponents presents.With "as much freedom as possible," the FPÖ proposes their "societal model," which "has the goal to create as much freedom as possible with as little state as necessary" (FPÖ 1970, 5).This would secure individual freedom and "enable him [sic] to fully unfold in its capabilities and capacities" (ibid).Such rights need to "to be protected from arbitrary interference from the state" (ibid).As a result, "he [sic] will voluntarily-free and willing-not only seize his [sic] rights but also his [sic] duties" as a "carrier of the open society" (ibid).This framing of the state as protector of freedom and little interference is closely bound to narratives of individualism and performance.Performance becomes the principle by which society ought to act upon, enabling social progress.Similarly and relatedly, social justice becomes a task of the market as opposed to the state.In contrast to the Keynesian state's "equalization," which is "the enemy of freedom and also justice," the FPÖ enables "people in their pursuit of self-realization" (FPÖ 1979, 5).Instead of equalization, "[D]ifferences as expression of performance have to be naturally recognized" (ibid).The FPÖ presents itself as a "party of justice" and a "party for performance," as it stands "for politics that do not hinder performance but instead awards and additionally sets incentives for it" (ibid).The narrative continues that the party is for all those "who trust their own capabilities more than external help and all those who are ready to defend their freedom of decisions against the paternalism of the state and other powerful apparatus" (ibid).
While the freedom from state interference and the incentivization of performance allegedly solve the crisis of class and status groups as well as welfare state dependence, the FPÖ proposes a "rational and frugal state administration" (FPÖ 1971) in order to solve the (performed) crisis of governmental debt and counter-cyclical budget management.Through the rational and frugal state administration, the state can focus on its task "to protect the freedom of the individual and create the conditions for the strongest possible and unhindered economic growth" (ibid).A "frugal and cyclically adjusted" budget management would guarantee the "security and order of the economy" (FPÖ 1975, 4).The FPÖ would thereby fend off the "consequences of wasteful and indulgent politics, which must eventually be paid by all citizens and would increase inflation" as "[O]ne percent less inflation would mean four billion Schilling for the savers" (ibid).The "refurbishment of state finances" would also give the economy new hope (Steger 1991, 64).
Aside the normative narrative on the superiority of their frugal state budget, the FPÖ introduces the narrative of a "new political economy" in 1979.It comprises a constitution based on the principles of performance-based taxation and the entrepreneurial possibilities in small and medium-sized enterprises.The strengthening of profits, a performance-based taxation system, and support for small and mediumsized enterprises is a narrative intended to solve the identified issues of the artificial greenhouse atmosphere of Austria's domestic market.These policy positions in combination with reducing welfare spending, incentivizing individual performance, and the rejection of demand-management present core feature of economic neoliberalism (Hay 2004, 508).
In 1983, the socialists lost their absolute majority, signifying the fall of the Kreisky era.Obinger and Tálos (2010, 106) argue that "Austro-Keynesianism was gradually renounced in this era of transition."Shortly before resigning, however, Kreisky negotiated a small coalition with the FPÖ's "liberal" party leader Norbert Steger.This "liberal orientation" in the FPÖ's program led to their first governmental participation in 1983, which the FPÖ describes as "historical breakthrough" (FPÖ 2017, 6).Despite the fact that the previous FPÖ leaders were former SS officers, Kreisky's appraisal for the FPÖ's "liberal outlook" helped the FPÖ "through the door" of Austrian politics (Sully 1997, 3).It granted the party "a degree of respectability" (ibid).The coalition remained in power until 1986.The FPÖ's goal in office under Steger was to "hinder more socialism in Austria" and "eradicate uncertainty in the economy" (Steger 1991, 63).The coalition agreement included decisions to "stabilize the budget" and removing the privileges for state-owned industries (Steger 1991, 66).In response to rising unemployment in the early 1980s with more than 5%, the coalition decided the first policy reforms, which departed from "the expansionist route" (Obinger and Tálos 2010, 106), such as curbing expenditures in pensions, suspending unemployment compensation in case of dismissal, and cut backs in family-related benefits (ibid, 106-107).By entering office in 1983, the FPÖ thus brought neoliberal economic ideas into government, thereby rendering neoliberal policies a viable policy option for Austria's political economy.

