Bodily Pathos and Virtue Ethics: On Miki Kiyoshi's Logic of Imagination

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Abstract

This paper revisits Miki Kiyoshi's moral philosophy through the lens of virtue ethics, with a focus on the logic of imagination (構想力の論理). Having paid specific attention to pathos for his philosophy of action (行為の哲学), Miki would proceed to highlight the importance of feeling, pathos or sentiment for morality, which echoes a feature of contemporary virtue ethics. More importantly, Miki constructs his moral philosophy by emphasizing the body in conjunction with pathos. I therefore suggest that the uniqueness of Miki's moral philosophy lies in the concept of bodily pathos. In order to unpack this claim, I shall begin by first examining why and how pathos plays an indispensable role for morality. Subsequently, I will consider how Miki focuses on the body in particular with respects to pathos. From there, I shall outline the ways in which virtue ethics can help rearticulate Miki's concept of bodily pathos in a systematic and effective manner. Through exploring this subject, I aim to show that Miki is a pioneer with respects to the emphasis he places on the body for virtue ethics. For Miki, feeling must be exemplified by the body. He views the two as interconnected, and vital for morality. While there is an extensive body of scholarship on Miki's philosophy of history, religion, humanism and so forth, his work on moral philosophy has been comparatively neglected. Yet, if we peruse his writings, it is easy to notice that many of his works actually include the Japanese terms for morality (*dōtoku*, 道徳) and ethics (*rinri*, 倫理), not to mention those concerned with action and poesis. Miki's moral philosophy is without doubt an area deserving of thorough research, especially with respects to its relationship with virtue ethics.

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(It is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. (Anscombe, 1958).¹

Put simply, formal logic is logic in terms of logos. Nevertheless, it is through our bodies that we come into contact with things themselves in their materiality. We collide with things qua things. If we here give the name pathos to the body in its subjectivity, the logic of things is not simply logic in terms of logos but at the same time related to things in terms of pathos. (Miki, 1937).²

1 Bodily Pathos: A Neglected Agenda

This paper revisits Miki Kiyoshi's moral philosophy from the perspective of virtue ethics, with a focus on the concept of bodily pathos that is embedded in his logic of imagination (構想力の論理). Having emphasized the union of logos and pathos in the logic of imagination, Miki argues that logos refers to formal logic (形式論理) or a logic of the intellect (知識の論理) (MKZ 8:15; PKS, 63). Meanwhile, the logic of imagination relates to the philosophy of action (行為の哲学), which in turn encompasses poesis (制作) and genesis (生成) (MKZ 8:7; PKS, 59).

In his masterpiece, *The Study of Man in Pascal* (『パスカルにおける人間の研究』, published in 1926), Miki thoroughly examines the existence of human beings in line with the philosophy of Pascal. Although morality is not his main concern in this book, within it he lays down the foundation of his philosophy of pathos (feeling, emotion or sentiment).³ In his mature work, *The Logic of Imagination* (1939), Miki writes:

What captured my interest after the publication of my previous book, *Reki-shi Tetsugaku* [『歴史哲学』 *The Philosophy of History*] (1932), was the issue of how the objective and the subjective, the rational and the irrational, and the intellectual and the emotional can be unified. At the time, my main

¹ G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, *Philosophy*, Vol. 33, No. 124 (January 1958): 1. See <https://www.pitt.edu/~mthomps/reading/mmp.pdf#search=%27moral+philosophy+anscombe%27> (accessed on 10 Feb 2021).

² 三木清 (Miki Kiyoshi), 『構想力の論理』 (*The Logic of Imagination*), in 『三木清全集』 (*Complete Works of Miki Kiyoshi*, hereinafter MKZ), Vol. 8. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967, p. 15. The English translation here is quoted from *The Philosophy of the Kyoto School* (hereinafter PKS). Fujita Masakatsu, ed., Robert Chapeskie, tran. and revised by John W. M. Krummel. Dordrecht: Springer, 2018, p. 62.

