Mutual desecuritization as a model of détente? Foreign policy change in the US-Cuban dyad

In foreign policy dyads characterized by enmity, mutual desecuritization can serve as a crucial asset for détente. But how does “the way out of the emergency mode” function, considering mutual securitizations over decades? Embarking from theoretical insights provided by second generation scholars on securitization and desecuritization studies, the authors generate a theory-based model of détente for dyads. This analytical tool contributes to the study of the dissolution of historically grown, mutual (re-)securitization processes in interstate relations. By clarifying the impact and functioning of the four desecuritizing modes (replacement, silencing, change through stabilization, and rearticulation), our model allows us to trace dynamics of change and assess the sustainability of détente. Especially mutual desecuritization as rearticulation has the potential to substantially change the self-other relation with effects on the social structure of a foreign policy dyad. The heuristic case study of US-Cuban relations serves as a prime example of a complex dyad of enmity which became a subject of change due to the Obama–Castro diplomacy in 2014. The study on US-Cuban foreign policy issues before and after 2014 helps to sharpen our understanding of dynamic securitization and desecuritization processes. The overall analysis demonstrates that the modes of desecuritization during the Obama–Castro diplomacy lifted the process of détente to a new and unprecedented level.


Introduction
The war in Ukraine demonstrates the importance of studies on de-escalation of bilateral conflicts for both academic research and political practice.Starting from the assumption that security is a social construction, the Securitization Theory tackles political reactions in the face of immediate threats (Buzan et al. 1998).The theory blossomed by, on the one hand, deepening and specifying its theoretical and methodological implications and, on the other, broadening its potential application by placing securitization on a spectrum reaching from securitization via politicization (by desecuritization) to non-politicization.The Copenhagen School was criticized by (critical) securitization studies scholars for leaving the concept of desecuritization underdeveloped.Yet in the meantime, desecuritization studies have paved the way with valuable theoretical and empirical contributions (Waever 1995;Roe 2004; K Hansen 2012; Austin and Beaulieu-Brossard 2018;Adamides 2020).As a followup, we make use of the concept of desecuritization to explore détente processes in dyads.While there are many good examples for studies on domestic desecuritization and foreign policy changes 1 , there is a literature gap concerning mutual desecuritization in state dyads.Neither have inter-unit effects of desecuritizing moves been explored in depth, nor has an interactive process between two (or more) actors been empirically examined.We draw on Wilhelmsen's (2021) argument that securitization is best understood not as an isolated domestic process but as an interactive process in which two (or more) actors react to each other's securitizing moves.In turn, we argue that the study of mutual desecuritization is apt to comprehend de-escalations in state dyads, thereby filling the theoretical and empirical gap in desecuritization studies.
Our second point of departure lies in a theoretical reconstruction of desecuritization as a mutually changing intersubjective understanding of the internalized enemyother.Hence, we add a systemic perspective to securitization theory by conceiving of desecuritization in state dyads as an interactive process with effects on foreign policy dyad's social structure.We assume that interactive processes in dyads imply some sort of collective identity formation, since "social identities and interests are always in process during interaction" (Wendt 1994, p. 386).In the literature, various case studies conceive of securitization and desecuritization in relation to the transformation of identities (Huysmann 2000;Roe 2004;Donnelly 2015).In order to trace a changing social structure "out of the emergency mode" (Buzan et al. 1998 et al., p. 4) and properly evaluate dynamics of (identity) change in dyads, we mainly look at mutual desecuritizing moves and acts, but we also include aspects of the role of audiences in the analysis.Our contribution aims at constructing modes of desecuritization that can be employed as interactive desecuritizing moves, thereby gradually transforming actors' relations.Here, we follow Hansen (2012) who has introduced four ideal-typical forms of desecuritization, namely "replacement", "silencing", "change through stabilization" and "rearticulation".Unlike Hansen, we put these four forms into relation for the purpose of interpreting and evaluating interactive desecuritizing moves.In addition, we specify these categories as détente strategies in state dyads with specific inter-unit effects on the social structure, generating a model of détente. 2  Our empirical ambition aims to consider the US-Cuban dyad as a hard case for détente.Since the freeze in diplomatic relations in 1961, US-Cuban relations were characterized by mutual re-securitizations over a long period of time.This social structure of enmity was continuously reproduced even after the epochal changes 1 With regard to desecuritization in interstate relations, there are insightful empirical studies on unilateral desecuritization processes, for instance, South Korea's desecuritization of North Korean threats (Kim and Lee 2011), Turkey's changing foreign policy towards Syria and Iran (Aras and Karakaya Polat 2008), the Queen's speech in Ireland as an example for reconciliation (Donnelly 2015), or changes in Japan's security policy (Gustafsson 2019). 2 Admittedly, détente is already an analytical term deriving from the history of the Cold War and we cannot do justice here to the extensive literature on the concept.Yet, when describing mutual desecuritization among foreign policy dyads as détente we stick to the core meaning of the term but up-grade it to become a theoretical term denoting different modes of desecuritization as change in interstate relations.ushered in by the end of the Cold War.Yet in December 2014, President Barack Obama and his Cuban counterpart Raúl Castro officially pronounced that the two countries wished to re-establish diplomatic ties.Even when, in 2017, Donald Trump stated: "I am cancelling the last administration's completely one-sided deal with Cuba" (Trump D., 16/06/2017), some features of the former rapprochement remained in place.
By elaborating mutual desecuritization as model of détente and applying it to the US-Cuban dyad, we expect valuable results in two directions: How can mutual desecuritization as a model of détente contribute to comprehending the quality of change in US-Cuban relations?Our "building block study" seeks to comprehend mutual desecuritization in foreign policy dyads (George and Bennett 2005, p. 76, 78).It aims at generating a typology denoting constituent characteristics of a model of détente (ibid, pp. 235-248).By proceeding deductively, we develop the model from a social constructivist ontology in International Relations (IR) and with the help of the theoretical state of the art in securitization and desecuritization studies.Subsequently, we apply it to a longitudinal case study which is apt to enrich and nuance the model.By so doing, the typology generation comes close to a typological theory which should "specify the pathways through which particular types relate to specified outcomes" (George and Bennett 2005, p. 235).
This article is divided into two main parts: a theoretical elaboration on mutual securitization and desecuritization in foreign policy dyads on the one hand and the historical case study of US-Cuban relations on the other.Mindful of mutual resecuritizations in the US-Cuban dyad around 1959 and following September 11, 2001, we place the empirical focus on mutual desecuritization from 2008 to 2016.The time frame covers the new presidencies in both countries which is understood as a possibility for a new political beginning-namely the presidencies of Raúl Castro and Barack Obama.The case study concludes with Trump's roll back as to better evaluate the quality and sustainability of the détente process.Finally, we conclude with a reflection on the applicability of the generated model of détente and with an evaluation of change in US-Cuban relations.