Mobilizing the winning formular 1986-1999
Austria's macroeconomic performance deteriorated further from the mid-1980s onward."[E]conomic growth was significantly lower compared to previous decades" and unemployment increased significantly to 7% in 1999 (Obinger and Tálos 2010, 108).Especially long-term unemployment and increasing numbers in atypical work posed sever tensions on the labor market fueled by large parts of state-run industries going bankrupt (ibid).Public debt rose further (to 69.2 percent of GDP in 1995) while interest rates were high.Simultaneously, Austria's commitment to the EU membership necessitated liberalizing capital markets and cut public debt to the "critical 60 percent Maastricht threshold" (ibid, 109).This period has been described as "the death knell for Austro-Keynesianism" (Winckler in Obinger and Tálos 2010, 109).
Even though the "liberal orientation" made the FPÖ a dominant force on the Austrian political landscape with the brief pause in its nativist discourse, the party remained deeply committed to its nationalist and nativist ideology.Because of this, the party experienced on-going intra-party conflicts between the liberal and the nationalist fraction.These conflicts escalated in 1986 and led to the election of Jörg Haider as the new leader of the FPÖ.With the change in leadership, also the coalition with the socialists ended as the nationalist fraction of the FPÖ was rejuvenated.
The FPÖ under its new leader, Jörg Haider, strategically built its program around these "mounting economic problems" and "deep changes in the international political economy" (Obinger and Tálos 2010, 122), mobilizing a radical discourse against public debt, employment regulations, stronger European integration, and state-run industries.Haider adopted this neoliberal discourse alongside a strong ideological conviction to nationalism and nativism (Ausserladscheider 2021).Haider calls his accension as "reincarnation of idealism" because "humans can only experience real freedom if they have strong roots in their homeland" (Haider 1991, 73).The FPÖ thus shifted toward a programmatic combination of "free-market anti-statist" appeals with a return of an ethnic conception of "the Austrian nation and culture" as well as the "support for tighter controls on immigration, asylum and assimilation" (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, 152).
Prior to this discursive shift through Haider's leadership, the specificity of farright populist agency in neoliberal ideational change remained implicit.In context of political forces advocating neoliberalism across a variety of different countries throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the exceptional circumstances of neoliberal advocacy in Austria were signified in two ways: first, the FPÖ's historical foundation through National Socialists, and second, the function of neoliberal economic ideas in making the party a relevant political force as the previous section showed.The years under Haider's leadership, however, made the far-right populist specificity within the FPÖ's agency explicit in its nationalist and nativist nature, presenting exclusionary neoliberalism in the making, as the following narrative analysis will show.
The identification of failure within the "standardization" through the state and the socialist governance found its continuation under Haider's FPÖ albeit more radically framed as "Orwellian state" (FPÖ 1994) that binds "its citizens with soft violence" (FPÖ 1990).Haider promises to break with "statist paternalism and planned mismanagement" (Haider 1991, 72).Similarly, high taxation and government debt remain part of the FPÖ's main narratives (FPÖ 1986(FPÖ , 1990(FPÖ , 1994(FPÖ , 1995)).Complementarily, Haider's FPÖ constructs a strong discourse against cooperatives and unions, which allegedly can no longer deal with the challenges that "society's life poses" (FPÖ 1990).These narratives were particularly successful among workers in industrial areas, which "felt they have been left in the lurch by the socialists" (Sully 1997, 4).
In response to Austria's commitment to integrate into the EU in 1995 and the Schengen area in 1997, Haider's FPÖ constructs novel narratives on "multicultural experiments" (FPÖ 1994), "the foreigners' question" (FPÖ 1990), and "the EU as Maastricht Superstate" (Ausserladscheider 2021, 214-215).Within these narratives, "xenophobic sentiment and preference for law and order policies are joined by a rejection of the egalitarian principles of the welfare state" (Plasser et al. 2000, 39).Indeed, Haider frequently stressed the "over-foreignization" in combination with the Austrian welfare state, which "coddles immigrants and encourages them to have large families, leading to the degeneration of the Austrian nation" (Happold 2000, 955).
