2
Theoretical Considerations

This chapter lays out the theoretical framework underlying the analysis of Brazil's exercise of power in global sectoral governance. After a brief characterisation of global governance, the chapter outlines the best way to analyse power in this context. Thereafter, the chapter distinguishes three types of power (discursive, decision-making/bargaining and resource-transfer power) and the accompanying types of interface (discursive, organisational and resource-transfer interface). As a first step in the further specification of these three types of power, the concept of narrative and the relevant narrative types as a form of discursive power are introduced. As a second step, the concept of nodal governance is further developed as an essential approach to a better understanding of both Brazil's decision-making/bargaining and resource-transfer power.

a)   Characterising global governance

'We live in a messy world', as Rosenau (2002: 70) stated when talking about governance in the new global order. Anne-Marie Slaughter speaks about a 'disaggregated world order' dominated by disaggregated rather than unitary state actors (Slaughter 2004: 5–6). Slaughter and Hale, for example, draw attention to the fact that the international system is made up of trans-governmental networks, 'informal institutions linking regulators, legislators, judges, and other actors across national boundaries to carry out various aspects of global governance' (Slaughter and Hale 2011: 342). Instead of a world order dominated by unitary states, the current international system is fragmented into a variety of different state and non-state actors (Slaughter 2004).

When characterising the complex processes of global governance, Rosenau introduced the term 'fragmegration', a combination of the

words fragmentation and integration. He referred to a situation 'where groups and countries are simultaneously fragmenting and integrating, where the two contrary forces are pervasive, interactive, and feed on each other' (Rosenau 2000: 1). In this fragmegrative environment, Rosenau stressed that states, notwithstanding their continuing significance, are no longer the only important actors and have increasingly lost the capacity to tackle global challenges on their own (Rosenau 2000: 7).

The principal underlying current of this messy, disaggregated and fragmegrated world order refers to the phenomenon of globalisation, which has triggered a variety of fundamental changes (Held 2002: 306; Woods 2002: 25): First, the erosion of political frontiers of states, regions and whole continents due to trans-boundary activities in the social, political and economic sphere. Second, a considerable increase in the number of networks, organisations, institutions and actors. Third, due to new information technologies, global interactions are moving with unprecedented speed and have a deepening impact, binding together the myriad actors, economies and communities involved.

These changes have amounted to new processes of interdependence which pose unprecedented challenges to the most important actors of the international system: the states. These challenges include such financial crises as the one experienced in East Asia in the 1990s affecting Russia and the US, or the financial crisis of 2008, which started in the US with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and shook the whole financial world like an earthquake (Wearden et al. 2008; Woods 2002: 26).

Global epidemics like HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, tuberculosis in the 1990s, SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2002, or Swine Influenza A/H1N1 in 2009 represent health challenges to the states which are of an all-encompassing and global dimension (WHO 2009, 2013a). Further challenges refer to flows of refugees, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Similarly, a multitude of other issues such as energy, environment or human rights are equally pressing global challenges which can no longer be tackled by the states alone.

At the heart of these challenges lies the protection of global public goods (GPGs), characterised on the one hand by 'nonrivalry in consumption and nonexcludability' (Kaul et al. 1999: 2) and on the other hand by the difficulty of being supplied easily (Kaul et al. 1999: 14). Since GPGs refer to goods which extend beyond national boundaries in space (the whole world) and time (several generations) (Kaul et al.

1999: 3), the supply problem is even more challenging than in the case of national public goods. The challenges involved in protecting these GPGs such as health – in the form of universal access to medicines or infectious disease mechanisms (Chen et al. 1999; Hein et al. 2007) – food security or the environment are huge when considering the recent examples of global crises and epidemics.

The importance of protecting GPGs was highlighted by the UN Millennium Declaration of 18 September 2000, when the UN member states agreed upon reaching eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the year 2015, among them the eradication of poverty, the protection of the environment and combatting HIV/AIDS.

As the example of the MDGs demonstrates, trans-boundary challenges triggered by the processes of globalisation have acquired dimensions which are global in scale and responsibility. The interesting question is how to actually confront these global challenges and meet the MDGs if there is no overarching authority present in the international system. And this is the point at which global governance comes into play. Raimo Väyrynen summarises global governance as the 'collective actions to establish international institutions and norms to cope with the causes and consequences of adverse supranational, transnational, or national problems' (Väyrynen 1999: 25).

Global governance should not be confused with global government, which would refer to a formal overarching authority in the international system. On the contrary, global governance is based on inter-subjective meanings derived from shared knowledge which needs to be supported by a certain majority of the actors involved (Rosenau 1992: 4). In other words, global governance can be understood as a process which is constituted by the actions of its own actors and the shared knowledge which a significant proportion of the actors agree upon. Viewed from this perspective, global governance may be of a messy, chaotic and even labyrinthine nature, but it is certainly not anarchic (Rosenau 1992: 7–8).

