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In Response to Jurg Steiner's ‘Concept Stretching: The Case of Deliberation’

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Abstract

Steiner's principal objection to our paper is that deliberators in a committee are permitted to speak strategically whereas deliberative theory requires ‘that actors do not lie but are truthful and authentic in their statements’. In this response we observe that such a prescription is relevant only to the extent that individuals might be expected to behave otherwise. Our paper explores conditions under which deliberators' strategic (descriptive) incentives are aligned with the (prescriptive) advice to tell the truth.

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Notes

  1. See also Coughlan (2000).

  2. Steiner does not offer any distinction between ‘truthful’ and ‘authentic’, but supposing there is a distinction raises a question: if deliberators have to choose between truth and authenticity, how should they choose? This might be particularly problematic if deliberators are indeed required to be both.

References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Managerial and Economic Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, 60201, IL, USA

    David Austen-Smith & Timothy J Feddersen

Authors
  1. David Austen-Smith
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  2. Timothy J Feddersen
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Austen-Smith, D., Feddersen, T. In Response to Jurg Steiner's ‘Concept Stretching: The Case of Deliberation’. Eur Polit Sci 7, 191–193 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210187

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210187

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