Abstract
Legislators have been using audit and financial crises as excuses to introduce additional regulation into an industry that is already over-regulated. This practice is questioned here because of the ability of the free market to punish audit failures, the dynamism shown by participants in relation to the voluntary adoption of new self-regulatory policies and the high costs and dubious effectiveness of the new regulations adopted. A more prudent approach that would give the market time to discover the efficient mix of services, quality safeguards and firm structures is advised. Current regulatory tendencies, the main element of which is mandatory auditing, risk condemning financial auditing to triviality and increasingly ineffective regulation.
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Arruñada, B. Audit Failure and the Crisis of Auditing. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 5, 635–643 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752904006354
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752904006354