Tanabe Hajime — “Where self-evidence resides”

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Abstract

In this article from 1928, translated here for the first time, Tanabe Hajime examines the concept of self-evidence, mainly in the light of Husserl and Brentano. The author starts out by establishing, through a preliminary analysis of the Cartesian *cogito*, two criteria for self-evidence, namely adequate fulfillment of the intention of *Sosein*, and the coextension of *Dasein* and *Sosein* (being-there, or existence, and being-such, or essence/properties). He then proceeds to consider four domains of knowledge through the prism of the question of their claim to self-evidence: knowledge of mathematical objects, categorial intuition, the ontological proof for the existence of God and finally, outer perception. Dedicating the last paragraph to a critical assessment of Husserl’s account of perception, the author concludes that all self-evidence is founded on inner perception. Outlining a creative appropriation of phenomenology while elucidating the conditions for certainty, this text constitutes an important milestone in a period leading up to Tanabe’s break with Nishida as well as to his critique of Heidegger, thus laying the groundwork for his independent philosophical stance.

Keywords Husserl · Categorial intuition · Perception · Inner perception · Ontological proof · *Cogito*

[273] Descartes’ *cogito, ergo sum* affirms the *Sosein* (*cogito*) and the *Dasein* (*sum*) of the ego¹ in an immediate combination. The adverb *ergo* which ties these to each

¹Ego: 自我 *jiga*. The ego or “the I”. For consistency, we have in all instances translated as “ego”. All notes, including bibliographical references, are established by the translators.

Source text 明証の所在 (*meishō no shozai*), in TANABE 1963, pp. 273–286. Originally published 1928, in 『哲学雑誌』 (*tetsugaku zasshi*: *Journal of Philosophy*).

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other does not mean the logical and indirect mediation between two different states [事態 *jitai*], but expresses the internal and immediate combination of two moments² within the singular and identical state that is *Cogitans sum*. More precisely, in immediate self-awareness [自覚 *jikaku*] through inner perception, the state of *Dasein*, i.e. *sum*, fully coincides in extension with the state of *Sosein*, i.e. *cogito*, and loses its own independence as something that exceeds this <*Sosein*>; *cogito* precisely includes *sum*, in other words, it means nothing other than *sum*. Thus, as the *cogito*, which takes *dubito* as one of its modalities [様態 *yōtai*], cannot – however much it doubts everything – be doubted, it at the same time makes the *sum*, which is implied in it, a state of indubitable and immediate certainty; here, the self-evidence of the above thesis comes about. In other words, the fact that the *Soseinsmeinen*³ of the *cogito*, which implies the *Daseinsmeinen* of the *sum*, is immediately, adequately fulfilled by the intentional act in any consciousness, is nothing other than the self-evidence of *cogito, ergo sum*. The being [存在 *sonzai*] of a thing cannot exhaust its *Sosein* which appears in the idea of the thing. Although the *Sosein* – which simply appears in the idea – transcends the distinction between truth and falsehood, room for falsehood arises when the *Sosein* is judged as pertaining to the thing and brought into relation with a *Dasein* which cannot exhaust it; it is exposed to doubt and loses its self-evident character. The being of the ego, on the other hand, does not come about by transcending its immanent *Sosein* but is implied in <this *Sosein*>, and insofar as its *Sosein* is necessarily adequately fulfilled as *cogito* in any consciousness, the *Sosein* and the *Dasein* of the ego form an identical and self-evident state. We might say that, understood in this way, the self-evidence of the *cogito, ergo sum* is established in the adequacy of the intentional fulfillment of the *Sosein* which implies the *Dasein* of the ego.

On the other hand, however, since to begin with *Sosein* is what is distinguished from *Existenz* under the term of *Essenz*, it is necessarily something free from *Dasein* (*daseinsfrei*),⁴ and affirming that it implies *Dasein* may thus seem to be in contradiction with the true nature of *Sosein*. Ontologically speaking, *Sosein* corresponds to the modality of possibility [可能 *kanō*], and *Dasein* corresponds to the modality of reality [現実 *genjitsu*]. Since the possible remains possible only insofar as it does not attain reality, [274] one may wonder if saying that it implies reality does not mean abandoning the essence of possibility. However, the self-evidence of *cogito, ergo sum* comes about where this seemingly contradictory combination becomes an immediate certainty. *Sosein*, which in normal cases is free from *Dasein* (*daseinsfrei*) here immediately implies *Dasein*; possibility which in other cases cannot in general attain reality, is in this case immediately reality; this is the foundation for the self-evidence of this proposition. In the state of immediate self-awareness expressed in this proposition, the *daseinsfreie*, essential meaning, which establishes itself in itself, instantly appears – insofar as it becomes intended⁵ – accompanying the fulfillment of the *daseiendes*

² Moment: 契機 *keiki*, i.e., a dialectical rather than temporal moment: *das Moment* rather than *der Moment*. (Cf. YAMAUCHI, 2020, p. 52, footnote.)