Mutual (re-)securitizations as escalation in foreign policy dyads
When political security issues in interstate relations are securitized, this means that there is a reciprocal knowledge of the enemy-other as being existentially threatening to the own nation state's identity (e.g., liberal or socialist).Corresponding emergency measures come at the expense of "effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules" (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 26).Securitizing moves and acts will likely decrease other states' security in that a set of formalized expectations has been violated, contained in the diplomatic code of conduct and international law.This in turn can prompt counter-securitizations, giving rise to a security dilemma (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 206).Stritzel and Chang (2015) define counter-securitizing moves not only as "a move of resistance against a securitizing move" but "as part of an interactive process" (Stritzel and Chang 2015, p. 551).Wilhelmsen (2021) argues that a process of mutual and multifaceted securitizing moves across issue areas (trade, culture, K diplomacy) leads to escalation in state relations.This is because representations of the other as existentially threatening to the self "send signals of offense and non-recognition across the border to the foreign state audience" (Wilhelmsen 2021, p. 2).From a dynamic, historical perspective, securitization and counter-securitization stages are not conceptualized as single, monochronic and linear processes but as permanent procedures over a long period of time.Therefore, we prefer the term mutual securitizations instead of "counter-securitization" and call it mutual re-securitizations following Adamides' (2020) explanation of constant re-securitizations in protracted conflict environments.Adamides' three-stage framework explains how securitizations become routinized and even institutionalized (Adamides 2020, pp. 58-68).The first stage, "birth", means a pivotal event that inherently securitized the enemy-other political order as existentially threatening to the self-powerful enough to develop new identities.The second stage, "unchallenged period", is characterized by "little or no contestation between securitizing actor and audiences on whether or not specific referent objects are indeed under existential threat" (ibid.).During this period, "negative perceptions vis-à-vis the source of the threats become deeply internalized" and the longer this "unchallenged period" lasts, the more likely there are constant re-securitizations that become institutionalized (stage three) (Adamides 2020, p. 61, 160).In foreign policy dyads, since the nation state's identity and sovereignty are at stake, these kind of securitized interstate relations are captured by a social structure of existential fear.Once institutionalized, the role of audience becomes "at best marginalized or at worst excluded" (Roe 2008, p. 618).As a consequence, deeply internalized representations of the enemy-other are almost impossible to deconstruct because any desecuritizing attempt would contest and affect the "societal routine" (Adamides 2020, p. 63) for actors and audiences alike when dealing with the other.

Mutual desecuritization as a model of détente in foreign policy dyads
Based on a discourse-theoretical reading of securitization, Wilhelmsen and Hjerman (2022) describe a securitization dilemma as follows: "States come to 'know' each other as friendly or hostile through social, discursive interaction.Official political speech that promotes an image of the other party as a threat can gradually naturalize assumptions of hostility, resulting in misplaced certainty and a powerful securitization dilemma" (Wilhelmsen and Hjerman 2022, p. 116) (italics by authors).
How to transcend a securitization dilemma in state dyads?From a social-constructivist perspective the security dilemma is not a dilemma at all because it remains the actor's "choice to phrase things in security (or desecurity) terms, not an objective feature of the issue or the relationship itself" (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 211;cf. Booth and Wheeler 2008;Bilgic 2014).By introducing the concept of desecuritization, the Copenhagen School not only suggests the possibility of deconstructing threats, but also provides an opportunity to find a way "[...] out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere" (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 4).Waever (1995) has pointed out that agents can desecuritize their relations if a securitizing move fails, i.e., if the securitizing actor's speech act is contested by relevant audiences.Using security language can succeed or fail depending on intersubjective conditions (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 80).The stronger the audience's "moral support", i.e., the "stage of identification", (public and institutional) of the securitizing actor's security discourse is, the more likely securitization will be successful (Roe 2004(Roe , 2008)).It follows that both securitization, and, as we argue, desecuritization, are strategic practices because "[...] the success of securitization is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor's ability to identify with the audience's feelings, needs and interests" (Balzacq 2005, p. 148).We resume that desecuritization processes in deeply securitized interstate relations require changing audiences' feelings about the enemy-other in both countries.That is why the role of audiences as another level of analysis should be addressed when studying desecuritization (Balzacq 2005).As Hansen (2012, p. 533) notes, the desecuritizing actor is not limited to political figures in the public sphere and audiences take an important role in the process of shifting the issue back into the political debate.In addition, Adamides' (2020) identifies a "bottom-up" approach of desecuritization when analyzing "audience-driven desecuritization" (Adamides 2020, p. 148).In mutual desecuritization processes, we assume that relevant audiences in both countries may even trigger and push élitedriven desecuritizations across borders. 3hen moving from securitization to politicization via desecuritization, the established discursive elements of the referent object (the self) and threat (the other) is not only contested by relevant audiences but there needs to be an intersubjective change in meaning (desecuritizing move).In securitized state relations, desecuritizing moves by political actors become effective through interaction.We assume that interactive desecuritizing moves in state dyads and a changing bilateral relationship away from enmity are mutually dependent since "interaction at the systemic level changes state identities and interests" (Wendt 1994, p. 384).In short, the systemic social structure defined as the internalized, collective knowledge and belief about essential characteristics of the bilateral relationship will be reconfigured through interactive desecuritizing moves. 4It follows that mutual desecuritization constitutes changing identities since actors learn through interaction at the systemic level.Assuming that US-Cuban relations find themselves in a social structure characterized by an institutionalized "securitization dilemma" (Wilhelmsen and Hjermann 2022, p. 116), we must admit that "[i]dentities and interests are not only learned in interaction, [...], but sustained by it" (Wendt 1999, p. 331).Conceiving of collective identity as a product of human communication and interaction that is not external to the actor but endogenously (re-)constructed (Waever 2002;Zehfuss 2001), is central to our concept of mutual desecuritization as détente.Historically reproduced securi-tized state relations require hard discursive work from both actors since the mutually established "grammar of security" has been internalized and needs to be re-articulated without losing legitimacy. 5Détente is dependent on a variety of interactive desecuritizing moves since not only domestic audiences but also the foreign state needs to perceive the desecuritizing attempts as reliable and respond accordingly.In order to meet the complexity of desecuritization processes in state dyads, we conceptualize a model of détente.In her theoretical reconstruction, Hansen (2012) distinguishes four types of desecuritization: change through stabilization, replacement, rearticulation, and silencing.We build our model on Hansen (2012) but go beyond her theoretical contribution in two aspects.First, we put the categories into relation and expect all of them to be relevant during the détente process.Second, we understand these four modes of desecuritization as discursive strategies between political actors and audiences with distinctive effects on the social structure.The latter is defined here as the institutionalized thinking and understanding of the securitized relation with the "enemy-other".The modes describe détente options of how the pattern of mutual securitization, i.e., referent objects and subjects (the enemyother), can be gradually deconstructed towards a new social structure.Furthermore, we believe that détente is a process requiring a set of discursive strategies that work only through interaction.Unilateral desecuritizing moves without positive reaction from the other actor are less effective and cannot be categorized as détente.

