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The problem of non-compliance: knowledge gaps and moments of contestation in global governance

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Abstract

How do we account for norm (non-)compliance in complex situations of global governance? Instead of emphasising power and diverging interests, this research note develops an innovative framework by arguing for a need to account for the social foundation of norms and the processes of norm contestation among relevant stakeholders. It comprises three crucial elements: first, the relevant stakeholders that form around specific policies; second, the types of knowledge about the policy object at stake; and finally, the knowledge gaps across stakeholders and their strategies to overcome them. Based on these considerations, we advance a framework of three pillars of ‘vested interests’, ‘vice’ and ‘virtue’: given, first, the diversity of stakeholders in policy-making and their vested interests, we assume, secondly, an increased likelihood for norm contestation. For some this constitutes a vice. However, we argue, thirdly, that open deliberation has the potential to lead to positive implications for governance arrangements and is therefore a virtue for norm compliance. Applying this framework to the example of the use of outer space, we show how our approach can address what we call the ‘lasting reality’ of global governance, namely the regular confrontation of culturally embedded normativity that stems from the increased diversity of actors in the global realm.

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Notes

  1. For the code of ethics, compare the American Bankers Association (ABA) at: http://www.aba.com/Training/ICB/Pages/ethics.aspx

  2. See: http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/aboutus/roles-responsibilities.html.

  3. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qk_fGc92bJY (accessed 10 May 2017).

  4. http://www.space.com/35472-china-moon-sample-return-mission-november.html. The mission was initially scheduled from November 2017 but was postponed due to difficulties with the launch vehicle.

  5. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/15/indias-space-agency-successfully-launches-100-foreign-nano-satellites.

  6. http://www.isro.gov.in/chandrayaan-2.

  7. Compare Onuf (1994).

  8. For a critique of this argument with regard to CSR, see Vetterlein (2017).

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Acknowledgements

Work on this article commenced while Antje Wiener held a EURIAS Senior Fellowship at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies, Wassenaar (2014/15), and Antje Vetterlein held a one-year fellowship at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University (2015/2016). An initial version of the article was presented at the workshop “The Politics of Knowledge: Europe and Beyond”, sponsored by UACES’s ERA CRN programme at Robinson College, University of Cambridge, in July 2015. The authors would like to thank the discussants and JIRD’s two anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University, Museum Avenue, CF10 3AX, Cardiff, UK

    Hannes Hansen-Magnusson

  2. Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, Steen Blichers vej 22, Frederiksberg, 2000, Denmark

    Antje Vetterlein

  3. University of Hamburg, Allende-Platz 1, 20146, Hamburg, Germany

    Antje Wiener

  4. Hughes Hall, University of Cambridge, CB1 2EW, Cambridge, UK

    Antje Wiener

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Hansen-Magnusson, H., Vetterlein, A. & Wiener, A. The problem of non-compliance: knowledge gaps and moments of contestation in global governance. J Int Relat Dev 23, 636–656 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-018-0157-x

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