And yet, a question remains: can we find any order at all in global governance? Rosenau presents three levels of activity which sustain a global order (Rosenau 1992: 14). First, there is the ideational/inter-subjective level, which consists of belief systems or shared values. In addition, there is the behavioural/objective level referring to the actors' actual activities. These two levels are complemented by the aggregate/political level, which refers to the places where governance takes place, as for instance in the fora of international organisations.

Since global governance implies the absence of one overarching authority, the global order is sustained by a vast number of

authorities – so-called 'spheres of authority' (SOA) (Rosenau 2006: 149) – through which different types of power are exercised. The effectiveness of these SOA is dependent upon the mutual relationship between those who exercise authority or power and those who are the targets of the exercise of authority or power. The better the relationship between these two parties, the more legitimised the exercise of power will be (Rosenau 2006: 174). In short, the processes of global governance are sustained, and power exercised, by both the actors' perceptions and their actions in those places where they meet, exchange their views and positions and implement their decisions.

Let us enumerate the various groups of actors which engage in these limitless interactions (Rosenau 2006: 189). First of all, there are subnational and national governments of the states, the most important actors of the international system. These governments, however, instead of acting in a unitary way, are fragmented in their activities, with single agencies and ministries creating their own trans-governmental networks and inserting themselves into global governance (Slaughter 2004). Second, non-governmental organisations of either a subnational/national (NGOs), or international/transnational scope (INGOs). Third, international governmental organisations (IGOs) which serve as the most significant places for interactions between the first two groups of actors. Fourth, transnational companies (TNCs) which have acquired an important role in sectors such as global health governance. And fifth, unorganised elite groups or mass publics which may come into existence for a short period when reacting to particular events or issues.

When confronted with this multitude of actors involved in a variety of interactive processes at different sites of global governance, the important question arises of how an emerging power like Brazil is able to exercise power in the complex webs of global governance. Ikenberry and Wright brought forward two essential arguments in response to this fundamental question. First, new rising powers are provided with the possibility to take advantage of 'a wide array of channels and mechanisms' (Ikenberry and Wright 2008: 5) to participate and integrate in the structures of global governance. Second, the existence of a variety of multilateral organisations creates new 'opportunities for membership and voice' (Ikenberry and Wright 2008: 5) and provides 'incentives to integrate and accommodate rising states in various ways' (Ikenberry and Wright 2008: 6).

In short, the complex mechanisms of global governance can serve as an opportunity rather than an obstacle to countries like Brazil. Similarly, Rosenau holds that the proliferation of a multitude of networks undermines hierarchical structures and gives way to new forms

of authority which are governed horizontally rather than vertically (Rosenau 2000: 9).

Since the perspective on global governance has increasingly shifted to the study of various complex sectors within its macro-structure,[1] an analysis of Brazil's activities in these specific sectors would provide a new understanding of the country's power strategies in its political rise in global governance. Developing countries like Brazil are most probably able to exercise power in global governance sectors which focus on development problems and challenges, such as health epidemics, food insecurity or environmental degradation.

The MDGs are complementary, and so are the fundamental development challenges in the sectors of global health and environment and the global system of food security. An African child suffering from hunger also suffers from bad health. In this situation, environmental degradation as a consequence of climate change only increases the situation of food insecurity and poor health in which the child is trapped. In this ever-changing, sectoral and multi-actor environment, emerging powers like Brazil, as the new kids on the block, are presented with new and unprecedented opportunities to exercise power in the structures of global governance.

b)   The multiple dimensions of power

The most prominent and traditional view on power refers to coercion. Power, for Max Weber, is 'the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests' (in: Roth and Wittich 1978: 53). Weber's famous definition of power embeds the coercive view on power in a social context, arguing that the possibility to exercise power depends on the social position. In this respect, the state as the prominent actor in international politics finds itself in a favourable position to exercise power based on coercion, since Weber attributes the legitimate use of physical force to the state's essential characteristics.

> It goes without saying that the use of physical force (Gewaltsamkeit) is neither the sole, nor even the most useful, method of administration of political organizations. [...] But, at the same time, the threat of force, and in the case of need its actual use, is the method which is specific to political organizations and is always the last resort when others have failed.
>
> (in: Roth and Wittich 1978: 54)

Weber's concept of power is 'sociologically amorphous' in that '[a]ll conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable combinations of circumstances may put him in a position to impose his will in a given situation' (in: Roth and Wittich 1978: 53). Talcott Parsons put more emphasis on the social aspect of power by regarding power as something in flux, 'as a circulating medium' (Parsons 1963: 236) and defines power as follows:

> Power [. . .] is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions – whatever the actual agency of that enforcement.
>
> (Parsons 1963: 237)

Parsons stressed that both generalisation and legitimacy are at the heart of the exercise of power. The exercise of power must be based on a repeated (generalised) 'capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations' which needs to be seen as legitimised in order to be accepted by other units in the system. Nevertheless, Parson's definition also includes the use of coercion (the use of force) in 'case of recalcitrance' (Parsons 1963: 238), in particular when 'the possession and use of power' (Parsons 1963: 238) is put into question.

