THE GOVERNMENTALITY OF BLACK BEAUTY SHAME

Discourse, Iconicity and Resistance

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For my family Encarna, Soraya, Damian, Jenna, Tev'ian, Lachlan, Arion, Nolan for all the joy, love and support and to Van and Cutie for helping me to finish this by doing the caring work that I can't do.
As always, for Mama.
To all Black women who will feel this.

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I want to thank all of the women who participated in my research on identity and beauty over the years. Your words still inspire and resonate!

CONTENTS

Transcription Conventions

[ ]   overlapping talk between two speakers
=   no gap between the two turns
(.3)   a pause of .3 seconds
(1.0)   pause of 1 second
?   rising intonation not necessarily a question
.   falling intonation
,   low rising intonation suggesting continuation
:   lengthening of sound
<u>my</u>   underline indicates stress on words
MY   capitals show loudness of delivery
°my°   degree sign means low volume
.hhh   inbreaths
((hhh))   laughter
>men<   speedy delivery
men-   cut-off

(Reference: *The Handbook of Classroom Discourse and Interaction.* Published online 24 April 2015 www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118531242.app1/pdf accessed 18th June, 2017)

Introduction: Developing a Black Decolonial Feminist Approach to Black Beauty Shame

Abstract This introduction constructs a Black decolonial feminist approach to Black beauty shame. Black feminisms-US, UK, Caribbean, Indo-Caribbean, African and Latin American—illustrate that intersectional racism/racialization matter for theorizing which centres Black women. A Black decolonial feminist approach to beauty and ugliness draws on Wynter, Espinosa Miñoso, Glissant, Césaire and Oyĕwùmi in thinking from/through Black women's experiences, their affective lives, and their becomings.

This book aims to develop a Black decolonial feminist approach to Black beauty shame. As such it begins from a perspective which does not deny that intersectional racism and racialization matter for Black women's experiences of being looked upon as beautiful or ugly. That is, beautiful and ugly are not seen as judgements which are neutral and inconsequential for Black women's lives. Rather, beauty and ugliness impact all of our psyches, our affective lives, our possibilities of being and extend to and through society, culture and political economy. Beauty and ugliness are socioculturally constructed and as such are raced, gendered, sexualized, classed, abled and aged in a multitude of ways. This is why it is important and necessary to think these categories intersectionally.

As intersectional categories 'Black beauty/ugliness' and 'Black beauty shame' drag coloniality with them into the twenty-first century. As such, Black beauty/ugliness and Black beauty shame always already demand a Black decolonial feminist analysis. Such an analysis would be one that takes on board the coloniality of power, being, knowledge and affect as integral to the very construction of these categories, as well as theorizing how it is that we can build Black beauties anew through Black decolonial feminist thought and practice.

Are We All Black Decolonial Feminists yet?

For Jamaican feminist philosopher and cultural theorist, Sylvia Wynter OJ

> You cannot solve the issue of 'consciousness' in terms of their body of knowledge. You just can't. Just as within the medieval order of knowledge there was no way in which you could explain why it is that certain planets seemed to be moving backwards. Because you were coming from a geo-centric model, right? So you had to 'know' the world in that way. Whereas from our 'Man-centric' model, we cannot solve 'consciousness' because Man is a purely ontogenetic/purely biological conception of being, who then creates 'culture'. So if we say consciousness is constructed who does the constructing? You see? (Thomas 2006: 2)

Wynter highlights first, who constructs consciousness and culture and second, Man as synonymous with Western Man racialized as white who creates culture. If we begin from the position of white Western Man, then we can see how it is that we still struggle within feminism over the construction of Black women's consciousness as well as what counts as Black decolonial feminist knowledge in the academy and beyond. We can see the very coloniality of Man in its raced, gendered, heteropatriarchal, ableist and classed modalities in academic life in other words. Black feminist thought in the UK academy still struggles to be perceived as theory as is also the case in the USA where for Ann Ducille (1994) Black feminist theory is not seen as a 'serious' academic endeavour. This erasure ensures that Black feminism is not seen as a discipline with a history, distinguished scholars and rigorous scholarship, but rather a buffet where Black feminist theory can be picked at by white feminists and discarded as easily as a half-eaten sandwich or relegated to the dustbin of the easy

to forget, the inconsequential, even whilst it is an essential part of the epistemological toolkit of Black feminists.

One example of this is Kimberlé Crenshaw's (1993) theorization of 'intersectionality' so key to feminist theory in general. Through lack of proper citation, Crenshaw's work at one time within European academic feminism was transformed into appearing to be a white woman's invention so much so that various feminist scholars had to reassert its origins (Brah and Phoenix 2013; Erel et al. 2010). Crenshaw had mysteriously disappeared from the genealogy of this approach to feminist theory and with it all of the precursors of this within the long tradition of Black US-based feminists attempting to account for Black women's multiple positionalities because of the simultaneity of oppression or the interlocking of oppressions (cf Combahee River Collective 1983; Davis 1981; hooks 2000). These accounts were essential in thinking Black women's lives because they enabled us to see racialization as intersectional when we viewed it as an object of knowledge. These accounts enabled an analysis of how racialization interfaced and continued to interface with gendered racialized violence, feminist politics, dehumanization and de-womanization. That is, intersectionality enabled us to look at wide-ranging anti-Black African descent women's oppression rather than just being focused on difference.

If we go back to Wynter's quote and its focus on the human as white liberal subject, we can see that Black feminist theory must essentially continue its thinking through oppressive hierarchies as well as the contestation produced by intersectionality. Further, Black feminist theory as a decolonial project must construct new forms of becoming which are not focused on Man as a position from which Black women would know the world or be known by that world. Wynter also reminds us that there are modes of knowledge which are liminal, erased or subjugated in the academy because they stand outside of the hegemonic text of white Western epistemologies. Responding to white feminism from a Black decolonial feminist perspective, Wynter (2001) has said repeatedly that her focus is not on gender but on 'genres of Man'. She asserts this as her position because in her view focusing only on gender leaves Man intact and this cannot then lead to women's emancipation. Therefore, for her, placing gender at the centre of Black decolonial feminist theory will not be the root of Black women's liberation. However, critiques built on gender, race, other intersections and coloniality enable feminism to liberate Black women.

Rather than solely Wynter's Man, here we should probably also put (Wo)Man under our critical gaze because in academia in the Global North West the only feminist theory which prevails is white feminist theory. Within the academy, white feminist theory still seems to be applicable to everyone, to be universal, whilst that from Black feminists is seen to be particularistic. Of course, this continues to elevate white feminist theory to the detriment of Black feminist theory which still is not seen as capable of occupying the 'proper place' of theory because it is seen to be very narrowly only based on 'Black women's experience'. The error here, of course, is in seeing white women's universal feminist theory as not speaking from a particularistic position which is itself racialized as white (Alexander and Mohanty 1997). Thus, white feminist theory remains transposable to limitless contexts in its very invisible racialization as white. The Black decolonial feminist answer to this deracinating attempt to universalize white feminist theory has been to change 'woman' into a heuristic rather than an essentialist [white] fait accompli (Spivak 1993; Lorde 1984; Davis 1981; Collins 1990). This went some way to countering the past and future life of woman as white fait accompli through the violence of dehumanization, de-womanization and erasure of Black women and women of colour by decolonizing the category 'woman'.

This decolonization continues to be theoretically important, perhaps more so than ever. This is the case because in times of Trump, BREXIT, #Black Lives Matter and Fallism, for example, we need to take account of gender, race, sexuality, disability, class and other intersections as constitutive in establishing the borders of who can be 'woman'. A question which the analysis of Black beauty shame addresses in this book has long been a Black feminist theme and continues to be an essential Black decolonial feminist one. That question is what we do in terms of a politics of liberation in a profoundly anti-Black African descent woman world where she continues to be seen as only flesh?

The Body and the Flesh: What Are We to Do in a Profoundly Anti–Black Woman World?

Sylvia Wynter draws on Frantz Fanon's (1986) work to assert that we live in a sociogenetic world in which we have converted the social construct 'race' into flesh. Thus, it is that white (Wo)Men see themselves as being outside of race and racialization, whilst Black (wo)men are its very embodiment, the absolute limit of race itself. As a result of the fact that

they have been constructed as inherently pathological Black women's bodies have to be abjected (Kristeva 1982) from the white body politic including feminism and feminist theory.

At the level of theory, within academic life Black women can be seen to be too critical of and in contradiction to, the taken for granted of the disciplines when they are conceptualized as only speaking from other, quantitatively and qualitatively unverifiable knowledge bases. This can open up subjugated knowledge such as Black feminist knowledge to censure and the very live possibility of erasure (Collins 2015). Within white epistemic domination which does not acknowledge its hegemony, Black feminist thought can be accused of being too political, be read as just our/their opinion and as our/their opinion rather than objective it is named 'irrational/not scientific enough'. Of course, what this censure from white supremacist epistemic traditions attempts to do is to erase the possibility of the construction of alternative visions through Black feminist praxis (Collins 2015). For Kristie Dotson (2015), one of hegemony's fundamental tools is having the power to judge who counts as a legitimate knower as well as who can be the arbiter on what counts as knowledge. Thus, injustice is built into knowledge production itself, and the epistemic power of Black women is at continual risk of elimination. This occurs through, first, the impetus to 'move beyond' Black women through recasting the particularities of their lives as universal, or second, the converse of that where Black women's experiences are regarded as so particular that they have little value (Dotson 2015).

Within these contexts of epistemic domination, anti-Black African descent woman racism is experienced through negative affect. The term 'misogynoir' coined by Moya Bailey in 2010 to describe Black African descent women's specific experiences of sexism and racism as absent/presence, hyper-visibility/invisibility and hatred/inclusion with provisos is very appropriate here (https://mic.com/articles/152965/meet-moya-bailey-the-black-woman-who-created-the-term-misogynoir#.ByIkkdjq2. Accessed 21 December 2016). Thinking Black women's positionality through misogynoir and negative affect makes us revisit the connection that Hortense Spillers (1987) made between 'the flesh' and 'the body' during enslavement.

Spillers focuses particularly on the Middle Passage to speak of the flesh as suffering, wounded and ripped asunder as Black subjectivity was victimized and made inferior. For her, before 'the "body" there is the "flesh", that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape

concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography' (Spillers 1987: 61) The flesh is not biologically prior but precedes the body though being constructed via the traumatic transgenerational suffering of whips, iron, chains and other modes of dehumanization within a scene of seemingly endless suffering and subjugation (Spillers 1987). It is through such white racialized violence that flesh racialized as Black was constructed in the Western Hemisphere. The 'hieroglyphics of the flesh' produced through such trauma does not disappear when enslavement ends, legal liberty ensues and the Black body emerges. The 'hieroglyphics of the flesh' remains within continuing racial hierarchies as part of an 'American grammar' still based on physiognomy and physiology (Spillers 1987). Rather than being solely focused on the USA, I would like to relate this grammar to the Global North/South West in general as the scene of the emergence of the Black woman's flesh and body. Here, Black women's gender, sexuality, class and ability, for example, are still seen as operating profoundly differently to that of (Wo)Man in terms of the 'hyper' or the 'hypo'. The hyper and hypo continue to circulate dehumanizing images of Black bodies. For example, the burden hyper-sexuality or hypo-femininity often puts on Black women's bodies, the disregard for Black women's disability in race, class, gender and queer theory and the repudiation of the possibility of Black queer theory (Erevelles 2016). This burden of the hyper and hypo also has material affects in terms of the social, cultural, economic and political conditions that texture Black women's beauty/ugliness and Black beauty shame.

Of course, what Spillers also shows us is the violent process by which the Black woman's body is made into mere commodity, abject, but with a use, exchange, surplus and affective value in racial capitalism (Robinson 1983; Cox 1948). However, Black women were represented as being without gender and subjectivity, only gender neutral flesh, lacking full human existence, because the human could only ever be white. If we think about it, this still in large part represents Black women's precarious beauty lives. Black women's bodies and Black feminist theory have use value only in so far as they have exchange value within racial capitalism, but it is an exchange value which will always be less than that for white (Wo)Men's bodies or white feminist theory. This exchange value is linked to affective value because in demonstrating to whiteness itself that it is 'tolerant' and 'non-racist' Black women's bodies and Black feminist theory instantiate a feeling that its 'post-race' (Goldberg 2015) rhetoric is a description of the real world as constructed by whiteness (Mills

1997). Thus, Black women's bodies and thoughts are appropriated so that the materiality of the flesh continues to be foregrounded as racialized lack.

If we go back to Wynter's 'sociogenesis', we can see why this is important for our beauty lives. Sociogenesis relates to the central role of human institutions in constituting phenomena that we have come to see as 'natural'. By this is meant that we believe that these phenomena have some inherent physical nature. Through sociogenesis, enslavement and colonialism's flesh continues to be the Black woman's burden. The hieroglyphics of the flesh still textures our/their beauty/ugliness as much as it does a feminist theory on beauty norms and white iconicity which still needs to be decolonized. This decolonization is necessary because of its focus on that colonial myth that 'all the women want to be white' (Tate 2010).

Decolonizing 'Woman': US, UK, Caribbean, African and Latin American Black Feminisms

Patricia Hill Collins (2015) declares that her motivation for writing her seminal book *Black Feminist Thought* was to speak truth to heterosexual, race, class and gender power relations by making Black women's lives and ideas the focus of knowledge as well as to illustrate Black women's interpretations of the world. Her aim was to challenge the usual positioning of Black women as objects of knowledge and instead to locate us/them as agents of knowledge. She started from the position that Black women could speak, so they were not as subalternized as in Gayatri Spivak's (1993) formulation. Rather, what was needed was the legitimation and analysis of what they had already said. Despite what Collins rightly sees as African American women's heterogeneity, there were key themes which were important within her analysis. For her, Black women exercised epistemic agency against epistemic oppressions (racism, sexism, class exploitation, ableism and heterosexism) to achieve social justice. The intersecting oppressions in Black women's lives meant that race only/gender only solutions to injustice would not work because of intersectionality. Collins did not claim that the framework for Black feminist thought of epistemic agency, social justice and intersecting power relations was new but linked it to the Combahee River Collective (1983) statement which could also be traced to Sojourner Truth's question 'Ain't I a woman?' in the nineteenth century and to Anna Julia Cooper's

(1892) *A Voice from the South* (Collins 2015). Black feminist thought based on intersecting power relations was carried forward theoretically by feminists such as Angela Davis (1981) and Kimberlé Crenshaw (1993) amongst many others.

In the UK, the Organisation of Women of African and Asian Descent (OWAAD) constructed a nationwide network of politically active Black women (Samantrai 2002). At this time, Black was a political umbrella term which encompassed African and Asian descent women as seen in the organization's name. From 1979 to 1989, the Black British feminist movement gained visibility and traction. It later fragmented because of a dispute about who could lay claim to being Black which led to the dismantling of Black as a political umbrella term. This occurred because some women identified their struggle within Pan-African or Afro-centric ideology, whilst others preferred the term 'Black and Asian' coined by the Commission for Racial Equality at the time (Sudbury 1998). Fragmentation also occurred on another level of identification, that to do with sexuality, as lesbians in OWAAD critiqued its unrelenting homophobia (Sudbury 1998). These areas of difference erased the myth of common Black British sisterhood. However, at its zenith in the 1980s, the Black British women's movement was comprised of a nearly nationwide loosely linked network of activists organized around issues such as immigration, women's health, work and education within the post-imperial British nation (Samantrai 2002). Their dissent and critique of national exclusions and partial inclusions created a multiracial feminist movement constantly thinking through the metaphors of Blackness and womanhood which altered representations, critiqued the existing terms of identification and built alternative visions (Samantrai 2002). Black British women developed a movement that was politically formidable in opposition to the assimilation norm of 'Englishness' prevalent at that time (Samantrai 2002). However, Black British feminism has always been built on dissent and difference which ensured that no one doxa emerged. Interestingly, one area of dissent from the norm and political action was the area of beauty norms and skin colour politics (Weekes 1997).

In her article 'What is Black British feminism?' Lola Young (2010) states that Black British feminists are largely absent from the canon in Anglo-American institutions and are offered meagre support by white feminists. However, African American feminism offers networks and intellectual sustenance in a context where Black feminism is embedded in African American Studies departments and academic programmes. More

worryingly for us as Black decolonial feminists within the UK, intersectionality is rarely discussed outside of academic circles and there is little attention to Black women's writing (Young 2010). In the UK, 'Black' is used as a political descriptor and has been critiqued for obscuring different histories (Young 2010) as we saw earlier in the case of OWAAD. Notwithstanding this, the publication of Heidi Mirza's (1997) edited collection *Black British Feminism: A Reader* was a milestone in establishing a genealogy for Black British feminism and setting out what it looked like in the late 1990s at the time of the demise of the politics of Blackness as a political colour in anti-racist and Black feminist movements. Mirza's edited collection highlighted the fact that Black British feminism continues to bind us through the use of Black as a political colour rather than as an eradicator of experience or an instantiation of African descent hegemony. Earlier than this edited collection, Hazel Carby's (1997) 'White Woman Listen!' carved out the differences between Black and white feminisms in the UK as a political manifesto for Black women in the margins of the early 1980s women's movement and within communities continually under pressure from racism. Within Black British feminism, 'Black' continues to be a political concept rather than a prefix which denotes solely African descent as we see in the continuing work of Southall Black Sisters. However, neither Black nor feminist resonates to the same extent in the African continent as we see in the work of Molara Ogundipe-Leslie (1994), Oyèrónké Oyĕwùmi (1997, 2015).

In 1994, Molara Ogundipe-Leslie coined the term 'stiwanism' to refer to feminism in an African continental context. This term emerged from STIWA the acronym for Social Transformation Including Women in Africa (Ogundipe-Leslie 1994). Stiwanism centres on African women's needs and goals whilst fashioning strategies within indigenous cultural frameworks. As an approach to African women's liberation, it insists that women are equal partners in African social transformation thereby ensuring feminism is grounded in African cultural imperatives (Ogundipe-Leslie 1994). Thus, Ogundipe-Leslie denies the relevance of white feminist epistemology and praxis for the African continent. Indeed, much like Oyèrónké Oyĕwùmi (1997), her position would be that 'Black' itself is problematic as a descriptor for African women because it is a Western colonial concept instantiated to ensure relations of domination and subjugation (Tsiri 2016).

Speaking from a decolonial perspective, Oyèrónké Oyĕwùmi (1997) asserts that one affect of Eurocentrism is the racialization of knowledge

which recreates only Europeans as knowers and enshrines white male gender privilege in the culture of modernity. For her, the goal is to enable African continental research to be better informed by local concerns and interpretations and for epistemology to take African experience into account rather than being narrowly focused on the particularity of the Anglo-US American experience of gender. This focus on the Anglo-US American experience of gender has led to feminist scholarship assuming the category woman and her subordination as having universal coordinates, whilst outside the USA and Europe generally imperialism, colonialism and local/global forms of stratification must be attended to (Oyěwùmi 1997). The fact of male superiority is claimed by Oyěwùmi (1997) to be particularly alien to some African continental cultures. For example, amongst the Shona, some women have patriarchal status exempting them from women's work. Further, gender is a historically recent category in Yoruba culture and emerged from European colonization, because traditional Yoruba hierarchies were based on seniority gained through age rather than that of the Western patriarchal value and colonial category, 'gender' (Oyěwùmi 1997). The category 'woman' thus needs to be subjected to rigorous continuous analysis which privileges the categories and understandings of African societies (Oyěwùmi 2015). Further, interpretations on/of/about Africa must begin in Africa (Oyěwùmi 1997), and the critical discourses and activist cultures of African feminisms should not be ignored (McFadden 2007).

Rhoda Reddock (2007) highlights the fact that early twentieth century Anglophone Caribbean feminists were conscious of their Indian/African heritage at a time of European colonialism and engaged in anti-racist work based on shared experience of past African enslavement, Indian indenture and their joint status as colonial subjects. They went beyond the difference of racialization within colonial societies in the Caribbean as they forged feminist communal struggles against women's oppression. The United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) through Amy Ashwood Garvey's work became a training ground for Black feminist activism in the 1930s. This occurred even amidst the contradiction between Black male leadership and the dependence on women's work to build the organization (Reddock 2007). The Jamaica Women's Liberal Club with Adina Spencer, Aggie Bernard, Madame de Mena, Una Marson and Amy Bailey as members was influenced by Marcus Garvey in terms of their anti-racist practice and along with other Caribbean feminists in the interwar years worked to fight

shadism, colourism and their link to racialized class discrimination (Reddock 2007). In Trinidad and Tobago, another early Pan-Africanist feminist Audrey Jeffers founded the Coterie of Social Workers which became the leading organization for Black and 'coloured' women in the 1920s–1940s of which Indo-Trinidadian Gema Ramkeesoon was a member. They led campaigns for women's rights to secondary education, for the appointment of women police officers and the Divorce Act. The Coterie set up social work programmes for women and children and fought against racial discrimination at work, for example, by enabling more Black women to enter white-collar jobs (Reddock 2007). As a member of the Coterie and the Caribbean Women's Movement, Gema Ramkeesoon campaigned to improve relations amongst African and Indian descent populations in Trinidad and Tobago to enable joint class and anti-racist anti-colonial politics. In directing their attention to anti-colonial race, colour and class politics early Caribbean feminists did not pay attention to the fact of African descent hegemony and the relative absence of Indo-Caribbeans and Indigenous Caribbeans from the movement (Reddock 2007).

The second wave of Caribbean Feminism emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s through Black Power, national liberation struggles in Africa and Asia and New Left movements in the region to which feminists were affiliated. In the 1990s, the emergence of Indo-Caribbean and Indigenous identity movements contributed to Caribbean feminist discourses on race/ethnicity, gender and class whilst at the same time African descent/Indian descent conflict emerged in some parts of the region and superseded the Black/white binary of internationalized Euro-American feminist scholarship (Reddock 2007). For Rhoda Reddock (2007), feminist politics in the Caribbean must look at differences between women to be meaningful and affective.

The Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA) was established in the 1980s focused on race, ethnicity, class, colour, sex and capitalism. CAFRA was pan-Caribbean in its outlook but failed in its outreach to the wider population of Anglophone Caribbean women, for example Indo-Caribbean and Indigenous women (Reddock 2007). Gabrielle Hosein and Lisa Outar (2016) take up this gap by thematizing Indo-Caribbean feminist thought. This refers to intellectual work including gender analysis by Indo-Caribbean feminist activists, scholars, writers and artists and attempts to end the marginalization of Indo-Caribbean gendered understandings whilst recognizing

convergences and dissimilarities with other streams of Caribbean feminist thought. Indo-Caribbean feminist thought is entangled with trans-oceanic dimensions of indentureship and post-indentureship as it analyses Indianness, Caribbeanness, gender and feminism to change gendered political, sexual and knowledge economies and their inequalities in the region (Hosein and Outar 2016).

The Black African descent Dominican Republic born, Latin America based, decolonial feminist Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso (2007) avers that it is possible to affirm that all art [also read knowledge] made by women that is inventive, sagacious, radical and committed to their existence is feminist art [read knowledge]. This is the case whether or not that was part of the consciousness which went into its production. Further, in her view, it is impossible for there to be decolonization without 'depatrialization'. Espinosa Miñoso's view is that if feminism is not anti-racist, it is racist and we must make visible both colonization and the Western gaze within existing feminist discourses (http://www.uchile.cl/noticias/101203/el-feminismo-antirracista-de-yuderkys-espinosa-en-la-u-de-chile. Accessed 9 March 2017). Thus, it is necessary to think Black women's positionalities through a Latin American feminism which is of colour, indigenous, lesbian and which continues to resist colonization as it is impossible to think feminism from a white positionality (Espinosa Miñoso 2007). Instead, we must question the conditions of subalternity and the mechanisms of privilege within modern heteropatriarchy (Espinosa Miñoso 2007). The Latin American feminist intersectional struggle against heteropatriarchy must be approached from an anti-racist, decolonial, anti-capitalist position.

The point of this very brief overview of different Black feminisms has been to show its divergent strands but its commonality in terms of the centralization of Black African descent women's positionalities in theorizing and political action as well as intersectional analyses. The overview also illustrates that the USA is not the only position from which Black feminist thought and praxis have emerged and continue to emerge. It also highlights the fact of coloniality and the necessity to decolonize feminist theory and practice emerging from the Caribbean, the African continent and Latin America. The discussion to this point also shows the significance of race, ethnicity, colour and location in Black feminist thought which we can also extend to Black beauty thought. This overview also illustrates that differences exist within Black feminism which sees *women* who claim Blackness as political position as its constituency, rather than

the Black woman of colonial discourse and white supremacy. The plural *women* also helps us to resist the trap of homogenization caused by the sometimes necessary politics of strategic essentialism. This is important because as Black feminist politics in the UK and the Caribbean illustrate, to homogenize is to erase the very differences which are fundamental to the Black decolonial feminist project with which, like Espinosa Miñoso, this book attempts to engage. We can only attempt the decolonization of beauty norms by going beyond the oppositional logic of colonialism which has given rise to marginalization and subalternity within Black feminist politics and by recognizing the importance of the intersections we inhabit as Black women for Black decolonial feminist politics.

Édouard Glissant (1997: 17) speaks of the oppositional logic of colonialism and the decolonial politics of going beyond it in this way

> The conquered or visited peoples are […] forced into a long and painful quest after an identity whose first task will be opposition to the denaturing process introduced by the conqueror. A tragic variation of the search for identity. For more than two centuries whole populations have had to assert their identity in opposition to the processes of identification or annihilation triggered by these invaders. Whereas the Western nation is first of all an "opposite" for colonized peoples identity will be primarily "opposed to"-that is, a limitation from the beginning. Decolonization will have done its real work when it goes beyond this limit.

Inhabiting a Black decolonial feminist positionality means that we must continue to go beyond the limits of white feminist theory and not see this as our natural home no matter how much a part of the academic canon it might be. As we draw on Glissant, Espinosa Miñoso, Oyěwùmi and Wynter to continue the work of decolonizing feminism, it is necessary to invoke Black decolonial feminist theory and practice as home and site of identification in the simple terms set out by Espinosa Miñoso. This in turn means that we have to leave behind essentialist ideas of Blackness which are only capable of coming into being through whiteness, through (Wo)Man. What we have seen in the brief overview of Black feminism above is Black women's engagement with *becoming women* on our/their terms, a becoming which exists within our/their cultural memory of struggles over class, gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, colour, disability and the development of theory and politics beginning from our/their own contexts. This is a becoming which counters

misogynoir through decolonizing its power, knowledge, affect and material affects. In the decolonizing task set forth by Wynter (2006), Glissant (2006), Espinosa Miñoso (2007) and Oyĕwùmi (1997), we must take a *critical* but inclusive position on matters of racialized gender intersections and intersectional racisms. As Black decolonial feminists, we must be vigilant against being co-opted by the forces of racism, heteropatriarchy, homophobia, transphobia, class discrimination, ableism and neoliberal racial capitalism even as we strive to *become ourselves* and other than we once were.

Conclusion

The book aims to weave a theoretical and political intervention by using a Black decolonial feminist perspective to engage the instantiation of Black beauty shame using conversations as data. Further, it looks at Black beauty shame as relevant for the bodies of all Black African descent women, including those who are Black-white 'mixed race'. This latter is significant because the Black-white 'mixed race' body is one which is often seen as 'the beautiful/desired' within cultural representation and our continuing preference for lightness reflected in colourism/shadism (Sharpley-Whiting 2007; Hunter 2005; Tate 2015a, b). Through its focus on the multiplicity of Black women's experiences in terms of the shame of being judged as beautiful or ugly, the book contributes to the fields of Critical Mixed Race/Gender/Critical Race/Critical Ethnic/ Decolonial Studies as it looks at the politics of aesthetics for gendered and racialized dis/alienation and community membership. It also contributes to scholarship on shame as performative in its production of subjectivities. Finally, it explores the data read as shame scripts within which 'race' performativity (Tate 2005) enables agentic 'counter conduct' when women deny shame's attempts to link the social to the psyche through the establishment of negative skin egos. This dis/alienation in turn negates the hyper-reflexivity of the surface of the body produced by Black beauty shame. Next, the book moves to developing a discussion of the governmentality of silence and silencing and Black beauty shame.

