Suez: the Debate

Abstract

The Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal in November 1956 resulted in an open break between the United States and its major European allies. The American response was swift and severe: the United States immediately condemned the invasion in the United Nations, speculated against the pound (thus threatening Britain with severe economic distress) and prevented Britain from withdrawing money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Britain was entitled to withdraw the money and an injection from IMF would have shored up the declining value of the pound. In addition, the United States withheld oil from Europe until Britain and France agreed to withdraw their military forces. The United States was able to do that because Egypt had blockaded the Suez Canal and other Arab nations had blown up the oil pipelines; thus the only oil available to Europe was from the western hemisphere which was controlled by the United States. President Eisenhower, however, did not think the British had been chastened enough and effectively forced the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, out of office. The American ambassador to London, Winthrop Aldrich, described Eisenhower as ‘vitriolic’ and ‘unstatesmanlike’. Why did the United States adopt such severe measures against its closest ally?