Skip to main content
Log in

Public Members on Medical Licensing Boards and the Choice of Entry Barriers

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of medical and consumerinterests on the choice of physician licensing requirements inthe United States. Using data on licensing requirements in thefifty states between 1986 and 1993, we find that, in general,public members on licensing boards are associated withlicensing requirements that have educational justification. Incontrast, medical interests, measured in terms of licensingboard independence and campaign contributions by medicalassociations, are associated with licensing requirements thatare more difficult to justify with educational criteria.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Akerlof, G.A. (1970). The market for 'lemons': Quality uncertainty and the market mechanisms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488-500.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, K.J. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 53: 941-973.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G.S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371-400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States (1986a). The exchange, Section 1: Flex and M.D. Licensing requirements.

  • Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States (1986b). The exchange, Section 3: Physician licensing boards and physician discipline.

  • Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States (1989a). The exchange 1989-1990: Section 1, FLEX and M.D. Licensing requirements.

  • Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States (1989b). The exchange 1989-1990: Section 3, Physician licensing boards and physician discipline.

  • Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States (1991). The exchange 1992-1993: Section 1, FLEX and M.D. Licensing requirements.

  • Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States (1992). The exchange 1992-1993: Section 3, Physician licensing boards and physician discipline.

  • Friedman, M. and Friedman, R.D. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gormley, W.T. (1989). Taming the bureaucracy. Muscles, prayers, and other strategies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Howard, R. (1998). Wealth, power and attorney regulation in the U.S. States: License entry and maintenance requirements. Publius 28.

  • Hyams, A.L. and Dyll, L.M. (1991). Professional practice: Licensure and discipline. In: American College of Legal Medicine (Ed.), Legal medicine: Legal dynamics of medical encounters. St. Louis etc.: Mosby Year Book, 2nd edition.

  • Kleiner, M.M. (2000). Occupational licensing. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 189-202.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leffler, K.B. (1978). Physician licensure: Competition and monopoly in American medicine. Journal of Law and Economics 21: 165-186.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCubbins, M.D. and Schwartz, T. (1984). Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. American Journal of Political Science 2: 165-179.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19: 211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman, S. (1989). The economic theory of regulation after a decade of deregulation. Brookings Papers: Microeconomics pp. 1-41.

  • PoliticalMoneyLine (2001). FECInfo. Accessed at http://www.tray.com/FECInfo/, February 27, 2001.

  • Roemer, M.I. (1986). An introduction to the U.S. health care system. New York: Springer, 2nd edition.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stewart, J. and Thomas, C.D. (1996). Regulating occupations. In: K.J. Meier and E.T. Garman (Eds.), Regulation and consumer protection, 41-72. Houston, TX: Dame.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G.J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2: 3-21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Svorny, S. and Toma, E.F. (1998). Entry barriers and medical board funding autonomy. Public Choice 97: 93-106.

    Google Scholar 

  • United States (1990). Statistical abstract of the United States, 1990: the national data book. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 110th edition.

    Google Scholar 

  • United States (1993). Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993: the national data book. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 113th edition.

    Google Scholar 

  • United States (1996). Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 116th edition.

    Google Scholar 

  • United States Census Bureau (2001). Historical income tables - households http://www.. census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h08.html. Accessed: November 2001.

  • Weingast, B.R. (1980). Physicians, DNA research scientists, and the market for lemons. In: R.D. Blair and S. Rubin (Eds.), Regulating the professions: A public-policy symposium, 81-96. Lexington, MA, Toronto: Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, J.Q. (1980). The politics of regulation. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Broscheid, A., Teske, P.E. Public Members on Medical Licensing Boards and the Choice of Entry Barriers. Public Choice 114, 445–459 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022651002775

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022651002775

Keywords

Navigation