Replacement
The category replacement is based on the assumption that every political community needs a distinction between the self and the enemy-other.For instance, replacement is reflected in Campbell's (1992) concept of national identity consisting of the self as "we" and a threatening other as "them" (Hansen 2012, p. 541).While one threat is no longer securitized, another one enters the public sphere and the former securitization is simply replaced by another.If (re-)securitizations (re-)produce the own identity, then unilateral replacement is a reliable domestic desecuritization option while maintaining a friend-enemy distinction.In state dyads, however, presenting a new threatening issue does not automatically mean a deconstruction of the former enemy-other.Hence, the social structure of enmity remains and change from securitization to politicization is unlikely.

Silencing
Silencing means that a previously securitized issue is not mentioned anymore and disappears off the security agenda.While Behnke (2006, p. 65) argues that an "issue becomes desecuritized through a lack of speech, not through speech acts affirming 5 In ontological security studies, re-securitizations are understood as a strategy to strengthen the actors' collective identity by re-establishing ontological security.This becomes problematic once desecuritization is perceived as a "destabilizing process", undermining ontological security (Browning and Joenniemi (2017, p. 32); Pop and Onel 2023, p. 89).Therefore, desecuritization is a peaceful way of mediating relations of uncertainties (cf.Huysmann 1998, p. 247).Desecuritization can deal with the ontological security problem by re-ordering the self-other relation on the basis of trust and reliability (Bilgic 2014).its new status," Hansen finds this form of desecuritization a difficult option for analysis as it contradicts "the ontological and epistemological status of the speech act in securitization theory" (Hansen 2012, p. 544).However, we follow Guillaume (2018), who understands silencing-as-doing: "Silence qua silere therefore is something that puts stress on a logocentric outlook because it forces us to look anew at the relations that exist between the different players in a language game" (Guillaume 2018, p. 486).
From a strategic perspective, desecuritization as non-politicization means that the state neither wants to deal with the threat, nor does it want to make it an issue of public debate and decision (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 23).Yet silencing and concealment, it should be noted, do not simply mean utter silence, but "can be a form of communication as well" (Schröter 2013, p. 13).For instance, by "trivialization" actors can relativize or downplay an issue to "reduce the significance of the act" (Clair 1998, p. 82).In addition, silencing by framing means to put the issue in another context which should be the main topic.Ideally, this topic-such as border management-looks easier to handle, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) may already be in place (Hering and Stahl 2022).Considering the "language game" (Guillaume 2018, p. 486) as part of securitization theory, we conceive of silencing as a strategic option to initiate ambiguity, an open phase with various possible outcomes.Silencing is either a manifestation of a political standstill that tends to conserve the securitized structure and is open for (re-)securitizations. Or it provides for a political vacuum allowing audiences and agents alike to implement active desecuritizing move(s) with desecuritizing policies.Hence, silencing can either hamper or push the role of the audience who may have the potential to become desecuritizing agents themselves.

Change through stabilization
Considering change through stabilization, Hansen (2012, p. 537) and Behnke (2006, p. 65) note that the concept of desecuritization has been developed from two distinct historical examples of Cold War détente practiced within Europe.First, a détente requires foremost that "parties to the conflict recognize each other as legitimate" (italics by authors) (Hansen 2012, p. 539) and this involves respecting each other's security interests.Change through stabilization is a "rather slow move out of an explicit security discourse" (ibid.).Securitized relations are transferred from a military problem into the realm of political security (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 7).Within this form of desecuritization, actors add new rhetorical elements to the security discourse: sovereignty and diplomatic rules of non-violent conflict resolution.This brings about an opening of political space for contestation of future (re-)securitizations and a call to desecuritize domestically as well as internationally, hence activating desecuritizing agents among the audiences.Such desecuritizing moves may result in politics of politicization, but the old social structure remains, for the conflict is not solved as the grammar of security possibly "still looms in the background" (Hansen 2012, 538).With respect to its effect on the quality of change this mode is more substantial than silencing or replacement, but the own national identity is still perceived as incompatible with the other and (re-)securitizations are possible.