³ 梶田啓三郎 (Masuda Keizaburō) states that “subjective truth, pathos and so on, have become fundamental concepts for Miki Kiyoshi, ... the sprouts of *The Logic of Imagination* and *Shiran* are also embedded in this masterpiece [*The Study of Man in Pascal*]. See 「解説」 (Synopsis), in Miki Kiyoshi's 『パスカルにおける人間の研究』 (*The Study of Man in Pascal*). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1980, p. 232. (underlined mine).

task was formulating this [problem] as a question of the unification of logos and pathos, analyzing all aspects of history as elements in terms of logos and pathos, and discussing their dialectical unity. The circumstances of this period are clearly illustrated in my collection of essays *Kiki ni Okeru Ningen no Tachiba* 『危機に於ける人間の立場』 *The Standpoint of Man in Crisis*] (1933). Even as I turned my attention toward matters of rationality and logos, I always found it difficult to avoid matters of subjectivity, interiority, and pathos. This is also why I was captivated by Pascal (*Pasukaru ni Okeru Ningen no Kenkyū* 『パスカルに於ける人間の研究』 *The Study of Man in Pascal*] 1926) and influenced by Heidegger. Even when my primary interest in historical philosophy led to an intense focus on the study of historical materialism (*Yuibutsushikan to Genndai no Ishiki* 『唯物史観と現代の意識』 *Historical Materialism and Contemporary Consciousness*] 1928), my pursuit of a human foundation for historical materialism, too, was indeed also a result of the same interest. My demand to not lose sight of matters of pathos for the sake of matters of logos, and yet at the same time to not forget about matters of logos for the sake of matters of pathos, eventually took the form of an assertion of humanism. This was, so to speak, a progression from anthropology to humanism, and my collection of essays *Ningengaku-teki Bungakuron* 『人間学的文学論』 *An Anthropological Theory of Literature*] (1934) stands as a manifestation of my thought in this period. (MKZ 8:4–5, PKS, 57–58, rephrased).

As seen in this passage, pathos is not only an indispensable component of Miki's moral philosophy. It also plays an important role for his philosophical career, appearing at almost every major stage of his intellectual development. With respects to moral philosophy, Miki argues that pathos should not be overlooked in comparison to logos, and that the body should also be considered, especially in the case of the philosophy of action. Beyond the emphasis given to feeling, which virtue ethics stresses, Miki's concern with corporeal embodiment is indicative of the uniqueness of his moral philosophy.

While there is a significant body of literature covering Miki's philosophy of history, as well as his writings on humanism, religion and other topics, there is surprisingly very little on his moral philosophy.⁴ Although Miki did not write a monograph specifically on moral philosophy, he did publish many articles on the subject.⁵ Hence, it is an aspect of Miki's oeuvre that should not be overlooked. The present

⁴ For examples, see 佐々木健 (Sasaki Takeshi) 『三木清の世界: 人間の救済と社会の変革』 (*The World of Miki Kiyoshi: Salvation of Human Beings and the Change of Society*). Tokyo: Daisanbunmeisha, 1987, 町口哲生 (Machiguchi Tetsuo) 『帝国の形而上学: 三木清の歴史哲学』 (*Metaphysics of the Empire: the Philosophy of History of Miki Kiyoshi*). Sakuhinsha, 2004, and 津田雅夫 (Tsuda Masao) 『人爲と自然: 三木清の思想的研究』 (*Artificial and Nature: An Intellectual Study of Miki Kiyoshi*). Kyoto: Bunrikaku, 2007. The most recent edited volume is: 田中久文 (Tanaka Kyūbun), 藤田正勝 (Fujita Makakatsu), 室井美千博 (Muroi Michihiro), eds., 『再考 三木清—現代への問いとして』 (*Revisiting Miki Kiyoshi: An Inquiry into the Modern*). Kyoto: Showado, 2019, does not include any discussion on moral philosophy.

⁵ As seen in the list of publications, although Miki does not have a monograph specifically on ethics, he has published many articles on this subject. See 「著作年譜」 (List of Publications), MKZ 19:891–932.

paper is an initial small step at rectifying this gap in existing scholarship. While drawing attention to the similarities and dissimilarities which exist between Miki's concept of bodily pathos and contemporary virtue ethics, I further seek to show how Miki's work may actually shed light on a number of questions with relevance for this field. For example, why is the body indispensable for pathos as well as action? How can bodily pathos help virtue flourish? And why virtue ethics is a better way for reading Miki's logic of imagination?