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The Governmentality of Silence and Silencing and Black Beauty Shame

Abstract Affect is racialized with respect to Black beauty shame because beauty/ugliness is a socially constructed, culturally specific binary and within the 'structure of feeling' in the Global North/South West anti-Black African descent racism structures our experiences within racialized assemblages. Shame is attached to judgements of Black beauty/ugliness. It is an affect which is at once silenced, even whilst it aims to silence and produce silencing on the connections between beauty, ugliness and racialization.

Keywords Governmentality · Silence · Silencing · Disalienation 'Race' performativity · Racializing assemblages · Affect

When we think of beauty, we think of the pleasure we get from gazing at its source. We want to touch her/they/him. We might even want to become them in some way by passing through them. In other words, we think about the positive affect of pleasure, fascination and desire. However, these positive affects remain racially marked so that we have to speak about racialization in the same breath as we utter pleasure, fascination and desire. It is the case that there is a racialization of affect with respect to both beauty and ugliness. I say this because beauty/ugliness is a socially constructed, culturally specific binary and within the contexts in which we find ourselves in the Global North and South West 'race', racialization and anti-Black African descent racism structure our

19

experiences. 'Race', racialization and anti-Black African descent racism are inherent aspects of the judgement of beauty, even if in our 'post-race' times, we deny that judgements of 'race', the racialization of groups seen as racially different and or inferior, and the act of racism emerge at the level of conscious perception. To quote Michel Foucault (1980: 146), 'power relations materially penetrate the body without depending even on the mediation of the subject's own representations'. We might choose to live with the denial that we operate within racism's categories but nevertheless 'race', racialization and racism are part of the 'structure of feeling' (Williams 1961) which we occupy that enables us to make judgements of beauty/ugliness and its embodiments. Thus, because racialized beauty's embodiments are affective, we feel them in one way or another as positive or negative, even before we add in those affects attached to judgements of beauty/ugliness.

The focus of this book, shame, is one of the affects attached to judgements of Black beauty/ugliness. It is an affect which is at once silenced, even whilst it aims to silence as well as produce silencing around questions of beauty, ugliness and racialization. Speaking of the racialized 'structure of feeling' (Williams 1961) which we inhabit but which appears not to enter conscious perception, brings to mind Michel Foucault's (1994) governmentality.

In its original formulation, governmentality did not include 'race', racialization or anti-Black African descent racism so we need to include these issues for our Black decolonial feminist analysis here. The racialized governmentality in the interaction of beauty shame and silence/silencing makes some questions immediately come to mind. For example, how does Black beauty/ugliness produce the possibility of feeling (a)shamed, being shameful, because of the matrix of racialized appearance normativities in which we are caught as social beings? What are the teachable moments in terms of how beauty/ugliness moves across Black women's bodies that we need to consider when we focus on shame's silences and silencing? In what ways can Black women's bodies be seen to resist such silencing through the production of different beauty norms? That is, how does 'race' performativity (Tate 2005) enable the production of disalienating (Césaire 2000) subjectivities which resist the shame of ugliness? These are some of the necessary questions in the exploration of Black beauty shame which will be undertaken in this book. These questions are necessary beginnings in order to orient us to the outlines of the biopolitics and necropolitics of racial beauty governance and the daily

resistances to these at the everyday level which are engaged by disalienating subjects. Let us move now to beginning to look at Black beauty's silencing.

BLACK BEAUTY'S SILENCING WITHIN RACIALIZING ASSEMBLAGES

South Sudanese model Nyakim Gatwech, called 'Queen of the Dark', has taken the world by storm simply because she celebrates and loves her darker skin (http://www.storypick.com/queen-of-dark/ accessed 13/5/2017). We should wonder why in the twenty-first century a Black woman's melanin is still such a topic of discussion simply because she refuses to problematize her darker skin whilst it still overwhelmingly continues to be problematized societally as ugly. As said previously, both beauty and ugliness are racialized, gendered, dependent on context and intersect with age, sexuality, class and being able-bodied. These intersectionalities constitute an aesthetic economy which does not remain hegemonic without being propped up by oppressive power knowledge conjunctures.

Therefore, the aesthetic economy of racialized beauty/ugliness is produced by and in constant interplay with political economy, societal racial structuration, inequality regimes, knowledge production, representational regimes and affective economies in which different bodies have different values. We can see beauty as operating within an affective economy of anti-African descent Blackness, anti-Black-white mixedness and iconic body values in which *how* one looks matters. Therefore, whether one is *looked upon* as beautiful or ugly is not inconsequential, unworthy of academic contemplation, nor is it politically vacuous. This is so because beauty values allied to embodied normalizations and iconicities without doubt have a lot to tell us about how societies view themselves and the bodies of their ideal citizens.

Indeed, in Immanuel Kant's (1914) *Critique of Judgement*, beauty and ugliness are 'judgements of taste'. This means that beauty/ugliness as a binary pairing is not evacuated from social life into some 'objective' plain of analysis. Rather, the judgements 'beautiful' and 'ugly' are discursively instantiated, deeply subjective, affective and relational assessments which come to us within our structure of feeling as a binary coupling. Their enunciation as a binary coupling also locates beauty and ugliness on the surface of the body rather than lying somewhere 'within'

(Tate 2009). Thus, it is that, beauty judgements are made based on the social, aesthetic, political, economic and cultural value placed on an individual's *surface* appearance. That is, as they *appear* to us and such *appearance to us* is already culturally determined. There is no original beauty that stands outside of culture that we can go back to as source for our judgements of beautiful/ugly. Beauty/ugly is therefore multiply inflected which we can see if we again go back to the case of Nyakim Gatwech's beauty.

Beauty's implication with an individual judgement which is always already social as well as appearance means that beauty is only skin deep. Further, beauty firmly remains 'in the eye of the beholder' who is situated contextually within discursive regimes of 'the beautiful' and 'the ugly' (Tate 2009). The beholder's eye can never be 'objective' about beauty as such. This is the case because this 'eye', the beauty gaze, is a part of the socio-cultural, political and racialized beauty psyches that we inhabit because of the shared/contested discourses on beauty itself. These discourses in turn impact our judgements of 'the beautiful'/'the ugly'. Thus, there is a psychic life of beauty/ugliness in which intersectional racialized power relations are played out societally in the very moment we make beautiful/ugly judgements based on their appearance on the body's surface.

However, as we know from the history of the discursive construction of *the* Black woman's body in the Black Atlantic diaspora, assessments of exterior beauty/ugliness can also extend to moral judgments about oneself or whole groups of people such as those of African descent (Morgan 2009; Hobson 2005). How one *looks* can also be related to how one is *looked upon* in the sense of negative or positive appraisal in relation to a norm which, in the Global North West is always able-bodied, racialized as white, cis-gendered, straight, young, slim, straight-haired and middle class/elite. We can change the racialized view by inserting 'Black' here which increasingly means 'mixed-racedness' as the beauty norm (Tate 2015a, Sharpley Whiting 205; Hunter 2005), but the other parameters remain.

Being *looked upon* in relation to such a beauty norm, or being negated politically and bodily because one is the norm, is the vehicle for the emergence of Black beauty shame scripts (Munt 2008). Black beauty shame scripts silence differences, dissenting looks, whether defined as embodiment, gaze, politics or theorization. In its need to be universal, the Global North West's politics of iconic beauty as first and foremost

white, with the fall-back position to lighter-skinned 'mixed race', is centred on a will to normalization. This will to normalization is silenced through allowing other beauties in so that it is made invisible. However, it is also in itself silencing because it produces silences on beauty differences which become nothing to see or know, nothing noteworthy. Normalization represses beauty difference and dissenting looks by asserting body values in relation to its bodily rules.

In analyzing the 'repressive hypothesis' in *The History of Sexuality Vol 1 The Will to Knowledge*, Michel Foucault (1978: 4) discusses the imposition of a socio-cultural 'general and studied silence' around children having sex, even though it was 'common knowledge' that this occurred. Such repression is different from the silencing brought about by penal law as 'repression operated as a sentence to disappear, but also as an injunction to silence, an affirmation of non-existence, and, by implication, an admission that there was nothing to say about such things, nothing to see and nothing to know' (Foucault 1978: 4). In this new regime of discourses, it was not that nothing was said in terms of dissent from repression. Rather, difference emerged within what was said and by whom to obtain different results (Foucault 1978: 27). Thus, silence is a strategy of silenc*ing* the non-normative to maintain the hegemony of the norm without appearing to be complicit in the norm's (re-)stabilization. Indeed

> Silence itself- the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required between different speakers- is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within overall strategies. There is no binary division to be made between what one says and what one does not say, we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, how those who can and cannot speak of them are distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of discretion is required in each case. (Foucault 1978: 27)

Silence functions alongside what is said in order to distribute power/knowledge and to establish beauty hierarchies between bodies with different values. Alexander Weheliye (2014) describes this process as 'racializing assemblages'. In such racializing assemblages reside, 'Agamben's bare life, Foucault's biopolitics, Patterson's social death, and, to a certain extent, Mbembe's necropolitics, [but also] the existence of alternative

modes of life alongside the violence, subjection, exploitation, and racialization that define the modern human' (Weheliye 2014: 1–2). These racializing assemblages cannot then 'annihilate the lines of flight, freedom dreams, practices of liberation, and possibilities of other worlds' (Weheliye 2014: 2). That is, the premise of this book is that disalienating subjectivities act to counter Black beauty shame's silences and silencing even within the fleeting moments of conversation as interlocutors act to construct 'enfleshment otherwise' (Weheliye 2014: 2). They do this by deconstructing old beauty iconicities as they construct new ones.

There are many silences, things that one must keep silent about, that are then 'banished from reality' (Foucault 1978: 84). The injunction to silence as a strategy that keeps the beauty norm invisible underlies and permeates discourses of the shame of ugliness in this instance. For the norm to be invisible, only some discourses will be recognized as they are attached to hegemonic discourses of beauty circulated in beauty magazines, billboards, catwalks, celebrity diet regimens and beauty pageants, for example. Hegemonic white beauty discourses also always already construct the category human from which non-white subjects are continually beauty shamed through exclusion within the Western Hemisphere's racializing assemblages. There are beauty hierarchies, of course, emerging from Black anti-racist politics which produce other racializing assemblages around who can occupy the space of Blackness which also produce shamed and shameful subjectivities. As containers of Black beauty shame, both of these assemblages will be the focus of this book in the chapters which follow.

To draw from Foucault (1984: 204) *The History of Sexuality Vol 2 The Uses of Pleasure*, once again, discourses of ugliness are linked to beauty shaming because shame

> is a question of *aischynē*, that shame which is both the dishonour with which one can be branded and the feeling that causes one to turn away from it; it is a question of that which is ugly and shameful (*aischron*), in contrast to that which is fine, or both fine and honourable.

Black beauty shame brands one with dishonour and produces feelings of aversion from both self and other. The negation of such 'racial branding' (Wingard 2013) causes us to 'turn away' from that which has been constructed as ugly and shameful, such as women's bodies racialized as Black. As stated above, beauty is racialized, contingent, dynamic

and assessed through partial judgements of the visual, the surface of the body and its stylizations. Here the phrase 'Black beauty' will trouble the white norm because Black does not go together as easily with beauty as it does with ugliness, grotesquerie and spectacle (Hobson 2005; Cheng 2010; Tate 2015b). Thus, in white supremacist societies in which 'Black' does not routinely go with 'beauty', women racialized as Black African descent necessarily always already occupy a space of being (a)shamed, being made to be shameful and being constructed as inherent carriers of racial shame because of their embodiment. Therefore, Black women would be incited to turn away from their very selves (Taylor 2000, 2016) and live within the perils of a psychic life of self-aversion because of their ascribed ugliness.

An example of this can be seen in Modesto Brocos's 1895 painting which is emblematic of the Brazilian nation—*A Redenção de Cam* (The Redemption of Ham). In this painting, the Black darker-skinned grandmother gives praise for the progressive lightening of the family line through her 'mulata' daughter who then has an even lighter-skinned, straighter-haired child with her white partner. This image makes us note that it is important to remember that Black women are not born shameful, we/they are not inherently shameful. Rather, what we must be clear about from the very outset is that discourses of shame are already there for Black women to inhabit from the moment they are born because as Black girls they are interpellated as ugly, as lacking beauty value. We can see this if we just gaze at *A Redenção de Cam*. Black girls are interpellated in the Global North West and the Global South West as having shameful and shamed bodies because of the history of conquest, violence, domination, genocide of the indigenous populations, enslavement and settler colonialism which is shared in these regions (Sharpe 2010). As well as this, these discourses produce their own governmentalities (Foucault 1976) so that as women are turned away from by others and turn away from themselves because of their un-beauty they are oriented (Ahmed 2010) to read their faces, skin, hair, muscle, bone, fat, wrinkles, for example, as ugly, because of their discursive positioning. This Black beauty shame is a devastating legacy to bear on/within one's body (Spillers 2003), and it leads to individual and transgenerational suffering especially if we remember that

> Shame is a very sticky emotion, when it brushes you it tends to leave a
> residue to which other emotions are easily attached, namely envy, hate,

> contempt, apathy, painful self-absorption, humiliation, rage, mortification and disgust […] Shame becomes embodied, and the body begins to speak for itself in specific ways […] The fleshy intransigence of shame means that it can take an unusual grasp of a person's whole organism, in their body, soul and mind, sometimes in eccentric ways. (Munt 2008: 2)

As Sally Munt illustrates here, shame is redolent with negative affect which is borne on and within the body and is potentially unending. Indeed, for Eve K. Sedgwick (2003), shame relates to the corporeal, to subjectivity, as much as it relates to the psychic, because it is a 'bad feeling' that attaches to what one *is*. If we look back again to Munt's list of negative emotions above, we see the psychic damage that such shame can do because of the negative affects which can attach to *it*, namely envy, hate, contempt, apathy, painful self-absorption, humiliation, rage, mortification and disgust. Shame makes us inhabit bodies that are shameful because of what we appear to *be* to ourselves and others. This makes it impossible to become beautiful because of beauty's possibility for recognition and affirmative valuation only through the norm which is also the locus from which springs Munt's list of negative affects because of failure to *be* or even *become* the norm.

As a 'bad feeling', shame transforms or intensifies the meanings of our very body parts including hair, skin, muscle, bone, fat and facial features. Shame also dictates how our bodies and their constituent parts are read by others and other people's behaviours towards us. Shame also guides how we sense the world around us, how we feel in that world and how we can occupy the world as subjects. In other words, although shame tends towards painful individualization it is also deeply relational and, as such, is context-dependent. The power of discourses of Black ugliness lies in its ability to continuously (re)produce Black beauty shame and to silence any dissent through discourses of difference or practices of stylization by always comparing these to the norm. This is a norm which becomes visible in the moment of the comparison, and it is a norm against which the comparator is always found to be lacking. The comparator is interpellated as ugly, divergent and abject (Kristeva 1984). Thus, any possible contestation, any deviation from the iconic representation of the hegemonic category 'beautiful' is silenced. However, a Black decolonial feminist approach to analyzing Black beauty shame is based on Black women's experiences as point of departure and pays attention to their 'multiple possibly conflicting positionalities' (Patterson

et al. 2016). This meant that the data analysis had to enable the multiple and conflictual nature of/on the question of Black beauty shame to emerge whilst showing the moment in which this shame was denied purchase in their lives.

The data used in this book are drawn from 35 tape-recorded conversations on the question of beauty between women who identify as Black and Black-white 'mixed race' and who were based in London, Birmingham and Leeds at the time of the interviews. The conversations were analyzed using an ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analysis (Tate 2005). In this discourse analytic method, the data were transcribed using a conversation analytic approach, followed by locating the discourses of Black beauty shame and the sequential organization of subject re/positionings in the talk. This ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analysis elucidated:

a. the discourses on/of Black beauty shame in which the women were imbricated and their racialized governmentalities;
b. what identifications were enabled or negated by the iconic Black beauty models emanating from Black Nationalist politics or the white supremacist politics of racialized difference;
c. and, how the shame inducing governmentality of these Black beauty models was resisted by the women through 'race performativity' in which they brought new subjectivities into being in the conversations (Tate 2005, 2009).

The data show that Black beauty shame is always already there in societies where the governmentality of the racialized discourses of white beauty as iconic produces Black 'ugliness'. White-originated discourses of *the* Black woman as ugly mean that Black women's beauty multiplicities are not recognized and they occupy identity locations of shame as a 'bad feeling' that attaches to what one *is* (Sedgwick 2003). Another discourse of Black beauty shame relates to Black Nationalist discourses which situate Black-white 'mixed race' women as bodies out of place within Black communal perspectives on beauty because they are 'racially mixed'. These are the racialized governmentalities explored in this book. In the interviews, as women disalienate (Césaire 2000) themselves from the governmentality of discourses which interpellate them as 'ugly' or 'non-normative' they use 'race' performativity to bring Black beauties into focus or position Black-white 'mixed race' beauty within Black beauty's

boundaries. In so doing, they renounce Black beauty shame's racialized governmentalities. As will be shown in the book's discussion, the shame and silencing attached to both the iconicities of white beauty and the Black Nationalist darker-skinned, more afro-haired beauty are negated. They are not the core of these women's beauty identifications within the data. Thus, the women illustrate Foucauldian 'counter conduct' as regards Black beauty shame's governmentality and its will to self-surveillance, negation, hatred, contempt and disgust.

Conclusion

The book has several aims as it develops Foucault's idea of counter conduct and augments this with a Black decolonial feminist reading in a discussion of Black beauty shame. The first of these is to illustrate Foucauldian governmentality in the form of the silences and silencing produced by Black beauty shame as it looks at affect and aesthetics. Shame is not seen as oppressive but rather productive because of the intensification of the body and the possibility of the agency contained in women's analyses of and disalienation (Césaire 2000) from shame scripts in their interviews. Thus, drawing from Foucault (1978) Black beauty shame's power is also a productive, liberating force in this reading. This does not mean that Black beauty shame does not produce misery. The data which follows in this book show that it does and that this misery continues across the life-course as normative beauty discourses attempt to take control of Black women's lives. Indeed, this misery is also transgenerational as centuries-old Western Hemisphere discourses on/of Black beauty shame haunt Black women's lives today. There is no easy exit from the power of Black beauty shame's constant reiteration. There is only the necessity for constant vigilance and self-surveillance in case Black beauty shame slips through the barriers erected to protect the self. Chapter 3, next, turns to further explore the ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analysis used in reading Black beauty shame in the data and the epistemological and ontological bases of this analytic method.

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Reading Black Beauty Shame in Talk: An Ethnomethodologically Inclined Discourse Analysis

Abstract Looking for shame when it is not uttered motivated an analysis that incorporated conversation analysis with discourse analysis to produce an 'ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analysis' (eda). Interviews with UK Black and Black-white 'mixed race' women were transcribed using a conversation analytic transcription to capture the intensification of shame within talk surrounded by speech disturbances such as in-breaths, out-breaths, pauses and loudness, to show Black beauty shame's silence/silencing and speakers' agency in talk-in-interaction.

Keywords Translation as reflexivity · Dialogism · Addressivity Ethnomethodology · Discourse analysis · Conversation analysis Agency

Introduction

Let us begin with talk that is not about beauty but about a shaming encounter so that we can see the outlines of the analytic method and why it was chosen as a way into looking at Black beauty shame

31

Tape 1 Side A LF:2

1 L >The trouble is< even sometimes Black people are your own worst enemy cos they say o:h
2   look at her she's discovered her Blackness all of a sudden=
3 S =Mhm=
4 L =>You know,< p-we say some HORRIBLE [things] about each other [to   ] each other don't we?=
5 S   [Mhm]   =Mhm=
6 L=I wrote an article last year in a magazine and .hhh ah:m somebody wrote a reply to it saying
7   >people like her< (.) [meaning me] ah:m pt just cos they've found their Black identity- just cos
8 S   [˚Oh gosh˚]
9 L they've found their Black identity all of a sudden and >dah di dah dah dah< and I thought oh you
10 know you're so: ignorant [>YUH KNOW THEY DON'T THI-<]
11 S   [So did she know   ] you had a white mother then?=
12 L =((clears throat)) I'm NOT SURE WHAT SHE was assuming=
13 S =Mhm=
14 L =BUT obviously from what she wrote she didn't kno::w me: (.) very well=
15 S =Mh[m]
16 L   [Be]cause .hhh to sa:y that I'd just discovered my Black identity is so: inaccurate=
17 S =Mhm=
18 L =I've discovered my Black identity as a very young chi:ld,

In this extract, Lorna speaks about being excluded from being able to call herself Black by another Black woman because she has a white mother. Her detractor claims that she had only just suddenly realized she was Black (lines 1–12). Lorna rebuts this woman's view of herself in her translation as reflexivity sequence by claiming that she does not know her very well (line 14), and she had discovered her Black identity as a very young child which is her identity repositioning (lines 16–18). Spoken shame scripts such as contained in this extract on the question of shaming Black-white 'mixed race' women who claim Black identity led me to question how it would be possible for researchers to look for negative affect such as shame in talk when shame itself is not spoken. Shame is seldom spoken, as in 'I feel ashamed', because to admit to feeling shame is in itself shaming. The question of how to look for shame when the word is not uttered motivated a data analysis that entailed the incorporation of conversation analysis with discourse analysis so as to produce an 'ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analysis' (eda). Tape-recorded interviews with UK Black and Black-white 'mixed race' women were transcribed in detail using a conversation analytic transcription which times silences, notes speech disturbances and other characteristics such as in-breaths, out-breaths, volume and speed, as shown in the extract above. This transcription method was aimed at trying to capture how the intensification of shame spoken about by Sedgwick might appear in talk. We can see this intensification from line 6 onwards in the extract as Lorna speaks about being denied Black identity as a Black-white

'mixed race' woman and her response to that which is to claim that identity from childhood rather than it being something 'newly discovered'. The claim being made here through using this method of transcription is that intensification appears within talk surrounded by speech disturbances such as in-breaths, out-breaths, pauses and loudness, so that we can see what Black beauty 'shame scripts' (Munt 2008) might look like in terms of silence and silencing. She was being silenced through that well-known Black political discursive shaming device 'you have only just discovered your Black identity'. We can then also see within the transcription through which discourses and strategies that silence/silencing was constituted as well as the identity repositioning which is so central to disalienation (lines 16 and 18).

To go back to Black beauty shame, after the initial transcription stage, the next stage of the ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analysis (eda) was completed. This was done by systematically looking throughout the data for Black beauty narratives where there is the intensification of the meanings of body parts produced by shame in two particular discursive contexts. First, where white beauty is iconic and reproduces the Black woman other as 'ugly' and second, where the Black-white 'mixed race' body is constructed as 'other' because of Black Nationalist discourses on beauty. Looking systematically for silence and silencing enabled the development of a theoretical positioning that locates beauty and ugliness as shame scripts which are products of discourses to which we are subjected or which we transgress. That having being said, in common with Weheliye (2014: 2), I do not want to think of Black liberation and here Black beauty liberation, as only 'liberatory if they resist hegemony and/or exhibit the full agency of the oppressed'. Rather, I want to complicate this by looking at the interaction of both subjectification and subjectivation in talk-in-interaction. That is, I want to make a claim that Black beauty shame's silence and silencing produce subjectification and subjectivation which it is possible to analyse in talk-in-interaction.

Black Beauty Shame's Subjectification and Subjectivation in Talk-in-Interaction

Why use talk as data in looking at Black beauty shame's subjectification and subjectivation through silence and silencing? Judith Butler's (1993; 2004) work has shown the paradoxes involved in the accomplishment of selfhood (Davies 2006). Butler (2004: 173) points us to the significance

of talk-in-interaction in constructing subjectivities when she asserts if 'saying is a form of doing, and part of what is getting done is the self, then conversation is a mode of doing something together and becoming otherwise; something will be accomplished in the course of this exchange, but no one will know what or who is being made until it is done'. Here, Butler talks about a self-fashioning through talk-in-interaction that is the performative production of the self. 'Whereas Foucault's interest is primarily on those larger discursive shifts over time through which different kinds of subjecthood become possible-or impossible-Butler's interest is in how subjection works on and in the psychic life of the subject' (Davies 2006: 425). Both Foucault and Butler speak of the ambivalence of submission and mastery which is at the heart of subjecthood. Indeed, for Butler (1995: 45–46) there is a 'lived simultaneity of submission as mastery and mastery as submission' within subjecthood. For both Foucault and Butler, the subject's formation is dependent on power which is external to the self, a self which exists in antagonistic relations with such power as well as being reliant on it to come into being.

Thus, 'we are comported toward a "you"; we are outside ourselves, constituted in cultural norms that precede and exceed us, given over to a set of cultural norms and a field of power that condition us fundamentally' (Butler 2004: 45). Resistance is not exterior to power but an inherent aspect of it. Therefore, Butler sees subjects as having agency whereby they can critique and transgress their conditions of possibility through disavowal of a dependence on the other for recognition as subject (Davies 2006: 425). Black women as subject reject the power of the other which is an essential act in claiming selfhood, if they can only ever be interpellated into the positionality of Black beauty shame, shameful and ashamed because of inherent ugliness. As agents, Black women choose other forms of constructing accounts of themselves, other ways of naming themselves and other ways of knowing which enable them to continue to have coherent selves as we saw earlier in Lorna's extract. This relates very clearly in my view to Aimé Césaire's (2000) disalienation so central to how Black beauty shame can be negated which instantiates the decolonizing turn in talk-in-interaction. It also links to Foucault's concept of subjectivation, the emergence of the subject through the government of oneself, as opposed to mere subjectification, the government of others which, through the discipline of the gaze of self or other, reduces us to objects in a process which Frantz Fanon (1986) would describe as colonial 'thingification'.

Integral aspects of subjectivation are resistance to prevailing relations of racialized power through self-fashioning and autonomy, speaking back to power, critique and problematizing the world in which one finds oneself (Bonnafous-Boucher 2009). This is at base what Césaire (2000) means by disalienation. Subjectivation necessitates the practice of freedom within which an analysis of historico-cultural and political conditions and, I would add here affective life, is central to the government of oneself. However, such acts of empowerment are always uncertain and subject to slippage as the self is in a constant process of becoming (Foucault 1997) because subjectivation is located at the juncture between the governmentality of racialized neo-liberalism and the government of the self (Bonnafous-Boucher 2009). Thus, insofar

> as it is a permanent invention of the self, acting at once against and with imposed rules, subjectivation introduces a form of subjectivity which bears a closer resemblance to an aesthetics of the self than to a form of ethics understood in the traditional sense, and for this reason posits more of a composition of disparate elements of the self than an unambiguous identity. (Bonnafous-Boucher 2009: 77)

In Foucault's (1997) idea of the 'aesthetics of the self', there is a purposeful self-creation for self-fulfilment. Here, the aesthetics of the self asserts the importance of affect, the body and everyday critical thought and action in subjectivity and aesthetic self-creation. Thus, whilst one is being moulded by the other, one is also becoming free from the other's domination. The subject is involved then in a continuing process of determining the position it occupies through the techniques of 'aesthetic self-empowerment' (Seppä 2004 www.contemporaryaesthetics.org/new/volume/pages/article.php?articleID=244#FN48link. Accessed 12 July 2016). An integral part of this could be speaking the self as free and self- empowered aesthetically which does emerge in talk-in-interaction on the theme of Black beauty shame.

