Global feminisms: a mega social analysis of confidence in women’s organisations in Europe and the MENA Region

This article aims at defining the concept of global feminisms within the framework of a mega-sociology of emotions that allows us to compare people’s confidence towards women's organisations in two different geo-cultural regions: Europe and the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), based on data collected by the World Values Survey (WVS) in the 6th edition 2010–14. From a discriminatory analysis, the article concludes that people's identifications with women's organisations are related to: (i) their fundamental conceptions of the social relationships between men and women and their conception of social change (emancipation, equality and sexual freedom); (ii) their identification towards other social organisations; and (iii) their sex-gender, social position, income and religious practice. The comparison of these gender cosmologies displays similarities and differences that could be useful instruments for those involved in transformative identity policies and programmes in both regions.


Introduction
This study present a mega-sociological proposal that tries to explore how audiences from two cultural region articulate confidence in women's organisations. Women's organisations are organisations run and/or led by women and/or with strong women's representation. They are plural, as feminisms are also plural (Butler 1993;Weird 2008;Moghadam 1997;Hekmans and Stacey 2008;Haddad 2010;Chafiq 2011;Ali 2012;Ewing and Marx Ferreee 2013;Eltawy 2015;Orloff and Evren 2016;Yaqub and Quawas 2017). Some could be considered or consider themselves women's rights organisations or feminist organisations which are women's organisations whose main objective is to advance women's and girls' rights, gender equality and/or feminist objectives and values (some of them may work too for non-binary/LGTBQI + + rights) (Tomas and Ferreras 2018; Ewig and Ferree 2013, p. 424), some are secular and some are religious or faith-based. Some authors propose to classify women organisations in a seven-fold typology: service organisations, professional associations, development research centres and women's studies institutes, women's rights organisations, development and women in development Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), women organisations affiliated to political parties, and grassroots women's organisations who are concerned with the welfare and equal rights of women workers (Moghadam 1997). Although this categorisation is not mutually exclusive as many women's organisations combine few of the above typologies (i.e. NGOs working for women rights, that are also research centres and provide services for women). In this paper, we use women's organisations and feminist organisations as interchangeable concepts, even though they may differ in their objectives and goals and from contexts to contexts.
Intentionally, we have chosen to work about confidence about women's organisations in Europe and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, two cultural regions that in appearances, in the last decades seem to have less and less in common. This supposed or created cultural distance allow us to present our proposal, that contains a post-colonial critique of the way of constructing knowledge about the so-called Northern and Southern feminisms, which in fact turns out to be enormously ethnocentric. Let us present, first, the general starting points of our proposal, together with the sources that have inspired this formulation. In the third section we will carry out a critique of the approaches that social scientists have used to evaluate the aims and values of feminist movements and women's organisations in both regions. Following this critique, we will present a concrete conceptual proposal for capturing people's attitudes about women's organisations.
To formulate our mega social analysis of emotions, we will operationalise and apply the concept of social cosmologies proposed by Galtung (1964Galtung ( , 1978 in the framework of peace studies, using the data of the World Values Survey . We will present the results of a discriminant analysis in order to determine the significant differences between those who show confidence-and those who do not show confidence-in women's organisations in each region. At the end, we will suggest how these emotions could spread in societies. We expect that the results of our analysis could help researchers, experts and advocates of global feminisms to orient their practices towards identifications with some broadly shared values and ideals, which are the base of transformative identity politics (Butler 1993, p. 94;Weird 2008, p. 128).

Confidence about women's organisation and global feminisms
The confidence towards women's organisations is a sign of global feminisms. It refers to the so-called "identifications" (Butler 1993;Weird 2008) of men and women with women's organisations, their commitment and values, and their solidarity towards these organisations. It shows the audience's support towards different women's movements, their shared positions and ideology (Moghadam 2012). Emotions are social, cultural and political constructs. They are part of our social life, and have been the focus of feminist analysis since the seventies (Hochschild 1975). According to several authors (Flam and King 2005;Barbalet 2009;Bericat 2016), confidence is a relational reflexive emotion, a feeling of attachment that relates to contingent events. The object of confidence is the expectation of the future, therefore it constitutes an anticipatory emotion. As Barbalet points out, "like all emotions, confidence has not only a phenomenal form and psychological tone, but also a social basis that includes acceptance and recognition, and the resources to which these provide access" Barbalet 2009, p. 376). The confidence towards women organisations show how individuals identify with women's organisations, accept the proposition for a new positive "reality", and how women organisations work very hard towards their target population needs so they could deserve public's support, even in the absence of public or state support. Therefore, we will try to formulate a mega social analysis of emotions, in a time when even the macro-sociology of emotions is not still even formulated (Bericat 2016, p. 505).
Our concept of global feminisms is related to emotions; it is also an invitation for the reader to "help your own community's women fight misogyny. By doing so, you help the global struggle against hatred of women" (Eltahawy 2015, p. 28). The term "global" used refers to something more than the "planetary scale of feminist collaboration for peace, justice, and women's right" (Porter 2007, p. 44), since we share the scepticism towards a unique global solidarity or global sisterhood, as advanced by the critique of cosmopolitanism of feminisms by the global south, intersectional black feminism, post-colonial, and transnational feminists (Ruppert et al. 2020;Sheehy and Nayak 2020;Alderl 2020;Zerbe Enns et al. 2021;Khader 2021). We would like to refer to the transitory identifications of women -and men-(and of people who define themselves in between or beyond the binary system, as well as persons who prefer a self-definition) from with women's movements in two cultural regions of the planet, not assuming the existence of any kind of shared identity of the audiences. This is why we refer to feminisms in plural.
