Fundamentalism and rigorism in Orthodox Christianity: the case of contemporary Russia

Since the last socialist years and especially the end of the Soviet Union, the importance of Orthodox Christianity has greatly increased in contemporary Russia. Religion is once again an integral part of public life, plays a major role for identity issues and is entangled with the political sphere in a variety of ways. In addition, it is important to underline that within Orthodox Christianity the fundamentalist circles are gaining ground and have a growing influence on society as a whole. Here a specific feature of Orthodox Christianity is visible, which emphasizes continuity with the early Christian Church. This is a very orthodox content of fundamentalism which is called rigorism and indicates that Orthodox Christianity perceives itself as the only legitimate heir of the Apostolic Church. For this reason, special emphasis is laid on preserving this tradition. Specifically, this is illustrated in this article, which is based on two ethnographic field studies in the Russian Federation, by describing the conflict of a company with a monastery and by referring to so-called “traditional moral values” and their relation to family issues. Traditional moral values are becoming increasingly important in the area of the family. Although there are convergences with other conservative religious communities outside the Russian Federation, joint efforts remained problematic and are rejected until today, especially by fundamentalist groups within the Russian Orthodox Church. As a result, a number of goals and aims could not be implemented despite ideological convergences and the rejection of the dominant liberal model.


Introduction
Today, there is a burgeoning literature and scholarly debate on religious violence (Chidester 1988(Chidester , 1991Smith 1990) and a resurgence of fundamentalism with religious foundations in very different cultural settings (Bruce 2008;Emerson and Hartman 2006;Herzfeld 2002;Tibi 2002;Woodberry and Smith 1998). To give just some examples, I would like to mention American Protestants opposing the liberal trend, militant Muslim groups or an increasing Hindu nationalism in India. Whereas these phenomena were largely characterized as fundamentalism earlier, nowadays a number of different terms is used for describing such phenomena. Even more problematic, there is an ongoing terminological discussion and confusion because sometimes fundamentalism has been replaced by or is used in connection to other terms such as conservatism, traditionalism, extremism or militarism. For that reason it is important to emphasize the differences, as it has been done in the introduction to this volume (Pollack et al. 2022). A first distinction relates to fundamentalism and orthodoxy, where the latter is called rigorism in the context of Orthodox Christianity. Following the distinction made in the introduction, fundamentalism will be described as mode of belief here whereas orthodoxy/rigorism refers to the content. Secondly, a differentiation between traditionalism and fundamentalism has been made in the introduction to the volume. Whereas both phenomena relate to the past, it is the claim to universality that distinguishes fundamentalism from traditionalism.
Although this article certainly is no place to discuss the different approaches and positions on the term fundamentalism in full detail, it is worth pointing at some important particularities and ramifications. In the introduction to this special issue, attention has been drawn to four key components of fundamentalism: 1) the claim to exclusive truth, 2) the claim to superiority, 3) the claim to universal validity and 4) the demand to restore the past (Pollack et al. 2022). All four characteristics find resonance in contemporary Russia, the regional focus of this article. Herewith, the article aims to apply this conceptualization to fundamentalism in contemporary Russia and in its relation to Orthodox Christianity, the mainstream religion in the Russian Federation. Moreover, I draw attention to specifics of fundamentalism in contemporary Russia. For this, two cases will be analyzed which are grounded in empirical material from ethnographic fieldwork and additional research.