First coined by Emmanuel Schegloff, '"talk-in-interaction" was used over a number of writings' (Boden 1994: 236). Subsequently, Harvey Sacks, Emmanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson isolated and analysed a conversation turn-taking model. The turn-taking model is very general but specific as a system for handling turns, topics, and speakers in talk that most pervasive of social activities (Boden 1994). Although the original work led to the name *conversation* analysis, it is clear that what is

at stake is *talk-in-interaction* which, for Deidre Boden (1994: 73), can range from the everyday to the institutional. If we extend this every-day character to subjectivation's self-fashioning, critique, resistance and speaking back, we can see that talk-in-interaction provides an ideal space for Black beauty shame's interrogation. This is so as speakers produce subjectivities in talk-in-interaction through the interplay of intersectional racialized subjectification and subjectivation in terms of 'relations of hier-archy, distance or perhaps affiliation' (Holland et al. 1998: 128).

These theoretical connections formed the basis for looking at Black beauty shame's silences and silencing as an everyday interactional phe-nomenon and meant that I had to use different theoretical approaches to make sense of the talk. Different approaches have varying perspectives on power, agency, structure and subjectivity. However, what was gained from them in terms of understanding how to read Black beauty shame and resistance to it as a process in talk, I felt, was more important than these differences. Thus, I did not attempt to reconcile these theories, but used them to facilitate data analysis of the interplay of subjectification and subjectivation in Black beauty shame scripts through an approach to analysis based on an *ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analysis (eda)*.

To go back to the framework formulated by data analysis and outlined earlier, what does eda encompass analytically? As I listened to the tapes, I was trying to engage in 'unmotivated looking' (Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998: 94), even whilst recognizing that I am already imbricated in/through discourses. My initial approach to the talk was to transcribe it in detail using the conventions of conversation analysis. I then looked at these transcriptions and listened to the tapes in order to draw out themes that were emerging in terms of Black beauty shame. This was a long pro-cess but a productive one. These themes helped to generate collections of sequences of talk in which Black beauty shame was being constructed through retellings of interactions with shamers or critiques of shaming discourses which attempted to position speakers as shameful or make them feel ashamed.

Once I noticed this basic pattern of discourses of positioning in terms of the binary beautiful/ugly and the speech disturbances, silences, hedges and speed of delivery, for example, which surrounded them, the intensification of shame itself began to become clear in the sequential organization of the talk. It is a given in conversation analysis that ana-lysing patterns in the sequential organization of the talk 'enables the

analyst to make robust claims about the "strategic" uses of conversational sequences: the ways in which culturally available resources may be methodically used to accomplish mutually recognizable interactional tasks' (Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998: 93). Thus, it can be said that interrogating the data showed that Black beauty shame emerges in the space of the negotiation of discourses. Within this space of negotiation, women position themselves as being made to feel shame but reposition themselves as not ashamed or shameful through the use of critique. This critique which I term 'translation as reflexivity' is central in going from subjectification to subjectivation. The Black beauty shame scripts structured by subjectification and subjectivation can be understood in the following way:

1. *discursive Black beauty shame identity positioning*—subjectification
2. *translation as reflexivity*-critique of such positioning—the beginning of disalienation
3. *subjectivity repositioning through disalienation*—subjectivation

Whether coined 'life stories', 'narratives' or 'autobiographies', as analysts we can use the assemblages of life episodes to show how individuals see themselves and speak their understandings of social life (Birch 1998). As Black women produce subjectivies through their life stories, these texts are selective representations of experience which cannot be interpreted without reference to power/knowledge discourses of, for example, disability, race, class, gender, sexuality, gender identity and age as Black feminists have shown and Black decolonial feminist theory would aver. Therefore, whenever the words racialized/racializing, race and racism are used they are thought intersectionally.

Thinking discursively, like Foucault (1994b: 262), we must 'deal with practices, institutions and theories on the same plane […] and […] look for the underlying knowledge [*savoir*] that makes them possible, the stratum of knowledge that constitutes them […] to formulate an analysis from the position of what one could call the "theoretico-active"'. In terms of the theoretico-active, the data used here are interpretative, but are also interpreted by speakers who produce theory in Alfred Schutz's (1967) sense. That is, theory of the knowledge found in the thinking of people in everyday life. A focus on process and content in talk is important in looking at speaker produced theories because for Michel Foucault (1994b: 262)

All these practices, then, these institutions and theories, I take at the level of traces, that is, almost always at the level of the *verbal traces*. The ensemble of these traces constitutes a sort of domain considered to be homogeneous: *one doesn't establish any differences* a priori. *The problem is to find common traits between these traces of orders different enough to constitute […] the invariants common to a certain number of traces* [my italics].

Finding verbal traces on/of/about Black beauty shame without establishing a priori differences means that shame itself must be seen as a dialogical process in which one is addressed and answers or does not answer, as ashamed/shameful/feeling shamed. This links Foucault with Bakhtinian dialogism within an ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analysis of shame scripts.

Connections: Foucault, Bakhtin and Analysing Shame Scripts

As we analyse talk-in-interaction, we have to be mindful of what speakers do in their talk and the discursive resources on which they draw when we explore 'the role of discourse in the construction of objects and subjects, including the "self"', (Willig 1999: 2–3). If we look back to the structure of shame scripts above, *translation as reflexivity* is the critique involved in the (de)construction, (re)assembling and (de)application of Black beauty shame discourses by speakers. Thus, it refers to how talk about social realities both describe and constitute them (Garfinkel 1967) which resonates with Mikhail Bakhtin's (1986) assertion that social realities are informed through others (Holland et al. 1998). Black beauty shame is reflexive and dialogical when it is spoken, heard and felt as it suffuses the body of the speaker or the body of the listener vicariously through the transmission of affect (Brennan 2004). Further, because the self is the nexus of a flow of activity in which it also participates, 'the Black beauty self' cannot be finalized (Bakhtin 1986).

Black beauty shame is reflexive and dialogical because the view of others is a component of 'authoring the self', a self which is made knowable in the words of others. Being 'knowable in the words of others' means that we also see ourselves from the outside, that is, as others see us. As such, we assume a position of *transgredience* or outsideness (Holland et al. 1998: 173–174) to ourselves, our bodies, as we judge beauty/ugliness. This is significant for reading Black beauty shame in talk as it

already assumes that this affect comes from without and impacts our psyches so that we potentially see ourselves as others see us. For Holquist (1991: 32–33), '"*transgradientsvo*" is reached when the […] existence of others is seen from outside […] their own knowledge that they are being perceived by somebody else, [and] from beyond an awareness that such an other exists. [In] dialogism […] there is […] no way "I" can be completely transgredient to another *living* subject, nor can he or she be completely transgredient to me'. Thus, both those interpellated as shamer and shamed through the act of shaming the other are irrevocably imbricated in Black beauty shaming encounters and during this space and time can be interpellated in either position. For example, we can be filled with shame through causing another to be ashamed when the intensity of their shame affects us, much as we can be made ashamed through white beauty iconicity's racist violence. As speakers produce outsideness in talk-in-interaction through translation as reflexivity and the beginnings of disalienation in the formulation being developed here, their meanings in terms of Black beauty shame depend on the organization of actions and interactions in time and space.

This links into conversation analysis because interaction is produced and translated as 'responsive to the immediate, local contingencies of interaction' (Pomerantz and Fehr 1997: 69). Thus, conversation analysis is an analysis of Bakhtin's dialogism in action as Black beauty subjectivities emerge in a dialogue on the boundary of the shamer and shamed, in a continuing interaction between real and imagined interlocutors as we narrate ourselves (de Peuter 1998: 38). Through this narration, this building of the self, Black beauty selves are much more about *becoming* rather than being, *fluidity* rather than fixity. If we see Black beauty selves as *becoming* through disalienation, this means that we also decolonize the coloniality of being, power, knowledge and affect still so present within our intersectional racializing assemblages.

The narration of selves implicates language as absolutely central in negating Black beauty shame or living within it. This is so even though shaming encounters can occur through looks, as easily as through withdrawal from interaction or through lack of that eye contact which affirms our humanity, our very value as people. However, Black beauty shaming language is produced by and productive of a world that is ideologically saturated in terms of racism rather than being simply a system of abstract grammatical categories (Bakhtin 1981). Thus, the 'unitary language' of Black beauty shame 'gives expression to forces working towards [..]

ideological centralization which develop in vital connection with the processes of sociopolitical and cultural centralization' (Bakhtin 1981: 271). Following Bakhtin then, Black beauty shame produces centripetal social, political, cultural, aesthetic and affective forces which form the stock of knowledge and practices of Black beauty shame silence and silencing embedded in the structure of feeling (Williams 1961) of any given era. However, Bakhtinian heteroglossia views the world as constituted by a multiplicity of languages with their own distinct markers (Holquist 1991: 69). For our purposes this multiplicity of languages would be the source of the production of the counter-conduct of disalienation.

The subject is surrounded by a myriad of responses from which to choose, each of which draws from a specific discursive context. Bakhtin's binary coupling of unitary language/heteroglossia links to Foucault's (1978) claim that in any era subjugated knowledge coexists with a dominant set of discourses determining what we see, think and experience. There is also a connection between Foucault and Bakhtin in their conceptualizations of 'the word'. For Bakhtin, 'the word' in conversation is always already oriented to an answer and is formed within the time-space of what has already been spoken and what has yet to be said. Indeed, 'the word in language is half someone else's' (Bakhtin 1981: 293) and 'all words have the "taste" of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, an age group, the day and hour' (Bakhtin 1981: 280). Heteroglossia's disruption of the unitary language of Black beauty shame enables the counter-conduct of disalienation. Therefore, counter-conduct (Foucault 2007) occurs here in the data derived model being developed through the critique of translation as reflexivity which begins disalienation, and the identity repositioning of unashamed which follows completing the disalienating turn in the talk-in-interaction. Methodologically then it 'is possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis of any utterance, once having exposed it as a contradiction ridden, tension filled unity of two embattled tendencies […]' (Bakhtin 1981: 272).[1]

This possibility is also hinted at by Foucault's (1991) assertion that we can struggle against domination's subjectification because power has many points of confrontation/instability and subjectivation can produce temporary inversions of power relations. In *Security, Territory,*

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[1] Interestingly, contradiction is a part of a discourse analytic approach to looking at texts (Parker 1999).

Population, Foucault (2007: xix) sketches the outline of counter-conduct as both a political and ethical response to power as conducting. 'As a form of resisitance counter-conducts, are movements characterized by wanting to be conducted differently, whose objective is a different form of conduction, and that also attempts to indicate an area in which each individual can conduct himself [themselves, herself], the domain of one's own conduct or behavior' (Foucault 2007: xix). Counter-conduct is coextensive with power and each exists in relation to each other so that there is an immanent relation between conduct (power-subjectification) and counter-conduct (agency-subjectivation). Thus, counter-conduct is not just a reactive after-effect but is productive. It modifies locally stabilized relations of power to affect the possibilites of the action of others in a new way (Foucault 2007: xxii). Foucault and Bakhtin implicate the role of language and reflexivity in talk as describing and constructing multiple social realities. The claim being made here is that this can be captured by an *ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analysis* which goes from local interactions to global discourses in building theory on Black beauty shame.

Foucault's counter-conduct can also be linked to Bakhtinian dialogism. Bakhtin's dialogism conceptualizes individuals as being in a state of being 'addressed'—being conducted—and in the process of 'answering'. This is his basic notion of addressivity. When one is addressed by discourses on/of Black beauty shame one can use a variety of answers. In other words, one can conduct the self and produce counter-conduct on Black beauty shame. If we think through Bahktinian dialogism, this allows us to look at the dynamic movement to the subjectivity of *unashamed/unshameful* emerging from subjectivation produced by counter-conduct against the subjectification of ashamed/shameful. Foucault's insights allow us to see how speakers construct versions of public discourses and how they use or disavow these in the construction of subjectivities.

An ethnomethodological way of looking at these subjectivities is to see how the 'subjugated knowledges' of counter-conduct come into being through talk-in-interaction. The analytical focus is on *traces* of different discourses and disalienating power/knowledge forms rooted in social settings and experiences in which the women speak about their interpersonal relationships and the broader social, political, cultural and affective contexts in which they live. This is where Bakhtin's work on addressivity assumes significance as the intervention of the addressee

makes meaning negotiable. 'An essential (constitutive) marker of the utterance is its quality of being directed to someone, its *addressivity* […] This addressee can be an immediate participant-interlocutor in an everyday dialogue, a differentiated collective of specialists in some particular area of cultural communication, a more or less differentiated public, ethnic group, contemporaries […] and it can also be an indefinite, unconcretized *other*' (Pearce 1994, pp. 73–74). New addressivity here denotes the repositioning within discourses brought into being by the disalienation accomplished by speakers because

> We enter into discourses as we go about the practical activities of our lives. The discourses are conditions of possibility that provide us with the resources for constructing a limited array of social realities, and make others less available to us. We enter into discourses and use the resources that they provide to construct concrete social realities by engaging in discursive practices that are similar to the interpretive methods and conversational procedures analyzed by ethnomethodologists [and discourse analysts]. Realities so produced are reflexive, because the discourses that we enter into in order to describe social realities also constitute those realities. (Miller 1997: 33)

Black beauty shame scripts are discursive, dialogical and constitutive of the social. Interlocutors use multiple discourses on/of/against Black beauty shame in constructing subjectivities in terms of 'assumptions, categories, logics and claims—the constitutive elements of discourses' (Miller 1997: 34). Discourse analysis is important for the data analysis here because of its interest in how subjectivities are constituted in interaction as 'language users engaging in discourse accomplish *social acts* and participate in *social interaction*, typically so in *conversation* and other forms of *dialogue*. Such interaction is in turn embedded in various social and cultural *contexts* […]' (Van Dijk 1997a: 2; Van Dijk 1997b). As such, interlocutors actively engage in selecting accounts so as to maximize their claim to be heard (Potter and Wetherall 1992: 108). Speakers' strategic performance makes discourses coherent and meaningful as well as reflexively constructing their subjectivities and Black beauty shame's momentary 'realities' in the sequential organization of talk-in-interaction. However, what does this all mean practically in terms of the data analytic task?

What Does This Mean Practically in Terms of Data Analysis?

As an ethnomethodologically inclined discourse analyst listening to the talk and reading the texts, my task is to look at a participant's display of ascription to/disavowal of the membership category Black beauty 'ashamed/shameful'. Looking at discourses in talk means that I am mindful that speakers operate in and against discursive constructions that attempt to fix boundaries and that these discourses reflect power relations. Therefore, issues of power and inequality are central to the analysis of Black beauty shame scripts. In other words, Black beauty and Black beauty shame *matter* for who we can be and become. The necessity in analysis is to look at the distinctive knowledge and power relations that interlocutors develop in talk-in-interaction. For example, how they resist these relations and build different power/knowledge relations in their construction of subjectivities. This reminds us of Harold Garfinkel's (1967) argument that members of society are 'capable of rationally understanding and accounting for their own actions in society. Indeed it is precisely in this rational accountability that members come to be treated and see themselves as members of society' (Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998: 30).

A key notion of discourse analysis is that 'by selecting […] vocabulary from available cultural themes and concepts and by its choice of their arrangement [a speaker] makes positive claim to a certain vision of the world' (Antaki 1994: 7). As I read the transcriptions, I focus on what Ian Parker (1999) terms contradiction, construction and practice. I do not uncover an underlying theme that will explain the *real* meaning of the texts but seek out contradictions between different significations and the construction of different 'worlds'. Through this approach, it is possible to identify dominant and subjugated meanings and highlight processes of counter-conduct (Parker 1999). As a discourse analyst, I do not take meaning for granted but look at how meaning has been socially constructed (Parker 1999). My concern with subjectification and subjectivation means that my interest lies 'with issues of power and open[ing] up a place for *agency*, as people struggle to make sense of texts. This is where people push at the limits of what is socially constructed and actively construct something different' (Parker1999: 7). It is within this dialogical tension between accounts in interaction and culturally available accounts

that we can see the emergence of the Black beauty subjectivities of un-ashamed/shameful in talk as women produce their own 'critical text-work'. For Ian Parker (1999: 7), 'critical textwork' in discourse analysis arises from our 'attention to contradiction, construction and practice combined with an attention to the position of the researcher'. My point of view is that speakers use these same approaches in their ethnomethods in talk so that both speaker and researcher are engaged in critical text-work. Indeed, for Bakhtin, talk is never a mere reflection of something already existing and outside of it, which is given and final (Shotter and Billig 1998: 13). Rather, talk 'always creates something that has never existed before, something absolutely new and unrepeatable' (Bakhtin 1986: 119–120). This is an understanding which links us back to Judith Butler's viewpoint, with which we began, that conversation constructs subjectivities which only become known when they are momentarily complete.

Conclusion

In looking for Black beauty shame scripts in talk-in-interaction, it has been necessary to interrogate the intersections and divergences between Foucault and Bakhtin on the subject, subjectivity and discourse in the development of a theoretical grounding for eda as the analytical method for reading unspoken shame in talk-in-interaction. The insights of Foucault and Bakhtin on the speaking subject and a focus on eth-nomethods and critical textwork impacted on how I listened to the talk, read the transcriptions and gave meaning to the shame scripts.

Bakhtin's dialogism and Foucault's aesthetics of the self both mean that there is always a possibility for challenging Black beauty shame's domination. The self as agentic and dialogical means that we have to look for the readings and translations of discursive positioning (subjec-tification) made by speakers and the production of alter/native (Truillot 2015), read decolonizing self-positionings (subjectivation) in talk. The multiplicity of selves and the intimate interaction with otherness which this involves entails that subjectivation as a process in talk-in-interaction does not imply a total break with discursively constructed essentialisms. Rather, what should be looked at is how essentialism, (re)produced in talk-in-interaction as Black woman sameness, interacts in a nuanced way with the differences being spoken. Extrapolating from Bakhtin onto analysis has meant that a turn-by-turn conversation analytic transcription

enables shame's dialogism to emerge. Conversation analytic transcription shows the dynamic movement in the talk from subjectification's positioning as ashamed/shameful to subjectivation's repositioning as unashamed/unshameful produced through disalienation from subjectification's Black beauty shame discourses. Further, Bakhtin's heteroglossia allows an orientation to the talk based on ethnomethods as speakers translate and critique Black beauty shame scripts. Based on these methodological understandings, the next chapter moves to look at the theme of Black beauty shame, biopolitics and the silencing produced by intensification.

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Black Beauty Shame: Intensification, Skin Ego and Biopolitical Silencing

Abstract Constructed through enslavement and colonialism, Black beauty shame drags the coloniality of power, being, knowledge and affect into the twenty-first century. Its silencing and silences work through intensification, which floods one with a suffusive sensation that isolates through precise individuation and a relationality which one cannot control. Black beauty shame is about social, political, economic and psychic domination through subjectification's biopolitical racializing assemblages, whereas subjectivation as unashamed produced through dis/alienation points to alter/native Black beauty.

Keywords Biopolitics · Dis/alienation · Alter/native · Subjectification · Subjectivation · Racializing assemblages · Intensification

INTRODUCTION

The discussion so far has highlighted the fact that Black beauty shame has been centuries in the making through enslavement and colonialism, an affect which still resonates today. This means that Black beauty shame drags the coloniality of power, being, knowledge and affect into the twenty-first century. The discussion has also shown that Black beauty shame is about social, political, economic and psychic domination through subjectification's biopolitical racializing assemblages. Black beauty subjectivation as unashamed/unshameful produced through

disalienation (Césaire 2000) from such biopolitical racializing assemblages alerts us to the fact of the existence of alter/native (Trouillot 2015) Black beauty models. To understand shame's subjectification as both psychic and relational process, it is necessary to see it following Eve K. Sedgwick (2003: 36–37) because

> [it is] peculiarly contagious and peculiarly individuating. One of the strangest features of shame […] is the way bad treatment of someone else, someone else's embarrassment, stigma, debility, bad smell or strange behaviour, seemingly having nothing to do with me, can so readily flood me-assuming that I am a shame-prone person- with this sensation whose very suffusiveness seems to delineate very precise, individual outlines in the most isolating way imaginable […] That's the double movement shame makes: toward painful individuation, toward uncontrollable relationality.

Shame is focused on individuals because of the psychic pain it produces as well as imbricating us as its constitutive outside-inside because of the uncontrollable relationality necessary for us to come into being within social bonds.

This chapter focuses on how Black beauty shame's silencing and silences work through intensification, described here by Sedgwick (2003) as a flooding of oneself with a suffusive sensation which isolates through precise individuation and a relationality which one cannot control. Thus, whilst shame spreads over one's body parts, it does not obscure them from view, but brings them into sharp relief as shameful. As a result of its relational nature, this suffusive sensation occurs in interpersonal interaction, in the face of others who 'envisage' (Derrida 2005) us as shameful. We feel shame in the face of others. Being envisaged as shameful produces the ashamed, an interpellation to which we respond or not in order to be intelligible as Black beauty shame objects or subjects. Drawing from Mikhail Bakhtin (1981), Black beauty shame is dialogical. Shame's envisaging also extends beyond the interpersonal encounter to our psychic lives and what we regard as our most intimate spheres in which we continue to see ourselves through the eyes of the other as shameful. Shame's powerful psychic life is made known through shame scripts which haunt our daily encounters and interactions. Shame and its suffusiveness continue to impact us because of the fact that this or that body part has been constructed through racialized body normativities which attempt to make us read skin/hair/bodies/facial features as intensely

(ab)normal. This chapter looks at the silencing effects of shame's suffusiveness first by touching on intensification and the skin ego before moving on to explore shaming beauty encounters and a biopolitics which is not deracinated. It concludes by thinking through *how* shame's intensification attempts to silence counter-conduct through its governmentality.

Intensification and the Skin Ego

In the example below, Lola makes us aware of the impacts of the socioculturally instituted anti-Black African descent woman racist body shaming within which she grew up in British society. This is a society whose centuries' old racialized bodily schema is based on the either/or opposition between Black ugliness and white beauty (Sharpe 2010). This soma-aesthetics (Taylor 2000, 2016) produced through conquest, settler colonialism, enslavement and their aftermaths is also reflected in Fanon's (1986) epidermal racial schema. Such a soma-aesthetics based on white racial supremacy and its concept of the Hu/Man (Gordon 1997; Wynter 2003) and thus beauty as white meant that as a child she never saw anything beautiful about herself. To never see one's hair, skin shade or features as beautiful because the ideal is white was not uncommon for girls growing up in 1970s UK. Indeed, it can still be argued that that particular ideal still persists and impacts Black women's lives globally (Hunter 2005, 2011; Glenn 2008; Craig 2006; Weekes 1997; Tate 2009). The intensification of 'bushy thicker' hair and 'darker skin' leads to the outcome of childhood self-hatred. The intensification of the Black beauty shame that she experienced was in relation to the white ideal.

What must it have been like for her to hate herself, her looks, her skin and her hair as a child? What trauma would she have experienced every time she caught a glimpse of herself in the mirror, a self which lacked beauty because it was not white/lighter skinned and straight(er) haired? However, this is a childhood self-hatred which her present adult Black political consciousness now urges her to silence because of the potential shame attached to such an admission. Nonetheless, she refuses this silence in order not to lie to herself, as she puts it, to be honest. Her admission of childhood aesthetic self-hatred is an admission of Black beauty shame as much as it is itself shaming in its narration.

It is a Black beauty shame only politically ameliorated because of her parsing her desire for whiteness as something relegated to her now

long past childhood. Black beauty shame circulated in the 1970s as it does in contemporary times through the hyper-reflexivity of the surface of the body as she was/is contrasted with the white ideal and found to be lacking. She is found lacking both on the part of white supremacist culture and by that very gaze's governmentality through which she puts herself under surveillance. Constantly, circulating racialized aesthetic judgements focused on the white ideal means that Black beauty shame oriented Lola to act in specific ways as a child with hating 'everything about herself' being one part of its impact. Another aspect is blaming her white mother for not being able to 'do' her hair properly. The claim being made here is that Black beauty shame is the motor of aesthetic self-hatred as well as its outcome.

Further, aesthetic self-hatred comes from outside the self and is transgenerational even though it is lived within the psyche. Thus, the self is imbricated in experiences of Black beauty shaming events and Black beauty shame scripts on a daily basis. The self is also caught in a loop of the negative affects aligned with shame outlined by Sally Munt (2008) quoted earlier. These Black beauty shaming events and shame scripts are then laid over the surface of the body as a discursively constructed, circumscribed and transgenerational 'second skin' (Cheng 2010) which conditions the politics of hypervisibility within which she is surrounded as a Black-white 'mixed race' girl. The operation of Black beauty shame's 'second skin' has far-reaching impacts on Lola's girlhood subjectivity as shame is all she can see, all she can feel. The white beauty ideal led to the emergence of a 'second skin' which occluded Black beauty so that Lola 'never saw anything beautiful about myself' because she was 'really on a self-hate journey' as a girl child. Evaluations of herself as lacking in terms of the white ideal led to Black beauty shame and self-hatred because of the either/or opposition between herself and the ideal (Hadreas 2016). Self-hatred leads to self-doubt. It also leads to the production of fear of being placed outside of social bonds because one does not and indeed cannot measure up to the ideal. Black beauty shame as this 'second skin' extends across interpersonal, personal, political, social and cultural relationalities. Doubt, fear and shame create powerful affective attachments to or detachments from those despised objects of dark(er) skin and non-straight hair as hyper-visible signifiers of Black African descent racial difference which are the bedrock of misogynoir.

The affective attachment or detachment to body parts is so powerful in its intensity that as an adult she can look back and recount Black

beauty shame's impact on her negative evaluations of her body's aesthetic value as a child. This also illustrates that as a child she dwelled with the objects of hate, her skin and hair, through a 'passionate involvement' (Hadreas 2016) with Black beauty shame's self-negation:

<u>Tape 1 Side B LS: 9</u>

1 L But I could ne- I never saw >NOUGHT beautiful about myself<=
2 S = GO[:SH:]
3 L   [No] never=
4 S= ((But you're really gorgeous [((.hhh))))]

5 L   [Never   ] never saw NOUGHT beautiful about myself ((inbreath)) I hated my hair.
6 I always said [my] mum didn't do it properly d'yuh know what I mean?=
7 S   [Mhm]   =Mhm =
8 L = Always said >((´you can´t do my hair you´))< and stuff like that ((inbreath)) cos my hair's a lot fi:ner now it was a lot
9 THI:CKER=
10 S   =Mhm=
11 L   =When I was younger and more bushy [and] thicker and stuff ((inbreath)) and I HA:TED it=
12 S   [Mhm]   =M[hm]
13 L   [I]
14 HATED EVERYTHING about MYSELF EVERYTHING [(.8)   ] >honest to God< ((inbreath))
15 S   [Go::sh°]
16 L I really went on a sa- a self-hate journey HATED EVERYTHING ABOUT MYSELF=
17 S =That must've been ´hard´=
18 L =Yeah REALLY ha:ted (.) ha:ted (.) everything ((inbreath)) I use- my face has got more oval and slimmer [but I]
19 S   [Mhm]
20 L had ((inbreath)) I USED to have a pretty round face [((inbreath))]
21 S   [Mhm°]
22 L and stuff like that and ah::m QUITE STOCKY as well and stuff like that and a:h:: and I think I have- I think I have got
23 LIGHTER as well I always remembered myself as darker=
24 S = >Go:sh but you are supposed to get darker< the older [you get aren't you?]
25 L   [YE:S ((inbreath))] I FEEL that I am LIGHTER than I used
26 to be: (.7)
27 S °Go:sh°=
28 L= I think I am lighter th- than I used to be ((inbreath)) and so I never saw no- never sa:w no beauty in myself or anything
 like that (.7)=
28 S= >What did that do: to you then?< never seeing yourself as a >beautiful person?< (1.7)
29 L pt (.4) I THINK IT'S AWFUL BUT YOU KNO:W (.) you remember the project I DID?=
30 S= Mhm=
31 L= It was as a RESULT of those feelings and ((inbreath)) you know you can PRETEND that that's not how you used to
32 FEEL> you know< because I'm so: Black conscious and stuff NOW it COULD BE QUITE EASY TO ((inbreath))
33 DENY your past and say >no I've NEVER wished I was white< and ((inbreath)) and th- f- but you are LYING to
34 yourself [you   ] know? I have to be honest and say that I did used to wish that I was whi:te ((inbreath)) when I was
35 S   [´Yeah´]
36 L young ((inbreath)) because I al:ways saw white girls as beautiful =
37 S =Mhm=
38 L =and I never saw anything beautiful about myself.

