Abstract
The reappraisal, concentrated over the past twenty years, of big business’s relationship to the Holocaust — or more generally business’s responsibility for the consequences of National Socialism — is one of the most vibrant and controversial areas of modern historiography. The reassessment itself, as well as some of the preconditions that spawned it, have profound implications for our attitudes about business, the Third Reich and, for that matter, our general views about modern history. Discussions of business’s relationship to or responsibility for genocide go well beyond questions about the profits that were earned from slave labourers and the extermination of millions of Jews and other ‘unwanted’ groups. They also involve the larger question of how sober and austere leaders of a civilized community like pre-Nazi Germany could accept — some would argue were seduced by — and work with representatives of a movement that not only thrived on the basest of human inclinations, but also very often espoused views, as Hitler did, that were antithetical to modern capitalist institutions and the material interests of big business. A proper study of business and the Third Reich should begin with the structure of German business, the attitudes of businessmen prior to Hitler’s coming to power and their relationship to the Weimar government, and end with business’s post-war reaction to the Nazi experience.
A grave economic system of decay was the slow disappearance of the right of private property, and the gradual transference of the entire economy to the ownership of stock companies … labour had sunk to the level of an object of speculation for unscrupulous Jewish businessmen.
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kainpf
In economic terms, Fascism and National Socialism were advantaged by their theoretical opportunism and purely instrumental and decisionist approaches to economic problems. They were anti-capitalist enough to be threatening to private enterprise and property but flexible enough to take advantage of the efficiencies of capitalist enterprises in the mobilization of societies.
Gerald Feldman, ‘The Economic Origins of European Fascism’
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Notes
See H. James and J. Tanner, eds., Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) for a comprehensive collection of articles on business in occupied and fascist countries. Several studies have laid to rest the notion that Austrians in business and other spheres of activity were Hitler’s first victims. See, for example, D. Stiefel, ed., Die politische Okonomie des Holocaust: Zur Wirtschaftlichen Logik von Verfolgung und ‘Wiedergutmachung’ (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2001).
P. Hayes, ‘Industry under the Swastika’. in Enterprise in the l’eriod of Fascism in Europe, eds. James and Tanner, p. 26.
See B. Eggenberger, M. Rappl and A. Reichel, ‘Der Bestand Reichswirtsministerium im Zentrum fur die Aufbewahrung historisch-dokumentarischer Sammulungen (Sonderarchiv) in Moskau’. Zeitschrift fur Unternehmensgeschichte 2 (1998), 227–36 and G. Aly and S. Heim, Das Staatsarchiv Zentrale in Moskau (Sonderarchiv): Rekonstruction und Bestandsverzeichnis veschollen geglaubten Schriftgutes aus der NS-Zeit (Diisseldorf: HansBockler Stiftung, 1993).
See P. Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 612–20 for a multifaceted, though not dispassionate, account of the so-called Abraham Affair and its relationship to historical scholarship. Novick was on Abraham’s PhD committee at the University of Chicago and identifies himself as a friend. Leaving aside the personal attacks on the participants, one of the main issues for both sides was the importance of interpretation versus facts in historical writing. For many of Abraham’s supporters, the overall interest of his argument — his revival of the Marxist argument that the contradictions in the Weimar economic system became so overwhelming that big business had to turn to authoritarian government — overrode whatever errors of fact, intentional or unintentional, he made. This structuralist interpretation of the behaviour of some of Germany’s elite and the demise of Weimar was deemed to be interesting and worthy of historical intention, even though no direct link between big business and the Nazis has been found. For Abraham’s critics, the ‘facts’ are an indispensable part of good historical interpretation; without them (that is, a body of information whose substantial correctness can be verified by other historians) one is, in a sense, not writing history at all.
Some writers have argued that attempts by companies to avoid government rules were a form of resistance or, at least, passive resistance. Examples of businessmen who used their offices for anything that resembled resistance are very rare. See J. Scholtyseck, Robert Bosch and der liberale Widerstand gegen Hitler 1933–1945 (Munich: Beck, 1999).
This interpretation of business and National Socialism runs through the Office of Military Government of the United States (OMGUS) reports, which were put together shortly after the war by the US authorities. These analyses of several sectors were published and included a lot of useful information, but also many conclusions that did not follow from the data presented. They, like the proceedings of the Nuremberg Trials, were the basis of several post-war books about business and focused on the anti-competitive practices of German companies, as defined by American standards, and business complicity with slave labour and war production. See also J. Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben (New York: Free Press, 1978). His subtitle is indicative: The Unholy Alliance of Adolf Hitler and Germany’s Great Chemical Combine. For Borkin, business’s camouflaging of foreign companies and other activities were done for the good of the Nazi state and business’s own pecuniary interests, which were virtually one and the same.