When talking about power Weber and Parsons both highlight two important dimensions of the exercise of power, namely the coercive aspect and the social position. Hannah Arendt developed an understanding of power which essentially differs from these dominant views by distinguishing between power and violence.

> Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.
>
> (Arendt 1970: 44)

Arendt contradicted Weber's concept of power (violence by the state) by claiming that no state exclusively relied on violence to maintain its power. According to Arendt, '[e]ven the most despotic domination

we know of, the rule of master over slaves, who always outnumbered him, did not rest on superior means of coercion as such, but on a superior organization of power – that is, on the organized solidarity of the masters' (Arendt 1970: 50).

In contrast to violence, she defines power, or the structure of power, as something absolute, 'the very condition enabling a group of people to think and act in terms of the means-end category' (Arendt 1970: 51), while she sees violence as something instrumental, a means to an end (Arendt 1970: 51). In this context, Arendt argues that '[p]ower needs no justification, being inherent in the very existence of political communities; what it does need is legitimacy' (Arendt 1970: 52). In the same vein, she holds that '[p]ower springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may follow' (Arendt 1970: 52). This kind of action is defined by Arendt as follows:

> To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin (as the Greek word *archein,* 'to begin,' 'to lead,' and eventually 'to rule,' indicates), to set something into motion (which is the original meaning of the Latin *agere).* Because they are *initium,* newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action.
>
> (Arendt 1958: 177)

I am completely aware of the fact that Arendt developed her view on power particularly against the backdrop of the mass protests and student rebellions in the 1960s.[2] Nevertheless, I am convinced that an application of Arendt's view on power to the socially constructed processes of global governance will contribute to a better understanding of Brazil's exercise of power.

In the endeavour for conceptualising power, three main strands have developed which may be categorised as *power over* (see Max Weber), *power to* (see Talcott Parsons) and *power with* (see Hannah Arendt). Applying these three perspectives to a social relationship highlights the multidimensional character of power and the need for an integrative and interactive approach to its conceptualisation. The perspective of *power over* refers to the power of coercion, agenda-setting or influencing the other's interests. In the exemplary master-slave relationship, the master has power over the slave because he has the power to coerce the slave into doing something, influence the slave's 'agenda' regarding their daily work and obviously influence the slave's interests. The second

strand emphasises the fact that power is something which emerges out of a social relationship. According to this perspective, the master has the *power to* exercise force over his slave due to his particular social position in a social relationship in which the slave recognises the master as such and recognises the master's power. The third strand, advocated by Arendt, stresses that the master is only able to exercise his power over the slave because the masters are much better organised than the slaves. In her view, it is not the master alone exercising power but instead the whole group of masters who *act in concert*. For Arendt, it is not the possibility of coercion which provides the master with power but the high degree of organisation among the masters legitimised by the slaves.

c) The concept of social interface

To develop my own types of power against the backdrop of the multidimensional concept of power and the socially constructed processes of global governance, I rely on the concept of actor-oriented interface analysis, as presented by Norman Long. According to Long, '[i]nterfaces typically occur at points where different, and often conflicting, lifeworlds or social fields intersect, or more concretely, in social situations or arenas in which interactions become oriented around problems of bridging, accommodating, segregating or contesting social, evaluative and cognitive standpoints' (Long 1999: 1).

Long's interface analysis consists of the following elements (Long 1999: 1–5): First, an interface can be characterised as an 'entity of interlocking relationships and intentionalities' (Long 1999: 1), since continued interaction between the actors amounts to shared knowledge which again shapes the actions and perceptions, and as such, the interactions between the actors so that a specific set of norms, rules and laws develops. Second, as follows logically from the first point, interfaces are also 'a site for conflict, incompatibility and negotiation' (Long 1999: 2). Different actors confront one another with different interests, agendas and objectives which need to be brought together so that shared knowledge with a common set of rules and norms evolves. Third, interfaces represent the spaces where we may witness 'clash[es] of cultural paradigms' (Long 1999: 2), since the actors also see themselves confronted with cultural differences. Fourth, interfaces are not possible without considering '[t]he centrality of knowledge processes' (Long 1999: 3) and here in particular the notion of shared knowledge. As a fifth element, the concept of '[p]ower as the outcome of struggles

over meanings and strategic relationships' (Long 1999: 3) is essential to analysing interfaces. Sixth, interfaces are logically 'composed of multiple discourses' (Long 1999: 4) competing with one another. And seventh, interfaces serve to understand changes taking place in interactions by focusing on 'intervention practices' (Long 1999: 4) which may transform a specific set of norms and rules supported by a majority of the actors involved.

