Articles

Globalization and Europeanization: A Challenge to French Politics

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This article examines how globalization and Europeanization interact with each other, either in a centrifugal or in a centripetal way, to alter French politics. It analyzes how globalization has redefined domestic politics in France and it explores whether Europeanization has accelerated or hindered these transformations. It studies in turn the impact of globalization and Europeanization on power, preferences and institutions — three essential components of a country's domestic politics. The central argument is that globalization and Europeanization not only have transformed the nature of domestic politics, but are also becoming a new cleavage around which domestic politics are being structured.

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Introduction

In France, the most surprising political mobilization of the year 2003 occurred in August in the barren region of Larzac, where more than 200,000 people gathered to protest against globalization.¹ From the state's proposed pensions reform to the privatization of public services, the ultra-liberalism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the threats posed by genetically modified crops, supporters of José Bové, a sheepfarmer turned McDonald's wrecker and media star, denounced the ravages of neo-liberal globalization on the French economy and society. Beyond the unexpectedly high turnout, the most surprising aspect of this mobilization was the non-political nature of the protest, despite the political nature of the issues addressed. Indeed, the growing strength and appeal of the French 'counter-globalization' movement is occurring at the margins of the traditional political sphere, outside of the party system. And yet, at the same time, globalization seems to become increasingly relevant as a new defining cleavage in French politics, so much so that politicians of all creeds now try to define themselves *vis-à-vis* this complex concept. How has it happened that the theme of globalization has permeated

French political discourse, and how has it transformed the nature of domestic politics?

In most European countries, the distinction between the Left and the Right has become increasingly blurred and on some issues, the extremes on each side of the political spectrum have now more in common with each other than they do with the center. This increased blurriness of partisan politics can be interpreted as the result of structural change, such as demographic transformations, the rise of the middle class (Goldthorpe, 1995), the resolution of the old cleavages (Franklin *et al.*, 1992), and an increasing disillusionment with catch-all political parties. It can also be interpreted as the product of a combination of globalization and Europeanization. Indeed, globalization — the accelerated movement of goods, capital, services, technologies, people, and ideas across borders — has been mostly a market-driven process taking place in boardrooms and over the internet, without much prior discussion of its political implications. Europeanization — the gradual integration of economies and societies that belong to the European Union (EU) — has been mostly an elite-driven process taking place away from the critical eye of the public and contested elections. Yet both phenomena have already impacted profoundly on the configuration of domestic politics in Europe. They alter some of the basic features of a country's politics, including the relationship between state and individual, the expression of cultural identity, and the practice of democracy. They redefine the limits of national sovereignty, affect democratic accountability and legitimacy, and upset the prevailing balance among interest groups and political forces.

Nevertheless, globalization and Europeanization differ from each other, not only in their nature but also in their political implications. Are they contradictory phenomena (Hirst and Thompson, 1996) or complementary processes (Held, 1999)? Is it possible to disentangle the impact of European integration on French politics from that of globalization? Some scholars have analyzed the impact of Europeanization on the French polity (Ladrech, 1994; Cole and Drake, 2000; Drake, 2003), while others have focused on the impact of globalization on France (Cohen, 1996; Meunier, 2000a; Gordon and Meunier, 2001; Hanley, 2001). This article examines how globalization and Europeanization interact with each other, either in a centrifugal or in a centripetal way, to alter French politics. It analyzes how globalization has redefined domestic politics in France and it explores whether Europeanization has accelerated or hindered these transformations. It studies in turn the impact of globalization and Europeanization on power, preferences, and institutions — three essential components of a country's domestic politics. The central argument is that globalization and Europeanization not only have transformed the nature of domestic politics, but are also becoming a new cleavage around which domestic politics are being structured.

Globalization, Europeanization, and Political Power

Globalization is a catch-all word, but is often underspecified in the literature. In its narrower definition, globalization is primarily an economic phenomenon, whereby economic activity is increasingly conducted across national boundaries (Goldthorpe, 2002). According to this interpretation, globalization is characterized by unprecedented levels of trade and capital mobility. In a broader definition, globalization is not only an economic, but also a social, political, environmental, and cultural phenomenon, encompassing a greater movement of persons, norms, technology, and culture, among others. A related and central question is whether globalization is a new, an old, or a cyclical development (Giddens, 1994; Held, 1999; O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999; James, 2001; Goldthorpe, 2002; Berger, 2003). Whether globalization is a real phenomenon or little more than a new slogan, it is obvious that the word itself has spurred considerable political rhetoric and activity. For the purpose of analyzing the potential political impact of globalization on French domestic politics, this paper adopts a broad definition of globalization and considers that, although it does not represent a radical discontinuity with the past, the current wave of globalization has distinctive features in its scope, scale, and intensity, which can have consequences of their own.

Europeanization has also recently become an ubiquitous concept, although somewhat clearer to define and less controversial than globalization. Europeanization usually refers to the sources of change in national politics and practices coming from European integration (Hix and Goetz, 2000; Green Cowles *et al.*, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Vink, 2003).

By accelerating the speed and intensity of exchanges and interactions, globalization reduces the meaningfulness of national borders. As a result, it can affect the relative power of different groups in society and redefine the issues and divisions around which domestic politics are structured. In France, as in most other advanced industrial countries, globalization has affected power in at least four dimensions: it has enhanced the power of the individual at the detriment of the power of the collective entity represented by the state; it has weakened the autonomy and tools of the state; it has increased the power of multinationals and international investors; and it has decreased the bargaining power of labor. This, in turn, has affected the nature of domestic politics.

Dirigisme vs the market

In its trade and financial incarnation, globalization 'shrinks' the state by shifting power away from the state sector into the hands of private actors. Although for some analysts there is a complementarity between the state and

private economic interests (Cerny, 1999), the most widespread view is that states and private interests are in opposition (Hanley, 2001). The state can no longer own/control much of the national means of production, directly employ large number of workers, and tax heavily to promote redistribution. In place of state control, the market takes over. Privatized firms act according to their balance sheets and shareholder interests rather than under national direction; the stock market dictates economic decisions more than the government; and new forces in society, from civic action groups to business executives, play more of a role than bureaucrats, officials, and political parties. As a result, power in society rests increasingly with private actors, be they individuals or corporations.

