

Erratum

In Nigel J.T. Thomas' book review on *Consciousness, Color, and Content* by Michael Tye, published in *Minds and Machines* 13, pp. 449–452, part of the text is missing on page 451. The second full paragraph on this page, beginning with “But if phenomenal experiences . . .”, should read:

But if phenomenal experiences are to be explained in terms of mental representations, and if (as Tye, with the mainstream of cognitive science, assumes) mental representations are (token) identical to brain states, which are, of course, physical states, then, as a form of mind-brain identity theory, Tye's representationalism faces the notorious “hard problem” or “explanatory gap”, vividly presented by authors such as Chalmers (1996) and Levine (1983). Tye himself sums up the issue neatly in a conditional statement:

if experiences are indeed fully physical, in the traditional sense (. . .), then an explanation is needed, but has not yet been found, for why the relevant physical states and qualities feel on the inside as they do. (p. 23)

The quest for that elusive explanation has so far defeated the best efforts of philosophers and cognitive scientists. Some are still hopefully seeking, but their efforts look increasingly quixotic; others, such as McGinn (1991) argue that the explanation may be forever beyond our reach; yet others, such as Chalmers, think that the quest has failed because the antecedent of the conditional is false, because experiences are *not* “fully physical, in the traditional sense”. In chapter 2, “The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion,” Tye argues that they are all barking up the wrong tree. The conditional statement itself is false. Experiences are brain states, but no explanation of how such states can have an “inside feel” is necessary.