³ I.e., intention of being-such, just as, further down, *Daseinsmeinen* refers to intention of existence. A. Meinong had distinguished between *Seinsmeinen* (intention of being) and *Soseinsmeinen* in MEINONG 1910, §§ 45–46.

⁴ Free from *Dasein*: *daseinsfrei*なる – *daseinsfrei naru*. Whenever the structure of the sentence does not allow for the direct integration of “*daseinsfrei*”, we have adopted this translation, conserving the composite German term used by Tanabe in parenthesis. For freedom from existence (*Daseinsfreiheit*), cf. MEINONG 1907, p. 33 *et passim*.

⁵ Becomes intended: 志向せられる *shikō serareru*. I.e., becomes the “object” of intentionality.

cogito. The fact of intending⁶ a merely possible *cogito*, in fact means adequately accomplishing [現前する *genzen suru*] the *cogito*, and this is precisely to establish, at the same time, the ontological state [存在事態 *sonzai jitai*] of *sum*. And since self-evidence originally means the modality of immediate certainty of judgment in consciousness, insofar as it relates to the problem of self-evidence, it goes without saying that *Sosein* is something intended. The self-evidence of *cogito, ergo sum* is established because: 1) an intention of *Sosein*, i.e. *cogito*, accompanies the adequate fulfillment of <intentionality>, 2) the *Sosein* of *cogito* fully coincides in extension [外延 *gaien*] with the *Dasein* of *sum*; they can only be distinguished in intension [内包 *naihō*] as the relation between centrifugal and centripetal, outwards and inwards; consequently, *Sosein* immediately implies *Dasein*. In short, one can say that the self-evidence of this proposition relies on the fact that the *Sosein* of the ego, which appears adequately in the mind of the judger [判断者 *handansha*] thinking this proposition, immediately implies *Dasein*.

Brentano analyzes the self-evidence of inner perception, and explains that the identity of the knower and the known is insufficient for this self-evidence to be established; it only comes about when the consciousness of this identity is added.⁷ It may seem, at a glance, that my analysis in the above differs entirely <from Brentano's>, but on closer consideration <the two standpoints> perhaps rely on [帰する *ki suru*] one and the same idea. When we know an object, we always know it through its *Sosein*. If we can take the *Sosein* that has appeared to consciousness to be pertaining to the knower as the mediation of the knower's knowing,⁸ then the object must indeed be the known as opposed to <the knowing>. [275] In this sense, what I call the implication of *Dasein* in *Sosein* can, as their coincidence in extension, be understood as what Brentano calls the identity of knower and known. Or more precisely, we can call it the identity of the intending and the intended.⁹ However, as mentioned above, this does not suffice for the self-evidence of self-awareness to come about. The additional fact that the intention of the *Sosein* of the ego immediately attains adequate fulfillment through the act of intentionality itself, is a necessary condition for establishing this <self-evidence>. But the adequacy of the fulfillment of intentionality of *Sosein* is necessarily mediated by a consciousness of this fulfillment, and must also adequately fulfill the *Dasein* implied in this *Sosein*. Brentano's so-called "consciousness of identity" must also be none other than this mediating consciousness of fulfillment.¹⁰ Considered in this manner, one can say that his analysis and my analysis arrive at almost the same place. Be that as it may, I believe that, when examining self-evidence of other types of knowledge [認識 *ninshiki*], my above analysis of the self-evidence of self-awareness can be a relatively convenient guide to discovering where self-evidence resides. Descartes' *cogito, ergo sum* was already claimed as a fixed Archimedean point for all of knowledge. Thus, Brentano affords the same position to inner perception. Following in their footsteps, I would like, on the basis of the above analysis, to consider the self-evidence pertaining to other types of knowledge one by one.

⁶ Intending: 志向すること *shikō suru koto*. I.e., taking ... as object of intentionality.

⁷ Cf. BRENTANO 1928, p. 6.

⁸ The mediation of the knower's knowing: 知るものの知る媒介 *shiru mono no shiru baikai*. Or "the knowing mediation of the knower".

⁹ The intending and the intended: 志向するものと志向せられるもの *shikō suru mono to shikō serareru mono*. In other words, the "subject" and "object" of intentionality.

¹⁰ Mediating consciousness of fulfillment: 媒介の充実意識 *baikai no jūjitsu ishiki*.