Global feminism is also "predicated upon the notion that notwithstanding cultural, class, and ideological differences among the women of the world, there is a commonality in the forms of women's disadvantage and in the form of women's organisations worldwide" (Moghaman 1997, p. 64). As Hanafi pointed out, "The term 'global' is indeed an invitation to introduce geographical space as central to the formation of knowledge and to take sociology to task from below" (Hanafi 2020, p. 4). As well as this it is a way to take into account the advancing technologies in particular through the growing role of social media that have fostered and shape the rise of feminist movements and interconnections and networking among organisations, movements, campaigns, emotions, concepts (Al Bunni, Millard and Vass 2018). One example is the movement #Enazeda (me too in Arabic), which took elements of the global #Me too movement. #EnaZeda is an emergent movement against sexual harassment and sexual assault in Tunisia, which started in the social media sphere, in October 2019, as a local appropriation of the international #MeToo movement. It seeks to support survivors of sexual assault and break the silence around sexual violence in Tunisian society by offering digital platforms where testimonies can be posted personally or anonymously, and debated.
Our global feminisms perspective benefits from a redefinition of the concept of culture, as the "discrete meanings that can be combined in a variety of ways for a variety of strategic (and other) purposes" (Jasper and Polletta 2019, p. 63). Our concept of global feminisms is an analytical framework that try to go further on the background of individual societies-or states-to capture the tendency organisations develop towards "transitory isomorphism" or "polyversality" (Eisenstein 2004) regarding emotions and values. By transitory isomorphism, we mean, around the globe, women's organisations shape themselves in similar-or diverse-ways to other women's organisations because they share-or not-some configuration of values with similar effects in locally-specific contexts, and because of the transregional and translation circulation of ideas and practices that marks the political and intellectual life of elites in the globe (Gleadle and Thomas 2018). This is also influenced by the increasing circulation of messages in social media. Consequently, researchers intend to use the concept of "global civil society" in a transnational turn that criticises the prominence of the nation-state as a unit of analysis (Brake and Mark 2015). In terms of Galtung, the founder of peace and conflict studies, we want to develop a mega-sociology because, "We cannot pretend that states do not exist, but the state system may be fading away, yielding to a system of regions and to some extent to a global system" (Galtung 2010, p. 23).
Furthermore, our global feminisms perspective includes as a starting point the concept of a participative global civil society. To capture participation, we need to transcend the overall tendency to counterpose local and global, or north and south, as transnational feminism theory states (Zerbe Enns et al. 2021). Because, "there is no single core process leading to a global society or anything resembling one, but-as in politics in general-a set of identifiable processes and mechanisms that intersect with domestic politics to produce new and differentiated path of political change" (Tarrow 2005, p. 9). Consequently, structuring differences and commonalities between emotions around women organisations often do not reflect strict territorial divides (Nicholls 2007, p. 618). Our perspective is diverse, because of the multiple and contested set of transnational social actors and because "there is no singular opposition of neo-liberalism" (Davies and Featherstone 2013, p. 239). Nor, we will add, there is singular opposition of patriarchy. Therefore, we can say that feminist activism and praxis occur under "non ideal" conditions (Khader 2021, p. 143). However, it is the existence of diverse feminist activisms and movements that really brings social change. As the authors point out, after analysing social movements and policies against violence against women in 70 countries over four decades, it is the feminist mobilisations in the civil society-and not the left-wing parties' action or the number of women in government, or economic factors such as national wealththat really explains the variation in policy development and its persistence over time (Htun and Weldon 2012). The authors explain that these autonomous movements "articulate social group perspectives, disseminate new ideas and frames to the broader public, and demand institutional changes that recognise these meanings" (Htun and Weldon 2012).
Feminist scholars have linked women's organisations globally with social movements since the nineteenth century. Women's organisations change depending on how they intersect the social positions of their members (among race/ethnicity, class, sexual orientations and gender identities and other crosscutting situations and/or conditions) of feminist claims and political opportunities (priorities in their social contexts). They also change over time (Ewig and Ferree 2013), depending on her desire to embrace 'relational' as well as 'individualistic' feminisms of the past (Gleadle and Thomas, 2018). Around the planet, women's organisations advocate for structural changes to confront the inequalities women suffer in access to educational systems, economic opportunities, political participation, and in relation with violence. Some of those organisations work with the government, even they work in lieu of the government institutions implementing policies and providing services. As Ewig and Ferree point out, "fiscal austerity commonly produced more NGOs too, as states used feminist organisations to do some of their work in poor communities" (Ewig and Ferree 2013, p. 420). And not only in poor communities, in countries affected by multiple crisis (political, social, economic, disasters, health crisis), women's organisations are at the forefront of the emergency responses.
Women organisations also engage and network with other social movements with whom sometimes they share common goals. Existing bibliography allows us to understand the current dynamic of social movements around the globe (Della Porta andDiani 2006, 2015;Roggeband and Klandermans 2017;Snow et al. 2019) and specifically the dynamic of gender equality inside social movements (McKee Hurwitz and Dal Crossley 2019). Social scientists have explained, the origin of social organisations and movements, why social movements and organisations emerge and why individuals participate-or not-in them. The explanations oscillate between assuming individuals are motivated by rational thinking and decisions (resource mobilisation approach), to the ways in which the interaction between particular political systems and actors determine the amount of people who participate and the intensity of social movements (political processes approach), while emphasising the gendered characteristics of political opportunity (McCammon et al. 2001). We are especially interested in the framing perspective of social movements (Goffman 1974;Gitlin 1980;Snow 2008;Polletta and Gardner 2015) because it allows to focus on the existing structures of meaning that are formed through interpretative processes (Snow, Vliegenthart and Ketelaars 2019, p. 405).
In this participative global civil society, women organisations networks, along with other organisations (that may have different objectives) and individuals, use non-traditional repertoires for pressing their claims which are related with a greater redistribution of resources and power, recognition of cultures and identities, or both (Nicholls 2007, p. 608;Meyer and Whittier 1994, p. 277). Women's organisations benefit from the experiences, practices and strategies of other movements and organisations, in addition to influencing and inspiring other social movements.

