Chinese perceptions of the EU: the impact of social media use

With the rise of China and the deepening of China-EU interactions, it is crucial for both China and the EU to know the Chinese public perceptions of the EU and what factors influence the formation of perceptions, to enhance mutual understanding. Given the increasing role of social media in the political process, this study hypothesizes that social media use is a strong predictor for Chinese public perceptions of the EU and China-EU relations. We analyze the effects by utilizing original public opinion survey data collected in China in 2020. Our findings show that social media use as well as socioeconomic factors together predict Chinese public perceptions of the EU and China-EU relations. However, social media use effects vary across different social media platforms.


Introduction
Perceptions and misperceptions matter in international politics. Over the last two decades, a growing body of research has examined how the European Union is perceived outside its borders. European scholars argued that studying the external perception is critical for EU policymakers and academia to understand the EU's global role, its self-representation, its identity formation, the effectiveness of EU policies, and to overcome the Eurocentrism in much of the literature on EU (Lucarelli, 2014). With the rise of China and the increasing interactions between China and 1 3 Chinese perceptions of the EU: the impact of social media use the EU in the fields of economy and politics, the Chinese perception of the EU is becoming a crucial sub-topic in studies on the external perceptions of the EU. The literature has shown that the EU is perceived by the Chinese public as an economic giant, an active player in global affairs (Jain & Pandey, 2013), and a leader at the international level in combating climate change and pollution (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2007). Many factors, such as socioeconomic status, prior contact, and media use, are identified to be of predictive power for individuals' perceptions of the EU (Zhou & Dong, 2008;Zhou et al. 2009;Dong & Liu, 2012;Dong & Zhou, 2012;Dong, 2012).
A factor that has been less investigated by the existing literature is how the changing media landscape impacts the Chinese public's perception of the EU. In recent years, the growing prominence of social media in our society is challenging the way traditional media have been used to distribute political news, set political agendas, influence public opinion, and conduct diplomacy. Social media is widely applied to diplomacy by allowing diplomats to engage with the foreign public in a sustained dialogue (Bjola & Jiang, 2015). Simultaneously, it provides digital platforms that make it possible for unpracticed players, specifically ordinary citizens, to become more involved in the political process and to make their voices heard (Dubois & Dutton, 2012). The interactions of the Chinese public, international news, public opinion, and foreign/European diplomats in the digital domain have influenced, are influencing, and will continue to pose a profoundly influence Chinese public perceptions of the EU. Those online interactions and the effects of social media use on perceptions of the EU are understudied. This is where the present study seeks to contribute.
More precisely, this study draws on recent data collected in an online public survey with 3009 respondents in six cities in China in 2020 to investigate the effects of social media use on public perceptions of the EU. Given the different media logic of three major social media platforms in China, this study hypothesizes that the use of Weibo has a more significant impact on perceptions of the EU and of China-EU relationships, compared to the use of WeChat and TikTok. The statistical findings confirm our hypotheses.

The EU in the eyes of China
A quite substantial number of European scholars have explored the external image of the EU. They have found that Chinese perceptions of the EU concerning different global issues are mixed (Chaban & Elgström, 2014). In terms of economic perception, the EU is at most times criticized by the Chinese public, elites, and media. Chinese government officials and most Chinese scholars have, on many occasions, pointed to the EU's arms sales embargo against China and the issues related to the non-recognition of China's full market economy status as examples of the EU's unfair and discriminating attitude towards China (Morini et al., 2010). In the meantime, the elites in China feel that the EU is using its strong economic position to protect neo-colonial interests, rather than providing a special kind of help to the third world (Larsen, 2014). In terms of political perception, overall, the Chinese are 1 3 more favorably inclined towards the EU than towards the United States or US-led organizations. And the EU is recognized as a model for regional cooperation (Jain & Pandey, 2013). However, they seem to not perceive the EU as a strong international actor (Morini et al., 2010) nor a normative power (Olivier & Fioramonti, 2010). Most respondents believe that the relationship between China and the EU should be strengthened. Meanwhile, the EU's critical approach to human rights issues in China and the Taiwan issue in China has been considered a serious obstacle to the development of cooperation between the two sides as it touches upon a sensitive issue for Chinese political elites (Morini et al., 2010). In terms of environmental perceptions, some studies have found that the Chinese recognize that Europe has been the champion and leader at the international level in combating climate change and pollution (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2007) and that China sees the EU as a role model for environmental policies (Chan, 2010). However, Lisbonne-de Vergeron (2007) also found that some Chinese elites identified the Copenhagen summit as evidence that the leading role of the EU is declining; and China did not perceive a need to follow the European lead, as China placed a strong emphasis on sovereignty, thereby limiting the appeal of the more multilateralist EU approach (Torney, 2014).