Globalization therefore represents a particular challenge for France, a country traditionally characterized by its *dirigisme*. In the *dirigiste* model, the state has an important role to play in guiding national economic developments, because only the state can identify and pursue the common interest that is superior to the sum of private interests (Hall, 1986; Schmidt, 1996; Levy, 1999). The market is allowed to work, but only under close supervision of the state, which controls many of its most important levers through a high degree of national ownership of the means of production and finance, high taxation and spending, interventionist industrial policies, and close governmental ties with the corporate world. By contrast, globalization requires abandoning, to a large extent, state control over the economy — and thereby over society. This transformation has already largely occurred in France, as evidenced by the massive amount of formerly state-owned companies that have been privatized, many of them by the Socialist Jospin's government (Gordon and Meunier, 2001).

Yet acknowledging this transfer of power is not an easy task for French politicians who, to counter accusations of the powerlessness of the state in the face of global constraints, must demonstrate that they are still solidly in command of the French economy. Former Prime Minister Jospin experienced this in 1999 when, whereas tire-maker Michelin announced massive layoffs amidst record profits, he declared that the French cannot expect everything from the state, and that there was nothing he could do in that case because it was no longer the state's duty to administer the economy. This extremely unpopular statement heightened public awareness of a sense of vulnerability associated with the new economy and was widely denounced throughout the country. Indeed, since globalization increases the role of the market as compared to the role of the state in the determination of economic relationships, it is particularly difficult for a society that is used to looking to the state to provide jobs, redistribute incomes, protect against unwanted imports, and promote prestigious industrial sectors and perceived national interests.

This impression has been further reinforced in 2004 by the Aventis episode. In the well-publicized takeover battle between French company Sanofi and Swiss company Novartis for the control of the French–German pharmaceutical giant Aventis, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin has limited his implication to comments indirectly supporting Sanofi, since it is a matter involving private companies and their shareholders and not national governments. Yet the absence of government intervention has been much criticized for what it reveals about modern capitalism. Many have argued that France’s national interest is at stake, not only because the merger would result in massive layoffs or outsourcing of highly qualified workers, but mostly because in the highly sensitive sector of health, shareholders should not be left alone to make decisions.²

A reduced margin of maneuver in policy-making

Globalization is also perceived to make the state ‘shrink’ because it has reduced national levers for macroeconomic policy, the availability of the tools of industrial policy, and the ability to raise resources to finance welfare and redistributive policies (Berger, 2000). With their margin of maneuver constrained by external forces, national governments may have less room to act autonomously. As a result, the central state loses some of its political power.³

The feeling that the state has ‘shrunk’ is prevalent in France, as it is in the rest of Europe. And indeed Europeanization, more than globalization, is often blamed for this in the discourse of politicians who claim that their hands are tied by ‘Brussels’ and by their European commitments. The French Socialists, in particular, have experienced this firsthand. The 1981 election of François Mitterrand as President had initially brought back *dirigisme* with a vengeance, based on the premise that France could save its own economy in a context of worldwide recession by taking control. But the Mitterrand U-turn of 1983 — moving from a defiant rejection of international economic pressures to an acceptance of its constraints in just 2 years — played an important role in France’s adaptation to international economic integration, both in its European and global dimensions. The lesson that the French and the rest of the world drew from this experiment is that the idea of going it alone was no longer an option for a national economy — particularly one that was integrated into the European Community.

Subsequent governments, both of the Left and Right, have given to the public the impression of conducting similar economic policies, subject to the same international constraints and European commitments. In a country known for its deep, ideological divisions, the differences between Left and Right on the economy, in practice if not rhetoric, have become minimal.

Notwithstanding the frequent cases of governmental turnover, economic management since 1983 has been driven more than anything by the need to adapt the French economy to the requirements of the European and global markets (Cohen, 1996; Schmidt, 1996; Gordon and Meunier, 2001). The pre-Euro requirements, in particular, seemed to constrain the hands of national policy-makers.

The ways in which globalization and Europeanization have diminished the power of the French state were forcefully evidenced in September 2003 with the Alstom affair. Alstom, a French engineering company employing 118,000 workers worldwide, faced impending financial collapse. In order to save the company, the French government planned to inject 300 million euros into Alstom by taking a stake in the company, and to lend the company an additional 300 million euros.⁴ But the competition arm of the EU Commission, which oversees the rules on state aid, forbade the French government to do so, leading to a watered-down rescue compromise. This well-publicized power struggle has reinforced the impression that the era of *dirigisme* is well over and that the central state has become powerless in the face of market logic and the diktats of Brussels.

To an extent, it is true that European integration has limited the margin of maneuver of national governments in Europe. The creation of the European 'single market' and the Maastricht Treaty on EU have indeed represented an extensive abdication of sovereignty. The principle of mutual recognition, which has enabled goods and services to circulate freely throughout Europe, has deprived member states of the capacity to set the rules and standards for products entering their home markets. The existence of a competition policy at the European level has prevented states from creating 'national champions' and continuing to conduct an industrial policy of 'high-tech Colbertism' (Cohen, 1992). The Schengen agreement has removed the national policing of intra-European borders, leaving people to circulate freely throughout Europe, legally or illegally. The creation of the Euro has limited considerably the tools of macro-economic policy available to national governments — let alone the symbolism of having a sovereign currency. In this sense, Europeanization has not only been a vector of globalization, it has also amplified its effects. It has accentuated the belief that conventional politics are increasingly irrelevant, since the major decisions that affect citizens are no longer taken in national capitals, but in Brussels or in boardrooms across the globe (Mair, 2000).

Yet national governments have a large part of responsibility in propagating perceptions of the EU as an overwhelming web of regulations that limits their capacity to act in their citizens' interests. National politicians have taken to blaming unpopular decisions on the EU, thereby fueling the misperception that Brussels can dictate its will and act forcefully against the interests of some of its

sovereign member states. Indeed, the EU has become a scapegoat for justifying unpopular measures that national leaders do not have the political courage to put forth (Hay and Rosamond, 2002).