Two concepts are central to analysing interfaces, namely (shared) knowledge and power. Long puts these two central issues in relation to each other by emphasising that '[k]nowledge processes are embedded in social processes that imply aspects of power, authority and legitimation; and they are to lead to the establishment of common perceptions and interests' (Long 2001: 183).

In common with other authors (Bartsch and Kohlmorgen 2007; Hein et al. 2007; Hein and Moon 2013: 38), I have slightly modified Long's original approach, which concentrated on vertical local/national-global interfaces, cultural practices and sociological aspects. Instead, I use the concept of interface to put greater emphasis on the political interactions of various actors on horizontal global-global interfaces within the structures of global governance. Based on a horizontal approach to the concept of interface and drawing upon similar attempts to differentiate between specific types of power in the realm of global governance (Arts 2003; Bartsch and Kohlmorgen 2007; Hein et al. 2007; Wogart et al. 2008), I introduce the following three interfaces to analyse Brazil's exercise of power in the sectors of global governance (Figure 2.1).


Figure 2.1   Exercising power on the interfaces of global governance

- On the **discursive interface** (Rosenau's inter-subjective level) I anal-
  yse Brazil's discursive activities in interaction with other actors in
  global governance at the most relevant sites of the respective global
  governance sector (Rosenau's aggregate or political level). The power
  exercised here can be defined as **discursive power**, the ability to
  develop a particular discourse or frame reality according to one's
  own interests. I further specify discursive power by introducing the
  concept of narrative as one particular form of discourse.
- On the **organisational interface** (Rosenau's behavioural level) I anal-
  yse Brazil's decision-making activities in interaction with other actors
  at the most relevant sites of the respective global governance sec-
  tor (Rosenau's aggregate or political level). The power at the heart
  of the organisational interface can be defined as **decision-making
  power** (or **bargaining power**), the ability to forge alliances, set
  the agenda, and contribute to the creation of rules, norms and
  laws which become shared knowledge in the processes of global
  governance.
- On the **resource-transfer interface** (a sub-category of Rosenau's
  behavioural level) I analyse Brazil's resource-transfer activities in
  interaction with other actors at various sites of the respective global
  governance sector. The power at the heart of the resource-transfer
  interface can be defined as **resource-transfer power**, the ability to
  transfer material and immaterial resources to other countries abroad
  in the form of development aid, knowledge and expertise or capacity-
  building. I further specify this interface by introducing the concept
  of nodal governance.

The three interfaces along with their respective types of power only
exist in social relations and are socially co-constitutive, with one
type of power producing, reproducing and instantiating the other. For
instance, if a state wields the power to develop a specific discourse
(discursive power), the chances are high that this form of discursive
power spills over into the processes of agenda-setting or decision-
making and vice versa, which may impact on the ability of the state
to contribute to the creation of specific sets of norms, rules and laws
(decision-making/bargaining power). In the same vein, the transfer
of material and/or immaterial resources like development aid, knowl-
edge or capacity-building measures is most successful (resource-transfer
power) when embedded in a powerful discourse and buttressed by a set
of rules, norms and laws (decision-making/bargaining power). Conse-
quently, the exercise of power is constituted through a complex process

of interactions, which can be best captured by concentrating on the various interfaces of global governance.

In addition to their being socially co-constitutive, these three types of power are multidimensional in nature. They include shades of hard power in the neo-realist sense, with an emphasis on capabilities and resources; soft power in the neo-liberal tradition stressing legitimacy and reputation as primary resources of power; and social power in a social constructivist understanding, with an emphasis on the importance of discursive activities. At the same time, the three types of power involve conceptions of *power over*, *power to* and *power with*.

d) The concept of narrative

To further specify the discursive interface and the exercise of discursive power in global governance, I introduce the concept of narrative as one particular form of discourse. The concept of narrative points to the fundamental importance of stories in exercising power and how, by telling powerful stories, political realities can be (re-)interpreted to project one's own vision and point of view on the world.