As solutions to these identified failures, the FPÖ under Haider continues to offer freedom as "our ideology" (FPÖ 1994), wanting "freedom without coercion instead of coercion without freedom" (ibid).Indeed, the FPÖ is "obliged to make room for the interests of our homeland Austria" and "build the binding foundation for a liberal problem solution" (FPÖ 1995).And finally, the FPÖ summarizes its demands in bullet points that read: "an immediate immigration stop, no new citizenships, strong intervention against organized crime, stricter punishment for drug crime and smuggling, fight against social security abuse, consequential deportation of criminal foreigners, repatriation of refugees after war has ended, no EU East expansion as long as they do not fulfill the entry requirements" (FPÖ 1999;FPÖ in Ausserladscheider 2021, 218).
In 1999, the FPÖ under Haider gained 26.9% in the Austrian general elections (BMI 2021).The FPÖ's strategy of performing a crisis proved electorally successful: economic (neo)liberalism combined with xenophobic sentiments were the main reasons for different groups to vote for the FPÖ (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, 152;Plasser et al. 2000, 36).Haider's FPÖ became "by far the most successful right-wing populist party in Western Europe" (Plasser et al. 2000, 34) and ultimately entered office in 2000 as coalition partner of the conservative party, controlling six out of ten ministries, including defense, finance, social affairs, and justice (Happold 2000, 954).

Shaping the neoliberal exclusionary state 2000-2006
"A good day begins with a balanced budget" Finance Minister 2000-2007, Karl-Heinz Grasser (Grasser in Oberinger and Tálos 2010, 114) The announcement of the coalition led to an outcry internationally as well as domestically.The 14 European member states sanctioned Austria by cutting "any bilateral official contacts at the political level with an Austrian Government integrating the FPÖ," refusing "support in favor of Austrian candidates seeking positions in international organizations," and only receiving Austrian Ambassadors at "a technical level" (Happold 2000, 955-956).The Washington Post wrote about "Vienna facing isolation over far-right party" (Drozdiak 2000), while The Guardian reports over "Europe rallying against Haider coalition" (Black 2000).Domestically, the coalition agreement gave rise to the Donnerstagsdemonstrationen (translated: Thursday's demonstrations), demonstrations, which took place almost every Thursday for two years to protest the coalition and its positions, which demonstrators saw as authoritarian and racist (Ziegler 2019, paragraph 3).
Even though the coalition had to issue a "declaration stressing their commitment to democracy and human rights" to attain the reluctant approval of the Austrian President at the time (Happold 2000, 954), the coalition's reaction to both the demonstrations and the sanctions left some commentators doubtful of their commitment (e.g., Preglau 2019, 171;Fallend 2012, 133;Albertazzi and Mueller 2013, 351).The sanctions were compared to a "conspiracy of the socialist international," which allegedly took its roots domestically with politicians from the social-democratic party and critical journalists, who would cooperate with the "enemies of Austria" (Preglau 2001, 207).Relatedly, leading Freedomites suggested to bring those, they accused of this conspiracy and other government-critical politicians before court for treason as well as prohibit the Donnerstagsdemonstrationen, both of which is deemed highly problematic in a liberal democracy (ibid, 209).Other examples have shown that the FPÖ systematically used libel procedures to suppress criticism as it was the case of the political scientist Anton Pelinka, who accused Haider (whose parents were Nazi officials) of being "close to national-socialism" and got sued by the FPÖ among others (Ahtisaari et al. in Albertazzi and Mueller 2013, 351).
The government's inaugural speech contrastingly celebrates Austria's democracy, its open society, and its many humanitarian acts since the end of World War II (Schüssel 2000).Schüssel (ibid), the incoming chancellor, therefore suggests that Austria has been unfairly criticized.The speech continues by describing the global challenges, which Austria has to tackle for which its "stiff structures," "restrictions to freedom," and "rules that prevent people from fully participating in decision making" are problematic (ibid, paragraph 26-27).In order to cope with those global challenges Austria will need to "break through these barriers," grant "more freedom," downsize the state, establish more efficient administration, free the economy from its "bureaucratic shackles," and give citizens the chance to "actively, selfreliantly, and future oriented" pursue new opportunities (ibid, paragraph 27).After the claim that the government promises "a new way of governing Austria" (ibid, paragraph 28), the speech continues re-iterating the FPÖ's policy positions, such as "courage to overcome the old traditions," "more freedom instead of the paternal state," "more self-reliance instead of paternalism from above," and "more individual performance instead of levelling down" (ibid, paragraph 29-34).While these core neoliberal ideas do not directly articulate exclusionary policies, the government program clarifies the exclusionary nature of the incumbent government.