Seen from the criterion of the immediate implication of *Dasein* in the object's *Sosein*, what first draws our attention is, needless to say, the type of knowledge that can generally be called *Eidetik*, *Ontologie*, or *Gegenstandstheorie*.¹¹ I do not currently have the time to discuss these in depth, so I only mean to take into consideration what is most representative, <namely> pure mathematics, the *Erkenntnischarakter*¹² of which is today at the center of debate. As evidenced by the fact that all that can be called *Ontologie* or *Gegenstandstheorie* can be seen as science of *Sosein*, it is normal to think of the objects of these sciences – especially mathematics – as *ideale Gegenstände* which, as such, do not have *Dasein* beyond their *Sosein*, their *Sosein* directly implying *Dasein* (which is of course not *reales Sein*, but *ideales Sein* in a specific [固有 *koyū*] *ideale Region*). [276] According to the proponents of Kantian transcendentalism, in mathematics, possibility is reality, and the possibility of the transcendental synthesis directly means the being of the object, and the *Dasein* of the mathematical object does not transcend its *Sosein* or come about outside of this *Sosein*. One might think that, relating to the foundations of mathematics, researchers in axiomatic formalism¹³ today represent this standpoint in the clearest way. According to this perspective, if the relations of the objects defined by an axiom do not formally contain mutual contradictions, such objects exist mathematically. In other words, taking the *Dasein* of the mathematical object as implied in its *Sosein*, precisely means understanding the non-contradictory definition of the latter as directly leading to the self-evidence of the former. Of course, even though it is a mathematical object, as an object it is a “thing” in the broad sense of the word; thus, as its essence, *Sosein* is inherent in it, whereas *Dasein* is not a property inherent in it, but a qualification of the “things” themselves; needless to say, therefore, *Sosein* and *Dasein* differ in intension. This is also true for the ego. In the case of both mathematical objects and the ego, *Sosein* and *Dasein* coincide in extension, the former implies the latter, and the independence of the latter exceeding the former disappears. It is in this sense that it can be said that *Sosein* implies *Dasein*, and axiomatics¹⁴ can be understood as accepting this as the self-evidence of the being of mathematical objects. However, the self-evidence of *cogito, ergo sum* in inner perception does not only rely on the implication of the ego's *Dasein* in its *Sosein*. Self-evidence does not only come about until the further condition of adequacy of fulfillment of the intention of *Sosein* <is met>. If we now take the standpoint of axiomatics, mathematical objects can be understood as immediately capable of self-evidence of being¹⁵ due to the implication of their *Dasein* in their *Sosein*; but as O. Becker has shown in detail, as an interpretation of mathematical being <this standpoint> still inevitably remains insufficient. As is well known, already Descartes accepted that it was not impossible to doubt whether all of mathematics was not caused by an evil demon's deceit, and taking mathematical self-evidence to be incapable of standing by itself, he grounded it on the veracity of God. The mere implication of *Dasein* in *Sosein* is insufficient for self-evidence to come about. It further requires, in addition, the adequacy of the fulfillment of the intention of *Sosein*. [277] The self-evidence of

¹¹ *Gegenstandstheorie*: i.e., Meinong's object theory. Cf., for instance, TANABE, 1963, p. 26, 105, 235, 278 for Meinong's object theory.

¹² I.e., character of knowledge.

¹³ Axiomatic formalism: 公理主義形式主義 *kōrishugi keishikishugi*.

¹⁴ I.e., axiomatic formalism, and *infra*.

¹⁵ Self-evidence of being: 存在の明証 *sonzai no meisshō*.

mathematical being is first established when, in consciousness, the path that intuitively fulfills the intention of the axiom, which defines the *Sosein* of the object, is given. This is precisely the assertion of intuitionism against axiomatic formalism. With regard to the opposition of formalism and intuitionism, which is today becoming an important point of debate, the theory of axiomatics still seems, in the light of the question of self-evidence, to be lacking in some respects, and I thus wonder if the standpoint of intuitionism is not more concrete. Be that as it may, it is no doubt legitimate to attach importance, as does intuitionism, to the approach of intuition for the constitution of the object in consciousness. And for the same reason, it is not when purified in the direction of logicism, but rather tied to transcendental aesthetics – rejected as impure from this standpoint <i.e. that of logicism> – that Kant’s transcendentalism offers a more concrete understanding of the foundations of mathematics. The being of the mathematical object cannot acquire self-evidence by the simple fact that *Sosein*, understood ontologically as possibility [可能態 *kanōtai*] implies *Dasein*. In the standpoint immanent in consciousness, the fulfillment of intuition must be given. Can the intention of the *Sosein* of mathematical objects thus truly be adequately fulfilled? If we were to take that to be the case, how would such a fulfillment be possible?