As in the case of networks, our lives are dominated by narratives, be they historical, fictional or autobiographical. We devour and create narratives throughout our lives. Jerome Bruner argues that 'we organize our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative – stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on' (Bruner 1991: 4). Given our fascination with stories, it is no surprise that the plots and characters of Ancient Greek and Roman mythology are as present in our daily lives as they were two millennia ago.[3]

Political actors use narratives to make sense of the political realities they act in. But much more than that, narratives serve political actors essentially to influence and change political realities. A huge amount of academic literature pointed to the significance of narratives in understanding international relations and law (Heathcote 2005; Tiefenbrun 2005; Ward 1995). The relationship between the creation of law and narratives is particularly instructive in this context. Amsterdam and Bruner, by examining how storytelling shaped the decisions of the US Supreme Court, stressed that '[l]aw begins, as it were, *after* [italics in the original] narrative' (Amsterdam and Bruner 2002: 283). Both authors came to the conclusion that both the law itself and our understanding of the law is shaped to a significant degree by narratives which develop before the beginning of the law-making

process. According to Paul Gewirtz, 'narrative and rhetoric pervade all of law and, in a sense, constitute law' (Gewirtz 1996: 3) which means that narratives can explain more about the fundamental question of how law is made, constructed, framed and eventually comes into being.

I very briefly present two different examples which underline the significance of the relationship between stories and our understanding of the world. The beginning of the last decade witnessed the rise of a global narrative which has exercised huge influence on how we (in Europe and North America at least) conceive the world. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the US government created a war narrative which became so persuasive and powerful that it helped justify the US invasion in Iraq in 2003, violating the UN Charter and severely undermining international law (Minda 2005). The US government also used this narrative of the war on terror as a justification to undermine fundamental civil rights by introducing new legislation, such as the US Patriot Act or the Homeland Security Act (Darmer et al. 2004). In other words, a powerful narrative based on fear, insecurity and threats resulted in the justification of widespread and sophisticated surveillance programmes, torture, detention and the introduction of military tribunals for civilians without due process.

Another poignant example refers to one of the key topics of this work, namely HIV/AIDS. The emergence of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s can be characterised as one of the most significant events in the second half of the 20th century which considerably changed our perspective on the world. In one of the most important intellectual accounts on HIV/AIDS, Susan Sontag demonstrated in her essay of 1990 'AIDS and its metaphors' how the epidemic has developed a powerful narrative that shaped our understanding of the disease. By understanding and making sense of the disease, HIV/AIDS has been portrayed through innumerable narrative accounts, be they academic, fictional or autobiographical in nature, as a terrible tragedy for those people living with HIV (Kruger 1996; Pastore 1993; Sontag 1990). A broad number of accounts gives testimony to the marginalisation, isolation and victimisation of people infected with HIV in society, be they homosexuals or other minority groups (Galvão 2000; Parker 1997; Sontag 1990; Wolff 2012). Susan Sontag, for instance, encapsulated in her short story 'The Way We Live Now' (Sontag 1986) the atmosphere of fear and incomprehensiveness in the wake of the spread of HIV/AIDS and its impact on US society by narrating the hopeless struggle and the unfolding tragedy of an unnamed man with an unnamed disease.

The storytelling process is based on a similar logic to the one associated with framing. According to Rein and Schön, 'framing is a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting' (Rein and Schön 1993: 146). A frame represents a subjective perspective on a specific issue drawing attention to certain aspects of the issue, while at the same time neglecting other aspects which might be important to take into consideration. Three elements are essential when studying frames (Rein and Schön 1993: 153–9): First, the construction of frames involves a process of naming by providing a definition for the problem and the action to be taken to solve the problem. Second, every frame is embedded in a particular context and as such depends on shifts taking place within the context, while at the same time, if powerful enough, frames may also influence these contexts. Third, frames rely on actors who engage in interactions with one another and actually develop, interpret and shape these frames.

As a consequence, narratives develop out of an interactive and socially constructed process, establishing a particular perspective in competition with other narratives' perspectives (Shenhav 2006: 248–9). In comparison with mere frames, narratives can be much more profound in creating meaning, which is based on the following three central elements generally contained in any narrative (Shenhav 2006: 251): (1) Events, characters and background. (2) The events contained in the narrative take place in chronological order. (3) Causality of the events narrated. In this sense, Suganami speaks of narratives as 'intelligibilifying' meaning that they 'give us our self-understanding, sense of direction, a vision of what might yet be achieved, or not' (Suganami 1999: 381). Or in short, 'without narratives, we signify nothing' (Suganami 1999: 381).

Philosophers, historians, linguists and literary theorists have all used the concept of narrative as an essential tool to make sense of our reality (Barthes 1996; Habermas 1995; MacIntyre 1984; Ricoeur 1984; Taylor 1989; White 1973). For all of them, Aristotle's *Poetics* provides the point of departure for their thoughts on narrative. The two thinkers which I borrow from, namely Hannah Arendt and Northrop Frye, are no exception.

Hannah Arendt, who derives her thoughts and ideas from Ancient Greek Philosophy and the constitution of the Greek polis, develops her thoughts on narrative based on the relation between action and speech (Arendt 1958: 176). For Arendt, action and speech are so closely intertwined that both cannot be regarded separately.