The "capture" of global feminisms in Europe and the MENA Region
To address confidence in women's movements in Europe and the MENA region, it is necessary to review the comprehensive and accumulated knowledge regarding the concrete goals and values of feminist movements in Europe and the MENA region. The results of our review corroborate the double standard thesis developed by postcolonial studies (Ranji 2021) and prevents the advancement of knowledge about global feminisms.
In fact, social sciences have addressed feminist attitudes in the MENA region considering exclusively to the effects of the Muslim religion on gender inequality (Fish 2002;Inglehart and Norris 2003a, b;Alexander and Welzel 2011), while in the West social sciences focus on women's employment or "gender ideology" (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009). These approaches "conceive the difference between cultures, first, as creating a battlefront that separates them, and second, as inviting the West to control, contain, and otherwise govern (through superior knowledge and accommodating power) the Other" (Said 1978: 47-48). We will shortly illustrate these two approaches.
Muslim religion as an explanatory variable for gender inequality in the MENA region was first proposed in the book Rising Tide (Inglehart and Norris 2003a). In chapter 3, it can be read that the growth of Muslim religion as a counterpart to the perceived threats of modern Western values to social norms and traditional sexual mores, suggested by Samuel Huntington, did not convince Inglehart and Norris (2003a, p. 51) who preferred to assume that the MENA region would not undergo a process of secularisation-in line with their modernisation theory-similar to that which occurred in other agrarian, industrial or post-industrial societies. Without explaining why their modernisation theory did not help to understand what was happening in the region, they gave way to the "culturalist" thesis by claiming that "Islamic religious heritage is one of the most powerful barriers to the rising tide of gender equality" (Inglehart and Norris, 2003a, p. 71). Inglehart and Norris argued that the problem in the MENA region was not even the lack of democratic values, but the attitudes towards gender inequality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003b). Following this approach, some authors also concluded that there is a robust support for patriarchy in Muslim societies and in Non-Muslim societies between people with high mosque attendance (Alexander and Welzel 2011). In the approach of Alexander and Welzel, the construction of the other leads to the construction of a Muslim/ non-Muslim category that seems to classify the world population, without taking into account that the category "non-Muslim" encompasses Catholics, Protestants, Hindus, Jews, Orthodox, Buddhists, as well as many people with no religious confession. Reducing women's inequalities as a result of the oppression of religions or the influence of beliefs, to the Muslim religion or Islam is the beginning of the construction of the Other in an ethnocentric way (Orientalism). In fact, as could be seen in the analyses of Inglehart and Norris (Inglehart and Norreis, 2003a, p. 67), some of the other religions also scored negatively on the gender equality scale. Moreover, it is surprising that these authors consider that the cause of patriarchy is religious denomination. Patriarchy cannot be exclusively a religious problem, even if fundamentalist versions of religions-of all religions-justify a social system (society, communities, families) organised in a way where there is a preponderance of men over women, men have power and control towards women, as any student who has done some reading in women's studies knows (see for example, Walby 1990).
These narratives magnify the negative effects of religion-in this case, Islam-on "patriarchy" (that is, gender equality, a scale based on items as equality of men and women as political leaders and business executives, preference for men or women when jobs are scarce, and the equal importance of university education for a boy or a girl), as several studies concluded. If Muslim religiosity is understood as the reading of the Quran, the result obtained is the more individuals read the religious text, the less they advocate for gender equality, and the correlation between support of democracy and gender equality is very low (17% of the population), according to the first Arab Barometer's data (Kostenko et al. 2014). However, religiosity is not a synonymous of "patriarchy", as shows Glas and Alexander's analyses of 51 Arab Barometer and World Values Surveys, which include 57.000 Arab Muslim. In fact, "one in four Arab Muslims supports Muslim feminism-far more than those who support a more secularist version of feminism" (Glas and Alexander 2020). In their research, support for Muslim feminism is particularly relevant between employed women, highly educated people, single people, and people who distrust institutions. Furthermore, as Price concluded, working with the four wave of the World Values Survey (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004), the negative regional effect of attitudes towards women's right to employment in the MENA region is reduced by accounting also for level of female tertiary enrolment, shares of women in parliament, economic rights for women, and national economic development (Price 2015). This author demonstrates, using multilevel models and 15 World Values Surveys (2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014) that religiosity is a medley, and "the salience of religion in daily life is found to increase women´s support for gender equality and cushion the negative impact of religious service attendance" (Glas et al. 2018). In any case, the overall likelihood of agreement with the items of the gender equality scale varies considerably from question to question. For example, attitudes towards women as political leaders are particularly traditional in the Middle East, but authors do not see evidence supporting a regional explanation for traditional attitudes towards education and employment access. It is more, "the contextual factors and the sex of the respondent appear to influence responses much more strongly than does whether the respondent is a Muslim or a non-Muslim" (Lussier and Fish 2016, p. 47). Also, there are some differences between the Arab Muslim countries and the non-Arab-Muslim countries in the region (Rizzo et al. 2007).
Reducing women's problems in the MENA region-or wherever-to their "religious beliefs" is a reductionist and binary (Ranji 2021) operation, which throws away all the knowledge accumulated about the relationship between men and women over decades. Binary in the sense of "terminology of Western/non-Western, democratic/non-democratic and free/non-free" (Ranji 2021). It also excuses those who exploit or dominate women by preventing the advancementand recognition-of local feminist movements and women's rights organisations, some that could even be faith-based.