Besides this European literature, Chinese perceptions of the EU have also been extensively researched by Chinese scholars. From 2007 to 2020, several surveys on the Chinese public's and elites' perceptions of the EU have been conducted and resulted in the publication of many papers and books, enriching the EU external perception literature to a great extent. It is found that the majority of the Chinese public held an optimistic attitude toward China-EU relationships as well as the prospects of these relationships. The Chinese public held a positive attitude towards some major EU member countries and agreed that they were in the leading position in the world concerning democratic systems, economy, culture, and technology (Wang, 2016). Meanwhile, the conflicts between China and the EU were well-noticed by the Chinese public. The issues related to human rights issues or Tibet, institutional differences, the EU's arms embargo against China, intellectual property rights, antidumping, China's full market status, environmental problems, etc. are extensively discussed among Chinese elites (Dai & Zhang, 2007;Zhou et al. 2009;Zhang, 2011).
Factors that influence these perceptions are extensively researched in the literature (Zhou & Dong, 2008;Zhou et al. 2009;Dong & Liu, 2012;Dong & Zhou, 2012;Dong, 2012). Demographic variables such as gender, location, age, income, level of education, personal behavioral factors such as contact with the EU or EU citizens, cross-cultural experience, and media usage patterns continue to affect the Chinese public perceptions of the EU and China-EU relationships. Similar conclusions had been drawn from studies of the Chinese elites. However, the direction and the strength of the effects of each factor differ from study to study.
Although previous studies have examined the perception of the EU in Chinese news media, few of them have focused specifically on social media. Two recent studies investigated the image of the EU on Weibo, while no research has been done on the other major social media platforms, i.e. TikTok and WeChat. Zhao (2019) extracted Weibo texts to conduct content analysis and concluded that the Chinese public's perceptions of the EU as a political union on Weibo have changed a lot under the influence of Brexit. Most of the analyzed texts held the view that Brexit is a twofold blow to both the EU and the UK. Politically, the European integration process has been frustrated and Eurosceptic forces are retaking their positions. Economically, Chinese netizens believed that Brexit would harm the economic development of the EU; the financial markets would be the first to be hit, and economic deterioration in various fields is inevitable. In the meantime, the social and cultural image of the EU is questioned by Sina netizens. However, Europe, or say the EU, still has extreme attractiveness in terms of tourism to Weibo netizens. Zhang and Cui (2021) found that during the pandemic, the Delegation of the European Union to China actively shaped the EU public image on Weibo, seeking to present the EU as a responsible normative force in international affairs, a leader in European solidarity and cooperation, and as China's partner on global issues, as well as in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Chinese netizens were mostly attracted to Covid-19 pandemic-related topics about the EU and China-EU cooperation, while posts about the EU itself and European solidarity and cooperation got less attention. In general, the authors argued that the digital public diplomacy carried out by the Delegation of the European Union to China through Weibo failed to form an efficient dialogue with Chinese netizens, rather, Weibo has become a place to increase conflicts, as both sides are advocating their values instead of listening to each other.

Social media and public opinion
Media effects have been a prominent focus of public opinion studies ever since. Many studies of the Chinese perceptions of the EU have thus investigated the role of the news media, hitherto focusing on print newspapers, television and broadcast. Indeed, traditional news media have not only helped to construct the images of both sides but also fed the policy-making process in the relationship between the EU and China (Zhang, 2022). With the advent of the Internet, media consumption is growing in spurts, while also becoming increasingly personalized. The emergence of social media has reinforced this trend of media consumption; in the meantime, social media platforms create unique public spheres that successfully converge mass media and interpersonal conversations, which are the two principal sources of people's public opinion perceptions (Noelle-Neumann, 1993).