The government program, titled as "a new way of governing Austria" (ÖVP-FPÖ 2000) embeds policies to "strengthen democracy," "national security policy and integration," "the efficient state" in exclusionary ideas.The coalition wanted to create a "new patriotism" to strengthen the democratic state (ibid, 8).While the ideational connection of democracy to patriotism signifies the programs' nationalist foundation, the strengthening of democracy should be reached through the introduction of new public management measures for the appointment of personnel in governing bodies as well as an "objectification for the appointment of judges" (ibid, 10).The section "strengthening democracy" continues to explain the necessity of reform for the Chambre of Labor as well as the social partnership (ibid, 12-13).Both, the changes in the "human resource management" of governing bodies as well as the reforms of institutions for workers' representation are indicative of the government's neoliberal state building.The subsequent policy implementations, which downsized bureaucracy and administrative reform predominantly affected institutional resource for the separation of powers and the independence of administration and justice (Preglau 2001, 207).
National security policy and integration seeks to address the "necessary fight against organized crime, against drugs, and against trafficking of illegal migrants" (ÖVP-FPÖ 2000, 53).Increased surveillance, provision of additional technological resources, as well as harsher punishments should solve issues of organized crime and facilitate the "fight against drugs," while the "fight against the trafficking of illegal migrants" problematizes illegal immigrants themselves and promises "consistent and intensified criminal proceedings" (ibid).These anti-immigration sentiments are bolstered by the erosion of asylum rights.The section on "integration" describes the necessity to "clearly separate humanitarian obligations" from "immigration to Austria" (ibid, 57).A faster processing of asylum applications and "effective border protection" seem to define the policy position on "integration" (ibid).On the labor market, the program follows, Austrians and people, who have already immigrated legally, need to be at an advantage before any newcomers (ibid).A study should show whether there are any displacement effects in different industries and which consequences are to be expected (ibid, 57-58).The enforcement of the law of aliens and the section on citizenship re-iterate the promise of stricter policies (ibid, 59-60).Overall, the coalition's national security policy put a stronger emphasis on law and order, especially in terms of surveillance of criminals, which are often equated to "foreigners."Finally, the "efficient" or "performance-oriented state" (ibid, 86) will have a reduced cost for administration and unburden the "public budget," which is narrated as strengthening Austria's business location as well as its service for citizens.The first policy points involve a significant cut in public office personnel, such as teachers and researchers, and a more selective appointment of personnel depending on cost-benefit calculations (ibid).The application of a new public management framework should additionally allow for "sanctions in case of violations of budget targets" as well as a softening of the service law to adapt wages based on performance (ibid, 87).Overall, 10 billion Schilling should be saved from cuts in education and research, 9000 public service workers will be let go by 2004, with further personnel reduction of two percent every year (ibid, 119).The program can be summarized in that it seeks to "halt a misunderstood Keynesianism, presented as Austro-Keynesianism, that had served as a smokescreen for soaring debt, and to free the nation of debt altogether" (ÖVP-FPÖ 2000 in Obinger and Tálos 2010, 114).
In their first year of governing, the budget deficit was abruptly cut to zero, nationalized companies were privatized, pensions schemes were substituted through private provision, and welfare state payments were cut drastically (Preglau 2001, 206); all of which is in line with core neoliberal economic ideas (Hay 2004, 508).Another major cut in welfare spending happened in 2003 (Hermann and Flecker 2012, 122).The FPÖ often wanted to push these policies further through demands such as cutting the resources for the Chamber of Labor by 40% or replacing social partnership through a holding, where the leadership would be appointed by the government (Preglau 2001, 208-209).Obinger and Tálos (2010, 113) observed that "reforms were literally pushed through so that the opposition and the unions were repeatedly confronted with a series of faits accomplis."Moreover, social democrats were removed from power positions and the government attempted to increase its "influence on the self-administrated social insurance bodies" (ibid, 114).