Taking mathematics to be a knowledge of “relations between ideas” which has nothing to do with the real being [実在 *jitsuzai*] of objects, Hume placed the certainty of this knowledge outside of <the realm of> doubt. This is due to the fact that he thought of these so-called “relations between ideas” as immediately established in reflection. But simply reducing, in the manner of Locke, this reflection to the inner perception that is the reflection on an act, is, according to Husserl, a *grundirrige Lehre*.¹⁶ Thus, Husserl replaced this <theory> with his original theory of categorial intuition. On this basis, the logical categories or mathematical objects, which we think of as *ideale Gegenstände*, and their relations, are never simply produced by reflecting on acts. What is produced in this way is only the conceptual objectification [対象化 *taishōka*] of such different acts as perception and judgment. [278] The establishing of *ideale Gegenstände* corresponds to the establishing of higher-order acts (or so-called founded acts)¹⁷ when the representations¹⁸ of outer perception, or the representations of memory and imagination based on them, are reflected through inner perception in their representational acts and are further synthesized; and in the objectival aspect,¹⁹ taking the representations of outer perception as its basis, <the establishing of *ideale Gegenstände*> relies on the formation of higher-order objects as the synthesis and formation of these <representations>. *Ideale Gegenstände* are not mere products of reflection, but the product of higher-order acts founded on the synthesis of reflected acts. Their fulfillment of intention occurs mediated by the fact that the inner perception – entering into the synthesis of acts as the founding act – acts [はたらく *hataraku*] as the so-called

¹⁶ I.e., a fundamentally erroneous theory. Cf. HUSSERL 1968, p. 139.

¹⁷ Cf. HUSSERL 1968, p. 145.

¹⁸ Representations: 表象 *hyōshō*, i.e., *Vorstellungen*. This German term is traditionally translated as “presentation” in the phenomenological literature in English, while *Repräsentation* (see below) is translated as “representation”; a literal reading of the corresponding Japanese terms used here by Tanabe (respectively 表象 and 表現 *hyōgen*) obliges us to invert the relationship.

¹⁹ Objectival aspect: 対象の側面 *taishō-teki sokumen*. Objectival, i.e., pertaining to the object, *Gegenstand*, rather than “objective” (客観的 *kyakkan-teki*, i.e. the opposite of “subjective”) – a term which does not appear in this text.

categorial presentation.²⁰ The higher-order intuition founded on this reflective synthesis, thus mediated by inner perception, is none other than categorial intuition. For Husserl's knowledge of *ideale Gegenstände*, and therefore for all knowledge, this is the important point of the theory of categorial intuition; on the one hand, it clearly corrects Locke's and Hume's psychologicistic theory of reflection, and on the other hand, it compensates for the shortcomings of Meinong's object theory, which, ignoring the synthesis in reflection of acts, merely explains the *Fundierung* of the object; <as such,> we must recognize <categorial intuition> as an important discovery. There can be no doubt that also for the detailed interpretation of the thought of the synthesis of apperception, which appeared in the theory of transcendental deduction in Kant's *Critique of [Pure] Reason*, this is an extremely fruitful perspective. If we in this way generally take the knowledge of *ideale Gegenstände* to be founded on categorial intuition, then the self-evidence of the knowledge of mathematical objects should also somehow be predicated on the adequacy of the categorial intuition. Now, what mediates categorial intuition is inner perception. In inner perception, the basic act is reflected, distinguished, and synthesized in various relations; while the immediate consciousness of this synthesis itself corresponds to the objectival aspect and comes about through the outer perceptual presentations of objectival foundation, it is not bound by the *Was* of this objectival foundation, but as it only relates to this general objectness,²¹ the fulfillment of categorial intuition comes about. Thus, the fulfillment of categorial intuition differs from the case of the *cogito*, where a single act of consciousness directly and necessarily fulfills intention through this <very> act: we can recognize that <the fulfillment of categorial intuition> relies on the synthetic correlation of multiple acts mediated by the identity of self-awareness. Consequently, the self-evidence <of categorial intuition> is not direct²² and necessary, like that of *cogito, ergo sum*, but must be indirect and postulatory. However, [279] this so-called indirectness is not separate from the direct *cogito, ergo sum*; it is indirect in the sense that it unfolds an internal moment within the latter, and that what is *an sich* it makes *für sich*. In the above, I took *cogito* and *sum* as coinciding with each other in extension, and conceived of them as distinguished in intension as centrifugal and centripetal, as inwards and outwards; but while this [i.e., categorial intuition] unfolds the intensive distinction and really distinguishes multiple *cogito* corresponding to different types of *cogitationes*, what unifies all of these as acts of the ego is none other than the *sum* as the identity of self-awareness. Rather, simply extracting a single act, *cogito, ergo sum* is the result of abstraction; in reality, it is immersed in the infinitely developing *cogito*, and this unifying direction²³ can be called *sum*. Thus anticipatorily implying the infinite development, and evidencing [自証する *jishō suru*] the identity of self-awareness, it indeed differs from the case of a single real act: the adequate fulfillment which grounds self-evidence is not direct and necessary; in a sense, it must be indirect and postulatory. But insofar as what is indirect and postulatory is none other than the necessary development of the direct and necessary, the adequacy of the latter guarantees the adequacy of the former. Despite being

²⁰ Categorial presentation: 範疇的表現 *hanchū-teki hyōgen*, corresponding to *kategoriale Respräsentation* (cf. Husserl 1968, p. 165 *et passim*.)