2 The Logic of Imagination: The Union of Logos and Pathos

When developing his logic of imagination Miki stresses the importance of pathos. As mentioned above, the basis of his thinking on this subject can be located in his masterpiece published in 1926, *The Study of Man in Pascal*. Miki also gives the following definitions of pathos in two short writings that were published in 1933 and 1935 respectively:

That which defines pathos is always already tinged with the corporeal. It does not objectively exist outside of consciousness, but rather transcends it in the opposite direction. In that place of the “subject” that cannot be taken objectively. This is why pathos not only moves, but possesses a subjective, active character. Thus, pathos can be viewed as the ground of active creative activity. (MKZ 19: 583).⁶

Pathos etymologically means a passive state. Such passivity has been taken as following from the physicality of humans. In other words, unlike logos, which is perceived as a pure spirit, pathos signifies a mental state which is bodily confined, that is, emotion and passion. However, while logos is concerned with objects, the character of pathos is that it expresses something subjective. As such, it must be dynamic.”⁷ (MKZ 20:203).

To contrast it with logos, Miki highlights three characteristics of pathos. Firstly, pathos is corporeal the body. It is impossible to perceive pathos without a body. Secondly, such bodily pathos is subjectively active rather than merely passive. Thirdly, such subjectively active bodily pathos is a creative mental state. Pathos is not an emotion that expresses one's mental state, but rather that which creates something new. The union of logos and pathos, therefore, is not only a formality but rather an important element of a philosophy of action.

⁶ The original passage in Japanese is: 「パトスを規定するものはどこまでも身体的の味をもちながら、このものが識の外部にある存在ち客體でなく、むしろ反対の方向において識を超越せるものとしてどこまでも客體とは見られない「主體」であるところに、パトスが單なる動でなく主體的能動的味をもつ事のできる理由がある。従つてパトスは能動的な創作活動の根源とも考へられ得るのである。」

⁷ The original passage in Japanese is: 「パトス[希英佛Pathos]語原的には受動の状態を意味する。かかる受動性は人間の身體性に基くとされ、従つて、パトスは純粹な精神と見られる理性(ロゴス)の如きものに対し身體的に制約される心的状態即ち情緒、激情を意味している。併しパトスはロゴスが對象的である反して主體的なものを表出することを特色とし、その限り能動性でなければならぬ。」

Miki is dissatisfied with what he regards as the common overemphasis of logos, which in his view cannot bring our subjectivity into touch with things through the body. While he admits that logos has its role, he points out that it should be “united” (統一) with pathos. In the preface of *The Logic of Imagination*, he states clearly that,

My demand to not lose sight of matters of pathos for the sake of matters of logos, and yet at the same time to not forget about matters of logos for the sake of matters of pathos, eventually took the form of an assertion of humanism. (MKZ 8:4; PKS, 58).

Inspired by the Kantian conceptions of understanding (悟性 *Verstand*) and sensibility (感性 *Sinnlichkeit*), Miki’s logic of imagination is intended to unite logos and pathos. (MKZ 8:5; PKS, 58) Miki argues that it is impossible to get rid of pathos when it comes to “matters of rationality and logos.” (MKZ 8:4; PKS, 58). Yet, by considering the logic of imagination as the philosophy of action, Miki posits that pathos should not be overlooked for all acts. He writes: “to act is to make new forms (形)...such forms are not simply objective, but are the unity of the objective and the subjective”. (MKZ 8:7, PKS, 59) For Miki, pathos should not be ignored for “matters of rationality and logos” as well as action, since action create forms and those forms are not simply objective but also subjective.

In saying that logos should be united with pathos, Miki’s aim is not to assert the shortcomings of logos, but rather to demonstrate its decisive role for action. Without pathos, it would be impossible to create new forms, which are “the unity of the objective and the subjective”. More importantly, those forms are no longer abstract dialectical unities, but rather historical forms (歴史的な形). Hence, the unity of logos and pathos can be seen as historical actions.