While it is true that European integration has amplified some implications of globalization, it is also serving to shield European countries from its more pernicious effects. The common minimum regulations that have been introduced in the EU, notably in the social area, have prevented competitive deregulation which could have undermined national features (Vogel, 1995; Howarth, 2002). Europeanization can also mitigate globalization because it gives each country individually more power at the international level. A united Europe can wield much more influence in international negotiations, whether they be on trade, the environment, food safety, international financial reform, foreign policy, the cultural exception, or anything else. Individually, none of the EU Member States could successfully stand up to the Americans in any of these areas, but the EU — with a GDP and population on a par or indeed even greater than those of the United States — does so with increasing success (Meunier, 2000b). Europe's collective trade positions and ability to threaten to take the United States to the WTO and impose retaliatory sanctions give it leverage in talks with the United States that separate EU member states could never achieve through acting alone. Even the creation of the euro provides protection from the vicissitudes of globalization, sheltering more than half of the trade of most European countries from international currency fluctuations. The euro also potentially gives the Europeans a greater international voice in monetary developments (McNamara and Meunier, 2002).

A new political balance of power

While globalization shrinks the power of the central state, it also changes the political balance of power in society, to the benefit of multinational corporations and international shareholders. The internationalization of capital markets seems to be the main source of the enhanced political power of multinational corporations. Thanks to the falling costs of transportation and communication, they can break off parts of their productive or services activities and relocate them in other countries. Thanks to the enlargement of market boundaries with the creation of regional entities like the EU, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR, they can relocate, in particular, in the countries 'that are most 'investment-friendly' in imposing the lowest tax burden and in giving priority to expenditure not on social benefits but rather on developing transport, communications and other facilities in ways that will enhance productivity' (Goldthorpe, 2002). Multinationals can therefore potentially play off locations one against another, which gives them greater voice inside the countries where they are located or plan to locate — be it in terms of

infrastructure location, fiscal burden, labor policies, or environmental regulations.

In France, globalization has clearly enhanced the political power of multinational corporations and international investors. From 1985 to 1997, the share of foreign investors in the capital of French companies jumped from 10 to 37%, which created an earthquake in the nature of French capitalism.⁵ Today, foreign ownership, mostly British and American, accounts for more than 43% of the Paris Bourse (stock exchange). The deal of corporate ownership, which used to be closely associated to the central state, has been radically transformed, and so has the political power structure. The ever-growing influence of foreign investors was indeed denounced publicly in 2000 by conservative president Jacques Chirac, who complained about the sacrifices French workers must make 'to safeguard the investment benefits of Scottish widows and California pensioners.'⁶

At the same time that globalization enhances the political power of multinational corporations and international investors, it also weakens the power of labor. Globalization (especially in its capital mobility dimension) increases job uncertainty and creates tensions between trade and domestic social arrangements. As a result, it also decreases the bargaining power of unskilled workers in the North, who may become politically quieter for fear that companies will move production to countries where wages are lower and workers are compliant (Rodrik, 1997). Throughout the EU the proportion of workers who are members of unions is declining, centralized systems of wage-setting are breaking apart, and labor market rigidities are being blamed for high unemployment. Although many scholars have documented that national patterns of corporatism are proving more resilient than expected, the evolution towards a weakened bargaining power of labor is undeniable (Garrett, 1998; Pierson, 2001).

France traditionally has had a very low unionization rate and has not been a corporatist country. Labor-government relations are often conflictual and often turn into street demonstrations, precisely because of the absence of strong institutionalized bargaining. European integration so far has not led to a genuine mobilization across borders, even though French labor mobilized, for instance, when carmaker Renault closed off a plant in Belgium. Nevertheless, while globalization has created many new, qualified jobs in France, it has also transferred many jobs out of the country and thereby has weakened the bargaining power of labor.

Finally, Europeanization may well reinforce the power of another actor in society, with important implications for domestic politics and partisan cleavages: the national executive. Indeed, as several scholars have shown, European integration can upset the balance between the executive and the legislative power. As was first explained by Moravcsik in 1993, European

integration strengthens the executive because: 'by transforming issues traditionally defined as domestic policy into foreign policy, international engagement can open and close channels for domestic actors to influence the initiation of policy (initiative); alter the domestic constitutional and statutory procedures under which policy decisions are ratified and implemented (institutions); create or redress asymmetries in knowledge (information); and reshape the possibilities for domestic actors to justify policy (ideas).' What it means for domestic politics is that even if governments seem powerless and the state appears obsolete, the national executive still has a major role to play (Phelan, working paper; Moravcsik, 1993; Scharpf, 1999; Marks and Hooghe, 2000).

Globalization, Europeanization, and Political Preferences

Globalization and Europeanization also have the potential for transforming domestic politics in France because they affect the preferences of the main actors in society, both for structural and for ideological reasons. As a result, French citizens have translated these new preferences into votes, and they have developed specific preferences on globalization and Europeanization, which have themselves become not only the cause but also the object of the political debate.

The transformation of political preferences

In many advanced industrial democracies, the dominant cleavage in domestic politics was that of class. In its simplest caricature, labor voted for the left and employers voted for the right. But class structure has dramatically changed under the pressures of globalization. In particular, the liberalization of trade and the falling costs of transportation have outsourced labor-intensive production and enabled the considerable expansion of the services sector in advanced industrial countries. Moreover, the spectacular advances in technology, and their spread through globalization, have enabled the progressive replacement of old manufacturing industries by high-tech industries. These developments, spurred by globalization, have created a new class of flexible, less unionized, post-Fordist workers. Who is 'labor' today? If the term refers to blue-collar workers, and if only they were to vote for the Left, it would not be possible to account for the electoral successes of the Left in so many countries in the past decade. As many scholars have demonstrated, class cleavages no longer structure individual voting choice. Moreover, individual political preferences have become more complex and no longer show consistency (Franklin *et al.*, 1992; Kitschelt, 1993; Goldthorpe, 2002).

Globalization may also transform structural preferences, because it generalizes social insecurity across the board. It used to be that only the working class bore the stresses and paid the price of economic fluctuation. In the context of the global economy, however, the threat of unemployment becomes generalized to all classes and occupations, including white-collar workers, salaried professionals, and managerial employees.⁷ Therefore, individuals who may have been natural supporters of the Right according to the traditional cleavages may now prefer governments who 'increase public spending in order to provide various forms of protection against market dislocations' (Goldthorpe, 2002). This is amplified by the widespread feeling that the differences between governing parties seem to matter less than they used to and that it hardly matters whether the Left or the Right wins elections. The electorate thus becomes more volatile.