Rearticulation
The category rearticulation takes up the conceptual relation between desecuritization and identity already hinted at above: "[a]n issue is moved from the securitized to the politicized due to a resolution of the threats and dangers that underpinned the original securitization" (Hansen 2012, 542).To rearticulate a relationship requires critical self-reflection in order to re-frame the self-other relation and to "actively offer[ing] a political solution to the threats, dangers, and grievances in question" (Hansen 2012, p. 542).Such a solution qualifies as rearticulation if it constitutes new political relations and not merely a technical solution.The securitized relations are not merely managed but transformed (Roe 2004, p. 285).In other words, agents need to start identifying each other and themselves as something different from enemies and need to stop assessing the other actor's policy and existence as existentially threatening to the self.Desecuritizing moves that qualify as rearticulation need to formulate identities which are compatible with each other (Waever 1990).Thereby, "[p]reviously antagonistic actors realise that their own and others' survival and interests are better served through collaboration, accommodation, and negotiation [...]" (Hansen 2012, p. 543).The conflict is not looming in the background anymore as conflicting identities are reconfigured in a way that enables a political settlement.Rearticulation is the only mode that brings normative and value-based changes, and thus a new social structure away from enmity with the power to change bilateral relations substantially.Nevertheless, rearticulation indicates a sensitive feature: it will probably lead to an audience split.Parts of the audience will stick to the old, deeply believed arguments raised by past securitizations.This represents the structural cost for the achievements of a future politicization of issues and substantial détente.

On methodology
For Buzan et al. (1998, p. 176) "[t]he obvious method is discourse analysis, since we are interested in when and how something is established by whom as a security threat".By now, according to Stritzel and Chang (2015, p. 550), there is a common understanding among securitization scholars that securitization discourse demands a specific grammar of security that includes "existential threat, point of no return and a way out" (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 33).Second-generation scholars stress poststructural elements to securitization theory and rather focus on the analysis of securitizing moves, i.e., whether, how, and under what (historical and intersubjective) conditions a specific grammar of security becomes legitimate.Our research focuses on interactive processes that reveal how conflict actors employ desecuritizing moves with effects on the securitized structure of a dyad, creating something of an upward spiral of détente.Mutual desecuritizing moves in foreign policy dyads are not isolated speech acts but discursive representations with the aim of gradually changing the meaning of the threatening other and the threatened self (referent object).Having elaborated desecuritizing modes for the purpose of coding helps us to identify and evaluate linguistic utterances in mutual desecuritization processes defined as détente in dyads.Discourse analysis allows for the interpretative character of analyzing security language-in-use.That is why we have chosen to integrate all four desecuritizing modes (replacement, silencing, change through stabilization, rearticulation) to the model of détente so as to maintain a level of interpretation having a broad range of possible outcomes with respect to the quality of change.
Sources are selected according to security-related events in the western hemisphere (securitization-discourses) and official statements concerning the relation with the other state (desecuritization discourses) within the defined timeframes (2002-2003 pre-study, 2008-2016 main study, and 2017 outlook) 6 .Cuban data encompasses speeches, interviews, and statements by Fidel and Raúl Castro as well as the Cuban Foreign Minister.Cuban media outlets are also examined, keeping in mind that they will largely express the official party line.US data includes remarks or statements by the President and Secretary of State.The analysis is complemented by secondary literature regarding historical events, emergency measures, and desecuritizing policies.With respect to the analysis of the relevant audiences, élite divisions in the US become relevant when comparing (de-)securitizations over time.Accordingly, opposite views are also mirrored in the relevant audience(s) opinions on US-Cuban relations.This is why we add sources such as newspaper articles, interviews, and opinion poll results.We assume that the Cuban-American community, the business community, and Congress form relevant audiences in the US while the Communist Party of Cuba and the Cuban public are relevant audiences in Cuba.We admit that the role of the audience who may accept or contest securitization deserves more attention than we can provide in our building block study.In addition, we share the insight that there is not necessarily a single relevant audience and the definition of their "acceptance" of the presented threat is underdeveloped (Balzacq et al. 2016;Côté 2016).However, we attempt to fill the theoretical gap empirically when looking at opinion polls and reactions in the US and in Cuba with regard to US-Cuban relations ("moral support" (Roe 2004)) and at legislation by congress or-in the Cuban case-by the support of the Communist Party of Cuba ("formal support" [ibid.]).
In the following, we illustrate interactive (de-)securitizing moves in a historical analysis of the hard case of US-Cuban relations before, during, and after the Obama/ Castro era.

Escalation and mutual re-securitizations after the Cuban Revolution
US-Cuban relations have been caught up in a distinct pattern of mutual re-securitizations since the rise of Castro's nationalist-communist movement in the 1950s. 7he Cuban Revolution represents a pivotal event that inherently securitized the enemy-other political order as existentially threatening to the self, powerful enough to develop new identities.The dramatic event itself gave birth to an unquestionable intersubjective understanding of the threatening other-the US perceived Cuba as a communist, anti-democratic regime with internationalist ambitions threatening the Western political order (referent object).In turn, Cuba experienced the US as an imperial power threatening the Cuban Revolution and its sovereignty (referent object).Historical examples of early emergency measures in Cuba are reforms such as nationalizations of US companies without compensation and a trade agreement with the Soviet Union (Pérez 2003, p. 239).The US reacted by not only imposing a partial trade embargo against Cuba but also by conducting Operation Mongoose and by organizing the Bay of Pigs invasion.In the following decades, the intersubjective understanding of the enemy-other was deeply internalized by the US and Cuban political élites and by the audiences alike.Political élites symmetrically (re-)constructed each other vis-à-vis their domestic publics as existential threats to political order and state sovereignty and even the epochal transformation in 1991 could not change the established social structure of enmity.
By contrast, relevant political élites simply replaced the security issue by presenting Cuba, the former communist-/military-threat, as an authoritarian violator of human rights, threatening the "new world order", namely liberal freedom and democracy (referent object) (Weldes and Saco 1996, p. 389;Schoultz 2011, p. 7, pp. 454-57, p. 464).From a Cuban perspective, the epochal changes and especially the new US legislations were existentially threatening to its national sovereignty and "survival seemed to preoccupy the Cuban leadership" (Pérez 2003, p. 263).