Relating the observations made above about the interaction of shame, fear, doubt and hatred but also the turn to self-acceptance implied in the critique of the child that Lola once was makes us think about the centrality of skin and hair in any discussion of Black beauty shame. As we can see from Lola's words above, in such a meditation, we must look at the interaction between the psyche and the social as well as how Black beauty shame's silencing enables the emergence of identities of subjectification ruled by Black self-negation.

How can we read skin and hair as surface and psyche? How can we constitute skin and hair as interpellation, subjectivity and home? How

can we manage our own skin and hair and indeed make them? As I write skin and hair, I draw attention to the fact that hair racialized as 'Black hair' operates in a similar way to skin racialized as Black skin. This means that what is said about skin can also be read as what I would like to say about hair and its psychic life, reading from Lola's words. The Skin and what grows from it is the body's mobile, affective and sensual wrapping which is central to psychic life as it impacts the ego as well as being impacted by the ego (Anzieu 1989). Didier Anzieu's (1989) formulation of the 'skin ego' drew on Sigmund Freud's work to show how skin as the body's relational surface boundary impacts the psyche. However, Anzieu did not look at race, gender or other intersections in skin's relationalities. Thus, he did not look at the materialization of gender on the body (Butler 1993). Neither did he look at the centrality of racialization as 'a set of socio-political processes of differentiation and hierarchization which are projected onto the putatively biological human body' (Weheliye 2014: 5). That is, he was not focused on 'race' intersectional discourses and performativity as I am here. Further, he began from the concept of the Hu/Man as a white, European project which Sylvia Wynter OJ problematizes as position from which to begin understanding Black women's worlds, knowledge and consciousness.

> You cannot solve the issue of 'consciousness' in terms of their body of knowledge. You just can't. Just as within the medieval order of knowledge there was no way in which you could explain why it is that certain planets seemed to be moving backwards. Because you were coming from a geocentric model, right? So you had to 'know' the world in that way. Whereas from our 'Man-centric' model, we cannot solve 'consciousness' because Man is a purely ontogenetic/ purely biological conception of being, who then creates 'culture'. So if we say consciousness is constructed who does the constructing? You see? (Thomas 2006: 2)

Notwithstanding this, Anzieu's work is significant for my argument as it does make us remember that skin is a complex structure of surfacings. Skin enables us to understand our physical, psychic, affective and epistemological worlds as we think through and simultaneously live skins. He also did not think through skin in detail in terms of governmentality and conduct/counter-conduct. This was not his project. However, following Anzieu we should say here that the surface of the body impacts the formation of the psyche because this surface relates to skin colour,

hair texture, fat, muscle, body shape and facial features all of which are racially branded (Wingard 2013) and in turn racially brand us. Thus, skin does not just relate to the wrapping around the body but to what grows from it or is attached to it and what lies under it to give it contours, as much as it relates to the outer covering that protects us from others at the same time as it opens us up to them (Ahmed and Stacey 2001). It is through such interepidermality that skin becomes meaningful as it is read for personal biographies and glimpses of the subject's interior life. Interepidermality reproduces skin as a site of inextricable linking to others and as a location for racialized valuations including those of beautiful/ugly.

At the level of affect, skin acts osmotically in allowing through those affective flows which emanate from inter-corporeality. That is, skin feels in a fleshy material sense as well as in the sense of its relationship with a world made up of other skins. The skin's surfaces are multiply inflected and constructed in discourses on/of Black beauty shame. Through these discourses and individual stylization practices which (re)present what we could read as subjectification or subjectivation in terms of discursive regimes on beautiful/ugly, we see the emergence of different skins, varied 'surfacings'. These surfacings emerge through the interaction of discourse and stylization's addressivities which means that the skin ego is never settled as this or that in a once and for all way. Rather, the skin ego is subject to the relationality of discourses, surfacings and other bodies which affect us. It is the affecting resonance between discourses, surfacings and other skins which lead to Black beauty shame's intensification.

The notion of affective resonance relates to Brian Massumi's (2002) perspective on the relationship between affect and intensity. For him affects like shame enable us to feel 'feelings' because of their intensity and affection is the process which facilitates the transmission of affect between bodies and between skins. This is so because affects are unstructured and unformed, unlike feelings and emotions. However, Black beauty shame's affective transmission does not mean that one's shame becomes another's. Rather, it is about the way that Black beauty shame is affecting and makes us feel the shame of others without us putting such affect into language (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2007, 2010). Indeed, Black beauty shame's intensity can be conveyed in a look, from ourselves or others even though shaming language can also resonate intensity.

Intensity is disconnected from any sequencing. It is delocalized but can be somatized in bodily reactions. That is, where to somatize

means the expression of psychological processes in physical symptoms. So Black beauty shame's intensity can be somatized in the heat of the skin itself—where skin is the key interface between the psyche and the social—as blood rises to its surface because of embarrassment (Probyn 2005). Beauty shame's intensity is autonomic but resists ownership or recognition because of the shamefulness of shame itself. Shamefulness, the possibility of being ashamed, surrounds us all and its governmentality must be resisted. Shamefulness must be resisted in order to have 'liveable lives' (Butler 2006) as women racialized as Black are always already constructed as beauty's others. Given the discussion thus far, what can now be said about the governmentality of Black beauty shame?

Racialized Shaming Beauty Encounters and Governmentality

In Foucault's (2007) *Security, Territory, Population,* biopolitics is intertwined with governmentality. Government or 'the conduct of conduct' amalgamates the government of others (subjectification) and the government of oneself (subjectivation). Thus, government encompasses the biopolitical governance of populations and how individuals become subjects. Of interest here is the subject because biopower works through individualization. Such individualization means that biopower produces individuals as the nexus of all the disciplinary techniques for monitoring the body at the same time as it discovers them as its object. If we go back to Eve Sedgwick's definition of shame above, we see her analysis of shame reflected within biopolitics and governmentality. We see this in her discussion of shame's intertwining of painful individuation with impossible relationalities and hyper-reflexivity in terms of the surface of the body. However, it is worth repeating here that biopolitics and governmentality do not stand outside of racialization. They are in fact a part of racializing assemblages (Weheliye 2014). Establishing a critique of biopolitics based on racialization is necessary because of my insistence throughout that racialization matters. Further, the assertion throughout the book is that Césaire's disalienation—Black women's abilities to understand the racialized origins of Black beauty shame, deconstruct and go beyond it to produce new subjectivities—is a necessary part of the analysis being undertaken here. In establishing a critique of biopolitics, I draw upon Weheliye (2014: 4) who sees racialization as 'deeply anchored […] in the somatic field of the human' even as

[…] biopolitics discourse aspires to transcend racialization […] [it] not only misconstrues how profoundly race and racism shape the modern idea of the human, it also overlooks or perfunctorily writes off theorizations of race, subjection, and humanity […] allowing […] biopolitics discourse to imagine an indivisible biological substance anterior to racialization.

Using biopolitics as a frame for understanding, how Black beauty shame works does not mean that this is *the* position of this book. Rather, the discussion throughout aims to show the pervasiveness of coloniality which continues to dictate the limits of 'proper theory', thereby often occluding the thoughts, practices, politics and lives of racialized others. Further, the discussion also maintains that 'there is no portion of the modern human that is not subject to racialization, which determines the hierarchical ordering of the Homo sapiens species into humans, not-quite-humans, and non-humans' (Weheliye 2014: 8). The book looks to the micro-practices of everyday life for critical glimpses of how Black beauty shame's subjectification works and how it is surmounted by agents through subjectivation even within conditions of neoliberal racialization which asks that we work on ourselves to become 'normatively beautiful' subjects. Here, beauty is deracinated if we look at white iconicity or very narrowly racialized if the view is from Black Nationalism so the discussion in this book wilfully inserts racialization also as a becoming entity into any consideration of 'the beautiful/ugly'. Having said this though, the discussion also recognizes the body fixities within essentialist ideals of the normatively beautiful.

Going back to the impact of coloniality on what is perceived as beautiful/ugly, it is the case that shaming beauty encounters are normalized within a particular racial affective economy. That is, one in which Black African descent ugliness is 'already embedded within citationality conditions that involve larger racist assumptions and accusations as they relate to the black body that shape [their] intelligibility' (Yancy 2012: 5). According to Constantine Nakassis (2013), citation represents discourses whilst marking that representation as not-quite what the citational act makes present. Citationality is an interdiscursive but powerful location through which language acts performatively. If we think about citationality, we can see how it is that agents can recreate the bounds of intelligibility differently. This is so because as repetition creates difference, new discourses on and subjectivities of, Black beauty emerges into the world (Nakassis 2013) to counter Black beauty shame. Citationality can open

up new Black beauty significations through its performative power. Thus, citationality is an important part of the process of disalienation from the governmentality of neoliberal racialization's biopolitics in terms of Black beauty shame.

However, Black beauty shame is always already within society, producing spaces of bodily un-location for Black women and girls, as Lola showed us above. This negative affect attaches to hair, skin, body, facial features and psyche. Black beauty shame as a 'bad feeling' attaches to what one *is* (Sedgwick 2003) because of judgements made by others irrespective of feelings of attachment and relationality to these others. When Lola complained that her hair seemed to be 'tougher' and her skin 'darker' when she was a child, she reproduces those discourses of ugliness through which the Black-white 'mixed race' woman's/girl's body is always already known. As she critiques the viewpoint of the child that 'wanted to be white' that she once was, as she marks that representation as not-quite what the white supremacist discourse of Black ugliness entails, she engages in counter-conduct. This counter-conduct creates a new beauty subjectivity in which whiteness is no longer her ideal. Her critical judgement of her childhood self enables us to see the shame of her affective attachment to white beauty which it makes no sense for her to deny as an adult. This Black beauty shame is claimed as part of what she once was but does not any longer feel. She can look at her shameful girlhood self as if from a distance as she estranges herself from herself in order to become herself, a conscious Black woman. As she estranges herself from this girl, she engages in what Aimé Césaire (2000) terms 'disalienation' from racist discourses on *the* Black-white 'mixed race' woman/girl as ugly because of African descent. Césaire's disalienation produces new ways to be Black as an antidote to the negative homogenization of embodiment and psyche forged through white supremacy.

This disalienation emerges here through disidentification (Muñoz 1999). Disidentification as process recognizes racist discourse's affective load as well as governmental impact on the psyche. Such affect and government are repeated by Lola in terms of feelings about the self as shamed individual because of bodily imperfections produced by racial mixing. As she disidentifies from this positionality of shame, she remakes herself anew as a conscious Black-white 'mixed race' woman rather than a racially confused child who wanted to be white because of the societally constructed and induced shame attached to the Black-white 'mixed race' body she inhabits. The shame she felt was based on her judgements

of her ugliness because of the discourses on her Black African descent, the fact of her Blackness and her inability to be white because of the one-drop rule of hypodescent which still pertains in the UK today (Ifekwunigwe 1999).

Lola illustrates that judgements of beauty are not devoid of affects. Indeed, when we make aesthetic judgements, we are overtaken by affects (Brennan 2004) even if those judgements are made of the self by the self, or, indeed, maybe especially so. What we must remember though, as Lola illustrates for us, is that this self is imbricated in white supremacist discourses whose governmentality attempts to rule psyches, to make subjects hate their Black embodiment and to produce an intolerable subjectification. To be clear, to speak of Black beauty shame fuelling self-hate is not just to speak of Kantian 'sensory states produced by thought [because] interruptive thoughts are produced by affects. Feelings are thoughtful, affects are thoughtless' (Brennan 2004: 116). As 'thoughtless', affects like Black beauty shame overcome our rational thought because they are expressions of intensity not mediated through language (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2007, 2010) as said earlier. This non-linguistic intensity is important because as we judge others or ourselves negatively we transmit a stream of affect towards them or ourselves which eliminates relationality because of objectification (Brennan 2004). We then cannot even relate to the image we stare at in the mirror because that too is subject to objectification. Indeed, in this scenario, Black beauty shame means that we have such a visceral reaction of abjection to the image that we cannot rationally explain this to ourselves and others. Our reaction to the image becomes a half-formed sentence, 'I don't know, I just don't feel […]'.

As we know from personal experience, judgements of beauty, whether we are told that we are beautiful/ugly, are significant for how we see ourselves through the eyes of the other, our life experiences and feelings of shame, value or esteem (Mama 1995; Hobson 2005). Thus, in the intensity through which *Black beauty shame* judgements are projected or introjected, we can capture the moment of affective transmission (Brennan 2004) of esteem or shame.

So, if this objectification is about negative aesthetic self-judgement, our bodies become shameful objects so that we curl in upon ourselves because we are placed outside of societal bonds (Probyn 2005; Mokros 1995). This curling inwards caused by Black beauty shame occurs because we do not have an 'other' onto which to project negative

aesthetic judgement. As Black and Black-white 'mixed race' women cannot mark others with the negative affect that they refuse in themselves through using projection, this affect continues to possess them (Brennan 2004). The continuing possession of shame leads to Black beauty melancholia. This claim is being made because whole lifetimes of Black beauty shame can be swallowed whole but continue their psychic haunting (Khanna 2003; Tate 2009). Black beauty shame then continues to emerge at unexpected, unwanted moments of shaming encounters and their re-stimulation of past hurt from Black beauty shaming events. This reiteration of shame enables the development of 'shame scripts' (Munt 2008:3). As we know from personal experience, judgements of beauty, whether we are told that we are beautiful/ugly, are significant for how we see ourselves through the eyes of the other, our life experiences and feelings of shame, value or esteem (Mama 1995; Hobson 2005). Thus, in the intensity through which *Black beauty shame* judgements are projected or introjected, we can capture the moment of affective transmission (Brennan 2004) of esteem or shame, which encases the skin ego and becomes difficult if not impossible to dislodge.

Although Black beauty shame is often a transitory affect experienced intensely in/on/through the body in moments of humiliation, the repetition and accumulation of such experiences can be sedimented in the psyche (Probyn 2005) as 'shame scripts' (Munt 2008) and become a part of the skin ego (Anzieu 1989). Such sedimentation can lead to a psychic hard-wiring of Black beauty shame. The skin ego here extends from the individual to the group being marked as shameful *or* the group with the power to shame, as different Black beauty 'shame scripts' and subjectivities are produced (Munt 2008).

As affect, Black beauty shame is transmitted within and between groups across time and space (Brennan 2004). Therefore, Black beauty shame can be transgenerational. Thus, it is possible in the twenty-first century, to continue to be affected by Black beauty shame accumulated over the centuries of enslavement and colonialism because shaming beauty judgements continue to be made based on racialized/racializing beauty ideals. The distinction between racialized and racializing is significant here because it points to the continuing discursive work being done in terms of beautiful/ugly as a fixed binary in which Black perpetually equates with ugly alongside the possibility of the emergence of racializing difference which destabilizes this binary. We see this, for example,

above with Lola as a child fixed as ugly by racialized discourse on white beauty iconicity and as an adult critiquing those very discourses through Black feminist consciousness and its racializing discourses of Black beauty as *both* being and becoming beautiful. Racializing discourses perpetually set Black beauty in motion and make it multiple so we can say 'Black beauties' to acknowledge this plurality. The dynamism of racializing beauty discourses is important in the continuing struggle against Black beauty shame scripts because the accumulation of shame defines 'what I am [… and] it also let's one know that he/she has power over me, power to hurt and mark one's consciousness with that hurt' (Munt 2008: 24).

Shame/shaming/shamefulness/being (a)shamed is about power. Shame is somatic, psychic, societal and material in its power to mark one as (a)shamed and to silence counter-conduct as well as to make one shamer. Such power makes Black beauty shame an affect which goes beyond the individual body to that of the social bodies of racialized politics, identifications and societies. Black beauty shame can produce communities of the shameful, the ugly through its 'erotic life' (Lorde 1984). We can see this if we look at the shared stock of Black beauty negation across the diaspora and its accompanying structure of feeling. Within this structure of feeling, there are two competing tendencies as stated previously. One is based on what Édouard Glissant (2006) calls 'the philosophies of the One in the West' which makes whiteness the ideal. The other springs from Black anti-racist aesthetics politics and asserts the iconicity of an embodiment racialized as African descent Black (Taylor 2000).

Whichever structure of feeling is hegemonic, Black beauty shame's power changes the racialized meaning of body parts, racialized identifications or others' behaviour towards oneself (Ahmed 2004; Munt 2008; Probyn 2005; Sedgwick 2003). Black beauty shame's power leads to the production of a 'precarious hyper-reflexivity of the surface of the body [which] can turn one inside out or outside in' (Sedgwick 2003: 116). Turning one inside out/outside in, in other words shame's reorientation of the self away from itself impacts the skin ego (Anzieu 1989). This reorientation *away* in turn means that Black women place themselves under minute surveillance as they assess where they are located in the racialized beauty stakes, which is a hierarchy that they did not themselves construct in conditions of their own choosing.

Conclusion: The Silencing of Intensification

To admit to Black beauty shame is to admit to non-personhood or to being too self-absorbed, too vain, both of which are shaming. There is a biopolitical aspect to Black beauty shame which means that we are perpetually in the panopticon of self-observation and self-management as we produce bodies disciplined by the intensification of such shame. Black beauty shame's intensification is about both subjectification and subjectivation. As subjectification, it reorients us and turns us towards the racialized beautiful/ugly binary through which we must be interpellated in order to come into being as aesthetic subjects. This binary silences the emergence of difference from itself as it produces those who are cast as aesthetic subalterns (Spivak 1993), outside of beauty's representational possibilities. Subjectivation as a movement *against* silencing emerges through alter/native (Trouillot 2015) aesthetic visions from within the politics of Black anti-racist aesthetics which enables the disidentificatory process of disalienation (Césaire 2000). That is, a remaking of Black beauty multiplicity within an anti-racist Black aesthetics frame. The next two chapters take up disalienation's challenge to the governmentality of shame's silence and silencing in terms of both Black and white beauty iconicities.

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White Iconicity: Necropolitics, Disalienation and Black Beauty Shame Scripts

Abstract White beauty iconicity is necropolitical because Black and Black-white 'mixed race' women live within shaming events produced by their aesthetic hierarchy positioning as ugly. Whiteness continues as the beauty ideal in the Global North/South-west and is a necessary defining context for aesthetic life. The promise of white ideal beauty continues to resonate negatively in Black and Black-white 'mixed race' women's lives as it makes their beauties un-narratable by erasing their possibility for representation.

INTRODUCTION

In contexts such as the UK, the USA and Brazil in which white beauty continues to be iconic, Black and Black-white 'mixed race' women live within the possibility of shaming events produced by racialized difference and their aesthetic hierarchy positioning as ugly (Tate 2009; Nuttall 2006; Hobson 2005; Hunter 2005; Banks 2000). What does whiteness mean? Why does it continue to occupy the space of the beauty ideal in the Global North West and Global South West and be such a necessary defining context for aesthetic life? Why does the promise of white ideal beauty continue to resonate negatively in Black and Black-white

'mixed race' women's lives? Why does whiteness make other beauties un-narratable by erasing their possibility for representation? How can we look at white beauty iconicity through a necropolitical lens?

These questions are important ones as we consider the possibility for Black beauty agency and the production of new Black beauty subjectivities through Césaire's (2000) disalienation. They are important in the face of the continuing suffering produced by the daily traumatic encounters with white iconicity's Black beauty shame scripts. Thinking through these questions also underlie a shift from thinking through Black beauty shame solely in terms of biopolitics, a form of the rule related to the living, as we have established earlier through looking at governmentality. The shift in thinking is now one focused on analyzing Black beauty shame silence and silencing necropolitical. That is, there will now be a shift to thinking how Black beauty shame as a form of racialized rule differentiates between and capitalizes on the erasure of Black beauties through the continuous revaluation, representation and recycling of the white ideal.

The generation of Black beauty shame by white racial rule seen through a necropolitical lens enables the mapping of somatechnics (Sullivan 2009, 2014) governance in the current moment of neoliberal racialization where there seems to be a democratization of beauty as consumers are presented with beautification 'choices'. Nikki Sullivan (2009, 2014) uses somatechnics in her analysis of transsexual bodies deriving the term from the Greek *soma* (body) and *techné* (craftsmanship). Somatechnics indicates that corporealities are continuously crafted, engendered and for our purposes intersectionally en-raced, in relation to others. It is in the process of relationality that categories of being integral to our becoming emerge or are erased. Erasure, which negates becoming only allows for normative categories of being, which in turn points to the necropolitical life of such relationality. If we think necropolitical relationality in terms of Black beauty shame, we can say that the only category of being, which is allowed into the circle of representation, is that of Black ugliness and shame as the non-shameful possibilities related to beauty are erased. What thinking through necropolitics enables us to focus on is racialized somatechnics as we look at how the normative idea of Black ugliness is recycled through (in)visibilized technologies of aesthetic power even whilst subjects transgress them through disalienation. Let us now turn to think about white beauty iconicity and shame's necropolitical orientation.

White Beauty Iconicity and Necropolitics

We know that 'not all the women want to be white' (Tate 2005, 2010). However, what we need to begin with is a shared position—whether we ascribe to this personally and politically or not—in which we know that the body that is the norm is the body racialized as white. The white body as the normative expectation is part of the racialized somatechnics in which we are embedded. This is a racialized somatechnics in which the category human is dictated by whiteness (Gordon 1997; Mills 1997; Spillers 2003; Wynter 2001, 2003; Yancy 2008, 2012). This whiteness in the Global North West and Global South West most often relates to being European descent as shown in skin colour, hair texture and facial features. Even though across this region 'whiteness' can assume many looks, visible European descent and societal acceptance of the body as 'looking white' mean that socially constructed whiteness must still appear on the surface of the body in order for it to be read as white. Much as any other racialized positionality, whiteness exists within economies of visibility through representation, which make society know, which bodies matter and which do not, those with which we can build relationalities and those that must be erased from the social body. That is racialized assemblages always already dictate, which bodies can be part of biopolitical regimes and which bodies are located within the necropolitical.

What I want to explore here in terms of white iconicity is that beauty itself is not only a thing of pleasure, something that pleases the gaze as Immanuel Kant (1914) would have it. Kant (1914) also meditated on the connection between beauty as a symbol of moral goodness, and we know that Black women have been thought to be immoral because they were seen as ugly during enslavement and colonialism (Gilman 2010). Following Arthur Danto (2002) speaking about art, we know that it is not true that anything is beautiful. Things become beautiful when our familiarity with them enables us to grasp the unity easily, whereas ugly works are those in which we can only perceive unity with an effort (Danto 2002). Rather, beauty is about power as Kant (1914) himself also concedes, when he says that judgements of beauty are subjective and partial but that these go on to be represented as universal, as applicable to everyone. This is the case when there are other racialized beauty ideals in existence, which speak to the hegemony of the universal. The hegemony of white European racialized beauty judgements started from that central position and expanded out to the world as it was conquered,

colonized and involved in the global trade in bodies, objects and knowledge, which fuelled European economic growth. In this context, iconic beauty could only ever be white. The familiar easy to grasp unity, which Danto speaks about, could only ever be racialized as white.

Danto (2002) avers that beauty is a necessary condition for life as we would like to live it. If we relate this to bodies which have been constructed as ugly, we then have a situation of unliveability (Butler 2006) emerging. What can 'beauty is a necessary condition for life as we would like to live it' mean in an aesthetico-political context in which anti-Black African descent racism and negrophobia would insist that skin, faces and hair racialized as Black should vanish from the social body, from the social skin and everyday life? This is a necropolitical context, which we must remember is not a twenty-first century phenomenon but one which has been centuries in the making through conquest, settler colonialism, enslavement and hetero-patriarchal miscegenation (Sharpe 2010; Spillers 1987, 2003; Weheliye 2014). This is a racialized necropolitical legacy, which still haunts our 'post-race' aspirations.

To 'breed out' that constructed human stain Blackness, and more widely non-whiteness, was part of the racial structuration of European empire and settler colonialism. This eugenic principle extended from the USA (Spillers 1987) to the Caribbean (Coleman 2003), Latin America (Freyre 2000) and Canada (Thompson 2009), for example. All of these regions had and still do have societies structured by white/lighter-skinned racial dominance. For example, Brazil, Cuba and the Dominican Republic focused their immigration policies on whitening the population (branqueamento/blanqueamiento), and this was foundational to the emergence of these nation states (Arrizón 2006; Candelario 2007; Pinho 2010).

Everywhere we see Black skins, visible African descent embodiment being attacked by the necessity to maintain white privilege, white power and white aesthetic supremacy. As said above, this led to Lola wanting to be white as a child. We see again through Lola's extract how the boundaries of whiteness as ideal are kept firm through everyday body surveillance by self and others, a surveillance, which is unwanted but given nonetheless. It is given so as to keep Black bodies in their constructed zone of ugliness and because of that ugliness also moral, intellectual, social and political apartness. Even in the twenty-first century, Black people's radical apartness is maintained by enslavement's and settler colonialism's discourses of physiognomy, which links facial features to one's character and psyche.

When we are constructed as radically apart we become disposable flesh, much as in enslavement when African and African descent (wo)men were

a raw material, which was routinely brutalized on plantations (Spillers 2003). Speaking of the Middle Passage Hortense Spillers (2003) makes a distinction between the 'body' and 'flesh', which is apposite here. 'Flesh' is prior to the 'body' as it is a degree of social conceptualization, which is concealed through discourse and iconography. In the Middle Passage and beyond, Black flesh was ripped apart, wounded, to begin to produce the corporeality of enslavement. This 'hieroglyphics of the flesh' (Spillers 2003) branded the Black body as a commodity with a use value, exchange value and capable of producing surplus value. Such 'racial branding' (Wingard 2013) within racial capitalism does not vanish once emancipation and legal freedom mean that Black (wo)men have bodies before the law. Rather, it remains part of the violence of racializing assemblages, which continue to dehumanize Black (wo)men's bodies within the contemporary material conditions of 'post-race' states. Within such assemblages, Black bodies continue to be seen as mere 'flesh'. If we transfer this understanding to Black beauty shame scripts, we can see how these scripts are transmitted transgenerationally and maintained through racialized structures of feeling in contexts in which the racial nomos (Gilroy 2004) means that Black (wo)men continue to be not-quite humans.

State necropower shapes Black women's bodies as disposable, as always already ghosts embedded in its racialized social, discursive and material life. This is so as, 'forms of subjugation of life to the power of death (necropolitics) profoundly reconfigure the relations amongst resistance, sacrifice and terror' (Mbembe 2003: 39). This points to a particular operation of power, necropower, a politics of poverty, repression, corruption and death (Mbembe 2003). Relating this to racialized aesthetic regimes ruled by white iconicity, we can say that the intertwining of necropower with aesthetics means that as objects of desire, fascination, objectification and abuse, Black women's multiple beauties continue not to be recognized or even thought of as possible. What necropower does is to seal us off from one another, to deny relationalities, to make us forget that 'we are interconnected, related to each other, that we do not exist as singular sealed "monads". Our bodies, our skins, are porous and open to somebody else's feelings' (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2010: 147) about our embodiment. It is only through relationality that beautiful/ugly are judged. It is only through the intensification produced by positive and negative affect that we become beautiful/ugly. The painful individuation of Black beauty shame is necropolitical in its very denial of relationality, in its refusal of a place within social bonds (Mokros 1995).