But this narrative does not come alone. It is complementary to the narrative developed in the West about "gender ideology". As mentioned above, debates in the West focuses on gender ideologies. Following Risman, the concept of 'gender ideology' belong to the institutional domain, and determine cultural expectation and legitimate inequality between men and women (Risman 2004, p. 437). For other authors, ideologies "reflect intellectuals' efforts to make a broad "spirit" or vision more systematic and explicit and to derive political programmes from them" (Jasper and Polletta 2019, p. 68). Another definition is that ideologies "characterise joint constructions of meaning and reality in a society" (Grunow et al. 2018, p. 42). Social scientists have used the concept of gender ideologies to analyse the division of paid work and family responsibilities (what is called the sexual division of labour), for example, "to represent the underlying concept of an individual's level of support for the division of paid work and family responsibilities that is based on the notion of separate spheres" (Davis and Greenstein 2009, p.89). Alternatively, "ideologies assert that (a) mother's primary responsibility is childrearing and a father's is breadwinning" (Dow 2016, p. 180). Usually, scholars approach gender ideologies by analysing gender attitudes expressed in one item or an index of various items.
As a result, gender ideologies have been hypothesised in a continuum with traditional at one end and egalitarian (or liberal egalitarianism) at the other. This definition contains an evolutionary and, of course, ethnocentric vision. Grunow et al. (2018) propose a "multi-dimensional" approach with includes whether the ideology emphasises choice or gendered traits. This multi-dimensional analysis conclude that, in Europe, 42.8% of people (men and women) defend the egalitarian ideology. Traditional ideologies (which do not emphasise choice) have been replaced for egalitarian essentialist ones (that defend stay-at-home mothering as a women's choice, and are difficult to assess empirically on the continuum between egalitarian and traditional). Another interesting finding of this study is that there is not a strong difference between men and women in defending this kind of ideologies. In fact, as the author conclude, "These findings provide no clear-cut corroboration or challenge to the argument that interest-based mechanisms are a driver of gender differences in ideologies" (Grunow et al. 2018, pp. 54 and 57).
There is still another proposal about gender ideologies that tries to include gender ideologies in the broad process of modernisation. We refer to the proposals of gender egalitarianism as formulated by the Developmental Idealism (DI), a cultural model formulated by Thornton et al. (2015), which remember the formulation of a rising tide of changes in sex roles around the globe formulated by Inglehart and Norris (2003). Following Thornton et al (2015), the DI has spreads from its origins among the elites of northwest Europe to elites and ordinary people throughout the world. One of the core values of the model is the desirability of a modern society, freedom and equality. The model defines some norms and values as modern: "pluralistic norms and laws, an emphasis on the individual as compared to the family and community, universalism, freedom, equality, human rights, secularism (including the separation of church and state), scientific-rational decision making" (Thornton et al. 2015, p. 6).
This model is not associated with particular places, cultures or people, but still it is very Eurocentric, because "northwest European societies are understood to be the positive endpoint of development, the model of the good life, and a powerful marker of the correct direction for social change" (Thornton et al. 2015, p. 4). We must recognise that this "endpoint" corresponds with some of our reading of feminist theorists from the Middle East. For example, in the word of Joumana Haddad, when she is "talking about finding a balance in the middle: a balance that so many people are striving and fighting for, and that would be the efficient and noble product of an efficient and noble competition between Capitalism and Communism. Much like the balance that some Northern European countries have succeeded in finding, to a large extent at least" (Haddad 2010, p. 25).
As Thornton et al. explain, their "omnibus" cultural model corresponds with the indicators of international development like the United Nation Human Development Index, and predict that individuals from the MENA Region-or America, Asia, etc.-will eventually develop beliefs and values similar of contemporary population of northwest Europe. They will believe that gender egalitarianism is necessary to achieve a modern and universal good life rather than a local and particular one. They claim that the DI exist in different formats across geography and history. The United Nations System, international financial institutions, governments, non-governmental organisations, international development projects, mass media, social movements and Christian missionaries and Christian organisations, have been some of the vehicles of the global diffusion of the model. These concept of gender ideologies contains an evolutionary vision of how societies change, and considers Europe (or, specifically, the Nordic countries) to be the places where the most progress has been made in terms of equality between men and women, as if equality were the only objective of feminist organisations, and assuming that in Europe men and women of different social positions defend the same ideology. The DI permit to advance the single proposal of gender ideologies because it introduces ideologies in a broader cultural environment, and give the idea that people identify with a model-the western countries-even if they do not live in one of the western countries.
That is, it ends up inviting the "West" to control, contain and rule the people of the rest of the planet by means of a supposedly superior knowledge and morality. 1 As suggested by J. Galtung, "Ideology, usually defines a social order to be realised in the future; and the more complete the ideology, the tighter will be the deductive framework and the more absolutist the attitude towards change, for the less will the system permit a mixture of two social orders. There will be one social order defined as right and the other social orders as wrong" (Galtung 1964, p. 212). In other words, these models always conclude that there are some individuals-or groups, or countries-who are "right", and some others-from developing countries, of course-who have a "traditional" gender ideology which, of course, they must change. As J. Butler pointed out in one of her texts by analysing the labels of "lesbian" oppression, this could also work in an overlapping way, through the constitution of viable subjects and the creation of an environment of abject subjects (Butler 1993).
In fact, the ideology-or "mobilising ideas and beliefs"-is a concept that have come back to the analysis of social movement "without having been fully cleansed of some of the ambiguities and shortcomings associates with the concept and its application" (Snow 2008, p. 383). One of these is that in the concept of ideology ideas and beliefs appear as preconfigured. Because of that, the framing perspective focused attention of the signifying work of emotions and meaning construction, from which the resultant products are the "collective action frames" (Snow 2008, p. 384). 1 In fact, gender experts prefer to use gender approach and gender perspective as gender ideology has been under attack by far-right conservatives and some religious movements. They use the gender approach and/or perspective as a tool based on a sound gender analysis (looking at norms, gender roles, division of labour, quantitative and qualitative data) to inform the design, development, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and policies. Gender theory, gender-based approaches and intersectionality provide a framework for addressing multiple asymmetries of power (deriving from how sex is constructed), including those that create and reproduce all forms of discrimination against women. While gender analysis is based on diverse methodologies such as Harvard Analytical Framework (1980), Moser framework (1986) and Longwe methodology (1998) among others, the concept "gender ideology" is been used by some religious coalitions and far right politicians and far right movements to destroy any possibility of gender analysis in projects, programmes and policies, any reference to sexual and reproduction rights, LGBTQI + + rights and to attack gender studies at the global level arguing it is a-scientific and based on the feminist ideologies. The reason of these attacks is their understanding of the gender ideology and the gender concept are opposing traditional family values and against traditional social order. "For the far right, propping up male authority and promoting a nuclear family that sticks to the gender binary are central tenets of the broader nationalist project. By contrast, gender studies promotes a more fluid understanding of self and society, in particular by recognizing gender as something shaped and interpreted by a given social order, as opposed to an immutable biological fact. In questioning traditional concepts of identity, sexuality, and kinship, gender studies therefore destabilizes the far right's simple narrative of a native "us" versus an alien "them."" (Apperly, 2019) These attacks against gender ideology are growing globally and are requiring dedicated responses from NGOs, gender scholars, donors and international organisations.