3 Philosophy of Action and Bodily Pathos

By emphasizing the importance of pathos for action, Miki reminds us that the body is an indispensable component. It is with the body that human beings come into contact with things through pathos. While the conventional logic that starts with the ancient Greeks also values perception (感覚), “it was only grasped in an intellectual sense” (MKZ 8:15, PKS, 62). Miki argues that human beings possess bodies and mediate them through action. It is therefore not possible to contact things outside of bodily pathos through action. When human beings make things (物を作る), their actions are not only intellectual, but also emotional or sentimental. This is the reason why Miki reaches the conclusion that “there ought to be something like a logic of sentiments in contrast to intellectualism”. (Ibid).

Of course, Miki is not the first to address the importance of pathos, emotion or sentiment for logic. Neither is he a pioneer when it comes to highlighting the importance of the body for action. What makes Miki’s logic of imagination appealing is that he tries to combine pathos with the body and argues for a so-called ‘bodily

pathos' as the root of action. Miki further elaborates upon the importance of the body in his book *Introduction to Philosophy* (『哲学入門』, published in 1940), a work that was written after *The Logic of Imagination*.

The relationship between human beings and [their] environment is a relationship of action. That which acts within the standpoint of action is the human being, which possesses not only consciousness, but also a body. Fundamentally, the subject is not merely subjective. As beings that possess a body, it is already impossible for us to be merely subjective. The body is a natural and objective thing. (MKZ 7: 15).⁸

There is a tendency to present pathos as standing in a dichotomy, in opposition to logos, where the former is subjective and the latter is objective. In *The Logic of Imagination*, however, Miki asserts that by having a body human beings are not merely subjective, but rather objective. That is to say, bodily pathos is not only a subjective, emotional, passionate or sentimental thing, but is also objective. It follows that actions realized by bodily pathos are not subjective or arbitrary, but have an objective character. Morality therefore also has its objective character, as it is embedded in action undertaken through bodily pathos.

In the following section, I shall offer a reading of Miki's bodily pathos, with particular attention given to the moral implications it has for virtue ethics, especially with respects to the concept of sentiment. I shall attend to arguments given by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Michael Slote. As noted above, in her article published in 1958, G. E. M. Anscombe sought to revive virtue ethics by claiming that moral philosophy cannot and should not be undertaken without having an adequate philosophy of psychology. Moral psychology or sentimental ethics has been extensively studied over the intervening sixty years. While Miki highlights pathos as an indispensable component of action, I suggest that virtue ethics may help reconfigure Miki's moral philosophy in a more meaningful way. Conversely, I suggest that Miki's conception of pathos or bodily pathos can also contribute to virtue ethics more broadly. In order to substantiate this claim, I shall draw a comparison between Miki's pathos and feeling as prescribed by virtue ethics.

4 Bodily Pathos and Virtue Ethics

To begin with, one of the main differences between Miki's concept of pathos and the concept of feeling stressed by virtue ethics is his concept of body. As noted above, for Miki, pathos can only be expressed by the body. The body is a technical tool (技術的道具) in the sense that it enables human beings to make something, instead of simply being a site of subjective feeling (or *kibun* 気分 in Japanese). While the body is objective, bodily pathos is not merely subjective. As our

⁸ The original passage in Japanese is, 「人間と環境との関係はもと行為の関係であり、行為の立場においては、動くものは単なる意識でなく身体を具えた人間である。もとより主體は單に主觀的なものではない。我々は身體を有するものとしてすでに單に主觀的なものであり得ないであろう。身体は自然的なもの、客觀的なものである。」

non-moral or moral actions are manifested by bodily pathos, they should not be taken as subjective, but rather as objective. Here, Miki's understanding of bodily pathos can potentially furnish us with a more convincing or even potentially a kind of 'universal' ground for moral philosophy. If the body is a technical tool, as Miki argues, then it is not only confined to the physical environment, but also embraces the social dimension.

It is not only the actions of the human being that are formative. Considering human beings are made by the environment, the function of nature and society should also be perceived as formative.⁹ (MKZ 7:10).