Another significant policy outcome lies in the hollowing out of the asylum system, exemplified well through the restriction on family reunification, which now excludes over 14-year olds, while allowing for custody pending deportation for under 14-year olds (ibid, 209).Similarly, the coalition agreed on an "integration contract" that obliges "foreigners" to sign an agreement saying that they would be fined, or even deported, if they were unable to achieve fluency in the German language (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013, 352;Heinisch 2003, 106).Here too, the FPÖ often wanted to push for more radical measures (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013, 352).The FPÖ thus played a major role in shaping the post-1999 exclusionary neoliberal state building in Austria in three ways: first, by making neoliberal economic ideas a viable policy option early on; second, by partaking in its implementation; and third, by impacting policy practices of neoliberal exclusion through the party's nationalist and nativist ideology (Table 1 in appendix shows an overview of government implementation and the FPÖ's corresponding narrative).
Aside the policy outcomes, however, the FPÖ's role as far-right populist party in implementing neoliberal policies also led to a wider acceptance of ideas critical of the foundations of liberal democracy domestically as well as internationally.Austria's political parties adopted a harder stance on asylum (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013, 352).Especially the conservatives were able to mobilize FPÖ's lost votes by adopting a similar rhetoric to the FPÖ's as well as the same policy contents in later elections (Preglau 2019, 243).The adoption of the FPÖ's rhetoric and policy content by mainstream parties normalized far-right populist ideas in Austria.Beyond Austrian domestic politics, the international community dropped the initially imposed sanctions after eight months (New York Times 2000).While the 14 member states initially vouched for these sanctions to avoid similar political developments in their own country, tensions between the member states emerged soon after, leading to the measures' retention (Happold 2000, 957).This, and political developments in other countries, indicate growing support for far-right populist parties (Preglau 2019, 242;Happold 2000, 955).
Both developments, the domestic and international acceptance of far-right populists in government, helped to normalize exclusionary and potentially undemocratic policymaking for the years to come.Indeed, in 2006, the Wall Street Journal celebrated Austria, the "once sleepy, corporatist economy," for having transformed into "one of Europe's most competitive thanks for 'free-market' reform and tax cuts" (Hermann and Flecker 2012, 121).In the Austrian case, neoliberal economic ideas played an important role in making the FPÖ an "acceptable" political force in the early 1980s; and vice versa, the FPÖ rendered neoliberal economic ideas viable as policy option for Austria's political economy.In a similar vein, the political developments in the early 2000s indicate that the FPÖ's role in implementing Austroneoliberalism made far-right populism in government a viable political outcome, domestically and internationally.

Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated how the far-right populist Austrian Freedom Party has been central to the construction of Austria's neoliberal exclusionary state in a discursive-intensive long-term process: first, the FPÖ's ideational agency brought neoliberal ideas into the 1983 government; second, the party's electoral success throughout the 1990s with its "winning formular" combined authoritarian and neoliberal policy positions; and finally, their governing role throughout 2000-2006 helped to construct the neoliberal exclusionary Austrian state.
Through describing this process, I have shown how far-right populist agents can play a key role in heralding paradigmatic reconfiguration aside centrist political forces.I thereby built on approaches that highlight the significance of within paradigm changes (Carstensen and Matthijs 2018) and its gradual and discourseintensive features (Wilder and Howlett 2014).While these accounts make an important contribution for understanding ideational change as background ideational processes, the political agents enforcing this change remained under-conceptualized. Based on the case of the FPÖ as major political agent in shifting the ideational context toward economic neoliberalism, I contribute to these accounts, by widening the conceptualization of ideational agency beyond institutionalized authorities.I suggest that the ideational agency of far-right populist parties has important implications for the nation-specific neoliberal variety that is being implemented.Restrictive immigration rules, strong law and order enforcement, and anti-judiciary procedures went hand in hand with the neoliberalization in Austria; policy implementations that have been described as threat to liberal democracy (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013).In addition, this paper contributes to the literature on populism by highlighting the ideational power of populist actors and its impact on the political-economic dimensions of institutional change.