Creating and re-creating global feminisms: social cosmologies
The confidence on women organisations shows how individuals identify with them across the planet, how individuals accept a new transformative "reality", and how women organisations works towards the public and deserve their commitment, even in the absence of public support. From our point of view, people need to create their own experience, re-create the social world. They punctuate elements to create their own social experience.
To capture this "own experience" we need more than a frame perspective. We need a concept that captures the emotions and the conceptions that help to build each social reality, and capture the similarities and differences among them, the aspects which permit people to "help your own community's women to fight misogyny". The concept that comes closest to what we are trying to do is that of "social cosmologies" developed by J. Galtung in the framework of peace studies. As defined by Galtung, social cosmology is "fundamental conceptions of social reality and social change" (Galtung 1964, p. 211). Formulated in terms of the peace cosmology, Galtung stated that, The thesis may be put forward -not a very original one -that there is an intimate connection between peace thinking and the geo-political situation of the country/region that produces it; not only between peace thinking and the general social cosmology. Since geo-politics are in the hands of the elite's peace thinking will reflect their interests, but at the same time it has to be built on concepts that are intra-paradigmatic in that cosmology is couched in terms that are meaningful in more than a purely linguistic sense (Galtung 1978, p. 18).
For Galtung, there are at least three different ways to explaining the configuration of social cosmologies: "in terms of the opinion-holder's personality, in terms of his/her social position, and in terms of the communication and influence structure of his/her social system" (Galtung 1964, p. 206). We propose to apply this definition of social cosmologies to the case of confidence in women's organisations in order to build our mega-sociology of emotions.
With "social cosmologies" we will try to capture emotions in and around social movements (Jasper 1998;Jasper and Owens 2014;Jasper and Polletta 2019). Emotions are relatively predictable, not accidental eruption of the irrational. Because confidence have an object (we show-or do not show-confidence in women organisations), it depends at least partly on cognitive understanding and appraisals of women organisations. As Jasper explained, emotions are conditioned by our expectations. They are tied to moral values, and cognition (Jasper 1998, p. 406).
We have said that confidence in women organisations shows the audience's sympathy for the women's movements, their shared positions and "ideology". The feeling of confidence arrives when people feel that the goals of the movement have been accomplished in the past, and/or they will be achievable in the future. As Jasper and Owens explain, "To the extent I identify with a group, its goals become mine. But that same identification also aids collective action by giving me the attention and energy to participate" (Jasper and Owens 2014, p. 538). From our point of view, the movement from "identity" to "identification-with" proposed by feminist scholars, is one of the most liberating dimensions that permit global feminisms. It allows opening spaces for engagement and action on global and collective struggles.
Galtung's proposal is interesting because it allows us to develop a mega-sociology of emotions about people's confidence in women's organisations. First, it allows us to explore the basic conceptions of individuals about "their" social reality and about "their" perception of change. Thus, we can formulate a model that takes into account the constituent elements of their perception of the relationship between men and women. Secondly, we can investigate the group's membership of the individuals-their sex, age, educational level, religiosity, income, etc. Moreover, it allows us to situate their emotions about women's organisations in relationship with their emotions about other social organisations in civil society. That would be our proposal to understand people identifications with "global feminisms".

Hypothesis
Following Galtung, people's confidence in women's organisations will depend on three factors. First, from what people understand that women's organisations "refer to". We have to capture the social facts that make individual's gender cosmology possible in the two regions separately, the constituent elements of their perception of the relationship between men and women. Therefore, we will carry out a factor analysis with all the items that are included in the WVS relative to relations between men and women in order to build the "content" of cosmologies.
Secondly, the confidence in women's organisations should be associated with the sex/gender, the social position, the income, and the religious practice of the individuals. We assume that, if women are more interested in women organisations, they will show more confidence in women' organisations than men. If we follow Galtung's theory, those from the social centre will also have more confidence in women's organisations as those from the social periphery if confidence in women's organisations are expanding. People at the centre are the ones who are most likely to influence the media, create opinion or set public policy on a given issue. Because we are comparing Europe and the MENA regions, we will include here two more independent variables: the income and the religious practice. The larger increase in the income, the larger increase in confidence in women's organisations. And the larger increase in the religious practice, the larger decrease in confidence in women' organisations, it seems that people who are practising in a more strict, formal or orthodox way, support less women's movements whether Muslim, Christians (Catholics or Protestants) or other denominations.
In addition (third hypothesis): confidence will have to do with the desirability of women's organisations having a role in the overall configuration of social movements. As women's organisations are a part of social movements, when someone relies on women's organisations, they will also have confidence in other social movements. Therefore, we expect that, in both regions, confidence in women's organisations will be framed within global civil society, which means that those who show confidence in women's organisations will also show confidence in other civil society organisations. In what follows, we will present the database from which we obtain scientific evidence on the gender cosmologies of people who trust women's organisations in Europe and in the MENA region.