Traditionally, the literature on media effects has suggested various mechanisms through which the media influence public opinion: by passing messages through opinion leaders, setting political agendas, by making people believe the social reality portrayed in media, by priming content-related thoughts, etc. In the specific case of social media, it has been proven to have strong effects on public opinion regarding domestic political issues, especially voting in the western democratic context (Bene, 2018;Robertson et al., 2010). The influence of the Internet and social media on politics is also considered in closed or semi-authoritarian states (Gainous et al., 2019). When it comes to public opinion on international affairs, say bilateral relations between states, the field is understudied, but international relations scholars are increasingly recognizing the significance of social media in world politics (Duncombe, 2017;Robinson, 2008). With social media integrated into people's lives, becoming an important source of information and a significant shaper of their perceptions of the world, we hypothesize that: H1: social media use has a significant impact on public perceptions of global actors and international relations.
But the term 'social media' actually covers a range of media that are actually very different and, therefore, potentially have differential impacts on discourses they portend, as well as on users' opinion. Kluver (2002) argued that the organizing principle of information, i.e., the logic of media, is a key reference for understanding the relative impact of a media format on international discourse. He suggested that three criteria for the logic are (1) the ability of the format to create a narrative and contextual framework; (2) the delivery of relevant and timely, or 'epistemologically significant' information; and (3) the extent to which the media promotes a deliberative perspective on an issue. As this article focuses on the three major Chinese social media platforms Weibo, WeChat, and TikTok (Douyin), we anticipate that they differ in the three aspects of media logic in terms of their effects on public perceptions.
Amon the three mainstream social media platforms, Weibo satisfies the above three media logic criteria the most. The information on Weibo is mainly in the form of short, restricted text and is very time-sensitive. Leveraging the open platform of Weibo, various actors are involved in spreading the news about the EU and China-EU relations, to effectively create a narrative. The official news media, such as Xinhua News Agency, are the main ones that publish news about the EU. The official accounts of the EU Delegation and EU countries on Weibo are also important first-hand sources of EU news for the Chinese public. Key opinion leaders and the general public can retweet the posts by official accounts with their own comments. Like Twitter, Weibo posts are very timely. Weibo has also developed a real-time hot search column where the most real-time discussions about a particular issue are in one place under a single hashtag. Weibo organizes communication based on the content of the shared information, reducing the costs of following and sharing information and opinions (Stockmann & Luo, 2017;Stockmann et al., 2020), and further promoting online deliberation.
WeChat and TikTok, however, do not fully meet the three criteria of media logic compared to Weibo. Regarding the first criterion, fewer users engage in international news discussions on TikTok and WeChat, as people tend to consume these two social media with a completely different purpose than they do on Weibo. As the social media that ushered in the short-form video era, TikTok has attracted many traditional news media to join in recent years, but the main content is still panentertainment rather than serious political news. And WeChat, as an instant messaging application designed to deepen the intimate relationship between families and friends, is even less able to create an effective narrative framework regarding inter-state discourse. Regarding the second criterion, the content posted on TikTok is also of great relevance in real time, however, since it is presented in video form, the coverage of breaking news is often not as rapid as that of Weibo, as it takes more time to create videos than to post simple text. The content on WeChat is mostly in the form of articles, which require longer-term editing and background auditing, so the dissemination of information on WeChat lags behind that on TikTok and Weibo.
Regarding the third criterion of media logic, the logic of conversation, conversations on WeChat mostly happen in private chats and groups between people who are usually with existing relationships in real life or happen below semi-private posts which are shown to users' contacts exclusively. The information on WeChat has an inward orientation (Stockmann et al., 2020), making it hard to develop online deliberation. TikTok, on the other hand, is more publicly accessible; however, due to its shortage as media for news dissemination, discussions about international news on it tend to be less serious and lively than on Weibo.
To summarize, we assume that Weibo -compared to WeChat or Tiktok -influences public opinion and thus the discourse and narrative of international relations on a deeper level regarding all three aspects of media logic. Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed: H2: Use of Weibo has a stronger impact on perceptions of the EU, compared to the use of WeChat and TikTok. H3: Use of Weibo has a stronger impact on perceptions of international relations, compared to the use of WeChat and TikTok.