In France, as in other European countries, class cleavages no longer structure individual voting choice. Individual political preferences have become more complex and no longer show consistency, in large part because of the generalization of social insecurity. Moreover, the electorate becomes more volatile, because of the widespread feeling that French governing parties seem to matter less than they used to and that it hardly matters whether the Left or the Right wins elections.

Globalization is also transforming partisan preferences through ideological mechanisms. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a generalized loss of faith in old ideologies and drastically diminished the importance of the communism/capitalism debate as a central ideological cleavage in domestic politics — as evidenced by the dismal electoral showings and near disappearance of the French Communist Party. Nevertheless, new themes of mobilization and discontent, often referred to as 'post-materialist' values, have emerged (Inglehart, 1990) — for instance, on the environment, human rights and, ironically, anti-globalization. Moreover, new communications technologies and the growing ideology of free trade have helped to make societies more susceptible than ever to foreign influences. Cross-cultural exchanges promoted by the EU, from students abroad to joint television programs in several European languages, help ideas to circulate. Therefore, these new political themes, as well as the practical mobilization that accompanies them, have spread easily across borders, affecting domestic political preferences.

Globalization and Europeanization also heighten the awareness of national borders and fear of their disappearance. They can transform partisan preferences for cultural reasons. The spread of the Internet, the liberalization of trade, and the dominant role of the United States (and thus the English language) in global business all combine to make many French citizens worry about their cultural traditions — in short, their national identity — in a globalizing world. Therefore, indirectly, globalization is reinforcing the politics

of identity — ‘an attempt to find a harbour of calm in a turbulent sea of hyper-change,’ as Roger Eatwell puts it (Eatwell, 2000).

Similarly, the migratory flows and the number of jobs lost to low-wage countries make many people more wary of foreign influences and foreigners in general. This leaves room for political preferences based on the issue of borders and identity — and, in particular, the rise of the extreme-right, which portray Europe as a villain, an agent of globalization and a cause for the decaying of national features and values.

French preferences over Europe and globalization

Interestingly, globalization and Europeanization have not only transformed French politics by rendering some of the old cleavages obsolete, but they are also becoming new cleavages themselves. The current rise of globalization as a new cleavage in French politics did not come out of nowhere. Its clear precursor was the debate about European integration that emerged in France in 1992. European integration has in many ways been an earlier, limited version of globalization — increasingly open borders to the free movement of goods, people, capital, technology and ideas, in this case on a European rather than global level. Although easier for the French to accept because of the more limited scale, the relative similarity of European economies, the greater commitment to social cohesion and income redistribution, the lack of a single, dominant European power or culture, Europeanization has none the less presented many of the same challenges to French society in as globalization. The bottom line in either case is that the country must be willing to accept influences from abroad, the rule of the market, lack of control over its domestic economy, and the declining power of the state.

All of these issues came to the fore during the divisive French debate over ratification of the Maastricht Treaty during 1992 (Percheron, 1991; Meunier and GR, 1993; Appleton, 1996). The Maastricht campaign provided the first opportunity for a public debate about the potential consequences of increasing capital movements, shifting power from states to markets, and loss of democratic control via the transfer or sharing of French sovereignty with supranational European organizations. And while the culprit for the loss of French sovereignty was not called globalization but Europeanization, the reasons for discontent were the same: the liberalization of trade and capital was rendering the French economy more dependent on the outside world, and therefore more vulnerable, while at the same time citizens saw their democratic prerogatives erode in favor of supranational and corporate actors.

Not surprisingly, the political alignments of the debate about Europe mirrored, almost exactly, those that would emerge later in the decade during the debate about globalization (Gordon and Meunier, 2001). The opposition to

European integration was led not by the 'Left' or the 'Right,' but by the margins against the center, thus putting pressure on many of the traditional alignments. On the Left, the majority of Socialists supported the government-backed treaty, which embodied their conversion to market liberalism and European integration. Only the iconoclastic Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who had already left the government in 1991 over the Gulf War, opposed Maastricht and joined the 'no' campaign. The Communists, not surprisingly, also opposed the treaty and, more generally, the *Europe des marchands* ('corporate Europe') and big capital. The Greens, newly arrived on the political scene, were deeply divided and unable to come up with an official position. On the Right, the great majority of the UDF joined the Socialists in campaigning for the treaty, a position consistent with their federalist aspirations and their belief in the benefits of the single European market (Appleton, 1996). Only the 'old France' branch made up of *notables* (local barons) from the provinces, such as Philippe de Villiers, opposed the kind of Europe envisioned by the drafters of Maastricht. The internal divisions were much stronger on the Gaullist right, however, mainly because of its insistence on the concept of sovereignty and its ambivalence about economic liberalism. The RPR was divided over the question of Europe because the Gaullist vision of a *Europe des patries* seemed antithetical to the Europe of Maastricht. RPR leader Chirac's decision to support the treaty created a split within the party, especially when Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin formed the *Rassemblement pour le non au référendum* (Rally for the No in the Referendum) to campaign against ratification. In the end, only a tiny majority (51–49%) of French voters approved the referendum in September 1992, thereby enabling the EU to implement the Maastricht agenda.

The French debate over Europeanization faded significantly afterwards, and the opponents of the European project became marginalized. On the Right, the main political leaders like Chirac had hitched their stars to the European wagon, made the case that monetary union was in France's interest, and were not now able or willing to turn back. On the Left, opposition to the EU also faded, helped by the fact that left-of-center governments began coming to power in most of the EU countries (most importantly Germany and Britain), undermining the argument that it was just a liberal, free-market club. Even many communists began to see 'Europe' as a possible force for social protection as much as a force for economic liberalization.⁸

As 'Europe' faded as the alleged cause of France's woes, the French debate shifted and globalization gradually became the new culprit for all those in France who were unhappy with their political leaders' acceptance of market capitalism and the erosion of French sovereignty. The anti-Europe campaign morphed into an even more vigorous anti-globalization movement. And the new political preferences of French voters, transformed first by

Europeanization and then by globalization, started to be felt strongly in electoral terms. If citizens feel that it is Brussels or nationless shareholders, instead of their national policy-makers, who control the levers of the economy, why bother to choose between the Left and the Right? This helps to explain the record-breaking rate of abstention in the 2002 presidential election (voting participation was 71.6%, the lowest in a presidential election under the Vth Republic) and protest vote in the first round that led the national Front candidate to the second round. As the 2004 regional elections further confirmed, there exists in France a large pool of voters not afraid to cast their ballot for extremist parties, mostly to the benefit of the Far Right, in order to punish the apparently interchangeable policies of the governing parties.