Data
To explore the communalities and diversities in the confidence on women's organisations around the globe we will work with the data of a worldwide sur- the sixth wave (2010-14), the countries included from the MENA Region, with representative samples at national level, were Algeria, Bahrain, Palestine, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt and Yemen, with a total sample size of 18,027. There are also representative samples at national level from Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Holland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden (the total sample size was 12,414). Our dependent variable is the confidence in women's organisations. In this survey, 85,072 people answered the question about their confidence in women's organisations on a scale of 1 to 4 (where 1 means no confidence and 4 a great confidence). The average stands at 2.60, with a standard deviation of 0.896. If we look at Fig. 1, the greater confidence in women's organisations (although with less homogeneity in the answers) occurs in Asia and Latin America; and the lowest in the MENA Region, in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in the Europe (the latter, however, is where there is greater homogeneity).
After exploring the data, we can say that confidence in women's organisations has increased in all regions, although the survey has not been carried out in exactly the same countries in the different waves. From the wave of surveys conducted in the years 1994-1998 to the one developed in 2010-2014, those who have more confidence in women's organisations increased from 12.4% to 15.5% of all respondents (men and women), and those who did not have confidence at all decreased from 17.4% to 12.5%. If confidence in women's organisations is a sign of global feminism, we can say that all over the planet, global feminisms are spreading because individuals show more confidence in women's organisations.

Measuring gender cosmologies
In the questionnaire of the WVS, there are several items about attitudes related to the relationships between men and women. In a preliminary analysis, we have introduced the variables related to the relations between men and women and their confidence towards women's organisations. Our factorial analysis, in both cases results in four factors (Tables 1 and 2) that permit us to group the variables in four indexes: sexual tolerance, gender equality, confidence in NGOs and emancipation. In the case of the indexes of gender equality and sexual tolerance, our factorial analysis corroborates the results of other research such as Inglehart and Norris (2003) and Rodriguez and Khalil (2013), but also, the results of this analysis indicate that we can build two more indexes that we named the confidence in NGOs and the emancipation index. Therefore, our gender equality index and our sexual tolerance index will include the variables that Inglehart and Norris used to construct the gender equality index and the sexual tolerance index (Inglehart and Norris 2003;Rodriguez and Khalil 2013). For the gender equality we will use: (1) A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl; (2) On the whole, men make better business executives than women do; (3) On the whole men make better political leaders than women do. For the sexual tolerance index, we will include the following variables: (1) Justifiable: Abortion, (2) Justifiable: divorce; (3) Justifiable: Homosexuality. The third component we detected comprise the following variables: (1) Democracy: women have the same right as men; (2) Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person; (3): Justifiable: for a man to beat his wife. We will name this component emancipation index. Finally, we built a NGOs Index using the responses to confidence in Environmental organisations, and confidence in Charitable or humanitarian organisations. If we look at Tables 1 and 2, where we have the rotated factor matrix, it is surprising that both in Europe and in the MENA Region, the factor that we have called "sexual tolerance" is the one that first defines the conception of people on relations between men and women. Secondly, appears the factor that we have called "equality". Then we have the factor "confidence in other social organisations", and at the end, the factor that we have called "emancipation". This analysis is important because "equality" has been considered by many authors to be the most important factor-sometimes the only one-to investigate in determining cultural change in the world regarding the relationship between men and women. Let us continue presenting how we are going to measure gender cosmology in Europe and the MENA region; it remains to see what relationship confidence in women's organisations has with these four dimensions.
In relation with the sociodemographic variables that we refer to in our hypothesis, it is important to highlight the WVS measures sex attending only to two options (men and women). We measured the social position according to the index elaborated by operationalised by Díez Nicolás (2009, 2020). In this research, the choice is to incorporate the income separately (that appears in the database on a scale of ten steps). Finally we have introduced in our model, the variable "How often do you attend religious services" (that has the following possible responses: 1. More than once a week; 2. Once a week; 3. Once a month; 4. Only on special holidays; 5. Once a year; 6. Less often; 7. Never, practically never), recoding the values in reverse for better readability.
A multivariate test of differences between groups or a discriminant function analysis (DFA) was performed. The DFA is a parametric technique which determines the percent of variance in the dependent variable (confidence: women's organisations) explained by the independent variables and that assess the relative importance of the independent variables in classifying the dependent variable.
We worked with two subsamples. In the subsample of Europe, there were 8,586 valid cases and in the subsample of the MENA Region, they were 8.671 (there are some excluded cases where at least one of the discriminant variables are missing). We performed a DFA because we wanted to know which independent variables were more relevant in our subsamples to discriminate between the confidence-or not-in women's organisations.

Result
In the Fig. 1, we presented the descriptive analysis of the results in the different geo-cultural regions of the study. The confidence in women's organisations is higher in Europe (with 2.59 over 4) than in the MENA region which obtained 2.33. The region with more confidence is Asia with 2.77, followed by Latino America with 2.75 and Sub-Saharan Africa with 2.69. Overall, the MENA region is the region with less confidence in women's organisations. The standard deviation (measuring the dispersion of the confidence in each region) shows that in Europe, there is more homogeneity in the responses. In the MENA region, the standard deviation is higher, showing more heterogeneity in the responses. This distribution corresponds to Galtung's approaches to the generation and development of attitude cosmologies so that the social centre (Europe) is usually the one that initiates the process of changing attitudes and, within it, the opinions are much more homogeneous than on the social periphery.
In Fig. 2, we summarise the findings related to the mean comparison of people who have confidence towards women organisations and those who do not have confidence towards them in Europe and the MENA Region.
In Europe and the MENA Region, the main significant variable, which differentiate the people who have confidence-or not-in women organisations, is the confidence in NGOs. The more they have confidence in NGOs, the more they have confidence in women organisations. The F values (which are not shown in the graph, to facilitate the visualisation) are also high in the two models, but in the MENA Region it is higher than in Europe (4153, 5 in the MENA Region and 3825, 7 in Europe). This result means that the global feminisms show the same structure in the civil societies of both regions. In the MENA region, women organisations are even closer to other NGOs than in Europe.