The case of the FPÖ's long-term agency in heralding the neoliberal paradigmatic change offers new insights into the discursive mechanisms by which populist actors can exert ideational power.Especially in light of the recent rise of far-right parties across the globe, the insights provided in this paper raise important questions about the type of economic policy changes, which political actors such as Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, or Viktor Orbán bring about in the long run.Recent studies on these political developments suggest that far-right populist policy positions have shifted away from neoliberalism to increasingly feature economic nationalist ideas (Ausserladscheider 2019; Rovny and Polk 2019;de Lange 2007;Pirro 2017).Accounts stressing this shift in economic positioning have argued that such populist forces have become electorally successful due to their anti-neoliberal (e.g., Gamble 2020; Hopkin and Blyth 2018; Hopkin 2020) and anti-globalist (e.g., Rodrik 2018) policy agendas.While these prevalent accounts make an important contribution in understanding dynamics of party competition in the wider context of macroeconomic transformations, there is little examination as to whether their economic nationalist policy positions had a lasting effect on neoliberal policymaking.Prospective studies of the (long-term) ideational power of such far-right populist actors could provide important insights into the wider implications of populism for neoliberal paradigmatic dominance and the global nature of the international economy.

Appendix
See Table 1.The "FPÖ's pressure" on measures regarding asylum "increased the number of official acts" against illegal immigrants, immigrants, and their facilitators by "more than 11%"; "this means that in 2001 almost 49.000 people, which is an increase of 6.4% in contrast to 2000, were caught" (FPÖ 2002, 12) Foreigners -Introduction of an "integration contract," obligating "foreigners" to learn the German language, if not fines or deportation -Measures to fight abuse of the asylum system -Decreasing the number of "foreigners" who stay permanently -Introduction of "suitable evidence," such as an examination of the carpus, to confirm age of immigrants -Health check when first registered -Establishment of a list of criteria for the term "key worker" "The amendment to the aliens law of 2002 led to a restriction of immigration and that only those foreigners, who possess a specifically required skill for the domestic labour market, with appropriate experience, are admitted for work"; "moreover, it is conditional that the required skill is not covered by the domestic labour force" (FPÖ 2002, 45) Security/crime -New technologies for investigation -Ban on wearing face coverings -Higher punishment for terrorist acts -Dereliction of wealth behind terrorist organizations -Enforcing border controls -Stricter punishment for trafficking immigrants -Life-long sentencing for drug lords, etc "Austria could be made safer and a reduction of crime achieved.Moreover, additional legal protection for executive officials, who often risk their health and life for the safety of our citizens, has been established" (FPÖ 2002, 80-81) Ethnic groups and expellees -Measures to improve living conditions of old-Austrian autochthone ethnic minority groups and expellees, such as recognition of the Germanspeaking minority in Slovenia through the cultural convention "Austria's commendable interaction with its minorities has also been recognized and praised by EU experts" (FPÖ 2002, 107)

SME and business location
-Reducing ancillary wage costs -Reduction of contributions to the chamber of labor -Tax advantages for start-ups -Efficient measures against distortion of competition through an amendment to antitrust laws (appointment of antitrust lawyer, repression of social partners, etc.) -Amendment to insolvency law to combat abuse of insolvency "Through these measures, Austria's economy has been unburdened by 600 million €," which led to a better position in the "World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002," Austria becoming a more "cost-efficient continental-European business location," insolvencies having declined by 2.4%, more self-employed, more start-ups (FPÖ 2002, 59-60)  2002,

-
Reform to downsize social insurance carriers -Reduction of administrational effort by 25%, saving 55 million € -Controlling instruments for social insurance carriers "Through the realization of these measures, it has been shown that the governmental participation of the Freedomites made social policy in Austria more social, safer, more just and fairer" (FPÖ 2002, 84-5) Taxation -Reduction of taxation privileges -Abolition of tax loopholes These measures have led to a "reduction of tax and contribution ratio of ca.1% until 20031% until  "  (FPÖ 2002, 90)   , 90)

Table 1
FPÖ narratives on policy implementation during 2000-2006 governing term

Table 1
(continued) Privatization and debt-reduction of Austria's holding company managing companies, which are partly or fully owned by the Republic of Austria -Decentralization of budget responsibilities -Reduction of tax arrears -Measures against illegal employment "Under leadership of the Freedomite finance minister, the planned 'zero deficit' for 2002, meaning a balanced budget, could already have been reached in 2001.The result means that there is no new indebtedness" (FPÖ 2002, 24)Public service -Removing civil service status from any employee, where a contractual alternative is possible, for example for the executive, judges, crown attorneys, military "The number of employees with civil service status have decreased significantly, especially in governing bodies with Freedomite leadership"(FPÖ 2002, 73)