> Without the accompaniment of speech, at any rate, action would not only lose its revelatory character, but, and by the same token, it would lose its subject, as it were; not acting men but performing robots would achieve what, humanly speaking, would remain incomprehensible. Speechless action would no longer be action because there would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of the words. The action he begins is humanly disclosed by the word, and though his deed can be perceived in its brute physical appearance without verbal accompaniment, it becomes relevant only through the spoken word in which he identifies himself as the actor, announcing what he does, has done, and intends to do.
>
> (Arendt 1958: 178–9)

Acting means speaking. Any actor is also a speaker with any action only becoming relevant with the words accompanying these actions. Arendt emphasises that '[n]o other human performance requires speech to the same extent as action' (Arendt 1958: 179). In other human performances, speech may be used as a means of communication or information without the revelatory character of speech (Arendt 1958: 179). But it is only when action and speech come together that a story develops 'with enough coherence to be told, no matter how accidental or haphazard the single events and their causation may appear to be' (Arendt 1958: 97).

While Arendt recognises Aristotle's claim that well-constructed stories rely on a causal and emotional structure, she goes further by emphasising the revelatory character of action and speech (Speight 2011: 117). This revelatory character manifests itself in the fact that through the interplay of action and speech 'men show who they are [...] and thus make their appearance in the human world' (Arendt 1958: 179).

It is through this interplay of action and speech that stories emerge, which tell us about the subjects, agents and the hero. According to Arendt, the hero revealed in the story has his/her heroic qualities attributed to him/her through his/her mere 'willingness to act and speak at all, to insert one's self into the world' (Arendt 1958: 186). These actors and speakers, however, are not necessarily the producers or authors of the story (Arendt 1958: 184). The fictional story, by contrast, can be clearly attributed to an author who 'pulls the strings and directs the play' (Arendt 1958: 186).

> The perplexity is that in any series of events that together form a story with a unique meaning we can at best isolate the agent

who set the whole process into motion; and although this agent frequently remains the subject, the 'hero' of the story, we never can point unequivocally to him as the author of its eventual outcome.

<div align="right">(Arendt 1958: 185)</div>

The main difference between fictional and real stories resides in the fact that real stories are not made, but reveal the hero through the interplay of his acting and speaking (Arendt 1958: 186). The full meaning of the agent's acting and speaking is only made explicit in the form of the drama. In common with Aristotle's argument in his *Poetics*, Arendt stresses that 'the theatre is the political art par excellence; only there is the political sphere of human life transposed into art' (Arendt 1958: 188). Taking Aristotle again as the point of departure, the drama can be divided into different types. By defining poetry, Aristotle distinguished between tragedy, comedy, epic poetry, dithyrambic poetry and the music of the flutes and of the lyre (in: Butcher 2000: 4). He goes on in his argument to elaborate more deeply on tragedy by referring to the tragedies of Sophocles and Aeschylus. Aristotle defines a tragedy 'as an imitation of an action' (in: Butcher 2000: 10) by which he means the plot of the story or 'the arrangement of the incidents' (in: Butcher 2000: 10) and enumerates six elements necessary for the construction of a tragedy: the plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle and song (in: Butcher 2000: 10).

Based on Aristotle's categorisations, literary theorist Northrop Frye (1957) distinguished between four types of narrative: tragedy, comedy, satire and romance. For my own purposes, I only concentrate on giving a more detailed characterisation of the narrative types tragedy and romance.

The main characteristic of tragedy refers to its fatalistic structure in that the hero is unable to escape his or her own destiny (Frye 1957: 208). Sophocles' Oedipus Rex may try as hard as he could, but would not escape his divine fate, predicted by the Delphi Oracle, of killing his father and sleeping with his mother. Similarly, people infected with HIV did not escape their 'death sentence' when testing HIV-positive in the 1980s and 1990s, no matter how much they struggled against the virus, no matter how passionately they defied their own fate. What has transformed all the stories on HIV/AIDS into a tragedy is the fact 'that the plot is already set in stone' (Riley 1999: 492) (first symptoms, knowledge of the disease, feeling sick, hospitalisation, increasing degradation of the immune system, physical deterioration, death) accompanied by a fixed language (Sontag 1990).

This personal tragedy experienced by people living with and dying from HIV/AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s was exacerbated by another tragedy involving the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical companies have been using their monopoly on patented AIDS drugs backed by the Agreement for Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) to sell these drugs at exorbitant prices to governments in the developing world. As a consequence, the costs for AIDS drugs were so high that many people living with the virus in developing countries could not afford to get access to these life-saving drugs.