See E. Hennig, ‘Materialien zur Diskussion der Monopolgruppentheorie’. Neue Politische Literatur, 18 (1973), 170–93.
C. Bettelheim, L’Economie allemande sous le Nazisme: Un aspect de la decadence du capitalisme (Paris, 1946), p. 273.
R. Wagenfuhr, Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1954); D. Eichholtz, ‘Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1933–1945’ (unpublished dissertation, Humboldt University, 1968); H.E. Volkmann, ‘Zum Verhältnis von Grol3wirtschaft und NS-Regime im Zweiten Weltkrieg’. in K.D. Bracher, M. Funke and H.-A. Jacobsen (eds), Nationalsozialistische Diktatur 1933–1945, Eine Bilanz (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fiir politische Bildung, 1986), pp. 480–508.
M. Broszat, DerStaatHitlers, 11th edition (Munich: dtv, 1986), p. 218.
In English, K.D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship, trans. Jean Steinberg (New York: Praeger, 1971). Bracher’s index contains no references to business, big business, industry or commerce. IG Farben, for example, is mentioned just three times, and then only in passing.
K.D. Bracher, Die deutsche Diktatur, Entstehung, Strukturen, Folgen des Nationalsozialismus, 2nd edition (Cologne: Ullstein, 1969).
See also Kershaw’s summary of Ernst Nolte’s views. I. Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), pp. 26–7, 44. Kershaw’s chapter, ‘Politics and Economics in the Nazi State’. provides a very useful discussion of the different perspectives on business’s role in the new political order.
W. Carr, Arms, Autarky, and Aggre.ssion, 2nd edition (London: Edward Arnold, 1979).
K. Hildebrand, Das Dritte Reich, 3rd edition (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1987), p. 45.
Although part of the Institute for Social Research’s overall analysis of fascism, Neumann alienated some of his colleagues at the Institute for his lack of interest in psychology and over-reliance, in their view, on legal institutions. He shared with his colleagues the view that capitalism and fascism were related, but they had differences as to what that relationship was. The attitudes of the members of the Institute were perhaps best summed up by Max Horkheimer’s pithy, but vague, aphorism, which became a popular rallying cry: ‘[H]e who does not wish to speak of capitalism should also be silent about fascism.’ Behemoth was one of the first works to outline the institutional arrangements in Nazi Germany and remains a classic. F. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and l’ractice of National Socialism (New York: Harper and Row, 1963, first published 1942).
R. Grunberger, The 12-Year Reich: A Social History of Nazi Germany, 1933–1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 167–84.
T. Mason, ‘The Primacy of Politics’. in Nazism, Fascism, and the Working Class: Essays by Tim Mason, ed. J. Caplan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 53.
R. Erbe, Nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftspolitik, quoted in A. Barkai, Nazi Economics, Ideology, Theory and Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 6.
H.A. Turner Jr, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 349.
P. Hayes, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
C. Kopper, Zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Dirigismus. Bankenpolitik im ‘Dritten Reich’ (Bonn: Bouvier, 1995); G. Feldman, Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); H. James, The Deutsche Bank (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995).
Foreign exchange transactions are an excellent illustration. Building on controls already in place when they came to power, Nazi officials created a system of foreign exchange subsidies for international firms to offset the impact of an overvalued Reichsmark. Satisfying the documentary and political demands of the bureaucracy on a transaction-by-transaction basis became a complicated business necessity for firms, which ordinarily would have little desire to placate thuggish bureaucrats. This control gave the government added leverage in all sorts of company planning, which helps to explain the passivity of business shortly before and after the Nazi takeover. See, for example, C. Kobrak, ‘The Foreign-exchange Dimension of Corporate Control in the Third Reich’. Contemporary European History, 12 (2003), 33–46.
Some authors have argued that there was little factionalism among German industrial sectors. This may have been due to the structure of German industry, which left few clear winners and losers from biting the political hand that was feeding them. See discussion in P. Hayes’ response to V. Berghahn, ‘Industrial Factionalism in Modern German History’. Central European History, 24 (1991). See also G. Stolper, The German Economy (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1967); H. James, The German Slump (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); and C. Kobrak, National Cultures and International Comperition: The Experience of Schering AG, 1851–1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
P. Hayes and I. Wojak, eds., ‘Arisierung’ im Nationalsozialismus. Volksgemeinschaft, Raub und Gedachtnis (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2000).
S. Friedländer, Das Dritte Reich und die Juden: die Jahre der Verfolgung 1933–1939 (Munich: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998).