²¹ Objectness: 対象性 *taishōsei*. I.e., *Gegenständlichkeit* or the vis-à-vis that characterizes the object (*Gegenstand*) as such, rather than objectivity (*Objektivität*), i.e., independence of the subject.

²² Direct: 直接的 *chokusetsu-teki*, generally rendered as “immediate” in this text, but to make the contrast with “indirect” (間接的 *kansetsu-teki*) clear, we deviate from the rule in this passage.

²³ Unifying direction: 統一の方面 *tōitsu-teki hōmen*. “Unifying direction” or “unifying aspect”.

indirect and postulatory, it does not accept the uncertainty of the anticipation of perfect fulfillment, but since it only renders manifest the developmental aspect²⁴ which resides within adequate fulfillment, it can be understood as being always in the process of reaching adequate fulfillment (which, however, is not yet reached). Thus, we can say that mathematical self-evidence is established insofar as it takes part in the self-evidence of inner perception. Not as external objects, but as presentations of the acts of the ego and their synthesis, can the formation [生成 *seisei*] of numbers and their fundamental relations endow axioms about them with self-evidence. Mathematical intuition must be the self-awareness of the synthesis of acts of the ego which takes presentation as mediation. Consequently, its foundation is to be found in the concrete *cogito*. Only thus can the being of mathematical objects attain self-evidence. Without this self-evidence of self-awareness, taking the implication of *Dasein* of mathematical objects in their *Sosein* as foundation in a merely ontological manner, the axiomatic formalism which asserts their being, is nothing but a type of *Ontologismus*. The *Ontologismus* must be expelled from such *ideale Wissenschaften* as mathematics. The achievements of intuitionism can be said to contribute to this <expulsion>.

[280] The most representative example of the so-called *Ontologismus* is, needless to say, the ontological proof [証明 *shōmei*] of the existence [存在 *sonzai*] of God. Here the existence of God is asserted due to the fact that the *Sosein* of God, the most perfect being,²⁵ implies *Dasein*. It is not necessary to explain once again that this assertion cannot be accompanied by any kind of self-evidence as it is. Nevertheless, it is worthy of our attention that this argument, in a particular sense interpreted from a particular standpoint, seems to have, at least to some degree, a claim to self-evidence. Of course, the mistake in this argument stems from the so-called *Ontologismus* which leaps from the ideal *Sosein* to the real [實在的 *jitsuzai-teki*] *Dasein*; therefore, if, on the one hand, we can take *Sosein* not as ontological possibility but as adequate intention which can be fulfilled by intuition, then on the other hand, by liberating *Dasein* from the sensible intuition of outer perception and interpreting it as a manifestation of the infinite absolute in our own lived experience,²⁶ we avoid the above-mentioned mistake, and to that extent, <the argument> can claim self-evidence. The immanent interpretation of the ontological proof, the path for which was opened up by Descartes and which culminated in Hegel's defense of it, seems to be similar to this. However, in our lived experience as finite and imperfect [beings], as the so-called *Ideal*, God – the infinite and absolute perfect being – forever leaves an intentionality which exceeds fulfillment; here is the reason why the chasm of this proof, unable to attain perfect self-evidence, can only be filled by religious belief. Under these conditions, we must say that the so-called *ontologischer Gottesbeweis* can, on the contrary, overcome *Ontologismus* and attain self-evidence. Hence, the ground for self-evidence is none other than inner perception.

I just mentioned the emancipation of God's *Dasein* from the sensible intuition of outer perception as a condition for preserving the self-evidence of the ontological proof of God's existence, but why is this condition necessary? Is it utterly impossible for the knowledge of *reale Gegenstände* – the objects of outer perception for which we can only hope to fulfill the intention through sensible intuition – to be accompanied by self-evidence in its judgment?

²⁴ Developmental aspect: 発展の方向 *hatten no hōkō*. “Aspect of development” or “direction of development”.

²⁵ The most perfect being: 最完全者 *saikanzensha*. Or, to convey the ontological neutrality of 者: “what is most perfect”. This goes for all mentions of “the perfect being”.

²⁶ Lived experience: 体験 *taiken*, which corresponds to the German “*Erlebnis*”.