The idea of bodily pathos may also shed new light on virtue ethics. Philip J. Ivanhoe has offered two models for understanding the Chinese Confucian tradition; namely, the virtue ethics of flourishing (VEF) and the virtue ethics of sentiments (VES). The former is "a theory about human nature and a related view of human flourishing described in terms of an ideal agent", whereas the latter "describe[s] the virtues primarily in terms of certain broadly construed emotion[s]." (Ivanhoe, 2013:49) Ivanhoe's analysis focuses on Chinese philosophy, Mencius and Wang Yangming in particular, where feeling or emotion is taken as one of the crucial components of virtue.

Ivanhoe's distinctions of VEF and VES help to further reveal the potential of Miki's concept of bodily pathos. Ivanhoe suggests that: "In contrast to those who promote versions of VEF, advocates of VES are more concerned with ideal traits and their benefits than ideals persons and their character. One consequence of this difference is that for VES the virtues are more like expressions of features of human psychology within the confines of particular social conditions than they are direct manifestations of human nature in its authentic, full or proper form". (Ibid, 51–52) As noted above, instead of confining the body to the physical environment, Miki stresses its social dimension. Hence, we may see the parallel between Miki and VES. Pathos, or bodily pathos, is not a ground for the flourishing of one's character or for ultimately turning into an ideal person. It is an expression of "human psychology within the confines of particular social conditions". Miki's concept of bodily pathos is about how we focus our emotions in relation to particular social conditions. More importantly, expressions of sentiment, feeling, passion or pathos are virtues. Therefore, the notion 'bodily pathos' that is embedded in his logic of imagination is not merely a logic of action, but also a logic of morality.

In his analysis of the moral philosophy of Mencius, Ivanhoe further adds that for VES the so-called 'four sprouts' (四端) entail the possibility of empathy with others. (Ibid) While VEF emphasizes the flourishing of human nature, which is individual-based, VES indicates a social-based morality through empathy or sentiment. Even opponents like Lee Ming-huei – who disagrees with interpretations of Confucian ethics based on an Aristotelian model of virtue ethics – agrees that the four sprouts

⁹ The original passage in Japanese is: 「人間のあらゆる行爲が形成的であるというのみでない、人間は環境から作られるという場合、自然の作用も、社会の作用も、形成的であるといわねばならぬ。」

posited by Mencius can be seen as moral feelings, which are united with rationality as postulated by Kant. (Lee, 2013:54 and 2008:1–48).

I suggest that the VES perspective can be strengthened through incorporating Miki's concept of bodily pathos. When we view the body as a subjective as well as an objective tool, we can see that it not only connects people through pathos, but also helps open up new pathways for enhancing and enriching morality. In *Introduction to Philosophy*, Miki reiterates, for example, that unlike animals the bodies of human beings can adjust to their physical environment intellectually as well as instinctively. (MKZ 7:21).

It is also possible to highlight the distinctiveness of Miki's conception of bodily pathos by comparing it with Michael Slote's moral sentimentalism. Both of these thinkers argue that pathos or sentiment are not the ground of morality, and both advocate an agent-based ethics. Miki never used the term 'agent' in his writings. However, we can see that by emphasizing the body as an indispensable component for pathos, Miki does actually put the focus of morality on the agent rather than actions. Slote writes:

In virtue ethics, the focus is on the virtuous individual and on those inner traits, dispositions, and motives that qualify here as being virtuous....Many modern philosophers think of the moral life as a matter of relating properly to moral rules, but in the virtue ethics of the ancient world and in those few instances of virtue ethics one finds in modern or recent philosophy, the understanding of the moral or ethical life primarily requires us to understand what it is to be a virtuous individual and/or what it is to have one or another particular virtue, conceived as an inner trait or disposition of the individual. (Slote, 2001:4).

For Slote, agent-based ethics should be distinguished from agent-focused and agent-prior ethics. Agent-based ethics focuses on "the virtuous individual" as the ground of virtuous acts. By comparison, agent-focused ethics is seen in some aspects of Aristotle's thinking, according to which "non-virtuous individuals can perform good or virtuous acts under the direction of others". (Ibid, 5) Moreover, there is also agent-prior ethics, as advocated by Plato, where, in a certain sense, "the Form of the Good represents a level of evaluation prior to the evaluation of souls". (Ibid, 7).