D. Ziegler, ‘Die Verdrangung der Juden aus der Dresdner Bank 1933–1938’. Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 47 (1999), 187–216.
B. Lorenz, ‘Die Commerzbank und die “Arisierungen” im Altreich’. Vierteljahrshefte fiirZeitgeschichte, 50 (2002), 237–69.
L. Herbst, ‘Das nationalsozialistische Herrschaftssystem als Vergleichsgegenstand und der Ansatz der Totalitarismustheorien’. in Totalitarismus: Sechs Vortrage iiber Gehalt und Reichweite eines klassischen Konzepts der Diktaturforschung, ed. K.-D. Henke (Dresden: Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung, 1999), p. 267f.
H. James, Verbandspolitik im Nationalsozialismus. Von der Interessenvertretung zur Wirtschaftsgruppe. Der Centralverband des Deutschen Bank- und Bankiersgewerbes 1932–1945 (Munich: Piper, 2001).
See G. Feldman, ‘German Private Insurers and the Politics of the Four Year Plan’. Gesellschaft fiir Unternehmensgeschichte, Arbeitskreis Unternehmen im Nationalsozialismus, Working Papers, no. 4 (1998).
R. Billstein, K. Fings, A. Kugler and N. Levis, Working for the Enemy: Ford General Motors and Forced Labor in Germany during the Second World War (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000).
N. Levis, Preface to Working for the Enemy. Levis mixes some detail about what Opel ostensibly did with general statements about what all companies did, with few footnotes to substantiate the claims.
One of the most notorious of the popular books about foreign business in Germany is E. Black, IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance between Nazi Germany and America’s MostPowerful Corporation (New York: Little, Brown, 2001). The misstatements in the title are sufficient for understanding the bias that runs through the book. Black presents no evidence that there was a strategic alliance between IBM and Nazi Germany in any meaningful sense of the expression, and IBM was nowhere near the most powerful company in America at the time. If it held this position, whatever ‘powerful’ means in this context, it might have been so considered for a few years in the 1970s or early 1980s.
R. Overy, Foreword to Doing Business with the Nazis (London: Frank Cass, 2000).
See T. Bower, Nazi Gold (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
L. Straumann and D. Wildmann, Schweitzer Chemieuntemehmen im ‘Dritten Reich’ (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 2001).
Some of the early attempts to address these issues were made by P. Erker and T. Pierenkemper, eds., Deutsche Unternehmer zwischen Kriegswirtschaft und Wiederaufbau: Studien zur Erfahnrngsbildung von Industrie-Eliten (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998) and A. Gehrig, Nationalsozialistische Rustungspolitik und untemehmenerischer Entscheidungsspielraum (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996).
D. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich: Der nationalsozialistische Vierjahresplan (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1968).
See R. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); idem, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 1932–1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and idem, ‘The Four-Year Plan’. European Yearbook for Business History, 3 (2000), 87–106.
Ibid., 103. In the beginning, industry saw potential profits from armaments. See L. Gall, ed., Krupp im 20. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Siedler, 2002).
Overy’s views were confirmed by Lutz BudraQ, who traced this development in the aviation industry, especially for production of Junker aircraft. The altered agenda was reflected in the change in the means of cooperation between companies and the government in other branches and highlighted by the development of state enterprises. L. Budra13, Flugzeugindustrie und Luftriistung in Deutschland 1918–1945 (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1998).
M. Pohl, in cooperation with A. Schneider, VIAG-Aktiengesellschaft 1923–1998: Vom Staatsuntemehmen zum internationalen Konzern (Munich: Piper, 1998).
A. Schneider, ‘State-owned Enterprises: Hitler’s Willing Servants? The Decisionmaking Structures of VIAG and RKA’. European Yearbook of Business History, 3 (2000), 107–24 and A. Schneider, ‘Die Vereinigte Industrieunternehmungen AG (VIAG) und der Vierjahresplan’. in Arbeitskreis ‘Untemehmen im Nationalsozialismus’. ed. G.D. Feldman (Frankfurt am Main: GUG, 1999).
R.-D. Muller, Der Manager der Kriegswirtschaft. Hans Kehrl: Ein Unternehmer in der Politik des Dritten Reiches (Essen: Klartext-Verlag, 1999).
P. Hayes, ‘Die I.G. Farbenindustrie’. in Unternehmen im Nationalsozialismus, ed. L. Gall and M. Pohl (Munich: Beck, 1998), pp. 107–16.
U. Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, Politik und Praxis des ‘Ausländer-Einsatzes’ in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches (Bonn: Dietz, 1985).