Another aspect of the necropolitical work accomplished by white iconicity, and its surveillance is to make Black beauty multiplicity disappear from perception, to actively erase it from representation. An example will suffice here. That is, that Black-white 'mixed race', 'ethnically ambiguous' 'mulattaticity' has come to stand in for all Black beauties, thus, erasing the presumably 'unmixed' Black woman from the category beautiful (Tate 2015b). For example, Thandi Newton, Beyoncé Knowles, Rihanna, Alicia Keys and Alesha Dixon are the type of Black beauty, which is recognized and circulated through representation. This erasure leads to trauma and the death of Black beauty multiplicity in favour of a constructed essentialist version of what Black beauty *is*. That is, Black beauty has now become lighter-skinned, straighter-haired, 'more European looking'.

Within this necropolitical Black beauty context, we can go back to Stuart Hall's (1989) discussion of 'the end of the innocent notion of the death of the essential Black subject' and read it anew for our times. Neoliberal racialization means that the white constructed 'essential Black subject' continues to be manufactured. It (re)emerges so that the world is constantly un-problematically remade in the image of the Black ugliness/white beauty binary. This is a binary that is insistent on what counts as beauty being only applicable to those bodies racialized as white European. We can see this, for example, if we look at how it is that light(er) skin, straight(er) hair and features, which show the mark of European descent, are still relevant in Brazil and the USA where Black women continue to occupy the space of 'monkey' within a white supremacist frame. In 2013, Brazil's first dark skinned Globeleza Carnival Queen (the Globo television network's competition), Nayara Justino, was crowned. She was called everything from a 'monkey' to a 'darkie' and told she was 'too Black' to be Globeleza. Her contract was terminated and Erika Moura, a lighter-skinned 'mulata' became Globeleza without even a public vote (http://www.clutchmagonline. com/2016/02/heres-how-brazilians-treated-its-first-black-globeleza- carnival-queen/. Accessed 25 September 2016). Justino was physically erased from public life and political economy and replaced by a lighter-skinned woman, whose embodiment did not trouble the social skin, did not challenge prevailing taken for granted knowledge about light/white being 'right', even in a country, which claims its African roots. We also saw this in the USA in 2016 where Michelle Obama has been referred to as an 'ape in heels' on social media (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ election-us-2016-37985967. Accessed 5 February 2017). Racist beauty

shaming can be used against all Black women irrespective of status and is integral to beauty's necropolitical life.

In the example, in the next section, Coral makes plain what is being problematized as aberrant if viewed from the perspective of white iconicity. That is, hair, lips and skin racialized as Black African descent. What is interesting about these body parts is their problematization in the Global North West and the Global South West (the Caribbean, Central America and Latin America), as signs of racialized difference, as markers of inferiority. It is these markers, which led to both the Justino and Obama incidents. The continuity of racist discourses, disparaging racist humour and contemptuous touching by gaze or hand across such a vast expanse of the world is little short of astonishing. However, perhaps it is not surprising at all if we think about how foundational discourses of Black inferiority and white superiority are in these regions and how much a part of this regime of racialized and racializing hyper-visibility remains.

What is also part of the everyday aesthetic necropolitical life of these regions is how bodies are read for signs of racial difference from the Black/white norm without this even being perceived as being problematic. This racial dissection (Fanon 1986) of epidermis, hair and facial features results from the necessity to socio-politically and culturally fix bodies as members of this or that racial group. Fixing bodies enables them to be available for the process of subjectification. This is a necessary part of aesthetic necropolitical life in which some bodies are granted life and others death, with no way of being involved in this racialized decision as we see with Nayara Justino. Aesthetic death is the gift (Derrida 1996) of white beauty iconicity as it seeks to be *the* aesthetic value, *the* sociocultural capital whilst remaining invisible in its ambition so as to give the appearance of being the only possibility. Drawing on Jacques Derrida's (1996) conceptualization of the gift of death is helpful in thinking about white beauty iconicity. This is so, as for him the gift of death signifies that which is unsignifiable because it is something that seeks to be beyond all conceptualization and eludes all characterization. If we relate this to whiteness and white beauty as iconic but invisible norm, we can see that its gift of death is the context for all beauty judgements. However, the connection between a conceptualization of beauty as deracinated, racially neutral and its necropolitical impetus struggles for admission within beauty's psychic and socio-politico-cultural life. Thus, we can assume that the difficulty here is in acknowledging white iconicity as problematic, as being the source of non-white beauty death. As we

saw from Lola and will see from Coral below, such death is implicated when 'we want to be white' or when Black children and adults are made to feel shame at their embodiment because they are not the white norm.

To think aesthetics necropolitically removes it from an individual, banal, everyday matter of vanity to one of nation state building and struggles over global beauty value, beauty citizenships and differing capitals of skin, hair and/or facial features. Looking at racialized aesthetics necropolitically enables us to see that white skin capital is still being negotiated by people of colour, those who could be whites and whites alike, even after the global impact of Black anti-racist aesthetics (Taylor 2000, 2016; Pinho 2010). This is the case even if we might wish it were otherwise. With such white iconicity at the helm determining global aesthetic futures, Black beauties would be made dead. Or thinking through Derrida (1996), they would commit suicide to give white iconicity life. They would have no future so as to give white iconicity its futurity. Whether this is the queer futurity outlined by José Esteban Muñoz (2009) or a straight one, such aesthetics are nothing but the harbinger of death for Black beauties in their production of 'death worlds' (Mbembe 2003) in which there is no 'forward thinking futurity' (Muñoz 2009: 1) if one is not racialized as white. Even if one is Black-white 'mixed race' kinship is irrelevant because the one drop rule of hypodescent always already dictates one's position as Black and by extrapolation, ugly. This is irrespective of the (re)production for public consumption of Black-white 'mixed race' beauty mentioned earlier.

What can we do to remove ourselves from this necropolitical lack of Black beauty futurity? One approach, which can be taken, is to engage in stylization, which mimics whiteness in order to minimize the shame attached to those body parts racialized as Black. This 'cultural appropriation of whiteness' would be a Black Nationalist reading of such stylization. Of course, we could also read this response to shame and being made ashamed as a racialized somatechnics, which can only ever be about failure. This is so as what is being appropriated is a reproduction, a translation of what whiteness might be seen to be. Those racialized as Black know that whiteness cannot be achieved through mere surface changes, they know that whiteness relates to descent, skin, hair, facial features and to societal recognition of these as constitutive of whiteness. I want to divert briefly here and also relate this to white 'cultural appropriation' of body parts racialized as Black, namely 'fuller lips' and 'larger bottoms'. What women racialized as white who have cosmetic surgery

interventions to change their bodies are doing is recreating their own stereotypes of what Black women's lips and bottoms look like. There is no *one* 'real' here either only the (re)production of white stereotypes.

Black women who (re)produce 'whiteness', however, that is instantiated, know that their mimicking will fail so the racialized somatechnics of shame can also be read from Jack Halberstam's (2011) perspective on the queer art of failure. That is, that these stylizations might well be about a pursuit of different discourses and practices on Black beauty. They might well be about counter-intuitive resistance rather than complicity. They might well be about creating alter/native beauties (Tate 2015a). This notion of counter-intuitive resistance takes us instead to Homi Bhabha's (1994a) decolonizing mimicry, because failure allows us to escape the beauty norms by which we are governed. Failure disavows the resonance of white beauty iconicity because it is made (un)recognizable. As (un)recognizable, Black women's stylization can itself be read as particularly Black rather than a failed whitely one. Perhaps, this is why Viola Davis's Emmys 2016 'look' went unremarked and the only comments in the days after the ceremony remained on her Marchesa gown and her matching plum lipstick. The award winning star of 'How to Get Away With Murder' was interviewed on the red carpet on 18 September 2016 and to my view and that of my sister QT had a noticeably lighter face than her body from the neck down though whether that was from lighting or make-up was unclear. She had previously spoken about the difficulties of being dark skinned in the USA in D. Channsin Berry and Bill Duke's (2011) documentary *Dark Girls* but now was a temporarily dramatically pale-faced version of herself.

Perhaps Davis's paler face serves another purpose if we look towards mimicry. It reminds us that the promise of white beauty iconicity can only ever be erasure and death within our present visibility regimes, whose marketing strategies make us feel like we matter or not. The inescapable fact is that Black beauty shame implicates both biopolitics and necropolitics as they demarcate those bodies, which are socially, culturally, morally, economically, politically and aesthetically valuable or in turn, subaltern, pathological, valueless. Or to put it necropolitically, Black beauty shame demarcates '[white beauty] subjects invited into life and [Black] abjected populations marked for [beauty] death' (Haritaworn et al. 2014: 2). Let us now turn to looking at the intersections of shame's bio-/necropolitics because of the promise of ideal white beauty and Black beauties' un-narratability.

THE PROMISE OF IDEAL WHITE BEAUTY AND BLACK BEAUTY'S UN-NARRATABILITY

What is it to have un-narratable beauty? If something is un-narratable that means that it is outside of representation, outside of the norms by which we live our daily lives, outside of the possibility for the formation of subjecthood in interaction with the other. However, the promise of ideal white beauty is something that we all live with in the Global North West and Global South West and its impact begins during childhood as we saw with Lola's narration of her childhood self, caught in white beauty induced Black-white 'mixed race' shame. We can also see this is in the following example in which Coral narrates the shame of Black difference, which she experienced as a child. Again here, like Lola, Coral reproduces a childhood other, which she now sees from a distance so that the shaming event can be narrated without implicating herself as the adult narrator in this racialized Black beauty shame. This intimate but distant other/self is necessary in order to tell the story of Black beauty shame.

CB: Tape 1-Side 1: 10

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1 C You know the- o- the other kids, the white kids > even tr-< treated us

2   differently because the name calling started from there?=

3 S =Right=

4 C = Right? ((Kiss teet)) from THAT age you know like a:hm pt > at First

5   School like I can remember< being called RUBBER LIPS and (.3)

6 S RUBBER LIPS?=

7 C = Yeah rubber lips ((.hhh)) they used to call us rubber lips and st-

8   I THINK THAT'S WHERE A LOT OF BLACK PEOPLE START GETTING A COMPLEX

9   FROM FROM A:HM=

10 S =Mhm (1.0)

11 C Yeah well I'll say that's where I- I started getting my thing from

12   about being (1.0) called RUBBER LIPS and a:hm >kiss teet< a:hm (.)