To be sure, a stronger relation of Orthodox Christianity to politics can be witnessed in contemporary Russia after some of the surrounding states underwent colored revolutions in the early and mid-2000s (Koellner 2021;Freeze 2017;Mitrofanova 2005). As a result, religion in general and Orthodox Christianity in particular became important for identity issues, morality and political mobilization. In so doing, however, some particularities of fundamentalism in relation to Orthodox Christianity have to be taken into account. One of the particularities of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet bloc at large is the re-emergence of religion after decades of self-declared atheism, a process which has been characterized as postsecularism (Parmaksız 2018, Rosati andStoeckl 2012), re-enchantment (Isnart and Testa 2020), de-secularization (Casanova 2001) or de-privatization (Berger 1999;Martin 2005). Since the 1980s, religion re-emerged in the public sphere and today the Russian Federation is considered an important example of this trend towards religion. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the turn to religion in the aftermath of socialism often is very ambivalent, and incorporates highly heterogeneous beliefs and practices (Pelkmans 2009(Pelkmans , 2013. Despite that ambivalence, Orthodox Christianity has become increasingly important for identity and national issues and this re-emergence is fostered from above, but equally welcomed from below (Benovska 2021, p. 56). Accordingly, Sonja Luehrmann interprets such developments in the following way: "what is happening in post-Soviet Russia is thus part of a more general shift of transformational hopes toward religious institutions" (2011:, p. 16). Her findings are confirmed by Douglas Rogers (2015, p. xii), who underlines the importance of religion in many everyday relations and calls this the "post-Soviet cultural front". Religion, then, enters into a specific mixture with national and ethnic identities, an amalgam that Karpov et al. (2012, p. 639) describe with the term 'ethnodoxy', "an ideology that rigidly links a group's ethnic identities to its dominant faith". As a result, demarcation from external groups was fostered, but also an exclusion within states, which primarily affects minorities with whom a threat is associated or who are perceived as fundamentally different (Kolstø 2018). For contemporary Russia, this means that it fell to Orthodox Christianity to provide an identity beyond ethnic affiliations, a moral basis for individual and collective action, and a basis for sacralizing action that can no longer be questioned (Agadjanian 2017;Koellner 2012;Ładykowska 2016;Steinberg and Wanner 2008;Zigon 2011). Therefore, the role of Orthodox Christianity will be analyzed in relation to fundamentalist tendencies and by examining the specific features in contemporary Russia.
With the growing role in public life, Orthodox Christianity also gained official recognition and support by political actors, a situation that has been recognized as entanglement (Koellner 2021). At the latest since President Vladimir Putin came to power in late 1999, religion became important for political initiatives and was favored from above. Some authors even recognize a tendency for the establishment of a national church (Stoeckl 2020a;Stoeckl and Uzlaner 2021). In many different ways, these processes influenced the internal structure of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and today, particularly traditionalist and nationalist orientations dominate within the church (see also Mitrofanova 2014). This is also a result of the political favoring and a growing emphasis on "traditional moral values" as a backbone of Russianness. As a result, liberal clergy such as Alexander Men' enjoyed some popularity as spiritual elders in the early post-Soviet years (Paert 2010, p. 193), but were killed or face serious harassment inside the Church and in fundamentalist circles. Therefore, the last years bear witness of a process where Orthodoxy became increasingly characterized by the incorporation of very conservative, militant and illiberal notions and practices. As early as 2003, it has been stated that nationalists and fundamentalists were the two dominant factions inside Orthodox religion in Russia whereas only a decreasing proportion of liberals remained active and had some influence (Verkhovskii 2003). Although the nationalist faction is considered the biggest within the church, the fundamentalists, nevertheless, have gained increasing importance in the last decade (Golovushkin 2016;Kovalenko 2021;Shnirelman 2018). Although, the Russian Orthodox Church has been described as a political party without being officially registered as such (Verkhovskii 2003), I am rather critical towards such interpretations. Despite the fact that the church has a program with clear political implications and institutionalized connections to the government (Richters 2013, p. 7), I consider this not to be sufficient to consider the church as a party. Reasons for this include that it is not participating in elections and also cautions to fully associate with politics, but at least officially declares a neutral position.
