Abstract
There are a number of factors particular to each conflict that can greatly affect the chances that peacekeepers will be able to help find permanent peace. They include the conflict’s history, what kind of peace there is to keep, how that peace was negotiated, and the intentions and good faith of the parties. Mozambique and Angola differed significantly in all of these conflict-specific factors, even though both countries obtained their independence from Portugal at the same time and in much the same way. The differences in local actors, internal resources, and external forces all contributed to making the peace agreements to end their civil wars very different and, in the case of Angola, far more difficult to implement than in Mozambique.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Minter, W. Apartheid’s Contras, London: Zed Books, 1994, p. 89.
Birmingham, D. Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique, James Curry: London, 1992, p. 41.
Anstee M. manuscript, chapter two, p. 12.
Lodico, Y. draft of “A Peace That Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola,” in Durch, W. Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 5.
Newitt, M. A History of Mozambique, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995, p. 523.
Hoile, D. Mozambique—A Nation in Crisis, Claridge Press, London, 1989, p. 11.
The problem of the ideological bias of the writer is frequently encountered. Questions such as who was responsible for Mondlane’s and Machel’s deaths, the extent of FRELIMO’s military operations and success before independence, the strength of rival independence groups, the degree of Rhodesian and South African responsibility for the creation and continued existence of RENAMO, the amount of Malawian, American, and other outside support for RENAMO, and the motivation and depth of its political support among the Mozambican people are all treated remarkably differently. Reports of events seem to depend mainly on the prejudices of the writer, which are so pervasive that the even-handed and objective observer appears to be the exception.
Isaacman, A. Mozambique-From Colonialism to Revolution, Westview Press, 1983, p. 106.
Lodico, Y., op. cit., p. 6.
Human Rights Watch, “Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections,” Washington, 1994.
Edis, R. “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process: An Insider’s View,” unpublished paper, February 1995, p. 1
Barnes, S. “Humanitarian Assistance as a Factor in the Mozambican Peace Negotiations: 1990–1992,” unpublished paper, January 1996, p. 2.
Birmingham, D., op. cit., p. 68.
Flower, K. Serving Secretly, London: John Murray, 1987, p. 262.
United Nations, The UN and Mozambique, 1992–1995, Blue Books Series, Vol. V, New York: UN, 1995, p. 10.
Williams, A. “In Search of Peace: Negotiations and the Angolan Civil War,” Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Washington: Georgetown University, 1993, p. 9.
Cleary, S. “Angola—Prospects for Peace,” South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1997, p. 314.
Copyright information
© 1999 Dennis C. Jett
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Jett, D.C. (1999). Similar Histories, Different Outcomes. In: Why Peacekeeping Fails. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780312292744_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780312292744_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-0-312-23942-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-312-29274-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)