13   a:hm (.) a:hm (.) >cotton< and cotton wool for your hair and stuff

14   like that (1.0)> it's like you were DIF< and they'd say oh LET ME

15   FEEL YOUR HAIR you know like- like your hair WASN'T NORMAL
```

There is a constant necessity to account for ourselves in a context in which we are seen as abnormal. This is especially so where this abnormality is taken as a given, as natural, as just how things are (Carroll 2000; Taylor 2000). Coral's shame here relates to what Sedgwick (2003: 116) terms the 'precarious hyperreflexivity of the surface of the body'. Such precariousness (re)produces her as other whilst simultaneously hinting at the contingent nature of the hyper-reflexivity contained in Black beauty shame. However, Coral's narrative and her recognition of the impact of her experience as being where she, along with a lot of other Black people, got their 'thing from about being called rubber lips and cotton wool hair and stuff like that', make us think again about the power of words to wound and erase our individuality through shame's will to silence both other beauty looks and the development of Black subjectivation. It also makes us think how it is that words can reduce Coral to 'rubber lips and cotton wool hair' through name calling and saturate her with Black beauty shame to such an extent that she still feels re-stimulated psychic pain in her adult life. This is the power attached to the necropolitical life of racist beauty shaming. That is, the power to erase the person because the white generated stereotype replaces individuality. Coral became 'rubber lips' and 'cotton wool hair' as a child. She became the embodiment of that racist icon of UK Blackness, the golliwog. Unfortunately, this does not just end with the termination of the racist shaming event itself. As shame is performative, necropolitical erasure is (re)produced as an effect of its performance.[1] So there is a re-stimulation, a revitalization of Black beauty shame whenever she narrates incidents of Black beauty shame.

As an adult, this psychic pain that she calls her 'thing' at once resists naming shame as well as making it clear because of its very unnameability. Even whilst unnamed, the performative power of Black beauty shame lies in its ability to reduce one to a stereotype, to an object of derision, to erase one's individuality and to produce relationalities of intimate distance. Herein lies the process of Black beauty shame's necropolitical orientation of Black bodies. This is a process, which brands Black African descent beauty as valueless, which marks it as irretrievably different and inferior in terms of iconic whiteness. As such, it can be abandoned within representation or more insidiously included so as to perpetually recreate

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[1] I draw this from Judith Butler (2004a, 218), 'If gender is performative, then it follows that the reality of gender is itself produced as an effect of the performance'. Also see Tate (2005, 2009) on race performativity.

a subaltern comparator culturally, socially, morally, aesthetically, politically and economically.

Whilst being located as the stereotype though, Coral also performs a task on the other side of shame's performativity. That is, she also brings into being what she names (Butler 1993). She calls out anti-Black African descent racism by representing the racist white kids, whose actions were seen and normalized as 'playground banter' in the 1970s. Alongside this, she also unmasks the possible origin of her 'thing' about being called 'racist beauty names' as being to do with her early experiences of racism and not her own inherent 'hyper-sensitivity'. Constructing Black women as inherently hyper-sensitive is one way in which white supremacy continues to deny its anti-Black racism. Coral locates the racist actions of the white children as abnormal when she says 'you know like your hair wasn't normal'. What made 'rubber lips' and 'cotton wool hair' both empowering and devastatingly hurtful was that they were related to racist stereotypes, which are transgenerational and transnational in their scope as they arise from the racist habitus in which we live in The Black Atlantic (Gilroy 1995).

As such, racialized positions of Black beauty shame are always already there for Black women to be interpellated into. They bring with them the possibility for multiple shaming events as Black women carry on their bodies the past, which they did not make, under conditions of their own choosing, into the present. This shame is an integral part of the suffering caused by conquest, colonization and enslavement, which Lewis Ricardo Gordon (1997) avers lies at the heart of Black liberation politics. Even though Gordon does not look at aesthetics or name Black beauty shame, the question of beauty is a location of suffering. We can see this, for example, if we look at Lupita Nyongo's narration of her perception of herself as being ugly as a child when she was an honoree at the Essence 7th Annual Black Women in Hollywood event (https://www.youtube.com/watch?V=ZPCkFAR2eE. Accessed 16 May 2017).

Going back to Coral's extract, the (1.0) pauses, micro-pauses (.) and fillers like 'ahm' and the kiss teet[2] are speech disturbances, which point

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[2] Kiss teet is the primarily Jamaican name for an embodied oral gesture, which is more broadly known throughout the Caribbean and African Diaspora as suck-teeth, and also known as hiss-teeth, chups (with many variant spellings) and related to cho, chaw and chut. Kiss Teeth is performed by an ingressive airstream captured in an air and saliva pocket

us to the shaming event. That is, her shame occurred in her wounding childhood encounter with white others in a context in which her body was out of place (Puwar 2004). Her body was not the expected ideal, it was not white. Coral's talk shows us Sedgwick's (2003) individuation-relationality movement as she talks about this experience as being one of the Black kids at school—'we'—whilst at the same time being about *her* pain. Black communal and individual beauty shame is the result of the racialized relationality that is a part of the lives of Black school pupils who lived in a society structured by racial dominance. As such, the data show that shame works, for example, through 'making us want to be like', 'feeling a way', 'reducing us to something', 'making us wish to be' or noticing that we are 'seen as not quite right' in one way or another in terms of appearance and the white beauty norm.

The racialized somatechnics of white iconicity structure spaces, interactions and bodies necropolitically and produce those who are 'not quite right', who make the Black/white social skin uneasy and who must be shamed back into their place of un-belonging. They are returned to the space of object without a narratable beauty life through shame's subjectification. Coral's disalienation emerges here in 'like your hair wasn't normal' and placing the complex 'the thing' about being called rubber lips and cotton wool hair onto white reactions rather than recognizing it as an inherent part of her Black self. However, what is the link between disalienation and narratability? Further, what are the politics that disalienation and narratability enable?

DISALIENATION AND BLACK BEAUTY'S NARRATABILITY

What can be done with the 'split [Black] subjectivity inaugurated by shame' (Munt 2008: 187)? How can narratability become a catalyst for going beyond shame when Black beauty continues to be constructed as shameful? These questions are important because as we have seen from

Footnote 2 (continued)

created in the mouth through varying configurations of velar, dental and lip closures and dental configurations such as pouting or protruding lips, lip slightly opened to one side, lips flat or compressed against upper teeth. Duration, pitch, continuity (steady versus staccato, for example) and intensity vary based on tongue position, lip tension, ability to hold one's breath and so forth. Kiss Teeth has been typically understood as expressing negative affect, but can also express positive affect and is performed to indicate moral positioning (Figueroa 2005).

the two examples above Black beauty shame exerts control on, through and in the body. It controls the body's intimate spaces as well as occupying spaces within which the body can be perpetually beauty shamed. Black beauty shaming attempts to regulate the formation of identities.

However, as we have seen above in the extracts, Black beauty shame cannot fully control the outlines of these identities as it also provides the means for resistance to the ideal. One of these means for resistance is the building of the self through constructing narratability within shame scripts of Black ugliness, which often exist nationally if not globally. This means that as Lola and Coral show, it is possible through narratability to go beyond the subjectification produced by Black beauty shame, to not internalize the stigma of ugliness, to not make it negatively impact one's life, to not give into its 'diffuse unyielding sadness' (Munt 2008: 3). Such it is that subjectivation, making themselves subjects, remains possible.

Adriana Cavarero (2000) takes up the possibility of making ourselves subjects through her perspective on the narratable self. For her, the narratable self rather than striving for intelligibility through its own self-story derives its story from another, even whilst it longs for the familiarity of its own unique story. Therefore, to go back to Bakhtin, the narratable self is dialogical. This dialogism implies that narratability is relational and performatively produces subjectivities through its very enactment. Thus, it is that we get a sense of ourselves as narratable and also that other narratable selves are essential to the self's production. Using the model of the lover Cavarero (2000) shows that agency and selfhood are interdependent because reciprocal narrations empower and bring each other and our very selves into being through co-appearance (Munt 2008). For Cavarero selfhood is 'ethically pluralistic and interdependent [and] in order to inaugurate these new selves, narrative and story become elemental' (Munt 2008: 187). In other words, to be or to become, we have to be narrated whether that 'we' is individual, community or nation (Bhabha 1994b). Thus

> It is this *sense* of being narratable-quite apart from the content of the narration itself-and the accompanying sense that others are also narratable selves with unique stories, which is essential to the self, and which makes it possible to speak of a unique being that is not simply a subject. (Cavarero 2000: xvi)

To become narratable Black beauty subjects necessitates that women move away from what Édouard Glissant (2006) describes as 'the philosophies of the One in the West'. This narratability is produced by moving away from whiteness as the arbiter of beauty. Narratability has been enabled by decolonial thought and politics springing from the following amongst others: from the late nineteenth to early twentieth century W.E.B. DuBois; early to mid-twentieth century Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon; end twentieth century to the beginning of the twenty-first century, Gloria Anzaldúa, Lewis Gordon, Emma Perez, Chela Sandoval, Linda Tuhiwai Smith and Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Maldonado Torres 2008: 7). I would also add Marcus Garvey, Walter Rodney, Édouard Glissant and Sylvia Wynter to Nelson Maldonado Torres's (2008) list. The work of decolonizing white beauty iconicity has also been done by anti-racist individuals and movements such as Rastafarianism (Jamaica and the Caribbean, the USA and the UK), Garveyism (Jamaica, the Caribbean, USA and UK), the Black Power Movement (the USA, Caribbean, Latin America), Steve Biko (South Africa) and the Black Movement (Brazil).

What decolonial thinking enables us to see if we draw from Fanon, for example, is that beauty shame is not something inherent to Blackness but it is the result of colonial violence and that such beauty shame also implicates whiteness in its production and futurity. Fanon would say that Black bodies are the product of the white mind, power, knowledge and affect. Black bodies are the white projection of that which it does not want to be or be seen to be. As well as this, domination does not enable freedom from the beauty shame meted out to others racialized as inferior but imbricates those racialized as dominant in its affective violence and superior–inferior relationalities.

Beauty shame subjectivities are produced through interpellation, which both Lola and Coral demonstrate, is also the zone of the emergence of alienation. Alienation arises because one is forever seen through white beauty iconicity as stereotypically ugly, not as one believes that one is or, indeed, desires to become. Such alienation cuts us off from our humanity, our narratability as unique and a person worthy of being seen and heard. To become narratable, one has to engage in what Aimé Césaire (2000) terms disalienation in order to become human being and this applies to both the dominant and the dominated (Gordon 1997). That is, for our purposes, we have to 'dis' the alienation produced by

white beauty iconicity. 'Dis' here is used in both senses of the word—
the Latin prefix, which means 'apart', 'asunder', 'away', a 'negative or
reversing force' and in popular parlance where 'dis' means to 'speak
disrespectfully', 'to criticize'. We would then alter Césaire's formula-
tion to dis/alienation to take this active 'dissing' on board. 'Dissing'
alienation is possible through the process of narration as we have seen
in the extracts and this produces another possibility for selfhood apart
from that of the Black beauty shamed. Further, dissing alienation, doing
something to mark oneself as apart, makes possible the political action of
building oneself anew envisaged by Césaire. This is so as

> […] the scene of narration, of telling each other life-stories, takes on the
> character of political action. Moreover, through such a suspension of the
> disjunction between discourse and life, it becomes possible to imagine a
> relational politics that is attention to *who* one is rather than *what* one is.
> (Cavarero 2000: 71)

Dis/alienation through narration creates counter-discursive sites for the
representation, contestation and subversion of white beauty iconicity as
we relate to *who* one is, to *who* we are. As said earlier, for Butler this is
about the self-becoming, which is made known in the course of a con-
versation. This *becoming* rather than *being* rejects the dominant account
of what one *is*. This dominant account is on the basis of Glissant's
(2006) 'philosophies of the One in the West', which perpetually repro-
duce racialized subjects as others, outside the bounds of human sociality,
as un-narratable, as Black beauty shamed and shameful.

Conclusion

Dis/alienation provides us with one possibility to move beyond the
necropolitics of Black beauty shame. What dis/alienation also entails is
that such shame and its foundational white beauty iconicity must be rec-
ognized in order to end the transgenerational suffering it causes. This
recognition has been illustrated by both Coral's and Lola's critiques of
white anti-Black African descent beauty regimes. Recognition and cri-
tique resist Black beauty shame's melancholic (Tate 2009) movement
inwards to blame the self for perceived shortcomings. It also rejects its
movement outwards as our bad feelings are projected onto others, to
become their psychic pain, their Black beauty shame. Dis/alienation is

dynamized by Black beauty shame as much as it is facilitated by counter-discourses such as those of Black anti-racist aesthetics. Dis/alienation protects both community and individual from Black beauty shame's negative role in subjectivities and relationalities as it moves beyond this to produce new versionings of self and community, new becomings. Black beauty shame continues to produce counter-hegemonic beauty politics into the twenty-first century in contexts in which racialized difference is reproduced as shameful because of white iconicity. Counter-hegemonic beauty politics continue as a necessary part of Black women's lives because whiteliness (Yancy 2008) is only geared towards aesthetic domination. However, Black diasporic and local community politics also produce their own exclusions, their own shaming events and shame scripts. The next chapter turns to look at this in more detail through approaching Black-white 'mixed race' beauty and its complexities.

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The Shame of 'Mixedness': Black Exclusion and Dis/alienation

Abstract This chapter uses 'brownness' as ideal to take up a discussion of somaesthetics and sarkaesthetics through looking at the shame caused by negative aesthetic value within Black Nationalist politics attached to being Black-white 'mixed race' and its 'dissing'. That is, Black women's bodies are a medium for creating aesthetic value through the subject's adoption of a third-person perspective, enabling the emergence of dis/alienation from existing Black Atlantic discourses on *the* Black woman's beauty shame.

Keywords Dis/alienation · Value · Skin shade · Somaesthetics Sarkaesthetics · Brownness · Browning

Skin shade is attached to aesthetic value which can then be exchanged for economic, social, cultural and political value in the global skin trade. Thus, the global skin trade (re)produces individual, communal and national value at a variety of levels. An example of this is beauty pageants where skin and bodies already laden with value from the context within which they emerge, produce further value for contestants, the countries they represent, as well as the global and local organizations and entrepreneurs which support the pageants. In terms of global beauty pageants such as Miss World and Miss Universe, one thing that we see clearly from the winners is that the skins which are most highly valued are light or white, along with straight/straightened hair and facial features which

can be likened to white European. Judgements of the body's aesthetic value then are not inherently impartial or objective. The body's aesthetic value is racialized, middle class, cis-gendered, straight and able-bodied as it orients us as a national/global society to what we come to see as beautiful. We are turned towards mediatized, global and societally valorized beauty and turned away from what is shunned as ugliness. Global and local (that is, 'glocal') aesthetic value is significant for how our bodies are viewed, how they are interacted with and the relationalities which we can establish with others. This chapter takes up a discussion of both somaesthetics and sarkaesthetics through looking at the shame caused by negative aesthetic value within Black Nationalist politics attached to being Black-white-'mixed race' and its 'dissing' by women in conversation. That is, Black women's bodies are seen as a medium for the creation of aesthetic value through the subject's adoption of a third-person perspective enabling the emergence of dis/alienation from existing Black Atlantic discourses on *the* Black woman's beauty shame. The discussion in this chapter questions the dominance of the lighter-skinned aesthetic norm within Black feminine beauty culture and society generally through drawing on auto-ethnography, interview data and data from the OWN (2015) documentary 'Light Girls'. Building a critique of brownness as aesthetic ideal and position of vulnerable Black political identification and recognition, the discussion seeks to decolonize colourism through the contention that sarkaesthetics needs to pay close attention to affective skin relationalities. As we unpick 'brown' dis-privilege without re-centring brownness as aesthetic ideal, let us turn to looking at aesthetic value.

Aesthetic Value

Aesthetic value is taken up by Paul C. Taylor (2016: 108) who makes a distinction between 'somaesthetics' and 'sarkaesthetics' when he looks at aesthetic value drawing on Shusterman's work. Somatic aesthetics is about the human body, specifically the way it is seen from the outside and apprehended by our external senses (Taylor 2016). Thus, the body in this version of somatic aesthetics is regarded as both an object with aesthetic value and an object of representation (Taylor 2016). For Stuart Hall (1997), thinking and feeling are systems of representation within shared cultural codes in which concepts, images and emotions in our

mental life represent things which may or may not be 'out there' in the world (Hall 1997: 4). Representation enters 'into the very constitution of things, and thus, culture is conceptualized as a primary or "constitutive" process, as important as the economic or material "base" in shaping social subjects and historical events- not merely a reflection of the world after the event' (Hall 1997: 5–6).

This discursive approach to representation from which I have departed in this book is concerned with the politics of representation—'its effects and consequences' (Hall 1997: 5–6). The interest in this book then is in how 'the knowledge which a particular discourse [on Black beauty shame] produces connects with power, regulates conduct, makes us or constructs identities and subjectivities and defines the way certain things are represented, thought about, practised and studied' (Hall 1997: 5–6). That is, how Black beauty shame representations produce shame and the bodies of the (a)shamed, how they structure the way we look at Black bodies and how violence, fantasy and desire are also a part of representational practices. Violence, fantasy and desire make representations of Black beauty shame far more complex at the same time because they can also make their meanings more ambivalent (Hall 1997). This discursive perspective on representation looks at the historical specificity of regimes of Black beauty shame representation (Hall 1997) which have been periodized as extending from exploration, enslavement and settler colonialism to today.

However, there is another version of somatic aesthetics outlined by Taylor (2016) which relates to embodiment and the way the body is experienced from the inside through proprioception rather than through representations presented to the external senses. This enables the body to move from merely being an object of aesthetic value to becoming the medium for its creation (Taylor 2016). Taylor outlines this as Shusterman's 'somaesthetics', and we can relate this to what we would expect if we think about dis/alienation. However, Shusterman does not relate this to representational somatic aesthetics which is also integral to dis/alienation. Building on Shusterman's work, Taylor (2016) goes on to name representational somatic aesthetics 'sarkaesthetics'. Sarkaesthetics is his name for 'those practices relating to the body as it were as flesh, regarded solely from the outside', from a third-person perspective and through external sensing (Taylor 2016: 108). However, it must be made clear that sarkaesthetics stylization practices in terms of

the rules for the body's representation and visual consumption relate to somaesthetics. Thus, the two can be seen to be intimately linked and resistant to any attempts at separation. Somaesthetics and sarkaesthetics work together in dis/alienation, in continually making something new out of oneself through the self being narrated, the self in action. This linkage will be taken up as given in the discussion within this chapter as the interest is in both somaesthetics and sarkaesthetics. That is, Black women's bodies as a medium for the creation of aesthetic value through the subject's adoption of a third-person perspective enabling the emergence of dis/alienation from existing Black Atlantic discourses on *the* Black woman's beauty shame.

Taylor looks at racialized sarkaesthetics by focusing on hegemonic feminine beauty culture in which lightness/whiteness continue to circulate as the norms within a beauty–gender nexus dynamized by continuing negrophobia. This position has long been supported by work on beauty by Black women (Craig 2002, 2006; Hobson 2003, 2005; Hunter 2005, 2011; Sharpley-Whiting 2007)and cannot be denied as an important influence on how beauty is seen. However, this chapter questions the dominance of the lighter-skinned beauty norm within Black feminine beauty culture and society generally by using auto-ethnography, interview data and data from the OWN (2015) documentary 'Light Girls'. By problematizing brownness first as aesthetic ideal, and second as position of precarious and vulnerable Black political identification and recognition, the analysis seeks to decolonize colourism. It seeks to decolonize colourism so as to allow the emergence of an inclusive Black antiracist sarkaesthetics future. Let us begin by looking at some interview data in order to problematize Black iconicity and its production of 'out of place brownness'.

BLACK ICONICITY AND 'OUT OF PLACE BROWNNESS'

In the example which follows, we continue to see the paradoxes which exist within Black community around the beauty of hair and skin shade from the point of view of Black 'mixed race' women. On the one side for Dana, there are Black women who bleach their skin and straighten or weave-on their hair in order to look like her through the unashamed use of artifice, but she cannot be accepted for what she looks like 'naturally'.

Beauty for Dana must look 'natural' rather than purchased or produced through products and technology if it is to be acknowledged as Black beauty. Her emphasis on 'natural Black beauty' illustrates the continuing significance of Black anti-racist aesthetics into the twenty-first century and her positioning of herself as undeniably Black irrespective of skin tone and hair texture based on her political positioning as Black because of African descent.

   For Dana, Black beauty shame lies within her recognition that she would be more acceptable to the Black community if she also used artifice—'a wig' or 'weave'—so it would be clear that her straighter hair was not real when other Black people pulled it. Tessa joins the conversation with her own experience of a shaming hair pulling event combined with 'dirty looks and little remarks', which are part of the daily lives of Black mixed race women with straight(er) hair and light(er) skin. She says, 'but it's something you know I've learned to live with I know that this will happen'. Her quotidian experience verges on micro-aggression from Black people in terms of the harassment she receives because of how she looks. Tessa says that her sister cut her hair to avoid further Black beauty shaming events. However, even knowing that these shaming events will happen does not stop Tessa from displaying that which could be the source of her exposure to further shame, her long straight(er) hair. She does not take the route of her sister and cut her hair short but takes a positive stance in terms of Black beauty looks being multifaceted. In doing this, she dis-identifies from the shame of having naturally straight(er) hair and light(er) skin and performs an-other Black beauty which is worthy of inclusion as a Black beauty model. Indeed, which is worthy of inclusion because this model already exists. The model that she co-builds in conversation with Dana is one which is necessarily based on a critique of authenticity regimes whilst (re)claiming authenticity for light(er) skinned, straight(er) haired women as a matter of Black political consciousness. This extract shows us that in their view within Black community its authenticity regime's 'fake hair' has aesthetic value as opposed to their 'naturalness' which struggles to be recognized and accepted as Black especially when aligned with light(er) skin. That is, their bodies do not have aesthetic value within Black community because of the authenticity politics of skin and hair based on dark(er) skin and more afro-textured hair. Let us now turn to listen to Dana and Tessa

Dana and Tessa- Tape 2-Side 1:12

D   >And yet< an look at some people using the face lightening creams and the hair straighteners (1.2) and

weaving on hair kind of like mine sort of thing and- and I think to myself but (.5) you're actually making

yourself artificially to look like [me]

T   [Yep]

D   >So why can't you just accept that this is how I look?< =

T   =Naturally=

D   = >And it would all make me< more acceptable (1.3) if I had a wig on or [I

T   [Oh

D   had a] weave [they'd   ] accept me >much< more then (.) I've had people

T   yeah]   [Definitely]

D   pull my hair to see if it's real [>ºyou know?<º]

T   [>Oh yeah<   ] I was- ou- I was out on ah:m Saturday night (.4) and I went to the

Albert Hall (.) s- somebody said to me it was a Black club and it was at the top of Wills Road and I thought I'll

try it (.5) >and I went with my two sisters< and my- > one sister gets accepted more than (.7) me and Elsa

will do >because she cut off her hair< she's got very short hair now >ever since she cut it off she seems to

be< spoken to more by (.) Black people whereas me and my eldest sister have kept our hair long >and every

two minutes I could feel somebody< pulling my hair? (.7) and I was getting the >oh< sorry >you know< I was

just passing by and I am >right?< so why is your hand in my head? (1.1) >right?< and we got the dirty looks

and the little you know remarks and whatever but it's something you know I've just learned to live with >I

know< that this will happen (.5)

D   And that certain Black people are going to behave like that (.)

T   Yeah they won't stop me leaving my hair out and wearing it long

Let us pause for a minute because as a result of this and the other examples earlier, a question is apposite here. That is, is their experience different from Coral's memory of having her hair touched by white kids because it wasn't seen as 'normal'? In this example, those who are doing the touching meant to diminish, to make them less than Black are Black and those being touched are also Black. However, I would argue that there is a fundamental difference to the *effect* of the touch itself. It is this *effect* which is significant here for Taylor's sarkaesthetics and for Black beauty shame scripts which attempt to silence the existence of light(er) skin and straight(er) hair through shaming. To be abjected by whiteness is a regular Black experience of violence, shaming though it can be and unacceptable though it is. However, to not be permitted entry to Blackness, to be placed as politically suspect and socially abject because of skin shade and hair texture is quite a different matter altogether in terms of wounding relationalities of intimate distance.

It is a different matter, because as Sara Ahmed (2004) persuasively argues, one feels shame because of a quest for relationality. If we feel part of Black community and are committed to that, then rejection from that home must be felt to the very core of our being. This effect can be devastating if not traumatic in its ability to make us see ourselves as ugly through the eyes of others with whom we seek community belonging because of the hyper-reflexivity of the surface of the body produced through relationalities with others. We feel so deeply because our strategic identification possibilities based on 'race' are brought into question and our Black political certainties are destabilized. This depth of bad feeling points to first, the continuing impact of the racialized norms of Black beauty on identifications, as well as politics and, second, the (im)possibility of non-shaming interactions within Black communities if you are light(er) skinned and straight(er) haired. The struggle for Black women who are doubly abjected from Black community because of light(er) skin and straight(er) hair which marks them as Black-white 'mixed race', is a very specific one, though one which is long enduring. That is, as Dana and Tessa aver, the struggle is to live as Black women whilst knowing that Black beauty shaming will happen every day, but to live none-the-less as oneself. Black beauty shaming is a daily possibility because 'certain Black people are going to behave like that'. However, going beyond that possibility they will not let this 'stop [them] leaving [their]hair out and wearing it long', they will not let it stop them from being who they unashamedly are and can become.

It is almost as if Dana and Tessa are being asked to confess their shame or at least to feel guilt for their embodiment, for having bodies that are 'out of place' (Puwar 2004) within Black community because of the mark of Black-white mixing on their skin and hair. They are being asked to remain in an interstitial Black community (Tate 2007) because they are Black-white 'mixed race' women. This inserts the plantation into twenty-first-century Black lives, politics and aesthetics. Black-white, heterosexual, reproductive mixing has a long history and continues into the present but some of this is worth rehearsing here as it gives context to the shaming encounters spoken about by Tessa and Dana through establishing the genealogy of shame's entanglement with Black-white 'mixed race' bodies.

As we know, heterosexual transracial intimacies were problematized in the colonies and their European metropoles. This was the case even though white men engaged in relationships with enslaved and colonized women alike whilst white women were discouraged from entering into transracial heterosexual relationships. However, even though the growth of the Black-white 'mixed race' population told of these intimacies national denials across Europe of transracial intimacy within the colonies and the metropole enabled ideas of white purity to remain intact. The fact that Black enslaved women endured rape was also denied by the discourse of 'the plantation romance' (Sharpe 2010). The intimate sphere was regulated and manipulated by 'race' boundaries through these national denials that extended from colonial anti-miscegenation regimes which included laws, jurisprudence and extra-legal norms (Stoler 2002, 1995; Thompson 2009).

The year 2017 marks the fiftieth year since the historic Loving vs The State of Virginia ruling in the USA, which illustrates how very recently anti-miscegenation law existed in that country (Morani 2001). The aim of these anti-miscegenation regimes was one of removing the possibility of 'Black pollution' from white purity (Gordon 1997). The legal/extra-legal prohibition makes clear that colonial and post-colonial transracial intimacy was not solely about affect. It was biopolitical (Foucault 1994) and necropolitical (Mbembe 2003).

Colonial transracial intimacy aimed to maintain white supremacy, racial state surveillance and self-surveillance, secure white racial dominance, discipline bodies and manage all racialized lives through the fear of death. During enslavement and colonialism the discourses of heterosexuality and transracial sex which maintained white dominance were

the desire of Black women for white men (Fanon 1986) and Black men as potential rapists of white women and, thereby, an unbearable threat to the white body politic which had to be eliminated (13th 2016). In *Fictions of Feminine Citizenship* Donnette Francis (2010) asserts that these discourses co-existed simultaneously with white men's desire for Black women's bodies and the surveillance and outright denial of the possibility of white women's desire for Black men. European settler colonialists and colonial authorities ensured that white Europeanness was middle class, elite and allied specifically with the necessity for white 'racial purity'. However, as we see from the growth of the 'mixed race' colonial and metropolitan populations European whiteness was strictly gender coded and white bourgeois society defined its 'healthy sexuality' through the purity of white women (Stoler 2002).

In the Caribbean, Antigua was the only British colony to legislate against miscegenation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Bush 1990). These laws bear historical witness and testify to the British Empire's concern in terms of the regulation of transracial marriages and the emergence of a 'mixed-race' population from white fathers (Thompson 2009). The satire 'Johnny Newcome in love in the West Indies' also illustrated that the state's concern was popularly taken up within cultural artefacts such as early 'comic strips' (Tate 2015a). Earlier transracial intimacies which involved indentured white women and enslaved Black men were erased from colonial memory (Francis 2010). This erasure enabled white European women in the colonies to be (re) located in domesticity as the only legitimately desirable object of colonized males, dislocated from the sexual desires of European men and denied the status of desiring subjects (Stoler 1995). White male heterosexual desire for Black bodies was acceptable as long as it aided Empire in constructing colonial citizens because of the purity of white femininity and the heterosexual imperative (Ray 2016). However, by the nineteenth century in the UK, the most important and ubiquitous transracial heterosexual couple was Black women and white men (De Vere Brody 1998). Within this racialized hetero-patriarchal intimate economy, white European men and women were respectable if they engaged their desires to achieve legitimate paternity, intensive maternal care, family and heterosexual conjugal love (Morani 2001; Stoler 1995). Thus, anti-Black African descent racism was embedded within hetero-patriarchal intimacy because Black (wo)men and Black-white 'mixed race' (wo)men as inferior others were a 'fundamental project for the establishment of

the superior [white] self whose superiority is a function of what it *is*' (Gordon 1997: 70). This was the case whether in the colonies, Imperial metropoles, in the Americas, the Caribbean or on the European colonized African continent.

During the World Wars, there was continuing governance of internal racial colonies through extra-legal regimes based on eradicating transracial heterosexual intimacy. For example, within Liverpool 'anti-Black riots' in June 1919 were blamed on class, poverty, racism and the white population's negativity about sexual relations between Black men and white women (Christian 2008). So-called 'half caste' children in Liverpool were nationally problematized and after these riots the 'mixed race' population took on greater socio-political and national cultural significance as problems. 'Half-caste' children became a national sign of the problem of white women's moral decay because they had been intimate with Black men. Racialized responses were prompted during and after World War 2 by the British government because of the presence of Black civilian and military personnel. The fear was of the interaction of mobilized white British women and mobilized colonial men and Black US GIs again because of the problem of 'half caste children'[1] (Winndance Twine 2010; Carby 2007). In 1942 the British Colonial Office was worried about the future British population because of the 'sexual invasion' of Black soldiers (Carby 2007). By the 1950s 'mixed race' orphans became 'the nation's lonely picaninny' (Carby 2007; Winndance Twine 2010). These 'mixed race' children were embodiments of the presence in the UK of reproductive sex across the colour-line with that colonial, problematized, if not taboo couple, the Black man and white woman. Thus, it enabled a gendered analysis of transracial intimacy in which there was 'the descent of white womanhood […] recast […] as a signifier of the social problems associated with the black presence [which] emerged ahead of crime as a theme in the popular politics of immigration control' (Gilroy 1987: 79–80). Illustrative of this socio-political 'problem' of white women's descent needing to be halted was the summer 1958 'race' riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham, reputedly the result of the

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[1] In the first wave, there were 125,000 volunteers, mostly Jamaican, who joined the RAF, worked in munitions factories and in forestry in Scotland. By 1942, there were 3 million American troops 130,000 of whom were African American. The British government responded with measures to curb the flow of non-white soldiers. From these policies, we can see the emergence of Britain as a modern racialized state (Carby 2007).

perceived threat to whiteness and white purity posed by heterosexual transracial intimacy between Black men and white women (Gilroy 1987). Transracial intimacy between white men and Black women continued but was not policed in a similar way because it did not pose a threat to white hetero-patriarchy but was rather a continuation of the intimate business as usual extending from European exploration.

Although anti-miscegenation laws were not enacted in the UK, much like Canada, we can say that 'an informal and extra-legal regime ensured that the social taboo of racial intermixing was kept to a minimum' (Thompson 2009: 354), especially as it related to Black men and white women. This regime continued to the mid-twentieth century and was made obvious in the colour bar in public spaces established to segregate white and Black thus minimizing the possibility of heterosexual transracial intimacy. In the 1950s UK transracial intimacies led to white women's loss of social standing through active *de-whitening* as they were 'Blackened' through their association with Black men. The construction of taboos on transracial heterosexual sex was necessary to state formation and to racialized social stratification in the 1920s to the 1950s (Winddance Twine 2010). However, white women 'played a central part in the social reconfigurations of the period' through their transracial intimacies (Niva 1994).

It is this genealogy of abjection which makes the pull on the hair and the attempted abjection from Blackness wounding because it drags centuries of shame into the present. Added to this is the idea of what/who is authentically Black which again brings to the fore ideas of Black 'purity', non-mixedness and more clearly what is recognized and valued as more authentically Black hair/skin/facial features as guardians of the Black social skin. From the standpoint of Black purity, both Tessa and Dana occupy zones of abjection (Kristeva 1984) from the Black social skin.