Data and method
The analysis of this study utilizes data from an online survey on Chinese perceptions of the EU conducted in late 2020. This questionnaire generated representative samples from six Chinese cities-Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xi'an, Chengdu, and Nanning-which are in different geographical regions at varying stages of development. We apply a weighting strategy based on socio-demographic variables (education and gender) to correct the bias brought by the online survey administration. Details on data collection and weighting are provided in (Dong et al., 2022).
The present study focuses on respondents' perceptions of the EU and of the relations between the EU and China. The first dependent variable, perception of the EU, is operationalized by survey question Q7b-"What impression do you have of the EU?", with closed answers proposed on a 4-point Likert scale, where 1 indicates "very unfavorable" while 4 indicates "very favorable". The second dependent variable, namely perception of the China-EU relationship, is operationalized by survey question Q15c1-"Do you think in general, the China-EU relationship at the moment is good or bad?", with closed answers proposed on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 indicates "very good" while 7 indicates "very bad". To ease interpretation, we reversed the scale in the data cleaning process, so that higher points indicate a better perception of the China-EU relationship.
The independent variable of interest is the use of social media. We have operationalized it by survey question Q19h-"Have you been visiting Weibo, WeChat or TikTok to learn about current events last week?". Respondents could choose Weibo, WeChat, TikTok, two of them, or all of them according to their own social media use patterns. Since our analysis focuses on the impacts of different social media use on perceptions, we further refined social media use into variables indicating the use of Weibo, use of WeChat, and use of TikTok. We have constructed them as dummy variables, where 0 indicates that respondents have not been using this specific social media platform for information gaining in the week prior to the interview, while 1 indicates that they have.
Furthermore, and drawing on previous research on the matter, we assume that socio-demographics (gender [Q1], age [Q2], income [Q36a], educational level [Q3a]), as well as prior contact with the EU (Q32a), national pride (Q20a), perceived salience of voting (Q19i), and political participation (Q19j) will affect the perceptions of the EU and of China-EU relationships. Therefore, they are considered as control variables. Additionally, we use city-dummies to control for the clustering of the respondents in the six sampling sites (with Beijing as the reference category).
In the first, descriptive step of our analysis, additional survey items were used to explore respondents' perception of the EU and of China-EU relations, as described in the text. Details on all survey items used as dependent, independent and control variables are provided in the methodological Appendix (Table 9).
For the multivariate analysis, this study employs ordinary least squares regression, a method commonly used for continuous dependent variables. We have regressed perception of the EU and perception of China-EU relationship, respectively, on each individual use of social media (use of Weibo, use of WeChat, and use of TikTok) to investigate the general impact, but also the potentially differential impact of different social media platforms, as suggested by H1, H2 and H3.
All analyses were performed with the open-source statistics software R.

Descriptive findings: Chinese public perceptions of the EU and China-EU relationship
The descriptive statistics show that the Chinese public has a quite favorable perception of the EU in general. Compared with other global actors or countries (Table 1), the EU is perceived positively in the eyes of the Chinese. Nearly eighty percent of the respondents show favorable or very favorable attitudes towards the EU, which makes the EU rank right after Switzerland and Russia. In contrast, the Chinese public has a predominantly negative perception of their Asian neighbors-Japan, South Korea, and India, which could be attributed to warfare history, current territory disputes and other regional issues. The United States is also perceived badly in the eyes of the Chinese public--most likely a reflection of the increasing irritations since the Trump presidency.
Regarding the importance of the EU on the global stage, 14.1% of the respondents perceive the EU as the most important global political actor, compared to 44.2% of respondents who choose the US, and 25.0% of respondents who opt for China ( Table 2). The EU is more likely to be perceived as the second most important political power (24.5%); However, a larger number of respondents agree that China is the second most influential political actor (33.0%). Regarding the salience of the EU in the global economy, the perception pattern is like the perception pattern for politics. The US and China are perceived as the most vital economic players in the globe. But the economic role of the EU is more prominent than its political role; slightly more respondents recognize the EU as a global economic giant compared to those who choose the EU as political power. To sum up, it seems that among the five global actors we prompted to the survey respondents -China, the EU, Japan, the US and Russia-the US remains the most important global actor in the eyes of the Chinese public; China at the second place, followed by the EU.