Mutual securitization after 9/11
After the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the US government fundamentally reassessed the terrorist risk and corresponding threat (unilateral replacement) followed by a "macro-securitization" in form of the "Global War on Terror" (Balzacq et al. 2016, p. 499).Undersecretary of State John Bolton opined that Cuba played a central role as a supporter of terrorism "beyond the axis of evil" (Bolton, J. 06/05/2002).Two weeks later, President Bush announced an "Initiative for a New Cuba" that included measures meant to end "tyranny and torture" in Cuba and promote "liberty and life" instead (Bush, G.W. 20/05/2002; Fact Sheet 06/05/2004).The US administration re-contextualized Cuba, the former communist-threat to freedom and democracy, in the War on Terror as a sponsor of terror-ism threatening world peace, freedom, and the US physical survival (Bush G The securitizing moves and corresponding emergency measures were responded to by Fidel Castro in kind.Castro could easily exploit the US' securitization of Cuba to legitimize his regime via counter-securitization.Cuba reacted by presenting the US as a place of terror which professes to be free and democratic, yet in reality fosters "corruption, inequality and injustice" (Castro, F. 10/05/2002;25/05/2002;01/06/2002).A terrorist threat to Cuba's independence, a "breeding ground for counter-revolutionaries and a command post for the most offensive subversive actions against our country" (Castro, F. 06/03/2003).Emergency measures followed in March and April 2003, the so-called "black spring", when 75 peaceful dissidents were incarcerated and three men who were accused of terrorism were executed (Pérez-Stable 2010, p. 50).Castro explained the measures as a necessary reaction to the conspiracy against and subversion of Cuba, led by the US administration and the mafia in Miami (Castro, F 25/04/2003).

Mutual desecuritization under the Castro-Obama diplomacy
Before we focus on joint desecuritizing moves on the bilateral level, we take a look at domestic desecuritizing moves in the US and in Cuba that took place before actors' announcement to reestablish diplomatic ties in 2014.
On the bilateral level, from the beginning Castro and Obama demonstrated their willingness to negotiate with each other, to find a political solution to the conflict and to "move US-Cuban relations in a new direction" (Obama 17/04/2009; Castro, R. 02/12/2006; 24/02/2008).However, any serious initiative had been previously inhibited by the actors' incompatible demands on how bilateral relations ought to be conducted.In other words, threatened referent objects of the securitized relationship impeded the normalization of the relationship.While Cuba agreed to serious talks under the condition of equality, sovereignty, and self-determination only, the United States wanted Cuba to respect human rights while continuing its democracypromoting activities (Castro R. 02/12/2006;23/07/2007;Obama B. 23/05/2008).Furthermore, the release of the Cuban Five (arrested in the US in 2001) became another important Cuban condition, while the US urged Cuba to release Alan Gross, a US citizen arrested in Cuba in 2009 (Castro R. 21/12/2013;Valenzuela A. 2010, 20/05/2010).

Transitional phase of détente
Obama already promised a new engagement with Cuba during his election campaign in 2008 (Zeleny 2008) and from that point onwards, the grammar of security concerning the Cuban threat could not be found in official statements.In turn, during these early years of the détente process, neither the Cuban government nor the Cuban media changed their rhetoric and continuously represented the United States' policies towards Cuba as hostile and aggressive (Mesa
However, simultaneously, there were already interactive desecuritizing moves that culminated in a historic phone call between Obama and Castro in December 2014.First, we observe in both countries a reassessment of threatening issues related to US-Cuban relations in desecuritizing moves and policies, characterized by putting former securitized issues into perspective (silencing by trivialization).The US administration classified human rights-related events in Cuba as "deeply disturbing" (Obama B. 24/03/2010; Valenzuela A. 20/05/2010) and stressed "very serious differences, including on democracy and human rights" (Obama B. and Castro R. 21/03/2016).Obama emphasized "the rights and freedoms that define the Americas, and that should be universal to all human beings" (Obama B. 24/03/2010).The fact that Cuba's poor human rights record was considered in relation to other countries in the region was particularly highlighted (Obama B. 21/03/2011) and years later framed as being "not unique to US-Cuban relations" (Obama B. and Castro R. 21/03/2016) (silencing by trivialization).In March 2011, Obama called on the Cuban regime to act immediately "to respect the basic rights of their own people" but rather for humanitarian reasons than for security ones because "any other country deserves it" (Obama B. 21/03/2011) (silencing by framing).Hence, in the realm of human rights violations, Cuba itself was not presented as a distinct threat to the liberal US compared to other countries which equally lack human rights practice.Another example of putting former securitized issues into perspective is Obama's migration policy.By ending the so-called wet-foot/dry-foot policy, Obama transformed the troublesome issue into the normal: "By taking this step, we are treating Cuban migrants the same way we treat migrants from other countries" (Obama 12/01/2017).The late date of this desecuritizing move suggests that desecuritizing actors employ trivialization as long as there are securitized issues left.On the Cuban side, the grammar of security was still employed; however, there were signs of a toning down, as Raúl Castro pointed out twice that domestic political challenges were more threatening to Cuba than the subversive activities of the US in Cuba (silencing by trivialization) (Castro R. 16/04/2011;29/01/2012).
With respect to US securitizing policies of the past, in 2009 the US Congress "took legislative action in an appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) to ease restrictions" (Sullivan 2018, p. 3).The same year Obama withdrew the restrictions on family travel and on cash remittances from 2004 and in 2011 he announced the further easing of restrictions on educational and religious travel to Cuba (ibid.).In Cuba, the release of 166 prisoners in 2010 and 2500 prisoners in 2011 were legitimized by the government as "a humanitarian and sovereign gesture" (Castro R. 19/04/2011) and can be interpreted as a withdrawal from emergency measures of 2003.