For both Tessa and Dana, the pull on the hair and the disparaging remarks confirm their lack of fit within the Black social skin. These Black micro-aggressions keep them outside of the Black social skin unless they themselves remove some of their beauty iconicity as light(er) skinned, straight(er) haired Black–white 'mixed-race' women. In this case, the removal of beauty iconicity is represented by Tessa's sister cutting off her hair to become a Black aesthetic and socio-political insider. Her exclusion from Black community because of those beauty discourses of Black purity which negated 'mixed-race looks', made her feel ashamed and led

her to cutting her hair short. In doing this she shows her subjectification by these discourses' normalizations. She could not move past these limitations as Tessa and Dana have done because 'wanting to belong' to a Black home, to 'pass' authentically as Black, to become recognizably and acceptably Black, impeded her. Tessa and Dana show us the possibility for beauty transformations through shaming events. Simply, if you are always made the abject (Kristeva 1984) there must come a point at which you merely say, 'enough is enough'. Through their disidentification (Muñoz 1999) they show us this 'enough is enough' moment. At this moment you either succumb to the norm like Tessa's sister or disidentify from it as Tess and Dana show here.

They disturb the Black beauty habitus (Bourdieu 1988), even if only momentarily within that conversation. The momentary disturbance enables us to see that the social rules of the Black beauty habitus are inscribed in their dispositions, in how they see themselves. This disturbance also shows us how they are re-inscribed with a difference in terms of the extent to which they can see/demonstrate/imagine/style alter/native beauty possibilities. The process of shame, disidentification and reinscription underlies the disalienation of Black beauty shame as a moment of beauty transformations and this is what we turn to next, beginning with some auto-ethnography.

BLACK BEAUTY SHAME: DISALIENATION, COUNTER-CONDUCT AND BLACK ANTI-RACIST SARKAESTHETICS

I remember when I was growing up in Jamaica in the late 1960s into the early 1970s and feeling slightly out of place. On the one hand, as 'brown' I was the pre-independence colonial skin ideal while on the other as 'brown' I was the visible, ineradicable reminder of the necropolitics of enslavement's past and the continuation of its pigmentocracy into post-independence times. I could not have articulated this in this way then, of course, not as a twelve year old in a country which was also only twelve years old. However, from the age of twelve I joined other 'brown' people on the beach at the weekend with my bottle of baby oil to get darker skin because I felt and knew this was what was more beautiful, more valuable societally. At least with darker skin I wouldn't be called 'red ants' anymore by my classmates and I wouldn't have to have a physical fight daily with any of them because of my reaction to being called that name. Until today, I still feel really beautiful when I am tanned. I still have a positive attachment to tanning though now I use SPF 50, wear a hat and sit a lot more

in the shade to protect against sunburn, sunstroke and sun damage to my skin.

Even at the age of twelve, I was engaged in Black Nationalist societal aesthetic valuations of my lighter skin shade and my view was that my brown skin lacked value. The skin I lived in and through lacked value because of the post-independence cultural turn to Africa, the continuing colour antagonisms around the stubborn hold of the brown and white skinned elite on Jamaican economic and political life and the impact of Rastafarianism and Black Power's 'Black is beautiful' mantra. In *Black is Beautiful*, Paul C. Taylor (2016) looks at aesthetic value through making a distinction between somaaesthetics and sarkaesthetics. If we recall, sarkaesthetics is his name for the 'practices of representational somaaesthetics- those practices relating to the body as it were as flesh, regarded solely from the outside' (Taylor 2016: 108). Sarkaesthetic practices cover three dimensions:

a. Descriptive—that is, the norms and principles that dictate the aesthetic evaluation of the body and the practices which spring from this;
b. Normative—which lays out the rules and principles for judgements and pursuits of bodily beauty;
c. Meta-theoretical—which raises broader questions about bodily perceptions and practices and relocates these to phenomenology, epistemology, ethics and social theory (Taylor 2016).

Looking back now at my twelve-year-old self responding to the norms and ethical perspectives of Garveyism, Rastafarianism and Black Power meant that for me tanning was a means of normalization towards a darker-skinned ideal. To fit into the darker-skinned norm, masking the brownness was essential in order to have skin with aesthetic, political, cultural, affective and societal value. This is how Jamaican Black Nationalist and US American/Caribbean Black Power politics as part of my psychic life became obvious. I wrote and wore them on my skin so to speak. Their governmentality and my self-surveillance meant that the skin I lived in had to reflect my ethical, political, social and affective attachments to African descent Blackness through tanning.

Attachment speaks affective skin relationalities and here is where we then see the gap left open within Taylor's (2016) theory of sarkaesthetics.

That is, Taylor does not pursue a fourth dimension, the affective, which can also be seen as impacting the three dimensions above. This will be the concern of the rest of the chapter. Its contention will be that sarkaesthetics needs to pay close attention to the affective skin relationalities pertaining to the descriptive, normative and the meta-theoretical as well as the affective value(s) of skin. The discussion will look at racialized sarkaesthetics and the issue of authenticity through the body of 'the browning' before going on to contemplate the possibility for decolonizing both colourism's 'traumatic intimacies' and white supremacy's Black African descent phobia through looking at the dis-privilege of brownness. This is important because brown dis-privilege also pertains to the possibility of shaming events as Tessa and Dana showed earlier.

RACIALIZED SARKAESTHETICS

In outlining the contours of sarkaesthetics, Taylor's (2016) concern is the styling of the body in relation to rules for its representation and visual consumption. Thus, the body is experienced from a third-person perspective through the bodily senses. Taylor thinks through racialized sarkaesthetics by looking at a Black feminine beauty culture in which lightness/whiteness and the straight-hair rule continue to circulate as the normative expectation. This normative expectation circulates within a beauty-gender nexus dynamized by continuing Black African descent phobia and the binary affective pairings of desire/revulsion, fascination/abhorrence, valorization/shame, for example. Taylor's question then becomes an ontological one though not one based in the anxiety of psychic dispossession. His question is, how can Black people 'authentically orient themselves to anti-Black sarkaesthetic norms?' This question is an important political one because the fact is that there is this orientation within Black colourism and white supremacy which impacts Black aesthetic valuations and stylization practices. The discussion's focus on brown dis-privilege also makes clear that there are other anti-Black sarkaesthetic norms which emerge from the shadeism of Black Nationalist authentic skin and hair discourses.

However, the phrase 'authentically orient' is what I would like to look at here. What does 'authenticity' mean in terms of the transgenerational practice of hair straightening used by Taylor as the case for analysis? It would appear that authenticity cannot be that view which says that we have to be ourselves in order to be authentic. Indeed, what

would *being ourselves, Black being* be about at any rate? This query is important as we step away from Black being to *Black becoming* when we exceed Black beauty shame's hold on who can be beautiful and the definition of beauty itself. Rather, to take a Spivakian (1993) perspective from her 'Can the subaltern speak?' authenticity must be about the *kinds of selves* that are allowed to emerge as intelligible and, therefore, recognized/recognizable at different points in time, within different spaces and through different representational, affective and politico-aesthetic regimes.

Authenticity must be seen as being itself produced from and through the regulatory ideal of the racialized bodily schema (Fanon 1986) of 'Black (wo)manhood'/ Black humanity. In other words, authenticity is already within a racialized sarkaesthetics in which some bodies and their stylizations are given more aesthetic value than others, judged through authenticity tropes. Authenticity extends to the realm of racialized aesthetic politics. That is, a politics of skin, facial features and hair which, allied with Black anti-racist politics, performatively produce the authenticity of the Black body. Authenticity is a performative, intersubjective, interpretive space that is constantly being negotiated as we show who we are by demonstrating who we are not through the uses of the body itself. Therefore, Black authenticity emerges as we actively racialize ourselves through bodily practices and stylizations. However, it does not exist in a once and for all way in and of itself.

Racializing practices and stylizations entail that the *authentic orientation* seen as linked to some putative *original* Black womanhood must and does shift. So whilst being formed according to the meaning of this putative original, alter/native (Truillot 2015) Black beauty femininities emerge across time and space as that imagined original is endlessly translated (Tate 2005). This is a translation which draws on the difference within the same of Black womanhood to produce new alter/native renderings. Thus, authenticity as trope is constantly refigured so that the question 'who is authentically Black?' can no longer produce a panopticon (Foucault 1991) which disciplines the emergence of difference through surveillance of skin/hair/facial features.

Taylor's enquiry looks at whether or not there has been a narrowing of the beauty gap—going from 'negro-phobia' to 'negro-philia', from the sarkaesthetic regimes of Thomas Jefferson's racism to Dave Chapelle's 'Racial Draft' and its 'post-racial 'play'. In short, he argues that the beauty gap has

> not narrowed as much as it might appear […] racialized beauty judgements are important […] because they reveal [how] race functions as a phenomenological inhibitor *and* catalyst, and […] authentic engagement comes from an ongoing struggle to deal responsibly and experimentally with the forces that condition our choices. (Taylor 2016: 115)

Within negrophobic, sarkaesthetics authentic engagement with the racialized and racializing beauty gap must involve the experimental-read creative—use of Black originated beauty practices to produce new Black looks which are productive of new Black beauties through stylization (Tate 2009). This means that we must recognize that

> "black" is essentially a politically and culturally *constructed* category, which cannot be grounded in a set of fixed trans-cultural or transcendental racial categories and which therefore has no guarantees in nature […] This inevitably entails a weakening or fading of the notion that "race" or some composite notion of race around the term black will either guarantee the effectivity of any cultural practice or determine in any final sense its aesthetic value. (Hall 1989: 443)

If we relate this to Black beauty and Black beauty shame we can see that like Taylor we have to pause and say that 'Black hair, facial features and skin must now signify quite differently. Thus, it is that the straight-hair rule, the light(er) skin preference and recognition of only those facial features deemed 'more European' as beautiful, must be questioned anew in terms of their continuing influence. This continuing aesthetic influence is produced through white supremacist anti-Black African descent racism as surely as it is by Black shadism/ colourism (Tate 2015), operating as different sides of the same coin. This is exemplified through Christina Sharpe's (2010) 'monstrous intimacies' drawn on by Taylor (2016). These monstrous intimacies were formed within what Sharpe (2010: 4) calls 'extraordinary sites of domination and intimacy' in enslavement and the Middle passage 'which were ruptures with and suspension of the known world that initiated enormous and ongoing psychic, temporal and bodily breaches'. As stated above, forced sex, extreme violence, submission, terror and trauma shaped the racialized experience of human beauty and shame and were inextricably entwined aspects of the 'plantation romance' rightly critiqued by Sharpe (2010) as myth. These reproductive traumatic intimacies were then shored up

by constructing societal structures in which Black-white 'mixed race' skin/ hair/ facial features were viewed as inherently more valuable than 'non mixed' others within racial capitalism's (Robinson 1983) aesthetic hierarchies.

Taylor (2016) asks that we 'authentically engage and deal responsibly and experimentally' with such a racialized sarkaesthtics. However, what is to be done when trauma is felt so deeply at the level of Black politics and seen as being epitomized through/on/by the body of the brown/'mixed race'/'ascriptive mulata' (Sharpley-Whiting 2007)/ 'browning' (Mohammed 2000) woman? We have to begin a process of decolonizing this trauma located in an-other Black woman's body through looking at dis-privilege. Remember here that 'dis' is to speak disrespectfully or to criticize as well as being apart, asunder, away, having a privative, negative or reversing force.

'Dis' though also produces other questions when it is a prefix to -alienation and -identification. How can we talk of the dis-privilege of brownness and the forced alienation from Black beauty community as Black communal violence against its own without re-inscribing brown skin privilege? How can we talk about brownness as political trauma without re-inscribing it as centre, as idealized norm? How can we speak about trauma without re-inscribing the tragic mulatto onto twenty-first-century Black women's bodies? As can be seen, these questions repudiate the legacy of the privilege of 'monstrous intimacies' at the political and interpersonal levels within twenty-first-century Blackness. The perspective from Blackness as a way into these questions is essential here as is illustrated if we draw on Taylor's work to speak about 'love' and 'the beloved'. For him, white supremacy short-circuits love and its turning towards the body of the other through 'transracial intimacy' (Tate 2015b). Thus, it is that the beloved never comes to be seen as beautiful because to quote Taylor (2016: 117), white supremacy stops 'attraction from growing into a judgement of beauty'. White supremacist sarkaesthetics entails that even if desired, however complected or haired, Black women cannot be the objects of love or favour but solely trauma (Sharpe 2010). To assume otherwise opens us up as women to anxiety, trauma and alienation from ourselves and our communities, however they may be defined as Sharpe (2010) shows in her analysis of Essie May Washington-Williams and her claim to whiteness through her father Strom Thurmond.

White supremacist *love of* is not a 'pairing', not an 'affective joining' which resists difference through identifying with 'the beloved's' wants, desires and needs (Hadreas 2016). It also does not identify with their politics. 'The beloved' is not the bearer of immeasurable value nor are they seen as unique. Why then would we seek to align ourselves with a position of dis-value? We could, of course, ask the same question of Black Nationalist positionings in which brownness is refigured as dis-value, a site of the human stain of whiteness, a corporeality which replays the trauma of enslavement's 'monstrous intimacies' through skin, facial features and hair. We will see some of this sarkeasthetics complexity in the example below of a discussion on hair, skin shade and Black authenticity taken from research done in the late 1990s in the UK amongst Black anti-racist activists.

In the example, Dana talks about that discourse of Black identity based on shade in which 'it's like awareness of identity to them is based on how dark you are' which means that she has 'to prove' herself 'all the time'. Sharon agrees that Dana is positioned as 'other' by this disciplinary Blackness because of her brownness and asks the rhetorical question 'what happen to them?' [that is, what is wrong with them?] to show her own distance from this skin colour politics. She also critiques this position by showing the paradox of the relationship between skin colour and hair texture as zones of reading Black identification when she says 'they're going well if you're dark you're really Black right but then they're there straightening their hair'. The Black communal surveillance of the body is itself revealed to be contradictory because that Black body from which the disciplinary gaze originates is changed through transforming 'natural Black hair' by 'straightening' and 'perming' or by weaving on Chinese hair. Through their critique of the deracination of Black hair they assert a Black anti-racist aesthetics based in Black Nationalist thoughts on 'naturalness'. 'Natural hair' signifies attachments to Black politics, cultural practices and rootedness in a philosophy of a natural Black body beautiful and is shared by both women. What is not shared with Black politics though is an anti-racist aesthetics which is based on exclusions of their skins and hair textures from Blackness. For them both, Dana's shade and hair are constructed within such aesthetics as contradicting Blackness so is 'not allowed', but darker-skinned Black women can have straightened/weaved on hair which 'imitates white hair' and Black people see no political contradiction in this.

Example 1-Tape 1 Side A DF:14

1 D   Yeah yeah and- and you kno:w? [.hhh if   ] you DO:N'T do that you know?

2 S   [Yeah ah know]

3 D   and it's like AWA:RENE:SS of >identity to them is based on how dark you are<=

4 S   =Mh:m I kno:w=

5 D   = So like ME: [I have to PRO:VE   ] myself all the time=

6 S   [>What happen to them?<]   =>I know but you know? I

7   fi:nd it so; contradictory D right?< they're going well i- if- if you're dark you're really

8   Black right? .hhh >BUT then they're there STRAI:GHTENING their ha:ir,=

9 D   =I kno:w (.)

10S   And if they're not strai:ghtening they're PE:RMING it if they're not perming it they (.4)

11   pla- =

12D   =Plaiting all things in=

13S   =They plaiting [all dead] HAIR INTO IT=

14D   [And the]   =And the thing that re-

15   the thing that rea:lly made me sick once was when this friend asked me: to go and buy

16   this hair, (1.) [>AND THE<] hair that she asked me: to buy was Chi:[nese   ]

17S   [Really?   ]   [>Putting on the Chinese stuff<]

18 D number two (1.3) and like I was with this Chi:nese person buying the hai:,r (1.0) and it was really you

19   know? and it was just like rea:lly (.8) you kno:w?

20S Mhm=

21D =Imagining that they putting that on their [hai:r it just seems] so: (.) [OUTRA:GEOUS?]

22S   [I know   ]   [I fi:nd it sick   ] >I fi:nd it sick

23   because you see these women walking along right? (.)=

24D   = AND THEN THOSE PEOPLE ARE THE SA:ME 25
ones right? that we:ave on hair [right? .hhh it] imitates white hair but .hh like (.7) MY HA:IR IS NOT

26S   [Oh it's awful.]

27D ALLOWED to be existing=

28S =Mhm=

29D =But it's ALRIGHT IF THEY weave that on their head,=

Sh   =Mhm I kno:w funny aren't they?

The extract also presents us with the problematization of shade as determinant of Blackness. Dana includes her brownness within Black anti-racist aesthetics quite un-problematically. For her, her skin and hair only become problematic when darker-skinned Black people position her as other, as being exterior to a very narrowly circumscribed Blackness. Both women are aware of the discourse of dark skin equals Black authenticity's 'will to truth' on their bodies through the various categorizing strategies of biopower. Here, power

> relations materially penetrate the body in depth without depending even on the mediation of the subject's own representations. If power takes hold on the body this isn't through its having first to be interiorised in people's consciousness. There is a network or circuit of biopower, or somato-power, which acts as the formative matrix of [Blackness] itself as the historical and cultural phenomenon within which we seem at once to recognise and lose ourselves. (Foucault 1980: 146)

The biopower of authentic Black womanhood as skin and hair and its silences and silencing is resisted as the women deconstruct *the* Black woman as a fixed political, social, cultural and aesthetic entity. In this deconstruction, brownness is both shown as dis-privilege but also importantly as an ineradicable part of Blackness.

This example does support Taylor's (2016) claim that whiteliness (Yancy 2008) shapes Black experience, expectations and preferences in terms of hair, skin shade and facial features. However, what we also see is a speaking back to that position of dis-privilege occupied by lighter-skinned, straighter-haired women's bodies within Black anti-racist aesthetics and politics, as Dana highlights the paradox of colourism/shadism. That is, active dislike of brownness allied with its emulation, which speaks fascination, desire and revulsion for such skin and hair. What Dana reveals is pervasive colourism/shadism but, importantly for the discussion here, that she can embody both privilege and dis-privilege simultaneously. Brownness is not an empowered/empowering position at the level of Black anti-racist sarkaesthetics especially if we occupy a Black anti-racist political consciousness. This is so as its previous normative aesthetic value is being called into question both by Dana and her interlocutor as something that must be marginalized because it leaves untouched anti-darker skinned and more afro-haired anti-Black phobia. This phobia is itself part of Black psyches in its necropolitical life and needs to be 'dissed'.

In this example, white supremacy is not being allowed to block critique of aesthetics within Black community and Black anti-racist politics. There is the space for a critique of brownness as in 'browning doan always carry di swing' [brownness isn't always best], shown in the Black darker-skinned dislike for her own embodiment which Dana conveys, as well as her own dislike of faking brownness. 'Fake brownings' are presented by her as anti-political, as carriers of anti-Black liberation positionalities in common with Fanon's (1986) colonized subjects. Thus, it can be said that Black women are not allowed the 'post-racial' play in which communities of non-Black women can engage. Black women are still asked by Dana to be authentically Black whatever their skin tone or hair texture. 'Authentic' here takes on another meaning. It is now about not changing what you were born with; it is about being 'natural'; it is about not participating in whiteness's 'eating of the [Black] other' (hooks 1992). It is about not participating in making the multiplicity of Black beauty invisible. Rather, it is about putting such multiplicity front and centre as 'and'/ 'and'/ 'and' with no predetermined hierarchical ordering from Black Nationalist or shadist/colourist aesthetic valuations. Dana illustrates the dis/alienating imagination necessary to evade Black beauty shame's silences and silencing. Such evasion necessitates making visible the continuing hidden fascination with and desire for brownness alongside its disavowal within Black communities. Making this visible involves 'dissing' those who are brown which subverts this desire and remakes Black aesthetic culture and politics with a difference. One in which brown (dis)privilege is not silenced.

To go back to the 'and' of a few sentences ago, Taylor (2016: 125) takes us to the nub of how this repeating 'and' would work when he says the real payoff for developing a critical race aesthetics has to do in large part with developing the resources to retrain our immediate perceptions. This relates to both sides of the beauty coin, the question of skin, facial features and hair (dis)privilege and white supremacy's 'negrophobic racial aesthetics'. We know that beauty authenticity in terms of the idea of an 'original' is still read through darker skin and more afro-textured hair within Black Nationalism. If that is to be our political anti-racist home as Black women this should change to let in other Black beauty embodiments. If this happened then light(er) skinned, straight(er) haired women wouldn't need fake tans, suntans, extensions, braids or weaves to perform acceptable Black feminine beauty. This is not about 'post-racial play' but about racializing performativities through stylization so

that acceptable, recognizable and political Blackness can be brought into being on the surface of the body. Such stylized Blackness is recognized as Black and becomes intelligible through its very performance. Of course, brown women run the risk of being called out as inauthentic, much as Mariah Carey has been throughout her career, apart from when she was married to Nick Cannon. Now engaged to white billionaire James Packer, we again see her Black credentials being questioned. This has also happened in 2016 to tennis superstar Serena Williams because of her engagement to white Reddit co-founder Alexis Ohanian. Black women's credential questioning is noteworthy at a time in US American society where we see what Taylor (2016: 129) describes as 'an *intensification* of the mechanisms of racial violence and dehumanization'.

What can be done at the aesthetic level within 'post-racial' (Goldberg 2015) states such as the USA and UK when racial violence and dehumanization continue unabated and are carried through aesthetic politics into and from social life? Following Taylor (2016: 129) we should first acknowledge that 'the beauty gap has not narrowed as much as it might appear'. Further, we should see the beauty gap as analytically interesting because of the 'way race functions as a Jeffersonian phenomenological inhibitor and Garveyite catalyst' (Taylor 2016: 129). Finally, we should 'excavate, clarify and domesticate the forces that condition our [aesthetic] choices' (Taylor 2016: 129). These concluding remarks seem to me to acknowledge Black women's agency to change how they see each other as well as live out beauty norms and aesthetic affective relationalities. If Black women are to be Garveyite catalysts for anti-racist aesthetic change they have to acknowledge a simple truth of his: unity. That is, to quote Garvey (1923: 142):

> The program of the Universal Negro Improvement Association is that of drawing together, into one universal whole, all the Negro peoples of the world, with prejudice toward none. We desire to have every shade of colour, even those with one drop of African blood, in our fold; because we believe that none of us as we are, is responsible for our birth; in a word, we have no prejudice against ourselves in race.

Having 'no prejudice against ourselves in race' might well be the only useful and effective strategy for an inclusive Black anti-racist sarkaesthetic future which decolonizes shadism/ colourism and white supremacist Black African descent phobia.

Decolonizing Shadism/Colourism's Traumatic Intimacies: Brownness Revisited

In example 2 next, both women narrate themselves as being positioned outside of Blackness and whiteness because of white supremacist and Black Nationalist discourses on skin colour. However, irrespective of this discursive positioning they still claim Blackness. Dana begins by placing both Tessa and herself at the centre of a brownness negating Black Nationalist view of shade and politics, to quote her, 'an attitude [..] that to be conscious you've got to hate light skin people now'. Tessa laughs before saying with a smile in her voice 'for some strange reason'. Such 'smiley voice' delivery makes us aware that they are speaking to each other as intimate insiders who know full well what that strange reason might be. Dana continues also with a smile in her voice 'and I think to myself what the bloody hell am I then? I've been here in the struggle now for thirty years now what the hell is going on you know?' Dana shows the nature of the Black political negation she suffers—'what the bloody hell am I then?'—from Black people because of her brownness. Tellingly, she also claims that this has a past and there is a possibility that this negation will continue, when she says 'to me it's always been like that and I think it always will be like that'. Their position as 'brown other' to Blackness and whiteness is explicated by Tessa's 'you have the Black people who don't want to accept you because you're mixed and white people who don't want to accept you because', which Dana's collaborative completion 'because you're Black' ends. Tessa reiterates their joint point of view 'it's like to the Black people you're white and to the white people you're Black'. Shadism/colourism and anti-Black African descent woman racism produce this skin negation in which nobody is 'interested in what I have to say about' identity. Skin says it all: it speaks volumes. It leaves these women open to questions from other Black people such as, 'do you see yourself as Black?' This shaming is something that 'really makes [Dana] laugh' and she finds 'so weird'. Dana places their question as weird and making her laugh in terms of irony because 'I just think I've always known I'm Black' and for her why should it be 'an option now that I should like to change?' This question adds to the ridicule she heaps on the shadist/ colourist position they critique here. They critique the irrelevance of this negated in-betweenness produced by shadism/colourism/anti-Black African descent woman racism and position themselves as Black. For both women, Blackness is not optional,

but an identity they have 'always known'. Through positioning them-
selves as Black, they dis/alienate from the Black beauty shame of being
Black-white 'mixed race'. They also establish their Blackness through
speaking the dis-privilege of brownness and claiming a Black identity
unreservedly.

Example 2 Tape 1 Side B TS:90–91

1 D   >AND I TELL YOU THAT'S AN ATTITUDE NOW< THAT TO BE: CONSCOUS YOU HAVE GOTTA HA:TE 2 LIGHT SKIN [PE:OPLE NOW]

3 T   [˚.hhh˚   ] ((*For some stra:nge [rea:]son))=

4 D   [˚And˚   =((*I think to myself >what the bloody hell

 5   am I then?<=

6 T = [.hhh   .hhh   .hhh .hhh

7 D   [I've been here in the struggle now for]ne- for THI:RTY YEA:RS<)) now what the hell's going on you

8   know? (.5) [.hhh   ]

9 T   [>I mean<] to me: it's like al:ways been like that and I think it al:ways will be: like that because

10 .hhh you have the Black people who do:n't want to accept you because (1.0) you're mixed (.3) and WHI:TE 11 PEOPLE who don't want- who don't want to accept [you because   ]

12 D   [>Because you're Black .hhh<]

13T Right because- and it's like to: (.4) the BLA:CK people (1.0) you're WHI:TE (.3) and to the WHI:TE people 14 yo:u're Bla:ck and then you're standing there going (.5) isn't anybody interested in what I have to say about 15   this? (.3) >And they REA:LLY ARE:N'T< you know [what I mean?   ]

16D   [WHAT RE:ALLY] ma:kes me: lau:gh is when I went

17   down to- >when I'm in London< and people say do you see: yourself as Bla:ck? (2.0)

18T ˚Yeah˚=

19D = I fi:nd that so: wei:rd .hhh because I just think (.7) I'VE AL:WAYS KNO:WN I'M BLA:CK (.5)

20T   ˚Yeah˚=

21D =Why: do you: think I sh- >an- and< I thi:nk is it an OPTION now? that I should like to cha:nge?

To 'always know' you are Black irrespective of lightness of skin shade
and 'race mixedness' enables Marcus Garvey's proclamation that there
is 'no prejudice against ourselves in race' to continue to resonate in the
twenty-first century. This is especially the case as we wonder about how
to decolonize white supremacy's anti-Black African descent phobia and
Black Nationalist shade politics/ Black communal twenty-first-century
shadism/colourism. Garvey warned us of the 'caste of colour', now our
colourism/shadism, and its destruction of Black unity. He asked us to

leave our ideas on 'monstrous intimacies' behind and allow every one of African descent into the community of Blackness. It is only from there that shadism/colourism can be decolonized as we decentre brown privilege from within the Black common.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2009) in *Commonwealth* (viii)

> Consider the common also and more significantly [as] those results of social production that are necessary for social interaction and further production, such as knowledges, languages, codes, information, affects and so forth.

The content of what is produced, such as, ideas, images and affects is easily reproduced enabling it to be held in common and as a basis for the production of subjectivity (Hardt and Negri 2009: x). We now have to look beyond identity politics to a politics of becoming, 'not what we are but rather what we are in the process of becoming- that is the Other, our becoming-other' (Hardt and Negri 2009: x). This becoming-other has long been the basis of Black Atlantic philosophies, epistemologies and political practices (cf Glissant 2006; Wynter 2001, 2003; Fanon 1986; Hall 1996a, b, 1989).

As we face this becoming-other, as we look beyond identity, what is it that we really want to decentre and by what could it be replaced? What we must seek to decentre is much more than just the skin shades of brownness and the colourism/shadeism which they convey. We also need to decentre the material, social and intimate (dis) privilege and power which these skin shades attract. Rather than valorization/ disvaluation it is time for us to see brown skins and straighter hair texture as a burden rather than just solely a privilege because of Black communal lack of recognition and erasure, as both examples have shown us above. We can also see brownness as a burden within wider society as well framed in terms of the 'what are you question' and the impact of being lighter skinned on employment in the racialized image factory of the world, Hollywood (Duke/OWN 2015).

If we are to have a politics of Blackness that recognizes it as being about producing the common out of the multiplicity of the 'we', that is, society as a whole, we, have to stop asking the 'what are you question' as recounted by journalist Soledad O'Brien in the documentary *Light Girls* (Duke/OWN 2015). O'Brien had gone into a coat store to buy a jacket

which she had had her eye on for some time. The shop assistant asked her 'what are you?' to which O'Brien replied 'I am Black'. She received the response that she could not be Black because Black people are thieves. She put the much loved jacket back on the rack. The question 'what are you?' is not inconsequential. It is not asked out of idle curiosity. Rather, it emerges from the need to categorize, as actress Tatyana Ali avers, to enable us to keep the boundaries of what we see as the binary division of the Black/ white common firmly in place. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TtDF_CMsjNY accessed 14.6.2016).

We see some of this keeping the common's boundaries firm from Raven Symone's contribution to *Light Girls* in terms of skin shade and stylization practices. When she had her own television show she used a tanning bed three or four times a week. She was told by the lighting technician to stop tanning as she was too dark and they would have to relight the whole show. She responded, 'sorry you know I just want to get pretty'. The need for 'light girls' to be darker so as to be considered 'pretty' in Hollywood is also commented on by actor/writer Chris Spencer who says that light skinned women have to deal with colourism in the industry because they cannot get jobs as the preference is to cast someone who looks 'Blacker'. This industry preference is also asserted by television producer, Ralph Farquhar, who claims that talented lighter-skinned actresses are overlooked because of their complexion as they have to cast darker-skinned women (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q_6vWvmayos, accessed 14. 6. 2016). Thus, it is that brownness within the centre of racialized and racializing image making that is Hollywood does have dis-privilege. It impacts even at the level of political economy as it can impact one's ability to earn a living. 'Browning doan always carry di swing!' We still have Black women styling out the brownness as we see from the examples above in order to be pretty, to be accepted, to be employable, to be categorizable, to be Black enough. For Black in all its aesthetic multiplicity to be truly beautiful how can we build a Black anti-racist sarkaesthetics future?

Building a Black Anti-racist Sarkaesthetics

Building a Black anti-racist sarkaesthetics entails calling on the affect of love (Hadreas 2016) as a political project to build the common. Here love does not mean that relationality which is part and parcel of the intimate couple and the private sphere though that can also be part of the political project. Rather, it is a breaking of the silence of brown

dis-privilege to show the pain, shame, anger, despair of skin when compounded by racism and sexism. What the examples have shown above is that the dis-value of brownness makes women aware of their bodies as objects, of their raced, gendered and complected flesh. Dis-value's despair alienates them from their bodies and thus enables them to see themselves as if from a distance, as Hardt and Negri's (2009) becoming-other. Thus, brownness dis-value enables a new descriptive dimension to a sarkaesthetics one in which there is no necessary privileging of darkness/brownness within 'the norms and principles that dictate the aesthetic evaluation of the body and the practices which spring from this'. This is important because for too long Black beauty has been circumscribed by this particular dark/light binary whether with origins in white supremacy or Black Nationalism. Without this position of no necessary privilege of lightness, we will not see the end to the psychic pain connected to skin shade as corporeality, affective life and preference. Black women must insist that they not be known only as, through and by the skin they inhabit as they shift the sarkaesthetic normative 'which lays out the rules and principles for judgements and pursuits of bodily beauty'.

As we shift to thinking about what brown dis-privilege can tell us about building a Black common through love as a political project, we can draw on the work of Audre Lorde and Aimé Césaire to help us to understand the meta-theoretical. The meta-theoretical is important because for Taylor (2016) it enables the development of wider debates about bodily perceptions and practices as well as well as relocating them to phenomenology, epistemology, ethics and social theory.

In 'Uses of the erotic: the erotic as power', Audre Lorde (1984) envisages the erotic as a powerful resource within us all. It is a power vested in our unrecognized feeling which can be a dynamic force in Black feminist community building. For Lorde, recognition of our deepest feelings makes us begin to be dissatisfied with suffering, self-negation, and numbness. It is such dissatisfaction which leads us to act against oppression. 'Lorde equates the erotic with realizing oneself as a coherent subject. The project of selfhood as Lorde describes it is one of empowerment through affective transformation. 'Against suffering and self-negation, Lorde situates responsibility, selfhood and feeling' (Musser 2014: 147). From this description, Lorde's erotic not only reinforces subjectivity but actively participates in the formation of community as the erotic exceeds intersubjective spaces because of its affection (Musser 2014). Thus, within Lorde's erotic construction of Black feminist community, affect displaces the strategic essentialisms of Blackness as the basis of identity

and opens up other political possibilities. It does this through the construction of communities of mutual relationality based on identification and recognition as becoming-other than the skins entailed in normative discourses from Blackness and whiteness. Identification and recognition as becoming-other mean less fixation on hair texture, skin shade and facial features and in fact a dis/alienation (Césaire 2000) from descriptive and normative Black sarkaesthetics in order to allow a Black anti-racist sarkaesthetics to emerge. This is central in building a Black anti-racist sarkaesthetics common for the twenty-first century and beyond.

What is Césairean (2000) dis/alienation and how can it work at the level of phenomenology and ethics? In the process of dis/alienation, racialized bodies have to be unmade and in their remaking will be restored to human modes of being in the world. This must be done in order to resist the requirement that we be alienated from ourselves even whilst we are estranged by white supremacy and Black Nationalist skin colour and hair texture politics (Césaire 2000; Fanon 1986). The Black anti-racist sarkaesthetics ethical perspective being developed here through the lens of Césairean dis/alienation and Lorde's erotic politics also bases its analysis on governmentality (1994a), the biopolitics of 'race' (Stoler 2002; Tate 2009), the operation of power/knowledge through 'race' discourses (Foucault 1980; Tate 2005), the necropolitics of Black beauty shame and skin shades' affective values. If we think of this ethical perspective phenomenologically we can see how we can act across the existing shade/colour lines which were drawn up in conditions not of our own choosing in the process of becoming-other. This is so as phenomenology's focus is on 'the importance of lived experience, the intentionality of consciousness, the significance of nearness or what is ready-to-hand, and the role of repeated habitual actions in shaping bodies and worlds' (Ahmed 2006: 2). It is through repeated habitual actions that shape bodies and worlds that dis/alienation can produce Black anti-racist sarkaesthetics which destabilizes the darker skin / browner skin binary and transforms either/or into a continuum of 'and/ and/ and' Black skin values.

CONCLUSION

'Browning doan always carry di swing' produces a rupture in skin shade, facial features and hair texture politics which is long over-due its moment of decolonization. If we read Black beauty shame from a decolonial