The protest vote in France is manifesting itself both on the Right and on the Left. On the Right, France has faced, for the past 20 years, the emergence of the Far Right as a major force in domestic politics. Capitalizing on the fears engendered by migratory flows and the number of French jobs lost both to foreign workers and to foreign countries, Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front has catered to the many people wary of foreign influences (Mayer and Perrineau, 1989). Globalization, of which population flows are a major component, has undoubtedly contributed to Le Pen's attractiveness, since it enhances consciousness of borders and fear of their disappearance. A more recent theme developed by the National Front, to great success in the 2002 presidential election and 2004 regional elections, has been the scapegoating of both globalization and Europeanization, thereby reinforcing the attractiveness of its decades-old message on borders, national identity, and external threats. For Le Pen, it was easy to draw a parallel between, or even link, the influx of immigrants and globalization. Indeed, one of the new highlights of his presidential campaign was the denunciation of 'Euromondialisme' — a pejorative term coined by the National Front to express a fear of what is not French but dictated to France by remote strangers. Moreover, the fact that on the right side of the political spectrum none of the moderate parties offered an outlet to those voters critical of European integration made Le Pen into the natural recipient of these protest votes (Meunier, 2003).

Focusing on the dangers, real and potential, of an 'open society' has so far proven a winning strategy for the Far Right. From the 1992 referendum on Maastricht to the 1994 conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT to the birth of the anti-globalization movement after the strikes of 1995, the National Front has capitalized on the emergence of a new cleavage in French politics and on the absence of alternative political outlets on the Right to channel the protests of the losers from globalization (Perrineau, 2002). The candidate Le Pen pursued this strategy during the 2002 and 2004 elections, which succeeded in attracting a large number of votes from workers, the unemployed, and small

business owners. Indeed, in the days following his spectacular score in the first round of the presidential election, Le Pen openly appealed to all of those who suffer from globalization: 'I call upon the patriots, the souverainistes and the authentic republicans to converge around my candidacy in order to oppose Brussels' technocratic Europe and to create a true popular force to defend national independence and opposition to globalization.'⁹ As long as no other political force is able to articulate so forcefully the despair of those who feel victimized by globalization in all its dimensions (economic, cultural, social, etc.), as well as by its European variant, we should expect the National Front to keep emphasizing this theme in the years to come.

A more recent phenomenon has been the emergence of a protest vote at the left of the political spectrum. It too, like the rise of the National Front, seems a consequence of globalization and Europeanization. The apparent 'pensée unique' shared by mainstream parties on the economy and the government officials' limited margin of maneuver, perceived or real, have lent credence to the idea that it is of little consequence whether a government of the Left or Right emerges from an election since they will in any case conduct the same policies as dictated by Brussels. Therefore, the only avenues open for protest are either fringe leftist parties, or non-political organizations, like the counterglobalization movement. Indeed, the 2002 presidential election saw the multiplication of candidacies at the left of the Socialist party. In the first round of the presidential election, where the stakes do not usually seem high, many voters cast their ballots for Trotskyist candidates (11%) and for former Socialist minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement (5%), all overt adversaries of globalization (Martin, 2002). Why vote for a pale, hesitant copy when you can get the original? Since then, the Far Left has lost some ground, as evidenced by its smaller showing in the 2004 regional elections where many voters tried to cast a 'useful' ballot ('vote utile'), but it still has considerable power of nuisance for the mainstream Left and is forcing it to cater more to its left fringe.

Indeed, the preferences of the mainstream Left have also been transformed by globalization, both because the nature of domestic politics has changed and because of the rise of globalization as a new cleavage (Hanley, 2001). The French Socialist party took a very long time to understand these transformations and was certainly outpaced by the Far Left and the Far Right in realizing how globalization was challenging French politics. For many years, the Socialists circumvented the issue by holding a double, even schizophrenic stance on globalization (Meunier, 2003). On the one hand, Socialist politicians, when in power, have adapted the French economy and society to the requirements of a globalizing world. The Jospin government accelerated the privatization of state enterprises, significantly cut France's historically high rate of taxation, and made France home to the world's second highest volume of executive stock options. Yet the Jospin government was also very adept at

‘globalization by stealth’ (Gordon and Meunier, 2001). It covered its tracks with such apparently anti-globalization measures as the 35-h workweek and rhetorically embraced several of the pet themes of more leftist groups and the counter-globalization movement — such as the Tobin Tax on financial transactions. The 2002 elections demonstrated that this double-talk did not stand up to electoral pressures.

French Socialists face a tough challenge in the years ahead regarding the articulation of their preferences *vis-à-vis* globalization, even if the unexpected results of the 2004 regional elections seem to give them a temporary respite. The choice is between aligning their actions with their rhetoric, or their rhetoric with their actions. The first strategy is a radical one — swinging back sharply to the left, becoming more anti-global and anti-Europe, balking at profound reform of the state, and refocusing on traditional leftist demands, such as a higher minimum wage. This is the option proposed specifically by Henri Emmanuelli and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who have created the new ‘Nouveau Monde’ current in the Socialist Party in September 2002. According to their analysis, the Jospin government failed in trying to ‘accompany’ globalization — when instead it should have denounced liberalism clearly and promoted a true alternative.¹⁰ The second strategy is a reformist one — reforming and modernizing, moving away from the left of the left. This is the option advocated by Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Laurent Fabius, among others, who openly favor a market economy, including when needed privatizations and the liberalization of the services sector.¹¹ If the Socialists choose the reformist strategy, they will have to confront and accept their own economic conversion and teach their electorate to like globalization, even if it is a ‘managed’ version.