The narrative type romance, however, is diametrically opposed to the narrative type tragedy. Romance is the birthplace of new hopes and desires with the hero projecting a certain illusionary ideal onto the world. Frye argues that '[i]n every age the ruling social or intellectual class tends to project its ideals in some form of romance, where the virtuous heroes and beautiful heroines represent the ideals and the villains the threats to their ascendancy' (Frye 1957: 186). The plot of romance can be understood as an adventure or a quest consisting of three stages (Frye 1957: 187): (1) The hero embarks on a dangerous journey, where (2) he encounters his enemy which leads to the crucial struggle of the whole plot. (3) After the end of the successful defeat of the enemy, the plot ends with the exaltation of the hero and the recognition of his heroic achievements.

While the structure of the tragedy is determined by its fatalism, with the tragic hero powerless to escape his or her fate (often death or destruction), the structure of a romance is characterised by its dialectic confrontation between good and evil, with the decisive confrontation between the two sides at the very heart of the plot (Frye 1957: 187). Hence, the hero is very often likened to a Messiah or a 'redeemer of society' (Frye 1957: 192), while the enemy may be regarded as evil, demoniac and immoral, full of wickedness and malevolence (Frye 1957: 187).

e)   The concept of nodal governance

Apart from specifying the discursive interface, I also intend to further specify the organisational and resource-transfer interfaces by using the concept of nodal governance. Networks govern our daily lives in a similar way to narratives. We organise ourselves through networks, communicate through networks and work in networks, so that our whole understanding of the world is shaped by and through networks

(Castells 2000a, 2000b, 2004). Kahler stressed that '[n]etworks have become the intellectual centrepiece for our era' (Kahler 2009: 2) and have 'emerged as the dominant social and economic metaphor' (Kahler 2009: 2).

Networks are no less fundamental to our understanding of the mechanisms of global governance (Braithwaite 2004–2005; Castells 2009; Drahos 2004; Slaughter 2004). All the networks which develop in global governance can be characterised as scale-free networks relying on an inhomogeneous connectivity distribution. In these networks only a minority of nodes are highly connected, while the vast majority rely on relatively loose connections. Due to the variation in the connectivity of nodes in scale-free networks, we are also confronted with nodes of different value. The more highly connected a node is, the more valuable it becomes, not only for the survival and the communication of the whole network and its surrounding nodes, but also for those actors engaged in these particular nodes which would allow them to exert more influence due to the high degree of connectivity.[4]

In this sense, the concept of nodal governance with a particular focus on those highly connected nodes can be understood as a further elaboration of network theories (Burris et al. 2005, 2008; Castells 2000a, 2000b, 2004; Drahos 2004; Dupont 2004; Kempa et al. 2002; Shearing and Wood 2003; Wood 2006). Castells underlines that '[a] network has no center, just nodes' (Castells 2004: 3) in the sense that '[a] network is a set of interconnected nodes [...] [which] increase their importance for the network by absorbing more relevant information and processing it more efficiently' (Castells 2009: 19–20).

According to Burris et al. '[n]odal governance [...] explains how a variety of actors operating within social systems interact along networks to govern the systems they inhabit' (Burris at el. 2005: 33). In the same vein, Burris et al. suggest that a node is composed of the following four main elements:

- A way of thinking (**mentalities**) about the matters that the node has emerged to govern;
- A set of methods (**technologies**) for exerting influence over the course of events at issue;
- **Resources** to support the operation of the node and the exertion of influence; and
- A structure that enables the directed mobilisation of resources, mentalities and technologies over time (**institutions**) [fat in the original] (Burris et al. 2005: 37–8).

When bringing together different networks, the overall performance of a node may vary, depending on the number of actors who dispose of a specific amount of resources to engage in creating an institutional framework (Burris et al. 2005: 38). By the same token, several nodes together can create a network which may result in the creation of other (super-structural) nodes even stronger in their capacity of exercising influence due to more resources and a stronger institutional framework (Burris et al. 2005: 38–9). Hein and Moon consider the World Health Assembly (WHA) as the principal super-structural node in global health governance due to its role as the central platform in the processes of global health where several different interfaces overlap:

> The WHA ensures the interface between the delegates of its members (nation-states) as well as the interface of these delegates with the representatives of many other global health actors. [...] Formal and informal meetings take place, agreements are reached, deals are struck, NGOs exert influence, the private sector lobbies, receptions are organized. In short, key global health players participate in the Assembly even if they are not part of the formal meetings.
>
> (Hein and Moon 2013: 40–1)

Nodes vary in institutional strength, resources, methods and mentalities depending on the activities of their actors and the linkages with other nodes or networks (Burris et al. 2005: 39). Consequently, nodes also vary in their ability to concentrate power. Hein and Moon explain that '[n]odal governance offers a useful way of thinking about the 'power map' in a governance system, and the key characteristics of effective governing nodes' (Hein and Moon 2013: 36). Castells sums up the aspect of power involved in nodal coordination by emphasising that 'a node is able to concentrate power in form of resources, discourses, institutions and methods which then may be used by one or more actors to achieve specific outcomes or to restrain other actors from achieving specific outcomes' (Castells 2004: 3).

