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The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?

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Abstract

The Public Interest Theory of regulation explains, in general terms, that regulation seeks the protection and benefit of the public at large. This paper argues that possibly the Public Interest Theory does not exist as such for reasons that will be discussed later. In addition, the paper contends that the Stigler's and Posner's characterisation of the Public Interest Theory has similarities with the welfare economics rationale for regulation. Nevertheless, the similarities do not prove or deny a connection between both the concepts of public interest and the welfare economics rationale for regulation.

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  1. Centre for Competition and Regulation, University of East Anglia, Norwich, Norfolk, NR4 7TJ, UK

    Michael Hantke-Domas

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Hantke-Domas, M. The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?. European Journal of Law and Economics 15, 165–194 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021814416688

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