[281] Descartes understands this as follows: The sensations themselves are beyond <the distinction> between truth and falsehood; the opposition of truth and falsehood appears in the judgments that attribute <the sensations> to real things [實在物 *jitsuzai butsu*] outside the mind, and it is not impossible that we always fall into error in our judgments; and it is only on the ground of God's veracity that we can overcome this danger and correctly judge sensible properties as the determinations²⁷ of real things insofar as they <i.e., sensations> are replaced and presented [置換表現 *chikan hyōgen*] by mathematical ideas that are clear and distinct; however, why can't the knowledge of *reale Gegenstände* possess self-evidence on its own without relying on God's veracity? The reasons for this are as follows. Firstly, even if we try to replace the sensations with mathematical ideas that are clear and distinct, the sensations to be replaced cannot be distinct by their true nature; already for this reason, the determination of external things can never have self-evidence. But even if we remove this difficulty by giving priority to mathematical constitution, by subordinating to it sensible contents, which cannot be shown to be in accordance with it, and by explaining their indistinct character on the grounds of the limitations of our sensible faculties, the second and more important difficulty <remains>: the *Sosein* of *reale Gegenstände* cannot exhaust their *Dasein*. Since they are already called *reale Gegenstände*, their *Dasein* must be a non-ideal transcendent being [超越的存在 *chōetsu-teki sonzai*]. Thus, their determination is not a merely ideal *Sosein* but a *Sosein* which pertains to transcendent being. Here, in the judgment that determines *reale Gegenstände*, there is inevitably a leap from immanence to transcendence, and here is the reason why the *Dasein* of *reale Gegenstände* always necessarily exceeds <their> *Sosein*. To this, someone might object as follows: Since the word *Sosein* does not refer to ideal and immanent consciousness, but to the meaning which the idea intends,²⁸ the *Sosein* itself is not merely something immanent, but transcendent; hence, the so-called real things outside the mind to which it [*Sosein*] should belong are, if critically considered, nothing but the limit of the synthesis of *Sosein*. Therefore, after all, *Dasein* comes about in the infinite series of *Sosein*; and in no point does it [according to this objection] essentially differ from the case of *ideale Gegenstände*. However, between the fact that, in *ideale Gegenstände*, their *Dasein* is implicated in the finite *Sosein*, and the fact that the *Dasein* of *reale Gegenstände* constitutes the limit of the synthesis of an infinite series of *Sosein*, there is an essential difference which cannot be reduced to unity. This is because, while the infinite requires the endless [282] and has as its essence the unattainability of the limit, the finite is characterized by the attainment of completion. Even if, by means of the infinite series, we reflectively homogenize²⁹ the qualitative difference between *real* and *ideal*, which are immediately distinguished, in reality, the qualitative opposition between the negative and positive, in the form of the infinite and the finite, still remains, and it can never be entirely erased. The fact that, in *ideale Gegenstände*, a *Sosein* of finite order contains *Dasein*, while the *Dasein* of *reale Gegenstände* comes about only in a *Sosein* of infinite order must mean that the two cases are essentially opposed and different. Thus, the negativity of negation [否定消極性 *hitei shōkyokusei*] which the latter infinite implies, i.e., the synthesis of *Sosein*, no matter how many *Sosein* it contains, cannot exhaust the *Dasein* of external things; in other words, as the limit of infinite de-termination,³⁰ the being

²⁷ Determination: 規定 *kitei*. Determination or definition (cf. intra., p. [276], [277]). In the few instances where Tanabe uses the term 限定 *gentei* in the present text, we translate "de-termination", in order to draw attention to the synonymy with "delimitation", which distinguishes *gentei* from *kitei*.

²⁸ The meaning which the idea intends: 觀念の志向する意味 *kannen no shikō suru imi*.

²⁹ Homogenize: 同質化する *dōshitsuka suru*, i.e., literally, convert them to the same quality (*shitsu*).

³⁰ De-termination: 限定 *gentei*. Cf. note 27 in the above.

of external things is rather the source of the infinite bringing into presence of the representational aspects³¹, and the fact that, no matter how much the de-termination advances, its core remains beyond the reach [彼岸 *higan*] of de-termination as something transcendent, shows that as thus pertaining to what is transcendent, the *Dasein* of the determination of external things differs entirely in dimension from the ideal transcendence of *Sosein*, and that it cannot be exhausted by the latter. In this sense, it is natural that the determination of things outside the mind, whose *Dasein* cannot be exhausted by *Sosein*, cannot possess self-evidence. Due to the double difficulty mentioned above, the knowledge of *reale Gegenstände* cannot possess self-evidence. This just means that in outer perception of *reale Gegenstände*, it is impossible to satisfy the two conditions that, in my analysis of the self-evidence of *cogito, ergo sum*, I distinguished as the adequacy of intentional fulfillment of *Sosein* and *Dasein*'s implication in *Sosein*. From this point of view, we can confirm the validity of the above analysis of self-evidence. Outer perception lacks both of the two moments of self-evidence. Husserl explains that in outer perception, both the side of intensional discernment and that of extensional expansion always contain change, development, and transition, and they are accompanied by contours that are not currently fulfilled but will be fulfilled in the future; the fact that he took the so-called *Abschattungen*³² to be the essence of <outer perception> also seems fitting in this regard. However, in opposition to Brentano's idea that self-evidence is particular only to inner perception, he [Husserl] tries to recognize self-evidence in outer perception as well, and from this point of view, he places outer perception and inner perception on an equal footing.³³ [283] Is this really justified?