For the right-wing UMP, there was originally no urgency in addressing upfront the issue of globalization. In large part through the rhetoric of Chirac, who has talked at length about the dangers of globalization and the need to ‘humanize’ it, the moderate right has been guilty of a double-discourse on globalization. But its positions were not fundamentally incompatible. After all, the Gaullists have evolved over time into timid backers of economic liberalism, so recognizing the benefits of neo-liberal market globalization while advocating the need for the worst effects of globalization to be corrected is not contradictory. Still, the moderate right will eventually have to confront its own ambiguities on the question and engage a real societal debate on globalization, as was suggested in the July 2003 Lepeltier report.¹² If anything, the disastrous results of the 2004 elections highlight even more the need for the right-wing to rethink its strategy of going about reforming the French economy and society to adapt it to a globalizing world. In particular, the UMP will have to decide whether to take into account the views of the ‘souverainistes’ who, in spite of their meager showings in recent elections and their personality clashes, may

represent a potentially rich reservoir of anti-globalization and anti-Europeanization votes.¹³ If there is ever a debate on the European constitution, this would represent the ultimate test of where the moderate right stands on the twin issues of Europeanization and globalization.

Globalization, Europeanization, and Institutional Change

Finally, globalization and Europeanization have the potential to affect domestic politics because they have an impact on the main institutions in society. An argument often heard among scholars is that globalization promotes not only policy, but also institutional, convergence. Globalization acts as a free market among countries that lead to competition among diverse socio-economic models. Increased contact with other societies through free trade, telecommunications, and foreign investment, among others, stimulates the borrowing of institutional features from one society to another. By reshaping national institutional configurations, weakening traditional features while importing foreign ones, globalization therefore indirectly affects domestic politics. In France, more than globalization, Europeanization has been the most important factor in promoting institutional convergence. From its abandonment of the national currency to its policies on environmental issues, industrial competition and sexual harassment, among so many others, the French economy and society have been deeply transformed by the massive transfers of sovereignty that have been realized within the context of European integration.

National vs international and supranational institutions

Globalization affects politics because it gives rise to new international and supranational institutions. The free movement of goods, capital, and technology can be very problematic if left unchecked and unregulated. As a result, new agencies of governance of an international kind have been created in many areas. Inevitably the creation of international institutions affects national institutions, which may now be forced to share power with them, thereby potentially weakening national autonomy. This has led to a generalized erosion of the public confidence in the capacity of their national state and, therefore, some reduction of national governments' legitimacy and authority. If important policy decisions affecting everyday life are now made at the WTO, the OECD, or in the boardrooms of multinational corporations, hasn't the institution that we know as the nation state become obsolete? This kind of thinking could lead to voter apathy, meager electoral turnouts, protest votes for extremist parties — features which all affect directly domestic politics.¹⁴

A related effect of Europeanization has been to put a strain on democratic politics. The apparent substitution of national by supranational institutions in many policy areas has eroded public confidence in the legitimacy of both national and international institutions. This has created a rift over the very definition of a democratic polity and can represent the source of a new cleavage.

The expression ‘democratic deficit’ has been widely used since the 1990s to describe, and often overemphasize, the presumed gaps in democracy characterizing the workings of the EU. An abundant literature has disseminated the term, which is used in general to explain popular resistance to integration (Banchoff and Smith, 1999; Scharpf, 1999; Schmitter, 2000; Siedentop, 2000; Moravcsik, 2002). Above all is the impression of the undemocratic structure of European institutions. European integration is a process that has been historically driven by elites, not by popular vote. Moreover, the institutions of the EU are often referred to as undemocratic, mostly because of the lack of transparency of the policy-making process and the extreme complexity of decision-making procedures, which allegedly makes EU institutions impossible to understand for the average citizen. Therefore, as Siedentop has argued, the EU often appears as an ‘alien government of strangers’ imposed from a remote capital (Siedentop, 2000). Critics also deplore the lack of a real cross-national debate on grand societal questions, as well as the non-existence of Europe-wide political parties. In the words of Greven (2000), ‘actors such as political parties or unions, which normally ‘translate’ the political debate for public opinion, are still pretty weak at the European level.’ Finally, the EU may suffer from a deficit of cultural legitimacy. Many nation-states (although not all) are bounded by a common language, religion, historical tradition, and legal culture. Instead, Europe is composed of a multitude of peoples, each with their own sense of national identity and belonging. Therefore, it is difficult for the citizens of Europe to develop attachment to the EU.

Not everyone, however, agrees that the EU actually suffers from a democratic deficit. The EU is not a nation-state, and its member states and supranational institutions coexist side-by-side; therefore, the EU should not be held to the same democratic standards. As Moravcsik has argued, the true pillars of the EU — economic welfare, human rights, liberal democracy, and the rule of law — appeal to Europeans regardless of national or political identity (Moravcsik, 2002). Furthermore, new patterns of recognition and representation have emerged in the EU, creating a new framework for politics alongside existing national and subnational arenas (Banchoff and Smith, 1999). Indeed, the EU has created many mechanisms through which citizens can now participate in the process and, in doing so, has opened up a lot of democratic space. For instance, because of the EU’s fragmented authority, an

interest group can now put an issue on the agenda in any of the Member States, as well as in Brussels. Therefore, the EU has multiplied the number of avenues for civic participation.

Anti-globalization institutions

Globalization also impacts domestic politics by transforming the institutions for political representation. Indeed, globalization contains the seeds to foster opposition to globalization and, as such, to reform institutions, both national and international. From the streets of Seattle to the streets of Porto Alegre and Mumbai, activists of all nationalities have denounced the 'democraticidal' nature of international economic institutions. As summarized by Deborah Yashar, globalization is 'changing the opportunities, incentives and constraints for engaging in political mobilization' (Yashar, 2002). Many scholars have indeed noticed a certain universalization and institutionalization of norms, especially those embedded in international organization and treaties (Franklin *et al.*, 1992; Finnemore, 1996). In turn, this globalization of norms has provided an ideational impulse for engaging in proactive kinds of collective action (Soysal, 1994). Scholars like Keck and Sikkink even argue that globalization is giving rise to a new 'cosmopolitan society' and internationalized forms of collective action (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The globalization of networks has provided new resources and ideas on which advocacy groups can capitalize to reframe political debates and struggles, especially when they confront severe political obstacles at home. Therefore, globalization has enabled the emergence of international non-governmental organizations and networks that support social movements and act as pressure for policy change. The groups to mobilize along those lines have been in particular environmental, human rights, women's and indigenous movements. Thus, globalization catalyzes proactive forms of collective action designed to reshape agendas in new ways.