Year of change
In December 2013, Raúl Castro held an astonishing speech about future relations with the US that should be "civilized" and focused on topics of mutual interest.He legitimized his plea for changing relations with the positive opinion among US the Cuban-American community, and Cuban citizens alike (Castro R. 21/12/2013).The changing attitude in the US society was positively recognized in the Cuban media during 2014 (Mesa Redonda 28/05/2014; 04/06/2014; 11/06/2014).The Cuban television stressed the changing attitude in the US towards Cuba as a credible "sign of a change" (Mesa Redonda 28/05/2014).The article ends with skepticism though and finishes with the provocative question directed towards the US administration: "Where does the ball go and will Obama be capable to sign up for an historical goal in US-Cuba relations?"(ibid.).Surprisingly, after 18 months of secret talks (silencing), the actors agreed on a prisoner exchange in December 2014.Soon afterwards, Cuba recognized Obama's announcement to remove Cuba from the black list as well as ending the imposed trade embargo as credible (Castro R. 17/12/2014;20/12/2014).

Consolidation phase of détente
In the beginning of Obama's tenure, the delicate issue of Cuba being a terrorist state was not mentioned until December 2014 when the US president announced that Cuba's inclusion on the terrorist list should be re-evaluated and "guided by the facts and law" (Obama B. 17/12/2014) (silencing by trivialization).Regarding the early emergency measure of 1962, the longest trade embargo's in modern history, the US president demanded Congress to have "an honest and serious debate about lifting the embargo" (Obama B. 17/12/2014).Hence, Obama activates the institutional audience, a formal supporter of past securitizations, to give space for formal desecuritizing policies.The removal from the terrorist list and the contextualization of Cuban domestic issues reveal the US' formal acceptance of Cuba as a legitimate actor.The latter is an important prerequisite for the application of diplomatic rules, international law, and thus for desecuritization as change through stabilization.
Since the phone call between Raúl Castro and Barack Obama in December 2014, the US no longer seems to pose a threat to Cuba, and no statements confirming the contrary can be found.Moreover, Cuban television highlighted the bilateral negotiations in January 2015 as "something historical", considering that the actors treated each other with mutual respect and egality (Mesa Redonda 23/01/2015) (change through stabilization).
Obama's words on Cuba's sovereignty-"We can never erase the history between us, but we believe that you should be empowered to live with dignity and selfdetermination"-not only reveal respect to Cuba's security interest, but also critical self-reflection, a prominent precondition for rearticulation (Obama 17/12/2014).The US president repeated this idea in September 2015 by stating that the United States "believe that Cuba find[s] its success" (Obama 28/09/2015).The remarkable first official bilateral meeting between leaders from Cuba and the US after 50 years finally took place in Panama during the Summit of the Americas in April 2015.Here, both leaders spoke the same diplomatic language, transmitting the same message ("I think that what President Obama has just said, it's practically the same as we feel about the topics, including human rights, freedom of the press [...]") and they jointly "agreed to disagree" (Obama B. and Castro R. 11/04/2015).Finally, at the press conference after the Summit of the Americas, Obama officially explained that K although there are differences, "Cuba is not a threat to the United States" (Obama B. 11/04/2015a;11/04/2015b).
By now, the actors had started assuring each other that they desired a respectful dialogue on all issues including conflictive ones.Common challenges and the benefits of cooperation had been underlined as well (Castro R. 17/12/2014; Kerry J. 17/10/2014; 20/12/2014).Half a year after the historic announcement in December 2014, the embassies were reopened.The accompanying speeches by Cuban Foreign Minister Rodríguez and US Secretary of State Kerry are desecuritizing moves that provide a textbook case of change through stabilization: "There are profound differences between Cuba and the United States [...].But we strongly believe that we can both cooperate and coexist in a civilized way, based on the respect for these differences and the development of a constructive dialogue [...]" (Bruno Rodríguez cited in Kerry and Rodríguez 20/07/2015, italics by authors)."[...] we signed off on an agreement which is in accord with the Vienna Conventions and meets both of our countries' understandings of what is needed and what is appropriate at this moment in time [...] for the moment we are satisfied and we are living within the structure of the Vienna Convention" (John Kerry cited in Kerry and Rodríguez 20/07/2015, italics by authors).
Rodríguez and Kerry point to "differences" in constitutive ideologies while Kerry equally recognizes Cuba's sovereignty as well as the strictly reciprocal nature of this action constituting diplomatic relations.However, Kerry also points to Cuban "obligations under the UN and inter-American human rights covenants-obligations shared by the United States and every other country in the Americas" (ibid.).Yet these common obligations are not securitized but referred to as one of the politicaldiplomatic topics for negotiation.
During Obama's visit to Cuba in 2016, Castro still focused on the profound differences between both countries, recognizing "different concepts about many topics like political systems, democracy, human rights, social justice, international relations, peace and world stability" (Castro R. 21/03/2016).Among these (former) referent objects, he stressed Cuba's view on human rights as "indivisible, interdependent and universal rights" (ibid.).He frames human rights as a special topic and repeats Cuba's ability and wish to keep the initiated dialogue on human rights alive.This is analytically significant since human rights are no longer securitized as ideological veneer of US imperialism, but constitute a common concern (silencing by framing).Moreover, Castro conceives of Obama's visit as "the practice of coexistence that implies to accept and respect the differences and not to put them into the center of the relationship" and he recommends to "rather promote the ties that both countries benefit from and let us focus on those issues bringing us nearer rather than those that separate us" (Castro R. 21/03/2016).By doing so, the Cuban government stresses the compatibility of different ideologies, focusing on mutual interests and continuous communication.This is an important precondition for rearticulating formerly securitized relations and thus, for substantial détente.
Similar to Castro, Obama points to "serious differences, including on democracy and human rights", while recognizing their "universal" character several times.He underlines United States would continue the discussion differences and "speak up on behalf of democracy, including the right of the Cuban people to decide their own future" (Obama B. and Castro R. 21/03/2016).Making sure not to appear as an imperialist teacher, Obama presents the meaning of freedom as politically contested: He acknowledges Raúl Castro's criticism of socio-political "shortcomings in the United States around basic needs [...], poverty and race relations and inequality" as well as Castro's emphasis of "decent education", "health care" and "basic security in old age" (ibid).In this way, Obama's substantive recognition of the other's diverging view also constitutes a formal recognition of sovereign equality.The latter is explicitly acknowledged by Obama earlier: "Cuba is sovereign and, rightly, has great pride.And the future of Cuba will be decided by Cubans, not by anybody else" (Obama B. and Castro R. 21/03/2016).Further shared interests concern, e.g., the environment and human trafficking.They are presented as issues for "frank and candid conversation", i.e., a diplomatic dialogue among sovereign states.