In addition to the particularities described above, there is yet another important connotation associated with fundamentalism in the Russian Federation. In everyday language, Orthodoxy (pravoslavie) 1 is understood not only as a Christian tradition but also as the true and only Christian denomination that needs to be preserved unchanged. Therefore, this article highlights the importance of practices and ori-entations inside Orthodox Christianity in contemporary Russia which have been described as being orthodox in the introduction to the volume (Pollack et al. 2022). As has been said, this refers to the content itself and its relation to fundamentalism as a mode for such beliefs and practices. In so doing, attention is drawn to local specifics of this orthodox content. Characteristics for this are a particularly conservative interpretation of the Bible (Scripturalism) and other more recent texts that put an emphasis on the unique position of Orthodox Christianity in the contemporary world. In the context of Orthodox Christianity, this has been called rigorism (Makrides 2004(Makrides , 2016. The latter, then, is more related to notions of religious authenticity and authority, as I will make clear in the following. In so doing, attention is drawn to the self-declared understanding of Orthodox Christianity as the sole and only legitimate predecessor of the Apostolic Christian church. In this context, rigorism is a crucial content and has specific connotations that add to the understanding of fundamentalism in contemporary Russia.

Research methodology on the "street level" and the field site
Let me now briefly explain my research methodology and the field site. Most of the previous research on the Russian Federation focuses on the national level, trying to understand what President Vladimir Putin or Patriarch Kirill (Gundiaev) intend and what they say. This is seen as problematic here because public expressions are made to cater for the needs of their specific audiences and the real intentions become clear only later. Therefore, this research focuses on the local level. The analysis, based on several years of field research, is able to show the complexities and nuances within institutions, which are neither presented as coherent nor as monolithic blocs. Instead it becomes clear that there are no homogeneous structures and that one should not ignore the different factions, discourses, and practices within the political sector and within Russian Orthodoxy, as has been presented in some previous works (Papkova 2011;Richters 2013;Stoeckl 2014;Verkhovskii 2003).
This research tradition will be continued here and thus the research pays more attention to the regional and local level. This will enable a more in-depth analysis and a better understanding of the complex relationships within organizations, institutions or movements. For this, the method of ethnographic field research was used, which is characterized by long-term stays and first-hand access to the everyday life of people. Thus, the research presented here follows a qualitative research methodology and is based on empirical material collected during two fieldworks (2006 to 2008 and 2013 to 2016) in the Russian Federation. An iterative research approach was chosen and the "ethnographic research cycle" (Spradley 1979(Spradley , 2005 was the main tool for data collection and analysis. In particular, this article draws on participant observation, semi-structured interviewing, and interactions in everyday life with politicians, clergy, believers, entrepreneurs, teachers, employees, and journalists. However, it also needs to be said that I was not focusing on fundamentalist currents inside Orthodox Christianity but on the relation between politics and religion. Furthermore, the research was inspired by Michael Lipsky's concept of "streetlevel bureaucracy" (2010 [1980]). In his analysis, Lipsky examined how policy is implemented in everyday life. In doing so, he convincingly drew attention to the fact that, despite hierarchical structures, actors at the local level, such as police officers, office clerks or teachers, are of considerable importance and have a great deal of room for decision-making and maneuvering. Detelina Tocheva (2017) was inspired by this approach and analyzed the manifestations of religion at the local level. Analyzing the Russian Orthodox Church, she realized that "[there are] practices and relations that are nowhere described [... by] people whose roles are not imagined in the official organization of the Church" (Tocheva 2017, p. 12). This aligns well with the findings of organizational scholar James March (2008), who stated in an interview that "history is not produced by the dramatic actions and postures of leaders, but by complex combinations of large numbers of small actions by unimportant people." Similarly, the aim of my research is to focus on everyday interactions at the local level without ignoring larger contexts at the regional or national levels.
Largely, the fieldwork was carried out in Vladimir and the surrounding area. The city, a provincial capital with a population of about 350,000 inhabitants, is located about 180 km east of Moscow. Before Moscow's importance and power increased, Vladimir was the capital of the North-Western part of the Rus' in the 13th century. Vladimir has a rich history and was the religious center until the 15th century. At that time, the grand princes still were crowned there. The historic and religious importance still plays a role today and Vladimir is referred to as the "soul of Russia" or the "heart of Russia". Nevertheless, the city also underwent heavy industrialization during the socialist era. This influences the character of the city until today and allows numerous parallels to be drawn to other cities of the same size in the European part of Russia (for the Kaluga region, for example, similar developments have been observed, see Benovska 2021; Koellner and Benovska 2021). In addition, other places in the Vladimir region and beyond (St Petersburg) were included in the research, so that the results presented here are important at least for the European part of Russia with an Orthodox majority population. Nevertheless, Vladimir is no representative or typical case, which is recognized as irrelevant in anthropology.