Indeed, since the *Dasein* of the object becomes the limit of the synthesis of *Sosein* in outer perception, Husserl clearly accepts that the fulfillment of intention of its being is only an *Ideal*. Consequently, he has no doubt that outer perception cannot perfectly possess complete self-evidence. On the basis of the essence of the constitution of the object, correlated with the temporal structure of consciousness, which Husserl has analyzed in detail, the object of outer perception can be compared – as he has clearly explained himself – to the idea in the Kantian sense, which remains eternally transcendent.³⁴ Despite this, however, he conceives the *Sosein* which appears in outer perception as perfectly and intuitively fulfilled through sensation, and to this extent he affirms that the self-evidence of outer perception is partially established. One can consider that this is what he points out when he distinguishes between adequate and inadequate self-evidence.³⁵ If we adapt this to my analysis, the implication of *Dasein* in *Sosein*, as a moment of self-evidence, does not come about, but the adequate fulfillment of intention of *Sosein*, another moment <of self-evidence>, does come about; and sensation – which can become clear, even if it is not distinct in the Cartesian sense – can be understood as capable of partially and elementally establishing the self-evidence of outer perception. For example, the object “a red thing” cannot be adequately intuited; but the object “red”, as its element, can be adequately intuited through the content “red” as a sensation. However, just as Brentano understood the concept of sensation, in the sense of outer perception, as something which necessarily contains

³¹ Infinite bringing into presence of the representational aspects: 無限の象面の発現 *mugen no zōmen no hatsugen*. Or, “the bringing into presence of the representational aspects of the infinite”.

³² I.e., adumbrations.

³³ Places them on an equal footing: 互格同列を主張する *gokaku dōretsu wo shuchō suru*. Tanabe seems to refer to HUSSERL 1968, p. 238. Cf. also BRENTANO 1924, p. 128–129.

³⁴ Cf. HUSSERL 1913, § 143.

³⁵ Cf. HUSSERL 1913, § 138.

transcendent intentionality, sensation – in the sense of purely immanent material data lacking the intentionality which points to something entirely exceeding itself – is a product of the reflective abstraction of constitutive phenomenology, and cannot be understood as something pertaining to reality. Although we can think of the content of sensation as the limit of subjectivation in the sense of Natorp,³⁶ it must nevertheless contain infinitesimal objectivation,³⁷ i.e., object intentionality. In other words, it bears the direction [方向 *hōkō*] of categorial formation. Material data entirely devoid of intentionality are nothing more than the product of the abstraction and immobilization [静化 *seika*] of this limit from the dynamic tendency of this <direction of the categorial formation>. The red of which we are conscious is not the simple content “red”. It is always the object “a red thing”. Reversing the formation of this “red thing”, it is only when the element which appears at its limit [284] is reflected and abstracted that the concept of the content “red” can be thought. Sensation as the adequate consciousness of content is none other than the product of abstraction and of <the subjectivation’s> being brought to the limit³⁸ in reflection. If this is indeed the case, then, since as an inadequate intentional act, the real sensation is itself the same as outer perception, it cannot possess the power to adequately fulfill <outer perception>; at the same time, despite the fact that sensation, as a product of the extremization and abstraction in reflection, is thought as pure immanent consciousness, what is adequately fulfilled by <sensation> is only the *Soseinsmeinen* of the representation-in-itself³⁹ as *Sosein* (such as “red” in itself); we must then come to the conclusion that <sensation> is not outer perception, which can only have the meaning of perception of *reale Gegenstände* once it has relation to transcendent being. Even if we suppose that the object “red” is fulfilled in the sense of “red”-in-itself, it is not fulfilled as a property of the object “a red thing”. However, this is necessary for the self-evidence of outer perception. Thus, it must under any circumstances be impossible for outer perception to have even the partial self-evidence which Husserl claims for it. Since the self-evidence of outer perception is problematic – insofar as the fulfillment of intention of *Sosein* as property of the transcendent being, which is necessary for <this self-evidence> to come about, is by essence impossible – even if we suppose that the fulfillment of intention of *Sosein* as mere in-itself [自体 *jitai*], separate from transcendent being, is possible, this is not sufficient grounds for affirming the self-evidence of outer perception. In fact, in this case, from the outset, we must not speak of the fulfillment of intention of *Sosein* separate from *Dasein*. Thus, by its essential structure, outer perception cannot possess self-evidence. Knowledge of *reale Gegenstände* does not possess self-evidence due to outer perception; on the contrary, it can take part in self-evidence only insofar as it shares in the self-evidence of inner perception which becomes included in this knowledge, and in the self-evidence of the categorial formation founded on inner perception. Since primary consciousness, which can be exemplified by and founded on outer perception contains, of its very essence, an intention of the object which transcends <this consciousness> itself, the adequacy of fulfillment of this intention remains an ideal and cannot be realized; a sensation satisfying this ideal even partially is an impossible concept. This [adequate fulfillment of intention] is in disaccord with the true nature of the primary consciousness which has transcendent intentionality as its essence; [285] only in inner perception, i.e. secondary consciousness, can adequacy come about through the fact that

