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Majority Support for Progressive Income Taxation with Corner Preferences

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Abstract

This paper studies voting over quadratic taxation when incomeis fixed and taxation non distortionary. The set of feasibletaxes is compact and self-interested voters have cornerpreferences. We first show that, if a majority winning taxpolicy exists, it involves maximum progressivity. We then givea necessary and sufficient condition on the incomedistribution for a majority winner to exist. This conditionappears to be satisfied for a large class of distributionfunctions.

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De Donder, P., Hindriks, J. Majority Support for Progressive Income Taxation with Corner Preferences. Public Choice 118, 437–449 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000019907.16784.cb

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000019907.16784.cb

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