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Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721, USA

    David J. Chalmers

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Chalmers, D.J. Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics. Philosophical Studies 118, 153–226 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019546.17135.e0

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