Audiences: desecuritizing agents and critics in the US and Cuba
This élite-driven desecuritization process is-and was so early on-accompanied by an increase of criticism on remaining emergency measures from relevant audiences and civil society actors. 8According to Gallup Poll data, the overall opinion of Cuba within the American society continuously shifted from "unfavorable" to "favorable" from 2006 to 2016, showing the majority of the US society would like to see the terrorist threat coming from Cuba reassessed (Gallup Poll Cuba 2022).In addition, across the United States there were positive headlines regarding economic opportunities of American agriculture and the promotion of trade with Cuba (Meehan 2014).
Cuban desecuritizing moves are accompanied by a more favorable opinion towards the US president among the Cuban people.It is important to note that already in 2011, events in the US such as the civil society "Conference to Call for Cuba's Removal from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism" were perceived as something positive in Cuba: "It was important that academic and civil society sectors with a certain voice and influence in the US political system claim that this [the US' allusion to Cuba as sponsor of terrorism] is an unjust measure" (Carlos Alzugaray cited in Jaime 2011).
As a reaction to Barack Obama and Raúl Castro's handshake at Nelson Mandela's funeral in 2013, a highly symbolic joint desecuritizing gesture, "the streets of Havana 8 For the sake of parsimony, we cannot pay tribute to the role of the interest groups as desecuritizing agents.Among these are the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF 2009) that has been classified as "a key player in working with the Obama administration to shape new policy" (Enrique 2014).Furthermore, open letters sent by Nongovernmental Organizations and private persons urged Barack Obama to end the embargo (Latin American Working Group 2013; Presbyterian Church 2014; Adams 2014).In addition, a letter to Congress was signed by 44 former US officials who insisted on making use of the "window of opportunity" (Adams 2014).
the news with hopes of improved relations" as the US media reported (Rey Mallén 2013).Furthermore, there are two independent polls that were conducted in Cuba after December 2014 that both showed overwhelming support for the normalization of US-Cuban relations: 97% of all Cuban people thought that normalization with the US would be good for Cuba (Partlow and Craighill 2015).Overall, in 2015 Cuban analysts at Mesa Redonda also evaluated the process optimistically (Mesa Redonda (03/03/2015).This is not to say, however, that even after 2014 several skeptical voices persisted, warning of possible dangers for the Cuban Revolution (Mesa Redonda 30/07/2015).For instance, after Obama's visit to Cuba in 2016, Fidel Castro publicly expressed his skepticism about the idea that the United States was no longer a security threat to Cuba (BBC News 2016).These kinds of re-securitizing attempts by one part of the Cuban élite were also prevalent in the US.Not only the Heritage Foundation (Quintana 2015) but also the former presidential candidate Senator Marco Rubio warned that Cuba, the "communist, anti-American tyranny", posed a grave threat to the United States' security interests.Moreover, the US administration's diplomatic engagement "has highlighted divisions in Congress [...]" (Siddiqui 2015).Some members demanded further Cuban commitments to protect human rights, others introduced laws to repeal the US' embargo (Sullivan 2018, p. 42).

Revival of old patterns of securitization: Trump's "roll back"
President Trump employed the grammar of security again, wrapped in the usual Cold-War analogies: Trump deems hemispheric "freedom" and "stability" endangered by Cuban policies, e.g., in Venezuela (Trump 16/06/2017).However, most Cuban Americans, political élites, the majority in Congress, and the business community (audiences) were not in favor of Trump announcing a new US-Cuban policy (LeoGrande 2017, pp.9-12).
The tone against Cuba became more aggressive when National Security Advisor Ambassador Bolton presented Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as "The Troika of Tyranny in this Hemisphere" (Bolton 02/11/2018).In his securitizing move he outlines that "the rule of law, liberty, and basic human decency in our region" (referent object) needs to be defended against "this triangle of terror" that causes "regional instability" and "immense human suffering" (ibid.).In January 2021, a few days before the Biden administration took office, the Trump administration re-designated Cuba as a "state sponsor of terrorism" which automatically implies sanctions against Cuba (Augustin et al. 2021).
It is noteworthy that élite-driven US re-securitizing moves remained unilateral, for securitization was not followed by re-securitization in Cuba-as used to be the case in 2003 and before.The Cuban government did not react to Trump in Cold War terms, but rather focused on the continuation of the established détente process (Cuban Government 16/06/2017).Raúl Castro blocked the securitizing move by "unmasking" Trump's rhetoric as being not in line with the majority opinion of the US American public.Castro, thus, had a credible reason not to employ the grammar of security and he referred instead to Obamas Presidential Policy Directive from October 16, 2016 as the common ground for bilateral relations (Cuban Government 16/06/2017).cancelled this Policy Directive, Cuba repeated to continue a respectful dialogue and in topics of mutual interest, as well as the negotiation of bilateral open issues" (ibid).Specifically, the Cuban government reminded the new administration of the US' "recognition of the Cuban independency, sovereignty and self-determination and the respect of the Cuban government as a legitimate and equal interlocutor" (Cuban Government 16/06/2017).Similarly, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez stated: "The new measures celebrated by old officials and anti-Cuban politicians in the US will not succeed.They know that these stand in contrast to the history and majoritarian will of the US public" (Rodríguez 19/04/2019).
Furthermore, in a press conference held on April 25, 2019, the foreign minister addressed the international community, reiterating: "the will to maintain relations with the US based on equality and mutual respect [...]" and that "actual politicians in the US are not capable to destroy the strong cultural ties between Cuba and the US" (Rodríguez 25/04/2019).