Given the favorable perceptions of the EU, it is unsurprising that the Chinese public holds a rather positive assessment of the current China-EU relationship, as well (Table 3). While the relationships with the US or Japan are assessed as worse, that with Russia or with Switzerland are assessed as clearly better. On the whole, it appears that a majority of the Chinese public recognizes the EU as a partner for China, or at least as a friendly stakeholder.
To examine their media use patterns, we asked respondents about the most important sources of their news information in the EU. The results show that Table 2 The Chinese public's assessment of the country/group of countries with most influence in world politics and world economy (in 2020) Note: weighted data "Which country or group of countries has most influence in world affairs when it comes to…" "….politics?" "… the economy?"

Most influential Second most influential
Most influential Second most influential most respondents have several sources for their information on the EU (Table 4) and that the internet is by far the most popular one among those. This finding might be due to the administration mode as an online survey, tapping into a population of frequent internet users. But it is also consistent with the exponential growth of information technology in China and the resulting change in media use patterns over the last decade. Online media have become clearly more important than traditional news media (such as television, newspapers or radio). Furthermore, the use of the three social media platforms of interest in this study (Weibo, WeChat and TikTok) is widespread among the respondents (Table 5). A closer look at socio-demographic variables (age, gender and education), however, shows no systematic patterns. While Weibo and TikTok users are younger and more often have a tertiary education (i.e. college and above), WeChat users are slightly older and less educated. Regarding gender distributions, the share of women is slightly above average among Weibo users but not among WeChat or TikTok users.

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Chinese perceptions of the EU: the impact of social media use

Multivariate analysis: social media effects on perceptions of the EU and China-EU relations
We now turn to the multi-variate analysis to test our hypotheses. The following Table 6 reports the OLS regression results with Weibo use as an independent variable while perceptions of the EU and assessment of the China-EU relationship figure as dependent variables. Models (1) and (3) present the results when regressing each dimension of perception on Weibo use without control variables, while Models (2) and (4) include all control variables of interest. It shows that Weibo use has a significantly negative effect on perception of the China-EU relations with and without covariates. Weibo users have 0.243 units lower perception of the China-EU bilateral relationship (on a scale from 1 to 7). The corresponding regression coefficients in the models (with and without covariates) assessing perceptions of the EU are, however, not significant.
In line with previous literature, we find that people who have been to the EU or have had contacted with the EU before, people who think voting rights are important, higher-income groups, older people, and females tend to hold a more positive attitude towards the EU. Respondents living in Guangzhou had a less positive opinion of the EU compared to that of Beijing. In the perception of the China-EU relations model, national pride shows a positive influence; increasing the value of feeling proud to be Chinese (1-4) by one increases the value of perception of China-EU relations (1-7) by 0.185 units. Gender remains a significantly positive factor.
We repeat the regression models for WeChat use and TikTok use, respectively (see Tables 7 and 8). When controlling for covariates, WeChat use shows positive yet not significant effects on either dimension of perceptions under scrutiny. People who use TikTok have a slightly significant more positive attitude towards the EU compared to those who do not use TikTok, but they tend to perceive the China-EU relationship more negatively. Considering the magnitude of the effect of TikTok use on perceptions, TikTok users perceive the EU (1-4) at 0.05 units higher level than their counterparts. TikTok users perceive the China-EU relations as 0.129 units lower than those who do not use TikTok as a source of information. Control variables in both WeChat models and TikTok models show similar influence on perceptions both in terms of direction and size compared to Weibo models. Prior contact, perceived salience of voting, age, gender, and income are still positive predictors for perceptions.