The rise of international and supranational institutions has contributed to a further erosion of public confidence in the legitimacy of national and international institutions. This loss of confidence has translated in electoral terms by increasing successes for parties denouncing the international drift of national institutions and the surrender of sovereignty, such as the National Front and the *souverainistes* on the Right. On the Left, some of the most vocal opponents of globalization in France have come from the Far Left and from outside the traditional party system, channeling their opposition mostly through associative movements. Their opposition is based on social, environmental, cultural and humanitarian concerns, as well as on central claims about the democratic deficit of international institutions.

The emergence of transnational NGOs that support pressure for political and social change has indeed been facilitated by globalization itself, mostly in its communication dimension. France's anti-globalization movement was born in 1998 at the occasion of the negotiation of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which aimed to facilitate international investment by ensuring that host governments treat foreign and domestic firms similarly (Graham, 2000). In the spring 1998, a draft agreement emerging from the negotiations that had been taking place in Paris since 1997 was leaked to the US-based consumer organization Public Citizen, which immediately denounced it as a threat to democracy and sovereignty, because it would limit the ability of national governments to regulate the protection of their culture, environment, natural resources and health, as well as to end the protection of their citizens from foreign investors. In France, the first to mobilize against the MAI were non-governmental, non-partisan associations, such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Help Citizens (ATTAC), created in the columns of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, and José Bové's *Confédération Paysanne*. They aggressively argued their case in the court of public opinion and garnered support from many famous personalities from the artistic world. They also successfully lobbied the Jospin government, which eventually chose to pull out of the negotiations. As a result, the negotiations were halted and the multilateral agreement eventually failed. Although the failure of the MAI resulted primarily from the lack of agreement between the negotiating parties, the catalytic role played by protesters in precipitating its failure was perceived as the first major success for France's anti-globalization movement.

Anti-globalization activists capitalized on the success of the anti-MAI mobilization, and started looking for further targets, several of which would come in 1999. In spring 1999, the WTO ruling that the EU's banana import regime was illegal, and that the United States could therefore implement retaliatory tariffs on EU exports, infuriated many in France, and gave further fodder to the anti-globalization groups, which saw this ruling as an unacceptable intrusion on French sovereignty in the name of protecting American corporate interests. For many in France, a ruling by an unelected multinational body that the United States could punish Europe because it chose to import its bananas from poor former colonies (who seemingly had nothing else to export) was an example of corporate power and economic liberalization run amok. The subsequent WTO ruling on hormone-treated beef in July 1999, which argued that the EU ban on hormone beef was protectionist since scientific evidence could not attest to any danger, further fueled this anti-American and anti-globalization resentment. In the midst of the mad-cow disease scare and other food crises in Europe, the Geneva judges' ruling struck

many in France as evidence of the potential dangers of the loss of national control in favor of international organizations brought about by globalization. As in the banana case, the WTO allowed the United States to retaliate against European products of their choice. The fact that the American retaliatory sanctions list included disproportionately French products — such as foie gras, Dijon mustard, and Roquefort cheese — helped to generate the public support that poured in when José Bové and the Confédération Paysanne attacked the Millau McDonald's as a symbol of the evils of globalization.

An important further step in the rise of globalization as a big political issue in France was the planned November 1999 WTO summit in Seattle, Washington. The meeting was supposed to launch the new round of multilateral trade negotiations, and, held in the home city of global exporters Microsoft, Boeing, and Starbucks, stand as a shining symbol of the successes of globalization and the free trade leadership of the United States. Many people in France — small farmers, union leaders, students and green activists, among others — united against globalization and denounced the 'democraticidal' nature of the WTO and the dangers of neo-liberal globalization (Meunier, 2000a). And in Seattle itself, of course, Bové with his Roquefort was an international media star, standing as a symbol of world opposition to globalization and France's leadership of the movement.

Since then, anti-globalization forces in France have turned into something quite original. Unlike some of their counterparts around the world who offer a radical critique of capitalism and globalization, the French have rebranded their denunciation of some, but not all, aspects of globalization as 'altermondialisation' (counter-globalization). The central difference lies in their rejection not of globalization *per se*, but the neo-liberal aspects of contemporary globalization. Economic neo-liberalism, embodied in institutions such as the WTO and the G8, is portrayed as the source of all evils, from war to pollution, from poverty to cultural harmonization. The only response to these evils is indeed globalization, albeit a globalization of a different nature — complete with global governance, global taxation of financial transactions, 'fair trade' and less stringent rules on intellectual property. The counter-globalization movement has now become a force to be reckoned with in French society, as was shown by the 2003 Larzac meeting and the export success story of ATTAC, with a French membership of more than 30,000 and now a presence in more than 30 countries worldwide. Yet it has so far has avoided turning into a political force of its own and has remained outside of the traditional party system, despite its broad appeal and publicity in French society — and despite its popular correlate, anti-Americanism. The French counter-globalization movement is ambivalent towards Europeanization, which it portrays alternatively as a Trojan Horse of neo-liberal globalization inside Europe or as the only meaningful rampart against its negative

consequences both at the domestic and the international levels — whether in matters of the environment, social standards, or even foreign policy.

Conclusion

Globalization and Europeanization are two phenomena with important potential political implications. In France, they have impacted the national political landscape with great strength in recent years. Even though the theme of globalization barely emerged as a topic of debate in the campaign for the 2002 presidential election, with the exception of the extremist parties, overt anti-globalization candidates obtained a remarkable score, almost half of the votes in the first round.¹⁵ And, logically then, the second round of the election pitched an anti-globalization, anti-globalization candidate (Le Pen) against a pro-Europeanization, timidly pro-globalization one (Chirac). Beyond the antics of José Bové and the countless intellectual publications criticizing globalization, this suggests that globalization has in itself become one of the central cleavages in French society.

By combining changes in power, preferences, and institutions, globalization not only transforms the nature of French politics but also provides in itself a new fault line in society: on one hand, an ‘outward-looking society’ made of those ready to benefit from the broader cultural horizons and consumption possibilities that globalization has to offer; on the other hand, an ‘inward-looking society,’ unable or unwilling to enjoy these while standing in the first row of those who suffer from its plagues: outsourcing, unemployment, pauperization, loss of identity (Perrineau, 2002). The transformation of the French political landscape from a predominantly Left/Right divide to an outward society/inward society division is still in its gestation period. The ambiguous link between globalization and Europeanization, in particular, remains to be clarified. The EU is seen by some as an agent of globalization, a Trojan horse of laissez-faire liberalism in the heart of Europe. As for the critiques of globalization, some nonetheless pin their hopes on the EU, which represents, above all, the possibility of a benign gatekeeper against the vagaries of globalization.