In both regions, people who have confidence in women organisations and those who do not have confidence also differ because they defend-or not-the  emancipation of women (the F value in Europe reach 1.159,4 and in the MENA region 862.1). The equality between men and women (The F value in Europe is 158.5 and in the MENA region is 152.9) is also associated with confidence in women organisations in both regions, but it makes less of a difference to those who do-or do not-trust women's organisations in comparison with emancipation. There are some differences in the models. The sexual tolerance is only significant in Europe with an F value of 16.7. This means that in the MENA region, people do not perceive women's organisations as fundamental social actors that defend abortion, homosexuality and divorce. In the MENA region (with some exceptions such as Tunisia), family laws, or personal status laws, usually condemn abortion, divorce (on request of women) and homosexuality.
In Europe, the income index is not significant and, in the case of the MENA Region, the social position index is not significant. This difference has to do with how social inequalities are established in both regions. In Europe, income alone does not differentiate people. Inequalities in access to resources are related to other variables (rural/urban, level of education, sector of occupation, age, etc.) whereas in the MENA region inequality is mainly expressed in people's income level. In Europe, the religious practice is not significant, and in the MENA region is significant. The separation of the political and religious spheres means that in Europe those who do-or do not-trust women's organisations are not differentiated by their religious practice. In the case of the MENA region, those who trust women's organisations are less likely to attend religious services than those who do not trust women's organisations.
The DFA is a parametric technique to both, to assess the relative importance of the independent variables in classifying the dependent variable, and determine the percent of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables.
Tables 3 and 4, and Fig. 3 classify cases using the discriminant prediction equation. In Europe, with a canonical correlation of 0.599, it can be said that 24, 4% of the variance in the dependent variable was accounted for this model. In the MENA Region, with a canonical correlation of 0,609, 24, 6% of the variance in the dependent variable was accounted for this model. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the predictive accuracy for the model for the sample analysis in Europe was 80.1% and in the MENA Region 79, 4%. In Europe, the group of people who has confidence in women's organisations has a previous proportional probability of 60, 6% and a predicted probability with our model of 88.6%. For the group of people who did not have confidence in them, the probability changed from 39, 1% to 68%. In the case of the MENA Region, the group of people who has confidence in women's organisations, has a previous proportional probability of 42.3%, and a predicted probability with our model of 76.7%. For those who didn't have confidence in women's organisations the previous probability was 57.7% and our model permit to predict 81.2% of the cases. Figure 3 show that in the two subsamples the variable that permit better classify people who have confidence or not in women's organisations is the index of NGO confidence. The emancipation index is the second variable that permits to better classify, and the equality index is the third. The sexual tolerance index is significant only in Europe.
Concerning the socio demographic variables, sex is an important predictor of confidence in women organisations. Women show more confidence as men. Regarding social position index and the income index, the first is significant-with a negative sign-in Europe but not in the MENA Region, and the second is significant in the MENA region-with a positive sign-but not in Europe. This means that in Europe, people who score low in the social position index also have confidence in women's organisations more often than those who score high on the social position index. In the case of the MENA region, those who have more income are those who have confidence in women's organisations. The religious practice is also a significant discriminant variable, but only in the MENA region. There, people with low attendance to religious services score higher in confidence in women organisations.

Conclusions and discussion
Therefore, we can already formulate some conclusions. The results of the factor analysis in the two separate subsamples allow us to formulate a model that takes into account the same constituent elements of perception of the relationship between men and women. This first conclusion is very important, because it means that there is no reason to suppose that people's goals and values with respect to women's organisations are incommensurable, as preached by those who defended the culturalist thesis. In fact, in both regions people who show confidence in women's organisations can be observed taking into account similar parameters.
In both regions, there are a wide range of factors in people's gender cosmology. In particular, perceptions about sexual tolerance (divorce, abortion, homosexuality), about equality between men and women (in the areas of work, politics and education), about other social organisations (environmental and humanitarian charities), as well as values related to the emancipation of women (having the same rights as men as a sign of democracy, the justification of intimate partner violence or women having a job in order to be independent). This wide range of factors must be contrasted with the reductionism of many of the international analyses of so-called gender ideologies (Inglehart and Norris 2003, Davis and Greenstein 2009, Thornton et al. 2015, Dow 2016, Grunow et al. 2018) and corroborates the polyvalence of women's organising (Eisenstein, 2004;Galtung 2010;Brake and Mark 2015;Al Bunni, Millard and Vass 2018).
The fact that the confidence in NGOs is the more relevant variable associated with confidence in women organisations means that the position of women organisations in the social structure is analogous: they belong to the global civil society. We corroborate the approaches of Meyer and Whittier (1994), Galtung (2010), Brake and Mark (2015) about the global civil society. Also, our analysis offers some tools to nuance the debate on the Global North/South or Minority/Majority World that the authors raise from transnational feminist theory (Zerbe Enns et al. 2021). The proximity of women organisations to civil society organisations is larger in the MENA region than in Europe. Also, women organisations in the MENA region are providers of services, competing with the state, as some authors have noted (Ewig and Ferree 2013).
Concerning the confidence in women organisations, we can see that the ideas about emancipation and equality are part of both models, but the emancipation is more important as the equality. That is to say, in the cosmology of attitudes that allow us to predict better the confidence in women's organisations, the most salient are those related to the economic independence of women, with the equal right for men and women as essential for democracy, and the justification of violence against women. This concept of emancipation is the more relevant in order to show confidence in women's organisations, both in Europe and in the MENA region. It should mean that people feel that the goals that women organisations have accomplished in the past, and/or will be achievable in the future are related to economic independence of women, equal rights (as essential elements for democracy), and violence against women. We have said before that there has been a reductionism with regard to the elements that make up gender ideologies. But it should be added that this reductionism leads to the dismissal of what really matters to people when they sympathise with feminist movements. In fact, the campaigns that are most likely to be shared internationally have to do with the items we have used to construct the emancipation index: women and employment, gender violence and democracy.