Discussion and conclusions
The ways in which social media use shapes political perceptions is an understudied issue in previous research on external perceptions of the EU. This is above all true for studies on the EU perceptions in China, where the widespread use of social media raises the relevance of this topic. To address this research gap, this The findings are twofold. On the one hand, the results corroborate H1 as they show that, indeed, the use of social media is associated with the nature of perceptions that citizens have of global actors (such as the EU) as well as of international relations (such as the bilateral relations between China and the EU). Beyond its specific results, this study thus contributes to the literature on the external perceptions of the EU, as well as on public perceptions in the field of foreign policy and international relations, emphasizing the importance of social media use in shaping such perceptions. This finding not only buttresses the (increasing) relevance of social media for shaping public opinion, but it also relates to the communication efforts deployed by official actors -most notably the EU Delegation -seeking to shape their image on social media in a positive way.
On the other hand, however, the results of our analysis also show that these effects differ across different social media. WeChat use is not significantly associated with positive or negative perceptions of the EU or of China-EU relations. TikTok use is a predictor for positive perceptions of the EU, while it acts negatively when it comes to the perception of China-EU relations. Weibo use is not significantly associated with perceptions of the EU but has a negative effect on assessments of the China-EU relationship. Therefore, H2 is rejected, while H3 is corroborated. Of course, this study also has its limitations. As it draws on data collected through a non-random sampling strategy, errors resulting from sampling bias cannot be completely excluded -even though we tried to minimize such errors by applying a weighting strategy. In addition, given that perceptions can change rapidly, a further limitation of our analysis is that it only provides a snapshot for late 2020 (the moment of data collection). It is plausible to assume that, following the mutually imposed sanctions in 2021, the perceptions of the EU, as well as the perceptions of the relations between China and the EU have experienced a downturn in the meantime. Hence, to understand Chinese public perceptions of the EU better, it would be desirable to collect perception data on a more frequent periodic basis. Nevertheless, our results for 2020 are still a relevant, in that they can serve as a point for comparison for future studies.
A further limitation of our study is that, due to restricted survey resources, our operationalization of social media use was somewhat rudimentary, thereby leaving a range of questions unanswered. Indeed, further research on the topic could concentrate specifically on linking the analysis of social media contents, texts, and discourses to individual perceptions, to better understand the mechanisms behind social media use effects. Brewer et al. (2003) examined two routes for media effects on the standards by which people evaluate foreign countries. The first is indirect: a news story about an issue in a domestic context may heighten the cognitive accessibility of thoughts about the issue, thereby priming audience members to base their evaluations of foreign nations on those thoughts. The second is direct: a news story that presents a frame linking an issue to a foreign nation in a way that suggests a particular evaluative implication may shape how audience members judge that nation. Brewer et al.'s experiment revolving around media coverage of two issues and attitudes toward four nations found evidence for media influence along the second route but not the first. Whether and how these two routes function in Chinese perceptions of foreign countries are yet to be studied.
Another direction of further research could be to explore the impacts of different media's international coverage, foreign policy and national image. Zhang's study (2012) employs first-and second-level agenda-setting to investigate how media salience, public opinion, and policy agendas influence the perceptions of foreign countries in the United States. Triangulation of research methods allowed examination of media coverage, public opinion and presidential public papers. Results indicate that salience promotes awareness of inflated significance for foreign countries named in US media. The study identified a strong relationship between the foreign country salience in media coverage and in presidential public papers, while agenda-setting effects of policy agenda on public agenda were not confirmed. Regarding second-level agenda-setting effects, a correlation was found to exist among a negative tone in news coverage, presidential public papers, and public opinion. In contrast, no correlation was identified pertinent to the positive valence in the three agendas.
It may also be necessary to bring in foreign media, particularly foreign news media. No research on the Chinese perceptions of the EU has yet included the role of foreign new media. Xu et al. (2022) examine the effects of media use, including traditional media, social media, and foreign media, on Chinese citizens' trust in their central and local governments. They found that using VPNs to access foreign media is negatively associated with Chinese citizens' trust in the central government but does not affect their trust in local governments.
More could also be done on analyzing the effects of media censorship in shaping perceptions, e.g. by extending the perception survey sample to Chinese people who live overseas and have other sources of social media use. 2020 -year of birth Gender Q1 "Gender" 1 = male; 2 = female Income Q36 "What was your annual income last year? (in RMB)" 1 = 10′000 or below 2 = 10,001 -30,000 3 = 30,001 -60,000 4 = 60,001 -120,000 5 = 120,001 -30,000 6 = 300,001 or above