Religious fundamentalism and rigorism in contemporary Russia: some theoretical reflections on the specifics
An important starting point for reflections on fundamentalism in this article is the introduction to the special issue that has been described in the beginning of the chapter. In addition, I draw on Martin Riesebrodt's finding that fundamentalism, although heavily drawing on notions of tradition and preservation, nevertheless, contains new elements and emerges in relation to modernity (1998). Therefore, Riesebrodt develops an understanding of fundamentalism as a mobilized and radicalized traditionalism and highlights its relation to religion and a perceived danger or crisis. Consequently, unchangeable rules or laws have to be implemented for overcoming the challenge (Riesebrodt 1998(Riesebrodt , 2000. Similarly, fundamentalism here is understood as a specific model with changing content. In contemporary Russia, K notions of conservatism certainly play a crucial role in fundamentalist circles and serve as important vehicles to convey messages but this is only one side of the description. Therefore, an interpretation of fundamentalism as a counter-movement in the sense of Mannheim (1984) and Freeden (1996) seems to be also relevant. In this understanding, fundamentalism can be described as a construction in itself and not as restoration of any tradition. Therefore, it has been pointed out that fundamentalism primarily is a modern movement against modernization (Lawrence 1989). This comes close to the fourth characteristic mentioned in the introduction. In this way, it can be described to be for something and against something (Eller 2022, p. 229).
To a large extent, then, fundamentalism in contemporary Russia is characterized by a rejection of liberal trends in society which include liberal competitive democracy, the liberal economic world order or liberal notions of family and gender (see Bluhm 2016, p. 31;Agadjanian 2017;Bluhm and Varga 2018). Herewith, fundamentalism is a good starting point for political action and allows concrete projects to be implemented. In this way, fundamentalism aims to radically change the social system within the country but sometimes also of the world as a whole (Eisenstadt 1999; see also characteristics 2 and 3 in Pollack et al. 2022). Sometimes, the ambition to change the whole world is disputed until today (Hovorun 2021;Mitrofanova 2004) because that might be a feature of political religion and not of fundamentalism in itself.
The examples for such fundamentalist trends in contemporary Russia are manifold and include very diverse manifestations. For example, we have seen trends such as the re-emergence of Cossack groups all over Russia (Koellner 2018), pre-military training during religious summer camps or during religious education (Koellner 2016), and rallies for or against works of art, culture or in relation to other topics (Anderson 2013;Bernstein 2014;Jonson 2015). Moreover, we also have to recognize that material culture as such is important means for conveying certain meanings through a particular symbolism. The most famous example for this is the Church of the Russian Armed Forces that aims to visualize the military power and greatness of Russia in history and until today (Kolov 2021).
In addition, I would like to draw attention to phenomena inside Orthodox Christianity which have a particularly orthodox content and were described as rigorism (Makrides 2004(Makrides , 2016. Like orthodoxy as a content described in the introduction to the special issues, rigorism is a similar description in the Orthodox Christian context for several reasons (Makrides 2016). First, phenomena of fundamentalism have a long history in Orthodox Christianity and precede the introduction of the term fundamentalism as such. One example for this are phenomena in 18th century Greece (Makrides 2004, p. 514). Moreover, and secondly, the term rigorism is more neutral and enables new approaches without implying a pejorative usage. Finally, there do exist a number of specifics in the Orthodox context. First and foremost, this pertains to a strong emphasis of Orthodox Christianity being the sole and only authentic Christian faith from which all the other Christian denominations diverged in their falsified understanding of the true faith (Makrides 2016, p. 219). This understanding is very important until today because it underlies everyday interactions and notions, as I will show in the following. In so doing, Orthodox Christianity becomes inaccessible for compromise although they might be beneficial.