³⁶ Cf. for instance NATORP 1965, p. 69.

³⁷ Infinitesimal objectivation: 極微の客観化 *kyokubi no kyakkanka*.

³⁸ Bringing to the limit: 極限化 *kyokugenka*. Or “extremization”, which we favor in the following lines.

³⁹ Tanabe borrows the concept of *Vorstellung an sich* from B. Bolzano. Cf. TANABE 1964, p. 108, 110, 311, and BOLZANO 1837, vol. 1, p. 215 *et passim*.

intentionality necessarily accompanies fulfillment. Considered from this point of view, we must say that Brentano was justified in considering all self-evidence as relying on [帰する *ki suru*] inner perception. In his later years, he revised his early thought, and if his limitation of the intentional object to the *Reales* can be interpreted as emancipating this so-called *Reales* from its meaning in naïve realism by taking it as a transcendent object in the sense of a “thing” in general, then this must indeed be accepted as expressing the essence of primary consciousness. The theory of the modality of representation, by which, out of antipathy for object theory or ontology, he negated *ideale Gegenstände*, and reduced them to the indirect intentionality of *reale Gegenstände*, was still insufficient: already, the consciousness itself of the relation between immediate and indirect modalities, requires the higher-order intentionality of meaning which is neither simply an immediate modality nor an indirect modality, and by no means can it be conceived as sufficient for negating the subsistence⁴⁰ of *ideale Gegenstände* in general. Thus, with regard to knowledge of *ideale Gegenstände*, and to the possibility of knowledge in general, Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition differs from Meinong’s *Komplextheorie*, and it cannot be denied that it pertains to a discovery which should be held in high esteem. But if, as we have already mentioned, the adequacy of categorial intuition can only be grounded on the adequacy of inner perception, then the theory of categorial intuition also accepts, to a certain degree, Brentano’s theory of self-evidence. Insofar as categorial intuition emancipates itself from the foundation of content of sensible intuition (despite its being the primary consciousness), and comes about on the formal foundation of objectness itself alone, mediated by the consciousness of the reflective synthesis that takes place within the inner perception of [this objectness], it can indirectly possess the self-evidence of inner perception. If <categorial intuition> is furthermore related to the content of fundamental outer perception of the Gestalt as a whole,⁴¹ if it binds itself to the task of forming this categorially, and thus partakes in the knowledge of *reale Gegenstände*, then at the same time its self-evidence cannot but lose its perfectness. But to the extent that the self-evidence of this categorial formation is established, knowledge of *reale Gegenstände* has self-evidence. Self-evidence can in general be conceived as something which comes about to the degree of emancipation from outer perception and approach to pure inner perception. [286] I believe that the adequacy of fulfillment as the foundation of self-evidence cannot after all require anything else than the inner perception where the intentional act itself immediately and necessarily fulfills intentionality. In this sense, I cannot but praise Brentano’s theory. Therefore, as is clear from what we have already said, the implication of *Dasein* in *Sosein*, as another moment of self-evidence, is not a relation of ontological states, but a relation of intentional content in the immanent standpoint of consciousness; only when mediated by the adequate fulfillment of intention of *Sosein* can it become a moment of self-evidence, and if the implication itself of *Dasein* in *Sosein* must be established within adequate consciousness, then in the end, we must say that the foundation of self-evidence is nothing but the adequacy of inner perception. In this sense, all self-evidence resides in inner perception, i.e. secondary consciousness. Thus, it seems that we can say that, as required by Descartes, the *cogito, ergo sum* has been ascertained as the true Archimedean, fixed point of knowledge.

⁴⁰ 存立 *sonritsu*, i.e., *Bestand* or *bestehen*.

⁴¹ Outer perception of the Gestalt as a whole: 全体の形態の外部知覚 *zentai-teki keitai-teki gaibu chikaku*. For the translation of *keitai* as “Gestalt”, cf. “On the concept of perception”, in TANABE, 1963, p. 233–239.

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