During the process of my research I found that Brazil heavily engaged in nodal design efforts on the resource-transfer interfaces of the various sectors of global governance. Brazil's nodal activities, however, cannot be properly explained with the concept of nodal governance as it stands so far. As a consequence, I further developed the concept of nodal governance and introduced a new term called *gateway node*.

Gateway nodes share the four general characteristics of a basic node. They have a particular way of thinking (or mission), rely on a set

of methods and resources and mobilise their resources, methods and mission through an institutional framework. In addition to these basic characteristics, gateway nodes fulfil two principal functions. First, they serve the respective actor as an access point and pathway to the complex web of global governance mechanisms. Second, they function as a platform to disseminate the actor's ideas and thus increase its presence in the mechanisms of global governance. The main capability of these gateway nodes refers to the creation and coordination of new networks and/or new governing nodes.

Among those mechanisms which I describe as gateway nodes, I discovered that Brazil developed two specific types of gateway nodes which I call *governmental* and *intergovernmental gateway nodes*. Both governmental and intergovernmental gateway nodes serve the state actor, in this case Brazil, as an access point and pathway to the structures of global governance and function as a platform which allows Brazil to disseminate its ideas and increase its presence in the mechanisms of global governance. Yet two key differences exist between governmental and intergovernmental gateway nodes. Figure 2.2 summarises the key characteristics, functions and capabilities of a governmental gateway node.

A governmental gateway node derives its designation from the fact that it is essentially a governmental agency linked to a state

General characteristics

- Common strategy or way of thinking within the whole "nodal complex"
- Set of methods to implement this common strategy
- Significant amount of resources to support the functioning of the node
- Institutional framework which enables the mobilisation of resources and the implementation of a common strategy within the "nodal complex"

Functions

- Serves the state actor as access point and pathway to the complex web of global governance mechanisms
- Serves the state actor as a platform to disseminate its ideas and increase its own presence in global governance mechanisms

Capabilities

- Creates and coordinates new networks (networking activities)
- Creates and coordinates new governing nodes (nodal coordination)
- Coordinates its activities in a complex network of inter-connected nodes

Figure 2.2   The governmental gateway node

actor. In other words, a governmental gateway node forms part of the government of the respective state actor. As such, a governmental gateway node derives its common strategy (or its mission) from its long-time work as a governmental agency. Due to its constitution as a governmental agency embedded in governmental structures, it is able to create and coordinate new networks, create and coordinate new governing nodes and coordinate its activities in a complex network of interconnected nodes in the structures of global governance.

The two key differences exist in the general characteristics and the capabilities. First, an intergovernmental gateway node does not officially form part of a government but belongs to the institutional framework of an intergovernmental organisation. As will be shown in the empirical part, all intergovernmental gateway nodes are based on cooperation agreements between the Brazilian government and an intergovernmental organisation in the UN-system such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP) or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As such, an intergovernmental gateway node derives its common strategy (or mission) from the reasons and intentions laid out

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│                                                                   │
│   General characteristics                                         │
│                                                                   │
│   •  Common strategy or way of thinking within the whole "nodal    │
│      complex"                                                      │
│   •  Set of methods to implement this common strategy             │
│   •  Significant amount of resources to support the functioning    │
│      of the node                                                  │
│   •  Part of the institutional framework of an intergovernmental   │
│      organisation in the UN-system which facilitates a profound    │
│      and quick integration into global governance mechanisms      │
│      (First difference)                                           │
│                                                                   │
│   Functions                                                       │
│                                                                   │
│   •  Serves the state actor as access point and pathway to the     │
│      complex web of global governance mechanisms                  │
│   •  Serves the state actor as a platform to disseminate its ideas │
│      and increase its own presence in global governance          │
│      mechanisms                                                   │
│                                                                   │
│   Capabilities (Second difference)                                │
│                                                                   │
│   •  Creates and coordinates new networks (networking activities)  │
│      and/or engages in the implementation of technical            │
│      cooperation projects in developing countries                 │
│                                                                   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Figure 2.3   The intergovernmental gateway node

in the original cooperation agreement. Second, due to the fact that all intergovernmental gateway nodes were created in the last decade, their principal capability has been limited to the creation and coordination of new networks and/or the implementation of technical cooperation projects in developing countries. In comparison with governmental gateway nodes, intergovernmental gateway nodes have not assumed the capability to create and coordinate new governing nodes. Figure 2.3 summarises the general characteristics, functions and capabilities of an intergovernmental gateway node and highlights the two main differences in comparison with a governmental gateway node.