B. Vogel, ed., System der Willkür: betriebliche Repression und nationalsozialistische Verfolgung am Rammelsberg und in der Region Braunschweig (Goslar: Verlag Goslarsche Zeitung, 2002); T. Urban, Uberleben und Sterben von Zwangsarbeitern im Ruhrbergbau (Munster: Ardey-Verlag, 2002); T. Kraus and P. Thomes, eds., Zwangsarbeit in der Stadt Aachen: Ausldndereinsatz in einer westdeutschen Grenzstadt wahrend des zweiten Weltkrieges (Aachen: Mayer, 2002); Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Archivarinnen und Archivare im Erftkreis, eds., Gezwungenerma/3en: Zwangsarbeit in der Region Rhein-Erft-Rur (Bergheim/Erft: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Archivarinnen und Archivare im Erftkreis, 2002); H.-J. Kuhne, Kriegsbeute Arbeit: der ‘Fremdarbeitereinsatz’ in der Bielefelder Wirtschaft 1939–1945 (Bielefeld/Gutersloh: Verlag fur Regionalgeschichte, 2002); C. Seichter, Zwangsarbeit in Ostwestfalen und Lippe 1939–1945: Stand der Forschung, Spurensuche vor Ort, Umsetzung im Unterricht (Essen: Klartext, 2002); S. Held and T. Fickenwirth, Fremd- und Zwangsarbeiter im Raum Leipzig 1939–1945: archivalisches Spezialinventar und historische Einblicke (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitats-Verlag, 2002); W. Reininghaus, ed., Zwangsarbeit in Deutschland 1939–1945: Archiv- und Sammlungsgut, Topographie und Erschlief3ungsstrategien (Bielefeld: Verlag fiir Regionalgeschichte, 2001); W. Meyer, ed., Zwangsarbeit wdhrend der NS-Zeit in Berlin und Brandenburg: Formen, Funktion, Rezeption (Potsdam: Verlag fur Berlin-Brandenburg, 2001); F. Baranowski, Die verdrangte Vergangenheit: Rustungsproduktion und Zwangsarbeit in Nordthuringen (Duderstadt: Mecke, 2000); U. Jungbluth, Wunderwaffen im KZ ‘Rebstock’: Zwangsarbeit in den Lagern ‘Rebstock’ in Dernau/Rheinland-Pfalz und Artem/Thuringen im Dienste der V-Waffen (Breidel/Mosel: Rhein-Mosel-Verlag, 2000); J. Anschutz and I. Heike, Feinde im eigenen Land: Zwangsarbeit in Hannover im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 2nd edition (Bielefeld: Verlag fiir Regionalgeschichte, 2000); B.C. Wagner, IG Auschwitz: Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung von Haftlingen des Lagers Monowitz 1941–1945 (Munich: Saur, 2000); F.-U. Betz, Zwangsarbeit in Schwetzingen: Lager fiir auslandische Arbeiter zur Zeit des NS-Regimes (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlaggesellschaft, 1998). A sample of literature before 1998 is presented by Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, p. 529, n. 12.
M. Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, Ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und Haftlinge im Deutschen Reich und im besetzten Europa 1939–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001). W. Gruner, Zwangsarbeit und Verfolgung: Osterreichische Juden im NS-Staat, 1938–45 (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2000); S. Posta, Tschechische ‘Fremdarbeiter’ in der nationalsozialistischen Kriegswirtschaft (Dresden: Hannah-Arendt-Institut fur Totalitarismusforschung, 2002).
H. Mommsen with M. Grieger, Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf: ECON, 1996) and H. Mommsen, ‘Erfahrungen mit der Geschichte der Volkswagen GmbH im Dritten Reich’. in L. Gall and M. Pohl, eds., Untemehmen im Nationalsozialismus (Munich: Beck Verlag, 1998), 45–72. A newer and detailed study, albeit local and limited, is offered by A. Heusler, Auslandereinsatz. Zwangsarbeiter fur die Munchner Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945 (Munich: Hugendubel, 1996); R. Peter, Rustungspolitik in Baden. Kriegswirtschaft und Arbeitseinsatz in einer Grenzregion im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995).
See, for example, M. Sturmer, G. Teichmann and W. Treue, Wagen und Wagen, Sal. Oppenheim jr. u. Cie. Geschichte einer Bank und einer Familie, 3rd edition (Munich: Piper, 1994); M. Wolf, Im Zeichen von Sonne und Monde. Von der Frankfurter Munzscheidereizum Weltunternehmen Degussa AG (Frankfurt am Main: Degussa, 1993); L. Gall, G. Feldman, H. James, C.-L. Holtfrerich and H. Buschgen, Die Deutsche Bank, 1870–1995 (Munich: Beck, 1995); W. Feldenkirchen, Siemens. Von der Werkstatt zum Weltunternehmen (Munich: Piper, 1997).