Miki also advocates an agent-based ethics, although he neither used the term itself nor spoke of virtue ethics in his writings. In his essay, *Ethics and Human Beings*, (「倫理と人間」), published in the journal *Thought* (『思想』) in December 1937, Miki criticizes normative ethics (格率的倫理) as impersonal (没人格). By drawing on the ideas of Henri Bergson, Miki argues that "ethics should be a manifestation of the highest moral thing embedded in humanity, which is a totality that calls out to the conscience of each single human being."¹⁰ (MKZ 5:388).

In a manner that is similar to Slote, Miki suggests that ethics should be derived from virtuous individuals and their inner traits rather than external norms. For Miki,

¹⁰ The original passage in Japanese is: 「ベルゲソンの言葉を用いると、格率的倫理は「没人格的 impersonnellesな社会的諸要求によって命ぜられた命令ordresの體系」であるのに対して、人間の倫理は「人間性のうちに存する最も善いものを現す人間によって我々の各々の良心に投げられた呼び掛け appelsの總體」である。」

without a (moral) conscience, ethics would only amount to something impersonal. In other words, what makes ethics personal is the conscience that is embedded in humanity.

Miki also highlights the importance of feeling or emotion for morality, although he does not prefer using the word sentiment. Unlike social ethics (社会的倫理), which subjugates feelings under rationality, human ethics (人類的倫理) evokes rationality through feeling. By borrowing the distinctions given by Henri Bergson, Miki argues that the former refers to a kind of social order, whereas the latter is derived from human conscience. This is the reason why Miki claims that human ethics resides in pathos, which serves as the consciousness of subjectivity and is fundamental.¹¹ (MKZ 5:387–390) Regarding the relationship between rationality and feeling for ethics, Miki prioritizes the latter. In doing so, it does not mean that Miki disregards the role of rationality for ethics. As seen in *The Logic of Imagination*, Miki intends to unify rationality and feeling for the philosophy of action. What Miki would like to suggest is the question of priority. Having emphasized conscience as the ground of ethics, Miki gives greater emphasis to feeling than rationality.

Finally, while Miki does share an agent-based approach as well as the prioritization of feeling that we see in Slote, what is decisively different in his case – and why his thinking here is deserving of closer attention by virtue ethicists – is the indispensable role that he assigns the body for feeling. Starting with his masterpiece, *The Study of Man in Pascal*, Miki has shown his concern for the body while examining the nature of existence for human beings. (MKZ 1:12) For Miki, the ethical order is established by the body, through which it also invents the virtue of others' bodies. While Socrates postulates the importance of the soul for life, Miki suggests that the body carries the same weight and should not be overlooked. In the case of Slote, moral sentimentalism can be verified by empathy, which is the cement of the moral universe.

In our moral lives (i.e., if we are leading morally good or decent lives), we are concerned about and act on behalf of other people—not just people we know intimately, but others, more distant or at least personally unknown to us, whose distress, misery, or tragic circumstances cry out for our compassion and our help....Empathy is arguable crucial to all these aspects of living morally, and that is what I mainly mean in speaking of it as the cement of the moral universe. (Slote, 2010: 13).

It is true to say that moral sentiment can be seen in the concept of empathy. However, in what way does empathy actually work or function? As a kind of moral sentiment, it is found in virtuous individuals. If we say that we are concerned about other people, it is neither a slogan nor merely a feeling without actions. Even if it is only a (moral) feeling, such feeling is and can only be manifested by the body, not to mention the moral acts that follow. The notion of bodily pathos, as elaborated upon

¹¹ The original passage in Japanese is: 「ベルグソンによると、人類的倫理はこのような起知性的な感情にかかわり、それに反して社会的倫理はむしろ知性下的な感情に関係している。そこで我々の言葉を用いて説明するとこういうことになる。倫理はパトスのうちにある。パトスは客體とはどこまでも秩序を異にする主体の主體性の意識として根源的であり、従って深いパトスは表象によって土台付けられているという如きものではない。人間的倫理は本来このような深いパトスに根差すのでなければならぬ。」

by Miki, is therefore deserving of greater attention from virtue ethicists. For Miki, pathos cannot and should not be detached from body. This understanding can serve to further strengthen or even enhance the potential of Slote's moral sentimentalism. The agent for moral actions is not merely a subject without flesh, especially in the case of the empathy that Slote discusses. I suggest, therefore, that Miki's concept of bodily pathos may help substantiate how an agent can be empathetic to others.