The role of sexual tolerance is different in the two regions. The sexual tolerance of Europeans is larger than the one of the MENA region citizens, and is connected with their greater confidence towards women's organisations. In the MENA region, however, sexual tolerance is lower, and is not related with confidence in women's organisations. In other words, women's organisations in the MENA region defend equality, emancipation, justice, dignity, but they are very likely to do so within the framework of the heterosexual family, as the proposals of some Islamic feminists point out (Ali, 2012, 32). There are only some exceptions, for instance in Tunisia, the Association des Femmes Democrates includes sexual and reproductive rights advocacy, the movement Falgatna tries to make visible black women, women who use veil and/or women migrants rights among other, and the #EnaZeda movement mentioned before. In Lebanon the association ABAAD has been working on masculinities as well as gender and sexual identities (among other issues) for a long time. Even more, some feminist scholars will say that in the MENA region, the sexual revolution "has not even begun" (Eltahawy 2015, 32). Geographical space, as formulated by Hanafi (2020) is central to understand global feminisms.
If we look at the results relevant to the profile of the interviewees, women identify with women organisations more than men do. This difference not only is significant. It is the most important sociodemographic variable, which allow us to discriminate people who show confidence and those who do not show confidence in both regions.
It expresses the gender identification of women with global feminisms, and contrasts with the results of Grunow et al. to the on the influence of sex on the formation of gender ideologies (2018, 54 and 57) and confirms that gender "cosmologies" constitute a better proposal to understand the mechanisms based on women's interests and the fact women support women's organisations because they are uniquely placed to support women's claims, mobilise and advocate for women's rights and promote social change.
The variables that are not significant in the two models give us some hints about the different elements in global feminisms. The analysis we have presented shows that in the case of Europe, income is not as important as the social position of people (where factors such as sex, age, habitat, etc.) intervene. In Europe, the lower the social position of the people, the more they support women's organisations. However, in the MENA region, what differentiates people in their attitudes towards women's organisations is their income. In the MENA region, the more income a person has, the more likely he/she will support women's organisations. This difference should lead us to think about how the global feminisms on the planet spread and circulate. If we follow Galtung's theory, attitudes expand from the elites to the peripheries. In the MENA Region the confidence would be starting to expand from the socio-economic elites to the peripheries. However, in Europe, social elites show less confidence in women's organisations than people with lower social positions. This result is really worrying if we consider that the elites have an enormous power to spread their ideas and their emotions. The lack of sympathy towards women's movements in the European elite should be studied to see why they don't support the idea of "help your own community's women to fight misogyny" (Eltahawy 2015, 28). This should be studied carefully in the context of the growing attacks of the far right towards feminisms and gender theory as mentioned before. We also believe as that the relations between religiosity and support for gender equality vary between different societal groups (Glas et al. 2018) and should be studied more in detail.
Our data also corroborates the idea that the more people who attend religious services, the less they have confidence in women's organisations, which could be explained by the fact that most feminist and women's movements and organisations in the MENA region consider themselves "progressists, autonomous or modernists" and most of them are secular (Ghanmi1993, Mahfoud and Mahfoud 2014, Naciri 2014, Ben Achour 2001). While they respect the fact that people have faith, they consider it should be something personal, kept in private and not interfere in public policies and laws.

Limitations
It is evident that our study has limits. We worked with the data of a survey that has not been designed to deepen people's attitudes about their confidence in women's organisations. The first limitation has to do with the binary conception of gender of the survey. Despite we refer to women and men, we also acknowledge the existence of other gender identities and the right to identify as either having a gender which is in between or beyond those two categories or as having no gender.
We have the advantage that the questions formulated by the scientific committee of the World Values Survey have been tested in different waves, and rigorously translated into each of the languages. In addition, the supervision and development of the surveys has been overseen by a scientific committee in each of the countries. However, it could be possible to find some other variables that we could incorporate into the model and that would allow to obtain a more accurate image about gender cosmologies and confidence in women organisations. We would need more questions on women's organisations in international research programmes, with a question about sex that includes other possibilities of responses apart from male and female, and in particular, more questions on other social movements, on emancipation, on gender equality and on sexual tolerance. The only research programme that brings together such a range of questions is the one we have used for this study.
Concerning the World Values Survey, samples in each of the countries are representative, but there may be difficulties with population censuses (particularly in the MENA region), or with floating populations. In any case, this analysis demonstrates the importance of building theory from empirical data, especially when we want to avoid ethnocentric views.
Another limitation has to do with the grouping of the data into cultural regions. We are aware that women's organisations do not have the same situation in Europe or in the MENA region, or even in each country of the two regions. There are indeed many differences in terms of the legal framework, access to finance, power relations, censorship, corruption, and other differentiative factors within the two regions. Here we have tried to stick to the confidence in women's organisations shown by individuals grouped into cultural regions. This level of generalisability, coupled with the diversity of women's organisations, means that our results should be considered as exploratory or pilot. Further studies (quantitative and qualitative) are needed to provide a more detailed understanding, taking into account, for example, the role of the states, the political parties, or the media, the access to finance of organisations and the level of censorship or corruption in each region.
Moreover, in this paper we have documented some elements and concepts about the confidence in women's organisations, and how these kinds of beliefs could circulate in societies. Our analysis opens the possibility to replicate the same analysis in other geo-cultural regions and with newer data, in order to see how these gender cosmologies and confidence in women organisations has evolved in the different regions and over time. Nevertheless, we have already advanced in a preliminary formulation and understanding of global feminisms.

Conflict of interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. This is to acknowledge that there is not any financial interest or benefit that has arisen from the direct applications of this research.
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