K. Hildebrand, ‘Die Deutsche Reichsbahn 1933–1945’. in Unternehmen im Nationalsozialismus, pp. 73–90, and K. Hildebrand, ‘Die Deutsche Reichsbahn in der nationalsozialistischen Diktatur 1933–1945’. in Die Eisenbahn in Deutschland. Von den Anfangen bis zur Gegenwart, ed. L. Gall and M. Pohl (Munich: Beck, 1999). Hildebrand’s point was their sense of bureaucratic duty (Beamtenpflicht), which served as a protective shield (Schutzschild) against acknowledging the cruelty of their actions.
Hamburger Stiftung fur Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed., Das Daimler-Benz Buch. Ein Riistungskonzem im ‘Tausendjahrigen Reich’ (NOrdlingen: Greno, 1988); H. Pohl, S. Habeth, B. Weitz and B. Bruninghaus, Die Daimler-Benz-AG in den Jahren 1933 bis 1945 (Stuttgart: Franz-Steiner-Verlag, 1986); B. Hopmann, M. Spoerer, B. Weitz and B. Bruninghaus, Zwangsarbeit bei Daimler-Benz (Stuttgart: Franz-SteinerVerlag, 1994); and N. Gregor, Stern und Hakenkreuz: Daimler-Benz im Dritten Reich (Berlin: Propylaen, 1997).
English translation: N. Gregor, Daimler-Benz in the Third Reich (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
C. Ruch, M. Rais-Liechti and R. Peter, Geschafte und Zwangsarbeit: Schweizer Industrieuntemehmen im ‘Dritten Reich’ (Zurich: Chronos, 2001); L. Straumann and D. Wildmann, Schweizer Chemieunternehmen im ‘Dritten Reich’ (Zurich: Chronos, 2001); M. Konig, Interhandel. Die schweizerische Holding der IG Farben und ihre Metamorphosen — eine Affare um Eigentum und Interessen (1910–1999) (Zurich: Chronos, 2001).
C. Ruch, M. Rais-Liechti and Roland Peter, Geschafte und Zwangsarbeit: Schweizer Industrieunternehmen im ‘Dritten Reich’ (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 2001).
L. BudraB, Flugzeugindustrie und Luftrustung in Deutschland 1918–1945 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998); M. Pohl, Philipp Holzmann: Geschichte eines Bauunternehmens, 1849–1999 (Munich: Beck, 1999); M. Pohl, Die Strabag 1923 bis 1998 (Munich: Piper, 1998).
W. Naasner, SS-Wirtschaft und SS-Verwaltung: Das SS-Wirtschaftsverwaltungsamt und die unter seiner Dienstaufsicht stehenden wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1988).
M.T. Allen, Preface to The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
J. Steinberg, Die Deutsche Bank und ihre Goldtransaktionen während desZweitenWeltkrieges (Munich: Beck, 1999). Dresdner Bank also commissioned a study of its gold transactions: J. Bähr, Der Goldhandel derDresdner Bank im ZweitenWeltkrieg (Leipzig: Gustav Keipenheuer Verlag, 1999). Some new studies have tackled the controversial area of armament production. Gregor Schollgen’s study of Diehl is very reserved in its findings, but lacks evidence and references: Ein Familienunternehmen in Deutschland 1902–2002 (Berlin: Propylaen, 2002).
S.J. Wiesen, West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2001), p. 5.
See P. Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000).
L. Gall, ‘A Man for All Seasons? Hermann Josef Abs im Dritten Reich’. Zeitschrift ftir Gesellschaft, 43, 2 (1998), 123–75. Gall argued that Abs acted in an economically rational way without any ideological sympathy with Nazism and that he helped some Jews.
A. Ritschl, ‘Die NS-Wirtschaftsideologie — Modemisierungsprogramm oder reaktionare Utopie?’. in Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, ed. M. Prinz and R. Zitelmann (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), pp. 48–70. See also Allen, ‘Introduction’. and Kobrak, ‘Politics, Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of German Managerial Innovation’. Enterprise and Society, 3 (2002), 429–61.
See, for example, W. Abeishauser, ‘Die NS-Kriegswirtschaft und das westdeutsche Wirtschaftswunder nach 1945’. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 47 (1999), 503–38.
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Kobrak, C., Schneider, A.H. (2004). Big Business and the Third Reich: An Appraisal of the Historical Arguments. In: Stone, D. (eds) The Historiography of the Holocaust. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230524507_8
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