viewpoint through a Glissantian (2006) perspective on relationality, we will see that this means that we cannot begin the project of *Black becoming-other* from the position of 'the philosophies of the One in the West'. That is, we cannot begin from the position of white supremacy and Black subjectification which underlies the colonial psyches of master/mistress and slave. We have to break from a white supremacist perspective on the HuMan (Wynter 2001, 2003). The seed of disunity is already sown within the colonial/ colonized psyche because of its white instituted 'caste of colour', its 'traumatic intimacies' and identification dis-junctures between being and becoming. As the women have shown us above, to remake oneself anew as Black and multiple, to dis/alienate is a political act which must be finally engaged in order to move beyond shadeism/ colourism. This is not to profess the existence of the 'post-racial' but rather to make plain that we must leave Fanon's (1986) colonial psyche behind and, further, that the struggle continues to be against anti-Black racism within our neo-liberal 'post-race' times. The struggle for Black African descent women's becoming is real.

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Conclusion: Post-Racial Black Beauty Shame's Alter/Native Futures: The Counter-Conduct of 'Race' Performativity

Abstract Black beauty shame matters in global racial capitalism. Global racial capitalism depends on Black ugliness as a source of surplus value through its over-exploited hyper-visibility which maintains white and Black lighter-skinned beauty norms. There are colonial and Black Nationalist aesthetic formations which necessitate that we develop ways of becoming and relating outside dominance if we wish to avoid shame. Rastafarian 'livity' is important if Black beauty shame is to be erased through dis/aliention from dominance.

Keywords Racial capitalism · Livity · Counter conduct · Futurity Value · Multiracialism · Dis/alienation

What I have attempted to do so far has been to construct a Black decolonial feminist account of Black beauty shame which establishes Black women's agency in the face of shaming events and shame scripts which aim to silence through their very silencing. A part of this Black decolonial feminist account has been to engage in a discussion which attempted to illustrate the volume and variety of Black beauty shame scripts, which impact even those judged as normatively beautiful. That is, the light(er) skinned and straight(er) haired. Those shame scripts, which emerged from the enslavement and colonial past when Black women were viewed as mere 'flesh' as well as those from their 'post-race' present, have demanded that they/we be in the process of becoming other than they/

we once were. That is, other than the discursive construction of Black women as both corporeally and morally ugly.

We can see the continuation of the colonial in 'post-race' USA in the beauty shaming of Michelle Obama with the 'ape in heels' comment, mentioned earlier. Alongside this, she was also compared to Melania Trump as a more fitting 'gracious' First Lady. Let us be mindful and notice that in our 'post-race' moment of neoliberal racialization, the words 'Black' and 'white' were never uttered even though the comments must be read from the standpoint of white supremacist anti-Black African descent woman racism. They must be read from that standpoint because that is indeed the context of their emergence. The racializing work was done through drawing on existing tropes of Black ugliness, 'ape'/white beauty, 'gracious' which are shared within our structure of feeling within the Global North West and Global South West. Shame emerges for all Black women in this racist comparative frame. It is not just Obama who is interpellated as 'ape' here but all Black African descent women. Beauty shame continues into the twenty-first century and is the companion of all Black African descent women whatever the complexion, hair, facial features, class, sexuality, ability, gender identity or kinship.

However, as we have also seen in Chaps. 3 and 4, the political, affective, cultural, social and aesthetic home of Blackness is also driven by dis-ease. It cannot be at ease with itself because of dissent from bodies which speak otherwise. This dis-ease is born from the political liberation necessity within Black Nationalism from the trope of 'authentic' Black womanhood judged through skin, hair and facial features. Here, Black-white 'race mixedness' and brownness struggle to fit un-problematically within Black beauty. Without this fit, shaming encounters from within Blackness itself are a daily possibility.

If shame is to be avoided, there are colonial and Black Nationalist aesthetic formations which necessitate that we develop ways of living, being and relating outside of the formations of the dominant. Creating new approaches to what Jamaican Rastafarians call 'livity' (Chevannes 1994) is important if Black beauty shame is to be erased through dis/aliention. This is the case even if this non-shameful levity can only emerge in fleeting moments in everyday life such as in talk-in-interaction. 'Livity' emerged out of Jamaican Rastafarian philosophy to describe a complete way of life extending from religion and dietary habits to personal aesthetics and secular/metaphysical beliefs that guide our everyday actions (Chevannes 1994). Although Rasta livity can be critiqued as normative

and hetreopatriarchal, what it reminds us is that we are not yet free as African descent people. This is so because the gendered, racialized, sexualized, able-bodied, aged and classed body is that very traumatically intimate location produced by global racial capitalism (Robinson 2005) from which we struggle to become other than we once were.

In order to produce one's communal livity as well as one's own conditions of and for liberation, we must exceed the affective, discursive and material violence that (re)produce us as vulnerable, marginal, disposable Black bodies, forever irredeemably ugly and inherently shameful/ashamed/capable of being shamed without any lasting repercussions (Sharpe 2010). We must remember that Black beauty shame matters as much now as it did during colonialism and enslavement in the biopolitical and necropolitical regime instantiated by global racial capitalism. It matters now because global racial capitalism depends on Black ugliness as a source of surplus value through its over-exploited hyper-visibility which serves to maintain the white and lighter-skinned Black-white 'mixed race' beauty norms as hegemonic. Global racial capitalism wreaks violence on the body but livity allows this violence to be transgressed. In a similar way, the Black-white 'mixed race' body is marked by but usurps the violence of Black Nationalist authenticity regimes with their will to homogenization of Black African descent women's bodies, experiences, thoughts, affects and relationalities.

Livity as a Black-originated decolonial feminist practice of dis/alienation occurs within historical contexts, whether enslavement or the twenty-first century, where the Black African descent woman's body was and continues to be primary commodity of exchange value. During enslavement and beyond, her body was seen as only capable of being rather than becoming because of its racialized outlines (Spillers 2003; Sharpe 2010). The 'ape comment' in 2016 illustrates the continuing scale of dis-value of Black women's bodies in the Global North West and Global South West. As First Lady, Michelle Obama has shown us that to dis/alienate from, to decolonize beauty regimes focused on whiteness/lightness, we have to step away from subjectification. We have to teach ourselves and others how to imagine the previously unforeseen and to proudly embody that which has been abjected, the African in African American. We also have to remember that that 'African' has been forged through a shared context in the Western Hemisphere through which they/we understand themselves/ourselves as Black African descent people. This necessitates critical, political reflection as we think of the possibility of a decolonial beauty 'futurity'

(Muñoz 2009) hinted at if not yet claimed by Michelle Obama. This futurity entails Black political and aesthetic subjectivities not boundaried off by 'the Philosophies of the One in the West', (Glissant 2006), or, indeed, the necessity for strategic essentialism sought through twentieth-century Black anti-racist aesthetics.

Livity as a Black decolonial feminist practice of dis/alienation produces other possibilities to be human and to live beyond Black beauty shame. This dis/alienation ruptures the body politics of dominant aesthetic regimes, both Black and white. It also produces glimpses of a non-shameful Black beauty futurity. This takes on board Césaire's (2000), Glissant's (2006) and Wynter's (2003) insistence that we dislocate the basis of the European civilization project which instantiated Black ugliness/white beauty as a binary and attached shame to a white supremacy constructed, irredeemable Black ugliness. The work of these Caribbean decolonial theorists also makes us note that unlike Black Power and Black Nationalism in general, we cannot only begin from this binary child of white supremacy to construct our Black beauty subjectivities beyond Black beauty shame. What they insist is that we move beyond being just opposite to whiteness if what we seek is liberation, if what we want to do is to *become* ourselves. That is, they ask that we decolonize the entire basis of beauty value which should also extend to the affective level so as to unseat Black beauty shame's place within our structure of feeling. As we unseat this shame, we also do something else at the level of the political, which again illustrates that aesthetics does matter and is not at all trivial. The something else that we do is to also decentre the myth of 'post-racial' (Goldberg 2015) aesthetic equality brought to life through the bodies of exceptional Black African descent others such as Beyoncé, Rihanna, Idris Elba and Tyrone Beckford. Their inclusion within 'beauty' is driven by global racial capitalism and attachments to multiculturalism/racialism, making claims to being 'post-race'. Multiculturalism has been deemed a failure within Western European politics, and multiracialism has been critiqued for its continuing anti-Black racism in the USA (Sexton 2008) even as it has morphed into the 'post-race' ideal.

In the face of continuing Black deaths and mass incarceration in the USA (13th) and the UK, Black beauty shame might seem trivial. However, it is one side of the necropolitics of neoliberal racialization which normalizes either literal or figurative Black beauty death and/or erasure through deploying Black beauty shame as its response to

the threat that racialized difference poses to the status quo. Black bodies must be placed under constant surveillance, disciplined and kept in their proper—read marginal/abject—place by whatever means possible. We have had and continue to have a Black women's beauty emancipation project before in terms of Black anti-racist aesthetics so what could possibly be new here? This is instantiated, for example, in the Black natural hair movement and the production of natural products for African skin and hair. First, we must ask the question of why this emancipation project is failing or perhaps has already failed? Why it is indeed, that the Black body is still located as a position of beauty failure, of beauty dis-value, of beauty shame.

This dis-value and Black beauty shame does not just emerge from white supremacy but also from within Blackness itself as we have seen above and we also see in Jared Sexton's (2008) critique of multiracialism in the USA. He sees US multiracialism as growing out of industries of thought, academic endeavour and performativities around 'mixed race'. Sexton (2008) states that mixed racedness has been made to be complicit with white supremacy and anti-Blackness by state and multiracial movement actors whilst staking a claim to being itself *avant garde*. For Sexton, multiracialism is a discourse which rationalizes the social, political and economic isolation of Black people. I agree with this latter sentiment but must speak against his placing of anti-Blackness as the direct result of the jockeying for societal power of those who are 'mixed race'. If we meditate on this a while, we can see though that Sexton is merely repeating what has been commonly felt in communities of Black African descent in the Global North West and Global South West for centuries. This sort of divisive view is what continues to rob 'Black is beautiful' of its potential for inclusion and transformation of the idea of Black beauty itself. In short, Sexton shames all Black-white 'mixed race' people because of their assumed collusion with white supremacy for personal gain which undoes the achievements of the civil rights movement. We can also assume that this extends to the aesthetic because white supremacy still values lightness, facial features and hair racialized as white European much as it did during enslavement and colonialism. What Sexton (2008: 4) does though is offer us a move away from the use of biology by right-wing political forces which 'disarticulates interracial sexuality from "miscegenation" and resituates racialization in a field of power: a political ontology of violence rather than a specious genetic inheritance or a dubious phenomenology of perception'. This is indeed

the position formed through the analysis of the racialization at the heart of the biopower and necropower of Black beauty shame's silence and silencing.

What about our responsibility as Black community though? What have we done to combat this pigmentocracy, to dis/alienate ourselves from Black beauty shame's negation as a necessary step in the affirmation and practice of 'Black is beautiful'? It seems to me, as exemplified by Sexton, that we still keep fighting over darker-skin/lighter-skin politics rather than grasping the need to critique differential inclusion as a part of 'post-race' Black beauty politics. Such Black decolonial feminist critique would enable us to negate the Black beauty shame which leads to political, affective, economic and aesthetic vulnerability. 'Vulnerable' comes from Late Latin *vulnerabilis*. It means to wound, to expose to physical or emotional harm or attack. I would also like to add here political attack and harm from Black communities because as we have seen Black beauty shame emerges from white supremacy and is a possibility within Blackness itself.

'Post-race' differential aesthetic inclusion means that Lupita Nyongo, Alek Wek, Michelle Obama, Beyoncé, Rihanna, Hallé Berry, Alicia Keys, Thandi Newton, Nyakim Gatwech and Dame Jessica Ennis Hill can be global faces of beauty and some can be the global faces of beauty products that sell transracially (Newton, Keys, Nyongo, Ennis Hill, Berry). This leads us to think that 'post-racial' aesthetics exist and, therefore, that 'Black is beautiful' as a site of aesthetic political activism and debate as well as its accompanying beauty politics is no longer necessary. Indeed, we could be led to believe that politics is defunct because of some Black women's inclusion in the realm of beauty, a beauty with a politics of commercial bodily value which maintains colonial aesthetic hierarchies.

So, if we diss the 'colonial aesthetic hierarchies', we are all fine, everyone can be beautiful, beauty is democratic without distinctions or hierarchies built on race/racism. We all just need money to access the product being sold through commercial skin/hair politics to add value to our bodies. Beauty is, after all, 'post-race'. Thus, it is that the 'race' and beauty inequality which (re)produces Black beauty shame becomes un-noteworthy and is perceived as not in need of any resolution, whether that is political, societal or affective. However, if we look again at the list of women above we can see that there is a prevailing 'mulatticity' or 'ethnic ambiguity' (Sharpley-Whiting 2007) notwithstanding Nyongo, Wek, Gatwech and Obama. Through the myth of the 'democratization

of beauty' within the 'post-racial', Black beauty once again ceases to exist much as it did in colonialism and enslavement. If it does not exist, it does not need to be politicized through 'Black is beautiful'. Here we have a perfect example of anti-Black violence wrought by the erasure of aesthetic politics. In order to expose this violence like Nyongo (https://www.youtube.com/watch?V=ZPCkFAR2eE. Accessed 16 May 2017) and Newton (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzKBGtf0i0M. Accessed 23 May 2017) before her, we have to recognize it. We have to illustrate that it is within the mundane nature of Black beauty shame where fear of ugliness and anger at the shame caused by Black beauty shame scripts resides. Let us now move to looking at how we can construct livity through the love, anger and fear in Black beauty shame's erotic life.

DECOLONIALITY AND BLACK BEAUTY SHAME'S EROTIC LIFE: LOVE, ANGER, FEAR

Bodily intensifications and hyper-reflexivities produced by Black beauty shame orient us to what we are supposed to be as racialized beautiful/ugly bodies. It does this as it produces addressivities where individuals always exist in a state of being addressed as beautiful/ugly and in the process of answering (Bakhtin, 1981). Answering is from a subject in process as an utterance context establishes a position from which to speak (Hitchcock 1993; Tate 2005). Further, for Stuart Hall (1997) struggles reside with the sign but also in the access to signification (Tate 2005). This is what marks the subject as being in a state of becoming rather than just the subject as position produced through relations of power (Hitchcock 1993).

Thus, thinking dialogically beautiful/ugly addressivities can be the location of both positive valuation and shame and constrain our beauty identifications but the answer, the speaking back, can re-orient those addressivities of Black beauty shame and call them into question. Such reorientation means that which has been racially intensified as 'other' can be transformed to become the norm/the ideal through alter/native beauty discourses. This reminds us of Ernesto Laclau's view that 'if the process of naming of objects amounts to their very constitution, then their descriptive features will be fundamentally unstable and open to all kinds of […] rearticulations' (Butler 1993: 210). In re-articulations we also see the instability and incompleteness of subjectivities and

governmentality as speakers critique their discursive Black beauty shame positionings. Black beauty shame's 'race performativity' (Tate 2005), therefore, is constituted by both the addressivities constructed by the reiterative power of discourse to produce the 'phenomena that it regulates and constrains' as well as a subject bringing into being what she/they/he names (Butler 1993: 2). In this process, subjects draw on Black beauty shame or esteem scripts from Black diasporic beauty genealogies rather than being mere mimics of white beauty as iconic ideal. As well as this, Black-white 'mixed race' women who dis-identify (Muñoz 1999) from the subject position of Black political and corporeal marginality also produce new spaces for the positioning of Black 'mixed race' beauty within Black beauty itself. This is a position from which to both critique Black beauty shaming discourses and to become other than the subjects interpellated by these discourses.

We can see this from the following reported dialogue by Sandra on an Instagram conversation between friends in the North of England in April 2016 as they interacted around Li'l Kim's latest 'look' posts which I will reproduce in plain transcription:

Sandra: Are you on Instagram?
Sonya: No
Sandra: You should be you get all the celebrity posts. Oh we have been having a discussion of Li'l Kim this week. Many of my friends were like what has she done? Does she want to be white? Is she so light skinned all over including you know where? You know the usual Black Nationalist ideas apart from the last one which was verging on the sexist, really? I just had to educate them one time that she can do what she wants with her body. It's not up to any of us to say what she can and can't do because that would be like saying as a 'mixed race woman' I can't straighten my curls out with a straightener without me 'wanting to be white'. All I do it for is styling my hair in different ways. I don't change as a person. They fully well knew that too. That is just nonsense! They had to quiet down and anyway I said if you look at her yes she has changed a lot. No doubt at all but if anything she looks 'mixed race' now and everyone knows she is Black so she can't change her race at all so why do we have to say that was her intention anyway? Things like that just make me angry.

This extract shows us that Black beauty shame continues to occupy those same very familiar political contours even whilst we are now faced with a third wave Black feminist reading of multiple body stylizations which counters the authenticity discourses of second wave Black feminism and Black Nationalism. What Sandra shows is that Black beauty shame is potentially present at any moment of the day and within even the most mundane encounters for Black African descent women. What makes this possible is the hyper-visibility of Black women's bodies, proscriptions about what they should look like and how they should comport in order not to show any 'desire to be white'. We see this as Sandra says above, 'It's not up to any of us to say what she can and can't do because that would be like saying as a "mixed race" woman I can't straighten my curls out with a straightener without me "wanting to be white"'. What she speaks about here is the process of subjectification through a gaze which seeks to determine one's politics by the judgement of Black authenticity through the appearance of the body's surfacings.

This is a process of subjectification with which she disagrees and which she says makes her angry. As we look at her extract as counter-conduct, a 'race performativity' which produces other types of Black beauty and thinks of Black-white 'mixed race' beauty rather than whiteness as iconic, we are arrested by her claim to anger. We are arrested because this could mark anger as the possible catalyst for decolonizing Black beauty shame in times of neoliberal approaches to 'choice' in beauty enhancement which impacts us all.

I want to turn now to think about love and anger as two undercurrents within the data which could help in refiguring the contours of counter-conduct, especially so if we read counter-conduct as a moment of decolonizing Black beauty shame. We arrive at the necessity to decolonize Black beauty shame because of a particular repetition throughout the chapters. That is, that Black un-beauty was itself a colonial project enacted in the name of white supremacy with the intentional aim of inducing shame in African descent populations. Indeed, white supremacy generated Black beauty shame was essential to African-phobic white racial rule whether in plantation societies, in settler colonies or the metropoles in the Global North West and Global South West.

What would the contours of this project of decolonizing Black beauty shame based on love and anger look like? We know based on Black antiracist aesthetics that one aspect must be self-love. We also know that such a politics was driven by that affect which Sandra speaks above, that

is by anger. Love and anger are key affects in dis/alienation and decolonizing Black beauty shame through the process of a 'race performativity' focused on subjectivation. These are the elements which link together in the decolonization of the coloniality of power, being, knowledge and affect. What the book has shown is that Black beauty shame is productive. It produces new Black beauty subject positions and a new politics of beauty along with new knowledge of 'the Black beautiful body'. This production of newness relates to Black women's bodies which create new spaces for themselves within a twenty-first century time of 'post-racial' neoliberal racialization. Rather than remaining 'stuck' being the other of white iconicity or the subject of Black Nationalist body politics, we see another becoming emerging. This becoming is based on anger at being made to feel Black beauty shame being voiced as a complaint. This is accompanied by the development of subject positions from which to love the self. Loving the self in a Black African descent-phobic world is nothing short of a feat of world creation. It is a subject position rooted in Black decolonial feminist liberation politics which refuses to succumb to the negation produced by suffering Black beauty shame.

Following Lorde (2007) and refusing suffering but acknowledging communal and personal pain enables a rejuvenation of Black Nationalist politics which is as alive to those intersectional differences highlighted throughout as it is to differences of skin shade, facial features and hair texture, as well as the problematics of colourism/shadism. These problematics are essential to overcome if we are to produce a Black decolonial feminist perspective on beauty shame. The women have shown us that colonial Being, Power and Knowledge on Black beauty and Black beauty shame continue to be omnipresent. What the women also show is that it is important to also include affect in thinking Black decolonial feminist critique, as said above. We need to speak about affects like shame as they dynamize Being, Power and Knowledge through their psychic impact. The coloniality of white power in Black beauty dis-value is central here and deserves some thinking through.

For Foucault (1980: 197), when we think about power, we should think of an apparatus. An 'apparatus is a much more general case of the *episteme* or rather, [..] the *episteme* is a specifically *discursive* apparatus, whereas the apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive'. Spillers (1987) spoke about racialized gender apparatuses in which Black women's flesh could never occupy the discursive of non-discursive position of 'the body'. If we move to thinking about

Black beauty shame as a racialized gender apparatus, part of racializing assemblages (Weheliye 2010), we can see that 'power in the substantive sense, (*'le' pouvoir*) doesn't exist […] The idea that there is located at- or emanating from- a given point something which is a "power […] fails to account for a considerable number of phenomena" (Foucault 1980: 198). Instead, what we should speak about following Foucault (1980: 198) are 'more or less organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated clusters of relations'.

These clusters of relations are both biopolitical and necropolitical. Thus, rather than looking for the origins of Black beauty shame's power, what we should look at instead are clusters of relations within the 'micro-relations of power' (Foucault 1980: 199) so that we can see how power strategies of Black ugliness/outsideness to Black beauty emerge. There is, of course, movement from below as well as above and these 'capillaries' of power produce new effects (Foucault 1980: 199). Here, we have the basis of the interconnection between power and struggle as 'we all fight each other and there is always within each of us something that fights something else' (Foucault 1980: 208). The channel to decolonize Black beauty shame here has begun in terms of a capillary of power from below contained in the refusal of the ever present whitening project and the authenticity politics of Black Nationalism. Fanon spoke of the colonial attitude of the Black subject in a white world, an attitude which reflected their self-location as racialized object. As we have seen reflected in the extracts above, Black politics and anti-racist thought have enabled a changing attitude to established Black beauty power, knowledge and subjectivities. What the women have shown is that Black women can and do interrogate power and can determine the sorts of questions that can be asked as well as the possible contours of the answers. This is the Black decolonial feminist attitude so necessary to ending the unfinished business of Black beauty shame.

Nelson Maldonado Torres (2016) presents a model of decoloniality as attitude and unfinished business by thinking through the decoloniality of power, decoloniality of being and decoloniality of knowledge. This model thought through intersectionality captures the outlines of the Black decolonial feminist critique of Black beauty shame being attempted here. However, as the discussion earlier asserts, we also need to include the decoloniality of affect into this formulation. Or better yet, rather than remaining with the noun why don't we instead think more dynamically and put the 'ing' back. That is, decolonizing the affect, power,

being and knowledge within Black beauty shame. Thinking of power, being, knowledge and affect in terms of Black beauty shame reaffirms Black women's corporeality, subjectivity and existence. This in turn enables the development of Black community irrespective of Black beauty shames' manifestations and, in fact, because of anger at its continuing harms. Such harms amount to no less than shame's somatization and occupation of the psyche in ways which are difficult to survive or erase. For Maldonado-Torres, 'amor y rabia'—love and anger—are enduring attitudes in the decolonial project, in the decolonial attitude which must be developed as a matter of political urgency. This is necessary if we are to escape from the grip of Black beauty shame.

We see this decolonizing attitude present in the 'race performativity' in which the women engage in the extracts. They perform a position *against* as a response to the pain of shame which they present as being against them (Scarry 1985).This is the only way to avoid or at least ameliorate the psychic damage and pain caused by Black beauty shame whether from white supremacy or Black Nationalism. Much like Audre Lorde, being against pain and alienation, the women choose anger. As they choose, anger they also choose affiliation with Black anti-racist beauty politics and through this they assert relationality with a wider diasporic community. This affiliation is built through positive affective attachment because of shared Black beauty shame, a shared suffering with which one can immediately empathize. We can empathize because we have also walked in those shoes or can potential walk in those shoes. Affiliation because of shared Black beauty shame occurs through the need to say 'no' to continuing dehumanization, shaming events and their corporeal and subjective differentiation. This affiliation is constructed through Black love of self and others, simply put.

This then is about how Black beauty shame, how affect through affection's intensity, can form global Black diasporic subjectivities and Black aesthetic community engaged in Black decolonial feminist beauty politics. We can see how affection works if we think about what happens in a room of Black people when someone speaks about their experiences of racism. This experience is felt though it is only vicariously experienced because of its re-stimulation of pain in others. This is a pain caused by our own remembered past and/or present racist exclusions. Psychic pain resonates and with this resonance based on a shared experience its effect spreads out like a net to affect others. Affection seeps under the skin; it does not remain on the surface. In effect, its empathy extends outwards

from the speaker so that the reaction back to the speaker—its reverberation—is that of an unconditional acceptance. There is an outpouring of affection based on the transmission of the shared affect of Black beauty shame. Sharing shame produces communities of affective relationalities bounded by the necessity for self- and communal love, appreciation and acceptance of differences of skin, hair and facial features in order for Black anti-racist aesthetics knowledge, power, being, affect and bodily practices to continue.

This connectedness begins from the position of complaint. Complaint has been cited by Anne Anling Cheng (2001) as indispensable in political action. Against Black beauty shame's silence and silencing, complaints emerge from grievances. Here, Black ugliness/Black difference and their production of shame scripts, which seek to interpellate their others as occupying a position of lack, are the sources of grievance. If one does not let go of grief, from the suffering of which it is a symptom to the agency implied by complaints, then melancholia sets in (Cheng 2001).

Black beauty shame's 'race' melancholia (Cheng 2001; Khanna 2003; Tate 2009) can be very resistant to Black decolonial feminist change because of its silencing mechanism where to speak one's constructed racialized ugliness is to enter into shaming oneself. If we can never speak shame, then it remains impervious to Black feminist decolonizing critique and dismissal as 'not of us'. If we think about what Black beauty melancholia means (Tate 2009), we can see that it relates to governmentality, shame's subjectification which (re)produces beauty's necropolitical and biopolitical life. The discourse of Black ugliness and its attached shame 'are swallowed whole' (Khanna 2003) and resists abjection from the psyche. Therefore, ugliness constantly re-emerges as that trauma which we want to dis-identify from but which remains obstinately a part of who we feel we are most intimately. The re-stimulation of this trauma in moments of shaming events means that Black aesthetic death is a possible quotidian experience. It is an experience which we see illustrated in the extracts explored above. We have seen women speak about shaming experiences many years past, with eyes glistening with tears unshed and tears yet to come, tears which are ever present because of the re-stimulation of past pain. Whether from Black Nationalism or white supremacy, Black beauty shame continues to resonate, continues to resist expulsion from the psyche and continues to impact the possibilities of self-healing and becoming whole so necessary in the Black feminist decolonizing project.

Melancholia is an ever present aspect of shame with which we continue to struggle.

Another aspect of shame, as stated earlier, is fear. Fear of difference, of being seen as different, often underlies the operation of Black beauty shame. This focus on fear distinguishes here between shame and guilt. In guilt one feels bad for something one has done but in shame one feels bad because of what one *is* (Sedgwick 2003), what one is incapable of becoming as said earlier. As humans, as people invested in the bonds of sociality, dependent on others to come into being, shame is something that is feared. It is feared because of its ability to sunder us from social bonds, to place us outside of friendship, community and the solidarity of recognition. We fear shame and try to avoid it at all costs.

However, shame pursues us irrespective of our own volition. It is something we cannot avoid. In the world which we inhabit in the Global South West and Global North West, Black beauty shame stalks social life and emerges in confessions such as that of Lupita Nyong'o and Thandi Newton. To quote Foucault (1980: 215–216) speaking of sexuality, confession 'is all those procedures by which the subject is incited to produce a discourse of truth about [her Black beauty shame] which is capable of having effects on the subject himself [herself]'. As we speak past shaming events, we are overcome by shame yet again. Therefore, we fear shame's repetition, its erasure of who we think we are most intimately or who we desire to become. It is important to get over fear of shame's interpellation as the women cited here have done. This is not about being fearless but about understanding the contours of Black beauty shame's possible operations. It is also about remembering that we are not born fearful just as we are not born shameful. Those affects come from somewhere outside of us. Once we understand shame and fear as outside, not of us, we can also see the possibility of Black anti-racist aesthetic politics which decolonizes shame from 'the margins' (Hooks 2000). Being outside, conducting Black decolonial feminist politics from this positionality, already enables a critique of Black beauty shame's interpellations. Such critique has been described above as translation as reflexivity followed by an identity repositioning. Such a location of becoming through refusal enables the use of new knowledge and new power relations within Black beauty shame. That is, rather than the women being described and named as shameful, they themselves subvert that look and become the describers and the namers of the discourses, politics and individuals who

are their beauty shamers. This process is a further exposition of Césaire's (2000) dis/alienation.

As they rewrite their subjectivities they engage in dis/alienation and remind us of what Homi Bhabha (1994) describes as mimicry produced by the look from the space of the otherness produced by Black beauty shame. Bhabha relates mimicry to the colonial subject who speaks back to discourses of othering by producing something different than what was expected by these discourses. We can translate this to the twenty-first century in terms of white supremacy and its European aesthetic standards. We also have to say that for Black Nationalism to let other Black beauties into that space was produced through this very same process as we saw in the extract above with Dana and Tessa. We must go beyond the scars with which Black beauty shame might mark us as we go about the job of creating new Black beauty subjectivities. This mimicry is absolutely and undoubtedly based on decolonizing the mind and producing a rejection of the beauty limit attitude with which Black women are faced in the Western Hemisphere.

Here, we have to leave colonialism behind but we also have to accept that being lighter skinned and straighter haired is not always a position of privilege in all spaces and times. Black Nationalist politics removes the previous automatic privilege of 'browning' guaranteed by white supremacy. This is something which is long overdue. That is, thinking beyond colonialism to the disadvantages produced by 'race' and our positioning as racialized other. These disadvantages emerge irrespective of how we are complected or our hair texture because of the 'post-racial' racializing assemblages we occupy. In these racializing assemblages, we are led to believe that 'race' no longer matters because the racial nomos works to ensure that race is removed from biology as it is no longer necessarily coded on the body as physical variations (Gilroy 2004). Within the racial nomos there is a spatial, legal and governmental spatial order where there is an impersonal, discursive, imperial ordering (Gilroy 2004) which ensures that the known meanings of 'race' are reproduced through an 'epistemology of ignorance' (Mills 1997: 18) which structures the world as we know it.

Decolonizing Black beauty shame means deconstructing the structures of the world that we know. It is only then that dis/alienation can begin and new forms of the human can emerge. Such decolonization produces many possibilities—personal, communal, political, cultural, aesthetic, social, economic and intersectional. What is important within all

this as well and something which we must not forget is that decolonizing Black beauty shame means also to be involved in a new politics of the revaluation of Black skin, hair and facial features in all their multiplicity. It is to move away from a beauty politics based on 'the Philosophies of the One in the West' (Glissant 2006) and its subjectification as Black other, as ugly. What we must recall is that we continue to be involved in contemporary modes of organic criticism of Black beauty and its parameters as much as we always have been. We must not lose sight of that and the power which it has to create new relationalities beyond Black beauty shame, beyond psychic pain. We must not forget that we still have the possibility—as we have always had—to go beyond the power relations of Black beauty shame, anger and fear to the relationalities of love.

As said earlier on this is a really old politics, a really old aim. However, it is something with which we need to re-engage to recreate Black beauty communities based on the decolonization of the shame of Black ugliness. This has got to be a reconstructed ethics of Black beauty which means that how we relate to each other and view our very selves cannot be done from a distance, seeing ourselves through the gaze of otherness. We must become intimately related to ourselves, with a Black aesthetics which is about valorization not erasure. This engagement must be one of reflection and action at once.

This points to the necessity to develop a Black beauty democracy on the basis of Black women's equality, in terms of knowledge, aesthetic value and stylization so as to establish new power relations. How can such a democracy be established? There has to be a centralization of and a focus on Black *women's* bodies, not just *the* Black woman's body of white supremacy or Black Nationalism. This already shifts the position from which Black beauty democracy is capable of being discussed. After the decolonization of the Black woman's body and its shame scripts has occurred, then difference can emerge based much less on hegemonic beauty hierarchical understandings of skin, hair and facial features. It enables the emergence of subalternized beauty forms into the mainstream and the removal of the previous mainstream to the off-centre position.

Of course, this is not to replace one dogma with another because that would be to reproduce former intimately remembered and felt Black beauty shame traumas. Traumas need not remain; they can be critiqued. They can be overcome by concerted individual and communal effort. Not replacing trauma means we have to see Black beauty as something

whose being, knowledge, power and affect must be imaged as plural and must be perceived as dynamically changing in space, time and across generations. What is beautiful can change and it is through this change that we can see the death knell for Black beauty shame. Finally, we can say that shame is not of me, it is not me, it does not determine me.

Finally, we can breathe.

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Index