The monastery and the factory for preservatives
An important example for what I have described as the rigorist content of fundamentalism occurred in 2016 during my fieldwork in the Vladimir region. Close to the city of Vladimir, there is the small town of Bogoliubovo. The town is famous in the whole of Russia because it hosts a women's convent of all-Russian significance, the remnants of the former palace of Prince Andrei Bogoliubskii and the religious heritage site 'Church of the Intercession of the Holy Virgin' on the Nerl'. Every year, the monastery and the sacred sites receive thousands of pilgrims from all over Russia and abroad. For these reasons, the town and its surrounding are considered to be a sacred site. Moreover, the monastery has a particular conservative orientation and is known for this in Vladimir region and beyond.
In May 2016, the pharmaceutical company Bergus announced plans for the investment of about 40 million rubles (about 500,000 euros) in the outskirts of the town but still close to the monastery (Pressservice-33 2016; PortalCredo 2016). The company produces sanitary goods and intended to produce nappies, bandages and preservatives in the new factory (Zebra-TV 2016). Whereas the announcement first remained largely neglected, in the second half of 2016 protests by people from the monastery and its supporters became virulent. Although the industrial zone with the company Bergus is located several hundred meters away from the monastery and other religious sites, the plan to produce preservatives "in the vicinity of church or monastic sites" was criticized. In particular, monk Ieromonakh Nikon (Levachev-Belavenets) of Moscow, a leader of the organization 'For Faith and Fatherland' and an editor of the monarchist newspaper The Gerald of the Tsar (Tsarskii vestnik), took a leading role in organizing the protests and voiced his critique (Lenta 2016a;Wikipedia 2017). Inspired by the monk's critique, the issue also gained importance on the local level. The lay supporters of the monastery, some of them monarchist and very conservative in their orientation, took the issue up and voiced considerable critique when I was talking to them. In addition, they addressed the media, wrote letters to Patriarch Kirill and several persons from the political administration including the then governor of Vladimir region, Svetlana Orlova. In the conversation and in the letters, they expressed their conviction that the production of preservatives is sinful behavior, will be punished by God and needs to be stopped (KolokolRussia 2016; Lenta 2016b).
For the company Bergus, the protests and the whole issue came as surprise. They never expected such a strong opposition because they were given that site for the construction of factory by the regional administration and emphasized that they were supporting the local community by creating new jobs. Moreover, the production site was located in an industrial area and had been used for production already beforehand although the product at that time was brick and not preservatives. For these reasons, the head of the company expressed his surprise and declared to be unable to stop the investment because about 200 million rubles (ca. three million euros at that time) had already been spent (KolokolRussia 2016). In addition, the head of the company felt obliged to announce his personal position: "I am an Orthodox believer, father of a family with many children and adhere to traditional values as well" (KolokolRussia 2016). Nevertheless, his personal statement was not enough for the Orthodox activists and they continued their protests on the streets in November and December 2016. They described Bogoliubovo with its monastery and the famous church as a 'holy place' which was in danger by the production of preservatives. They understood this to be sinful. In particular, Tat'iana Borovikova, an organizer of the protests and the head of the 'Association of Families with Many and Adopted Children', stressed the sacred character of the town because it was selected by the Virgin Mary herself, who appeared to Prince Andrei Bogoliubskii during a dream and advised him to build a church here (Koellner 2012, p. 131-132). According to Borovikova's perception, the sacredness of the town and the production of preservatives were impossible in one place.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Orthodox activists although they were a very visible group did not represent the institution of the ROC as such. The Vladimir eparchy, for example, voiced no official criticism because they "did not want to get involved in questions of economic decisions" (Provladimir 2016). On the other hand, however, the eparchy also refrained from open criticism of Ieromonakh Nikon, Tat'iana Borovikova or any of the other Orthodox activists. They declared the statements to be personal opinions that have to be respected (PortalCredo 2016). This shows nicely the particular position of these activists as pertaining to the rigorist minority inside the church. The lack of open criticism, however, also is an indicator for the power of that faction within the church. For that reason Father Antonii, a secretary to Metropolitan Evlogii of Vladimir and head of a parish community, voiced his criticism in a personal talk only and not in public. He declared: "This is another form of Orthodoxy (Eto ne to pravoslavie)". This also confirms to further conversations I had with believers and inhabitants of Bogoliubovo who distanced themselves from "these crazy people from the monastery".