Conclusion: mutual re-securitizations and desecuritizations as strategic interplay in dyads
This article focuses on a better understanding and theory-based evaluation of changing interstate relations.By applying the interplay of mutual securitization and desecuritization, in particular modes of desecuritization, we have proposed a theorybased model of détente in dyads.The analysis of US-Cuban relations serves as rewarding empirical ground for a dynamic protracted conflict situation in a dyad.Let us start with the empirical results concerning foreign policy change in the US-Cuban dyad before theoretically reflecting on mutual desecuritization as model of détente.
The escalated conflict between Cuba and the US was continuously reproduced through mutual securitizations, i.e., interactive securitizing moves and corresponding policies.In our historical case there are various referent objects and securitized issues on the table for desecuritization.While Cuba remained consistent with the representation of the United States threatening the Cuban Revolution and its national sovereignty (referent object), the US employed various referent objects around the issue of liberal freedom in the past decades: Cuba as threatening liberal freedom and democracy; Cuba as a sponsor of terrorism threatening world peace, freedom, and the US physical survival; or Cuba as a threat to hemispheric freedom and regional stability.As a result of our empirical findings we could organize the détente process during the Obama-Castro era into a transitional phase and a consolidation phase.Détente began with mutual desecuritizing moves and policies characterized by multifaceted silencing by secrecy, trivialization, and framing.Change through stabilization as desecuritizing mode only become relevant from December 2014 onwards, entering a consolidation phase of détente.Hence, change through stabilization but foremost rearticulation follow as the crucial modes of change which represent the core of détente in the US-Cuban dyad.The issues freedom and human turned out to be the most sources for fully rearticulating and hence reconciling US-Cuban relations.As the analysis demonstrated, these former highly securitized issues allowed for a bridging of regime differences (a socialist and a liberal nation-state identity), thereby commencing to build a common ground for conflict resolution.
Trump's "roll-back" demonstrates how fragile desecuritization in interstate relations is when having such a long past of mutual re-securitizations.However, while the initiated rearticulation was suspended, the relevant audiences-a willing civil society in the US and in Cuba-stuck to their role as desecuritizing agents, facilitating diplomacy and negotiation.Moreover, the re-securitizations by the Trump administration were highly contested even by the Cuban government who, probably for the first time since 1959, did not react with counter-securitization but who referred to achievements made before.This is a sign for structural change in US-Cuban relations because rearticulation as détente initiated a reconfiguration of conflicting identities.It is exactly this desecuritization resource which provides the Biden administration with an opportunity to re-establish change through stabilization.Proceeding further along the path to rearticulation looks less likely, considering that the growing audience split of the Cuban community in Florida will mean effective political cost for the Democrats at the ballot box.
Summing up the findings regarding the model of détente, we have learned that the pre-study on mutual securitizations is important so as to fully understand the change of meaning of previously established referent objects and subjects as well as desecuritizing policies.Furthermore, we can say that the interactive desecuritizing moves of silencing, change through stabilization, and rearticulation come into play, overlap, and are simultaneously employed while replacement was not relevant in our specific case.As re-securitizations after the end of the Cold War and the most recent re-securitization efforts by the Trump administration reveal, the mode replacement as a unilateral, domestic process can be employed to further institutionalize previous securitizations.As a desecuritization mode in foreign policy dyads, rather joint replacement as a special form of replacement seems to be an interesting exit strategy for the political élite to open a door away from routinized securitizations.What if actors replace their securitizations of the other by a joint issue, like for instance the joint handling of repeated migration crises in the 1990s?Then actors turn into a threatening "we" with effects on their internalized social structure.Moreover, our study on US-Cuban relations suggests that multifaceted silencing, especially secrecy and the trivialization of former securitized issues are discursive strategies for political actors to enter a transitional phase and picking up audiences towards more profound forms of desecuritization (change through stabilization or rearticulation).
Continuing with what we call the consolidation phase of détente requires substantial change among the audiences' intersubjective understanding about the enemy-other.In stark contrast to the other three modes, rearticulation demands hard societal work back home since it eventually demands an identity change: The enmity-other has to be abandoned.In this regard, the relationship between rearticulation and audience split is significant because it reveals that any (re-)securitization which entails politically desired rally-around-the-flag effects in the short-term creates societal burdens in the long-run.The audience disintegrates in different interest groups which hold K different foreign policy.From this perspective, détente the enmity/other relationship from the international domestic realm.
In addition, due to findings on the role of audiences in the US-Cuban dyad, it is worth researching the audiences' influence as bottom-up desecuritizing actor who may not only accept or contest securitization but even promote and demand desecuritization as their own responsibility and preferred option.
To conclude, the proposed model of détente can make sense of long-term relationships characterized by ups and downs of their "culture of anarchy" (Wendt 1999).Due to our theoretical and empirical findings, we suggest that the introduced model of détente is applicable to further dyads characterized by deeply securitized relations (e.g., Israel-Iran, India-Pakistan).Moreover, the analysis of mutual securitization and desecuritization may provide important insights regarding the past, current, and future status of diplomacy.The identified desecuritization modes can function as détente strategies revealing several ways of how to gradually overcome the mutual use of a grammar of security and substitute it by a solid "grammar of diplomacy" with effects on a changing social structure of a foreign policy dyad.This article is licensed under a Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made.The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material.If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

Funding
enabled and organized by Projekt Conflict interest A. Felfeli and B. Stahl declare that they have no competing interests.