5 Concluding Remarks

By way of some final remarks, I would like to conclude by briefly outlining why virtue ethics may be a better and more fruitful way for reading Miki's notion of bodily pathos. For this purpose, I shall focus on the other two main normative ethical theories, namely, utilitarian and deontological ethics.

In the case of utilitarianism, telos and consequences, especially pleasure and pain, are the two main concerns for value judgment. As explained above, with his concept of bodily pathos, Miki aims to overcome the shortcomings of logos, which is seen as something which focuses on attaining the objectivity of things. Miki argues that the pathos which is embedded in the body is an indispensable component of logic itself as well as the logic of action. In saying so, bodily pathos can of course also entail pleasure and pain. However, Miki is not interested in building up his logic of action based on telos or consequences. Rather, Miki is concerned about the question of how pleasure and pain are found; that is, their ground, or logic.

What about deontological ethics? Miki's bodily pathos is neither a categorical imperative nor the good as such. Although Miki would like to formulate a ground or logic for action through the concept of bodily pathos, he does think that it is an obligation for human beings. Neither the body nor pathos is a duty or a good as such, but merely a source of action alongside logos. Moreover, if bodily pathos is considered as a kind of virtue, it may be possible to interpret it as a virtue for ethics, which is a good as such. Debates between deontological ethics and virtue ethics on the idea of virtue continue. There may be room for reconfiguring Miki's bodily pathos by way of deontological ethics in the future.

In short, by advocating virtue ethics as a fruitful way to read Miki's concept of bodily pathos, I wish to draw attention to how bodily pathos can help human beings become moral. The value of this approach, I suggest, is visible in the case of the concept of habit, or what I term 'habitual ethics', which Miki addresses.

In his book *Notes on the Theory of Life* (『人生論のノート』), Miki points out that habit, or bodily habit to be more precise, is the key for morality (道徳). The forms of actions depend on habit. (MKZ 1:222).

It is important to understand that all morality entails technical things. For us, habit is the most intimate thing, which is a means within our strength. (MKZ 1:228).¹²

¹² The original passage in Japanese is: 「すべての道徳区徳には技術的なものがあるといふことを理解することが大切である。習慣は我々に最も手近かなもの、我々の力のうちにある手段である。」

Nowadays intellect is particularly important even for morality. However, we must be aware that morality is not something that can be attained separately from the organic body, and within the intellect we find habit at work. (MKZ 1:222).¹³

In highlighting the importance of habit or bodily habit (my term), Miki means an internal essential function of life (生命に内的本質的な作用), rather than mere mechanical or physical repetition. (MKZ 1:228) Since it is internal, we should not look for external norms in the manner of utilitarianism for morality. Similar to virtue ethics, virtue is something internal that drives us to be moral. The difference or lesson of Miki's concept of bodily habit is that we have to use our organic body to form our habits. Since it is organic, it is definitely neither mechanical nor physical.

As is well known, habit is also an important agenda for virtue ethics that has attracted much attention in recent years. Miki actually can be understood as a pioneer in this area if his concept of bodily pathos is read by way of the perspective of virtue ethics, which was consolidated in the 1930s. This is especially the case with respects to the notion of bodily pathos, which is unique and significant not only in the context of virtue ethics or moral philosophy, but also for Miki's philosophy itself.¹⁴

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¹³ The original passage in Japanese is: 「今日では道徳においても知識が特に重要になっているのである。しかしまた道徳は有機的な身体を離れ得るものでなく、そして知性のうちにも習慣が働くといふことに注意しなければならない。」

¹⁴ The concept of bodily habit will be examined in another paper.

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