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Simulating the Effect of Regulatory Systems in a Fishery, An Application to the French Driftnet Albacore Fleet

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Abstract

With a thin economic component, most bio-economic models of fisheries failto assess the effects of the regulation systems on firms. In order to analysethe short term consequences of different management schemes, a simulationmodel is applied to the French driftnet albacore fleet: licence allocation withdriftnet regulation, individual quotas, and individual transferable quotaswithout any input control. Vessel technology is estimated by using the datacollected, and groups of vessels are distinguished according to criteria ofperformance. We present the adjustment within firms and between groupsunder different scenarios (limited entry with and without driftnetregulation, individual quotas and individual transferable quotas allocation),and we compare their results in terms of quasi-rent value and otherindicators such as hake harvests or dolphin by-catches.

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  1. IFREMER (Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer), Service déconomie maritime, B.P. 70, 29280, Plouzané, France

    Olivier Guyader

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Guyader, O. Simulating the Effect of Regulatory Systems in a Fishery, An Application to the French Driftnet Albacore Fleet. Environmental and Resource Economics 23, 1–28 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020273001099

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