To be sure, the basic party structure of the Fifth Republic remains in place, and it is still broadly accurate to talk about ‘the Left’ (Socialists, Greens, Communists) and ‘the Right’ (liberals, Gaullists, extreme right). But globalization is helping to realign these movements and contributing to a mixing up of traditional political-ideological categories (Fougier, 2000). Where the debate about globalization is concerned, as was already the case in the debate about Europe in the early 1990s, the extremes on each side of the spectrum have more in common with each other than they do with the Center.

Now Communists, Greens, civic movements and the left-wing of the Socialists stand together with the National Front and some right-wing Gaullists in their staunch opposition to globalization, while mainstream Socialists, centrists, and moderate Gaullists all agree on the need to accept and manage it. Only a small element of liberals, backed by France's business community, enthusiastically embrace the free flow of goods, people, capital, and ideas associated with globalization and remain relaxed about its potential cultural or geopolitical implications.

Globalization has not only created a new cleavage, it is also transforming the way politics is being conducted in France. Particularly striking is the degree to which globalization has unleashed new forces — from vocal chief executives of privatized companies to activist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) — that are wielding more influence than ever before in a country where the state has traditionally played a dominant role. In particular, new forms of collective action have emerged, capitalizing on the popularity of the counter-globalization movement and stealing the spotlight from traditional parties. This is not without resemblance to the original characteristics of the 'écologiste' movement throughout the 1980s, which however evolved in the 1990s into a political force. Whether Bové and his followers will be able to continue to challenge traditional French politics while remaining outside of the traditional party system remains an unknown for the moment.

Notes

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Political Science Association's Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, August 28–31, 2003, at the conference 'The New Cleavages in France', Princeton University, October 10–12, 2003, and at the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 11–13, 2004. I thank Elizabeth Addonizio, Philip Cerny, Nicolas Jabko, Harold James and John Zysman for comments, as well as the participants to the Comparative Politics Workshop at Yale University and two anonymous reviewers.

2 Frédéric Lemaître, 'Aventis, Dassault: le malaise des politiques', *Le Monde*, 25 March 2004.

3 There is a lot of disagreement among scholars over the extent to which globalization is limiting national sovereignty and the ability of national governments to make autonomous policy choices. In the 1996 introduction to the collective volume *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*, Berger wrote: 'We find little support for the notion that internationalization of the economy reduces national states to passivity and impotence. The conclusions of a growing body of research on economic policymaking in advanced industrial countries reveal no compelling evidence of an across-the-board convergence' (Berger and Dore, 1996). Similarly, Goldthorpe (2002) argued that numerous, sophisticated studies do not bear out the extreme opinion, often heard in the media and from armchair social scientists that globalization is bound to destroy the fabric of social welfare states. 'The tax and social policies of national governments are not inevitably caught up in a 'race to the bottom'. An extended welfare state remains entirely possible and redistributive policies can still be successfully pursued, provided that there is adequate electoral support and that collective, including, of course, class interests have an effective means of expression'. Yet whether one believes that states are being forced to policy

convergence and their autonomy is being laminated by outside forces, or one finds they have greater resilience and capacity for adaptation, there is no denying that globalization challenges the power of states, either directly or indirectly.

- 4 Paul Meller, 'France gets a deadline on bailout', *The New York Times*, 18 September 2003.
- 5 Cécile Ducourtieux, 'La France s'ouvre de plus en plus aux fonds anglo-saxons', *Le Monde*, 29 July 2003.
- 6 John Tagliabue, 'Resisting the Ugly Americans: Contempt in France for US Funds and Investors', *New York Times*, January 9, 2000.
- 7 Goldthorpe (2002) discusses the literature making this argument, adding p. 13, that 'the grounds on which globalization theorists argue that the pervasiveness of economic insecurity now undermines the significance of class must be reckoned as tenuous.'
- 8 See 'L'Euroscepticisme se concentre aujourd'hui au RPF', *Le Monde*, May 10, 2000.
- 9 Communiqué de presse de Jean-Marie Le Pen, Candidat à la Présidence de la République, Saint-Cloud, le 23 avril 2002.
- 10 'Emmanuelli et Mélenchon unissent leurs forces', in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 28 September 2002.
- 11 Edouard Pflimlin, 'Les chantiers de la réforme', *Le Monde*, 23 October 2002.
- 12 See 'M. Raffarin investit les champs de réflexion de la gauche', *Le Monde*, 10 July 2003.
- 13 For the moment, the souverainistes are splintered. On the issue of enlargement, William Abitbol believes that it is undesirable for Europe to enlarge to the East because it would lead to political chaos and social crisis, whereas Charles Pasqua and Philippe de Villiers favor enlargement, which might temper any federalist push in Europe. The most urgent disagreement, however, is on political strategy. For Abitbol, the souverainistes should not integrate the UMP because in 2004 they would have to say 'no' to the European treaty creating the constitution, when Chirac and Raffarin will likely say 'yes'. For Abitbol, to create a souverainiste movement within the UMP would be 'like to create a pro-American current within Al Qaeda'. See Christiane Chombeau, 'Les souverainistes de droite à la recherche d'une organisation et de nouveaux adhérents', *Le Monde*, 3 November 2002. But other souverainistes, such as Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, have decided instead to integrate the UMP in order to reach out to the former RPF supporters and those who are skeptical of Europe.
- 14 An additional argument is sometimes made that globalization weakens citizens' attachment to national authority, leading to a decline in the legitimacy of central governments. This would be because between the greater exposure to foreign influences and the loss of autonomy and reduced margin of maneuver of national governments, individuals become citizens of the world more than citizens of their own country. As Berger notes, however, 'Contemporary politics in advanced industrial countries provides much evidence of a growing distrust of elected politicians. But there are no signs that the electorate's disillusionment about their representatives reflects a deeper detachment from national loyalties, let alone a transfer of political allegiance and identification to regional or international bodies. As pressures from the international economy intrude on domestic societies, citizens turn ever more urgently to their own governments for help.' (Berger, 2000, p. 58).
- 15 A total of 42.5% if one adds together the votes for Besancenot, Chevènement, Gluckstein, Hue, Laguiller, Le Pen, Mégret and Saint-Josse (48% if Mamère is included).

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