Despite these ambivalences in the local population, a return to 'business as usual' was impossible for the company because the case received increasing attention on the regional and national level. In December 2016, Bergus finally announced to stop investments for the production of preservatives in Bogoliubovo (NTV 2016;Vedomosti 2016). Nevertheless, the whole affair turned out to be a success for the company as well. They received strong support from young Russians who organized social media campaigns, which helped sales to rise considerably and so the company was able to invest in another production plant outside Bogoliubovo. From then on, Bergus produced nappies and cosmetic products in Bogoliubovo, and preservatives were produced in the second factory at another location. Nevertheless, the affair also shows the growing importance and involvement of fundamentalist groups inside the ROC in everyday activities and the rigorist content of that activism. Based on a very specific understanding of Orthodox Christianity, they were able to stop the production of preservatives in Bogoliubovo and thus challenged the official position of the ROC and the local administration. Here, it is important to keep in mind that Orthodox Christians largely depend on the interpretations given by priests, monks or spiritual fathers who evaluate such events and provide guidance for believers (Koellner 2013;Gurchiani 2017). In some cases, this fosters the promotion of rigorist and orthodox contents and allows them to influence everyday interpretations and organize action in the local community.

Traditional moral values and the family
Yet another example for rigorist fundamentalist contents pertains to the promotion of traditional moral values in the family sector. Since the mid-2000s, families and family values receive increasing attention in religious and political circles in the Russian Federation. Notions of the family have been related to the notion of socalled 'traditional moral values' and tend to foster particularly conservative interpretations of family, gender and sexuality (Bluhm and Brand 2018;Elsner 2017;Stoeckl 2017Stoeckl , 2020b. One rationale behind is the emphasis on fertility because President Vladimir Putin noticed a demographic and family crisis, and declared this "the most acute problem for Russia" at the Federal Assembly in 2006. Among other tasks, Putin suggested to increase the birthrate (Kremlin 2006), which was supported by the Russian Orthodox Church and fundamentalist circles. In the following years, different instruments for stimulating the fertility rate were implemented. The instruments introduced included maternity capital (materinskii kapital) and birth certificates (rodovye sertifikati) allowing for some financial support for families and mothers by the state. Although the overall success of these measures has been evaluated critically (Rivkin-Fish 2010), they received substantial support by the media and during various state-related events. In particular youth camps, such as the one by the youth organization 'Nashi' at Lake Seliger, became important and encouraged the young participants to "demonstrate their patriotism while engaging in heteroprocreative sex", as it was phrased by Julie Hemment (2015, p. 178). Further initiatives included mass weddings at these camps or calls such as 'Give Birth to a Patriot on the Day of Russia' that aimed at fostering patriotism and a higher fertility rate (Hemment 2015, p. 187). In addition to these instruments targeting the youth, a number of further initiatives have been implemented, some of which directly draw on the support of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Among others, this included the celebrations during the 'Year of the Family' in 2008 as well as the introduction of a new festive day called 'Day of Family, Love and Fidelity' (Den' sem'i, liubvi i vernosti) on July 8th in 2008 (for more details on the introduction of that festive day and the underlying meanings see Koellner 2020). Since then, the festive day and the two Orthodox Saints Peter and Fevroniia originating from Murom in Vladimir region receive increasing attention. The introduction as an official festive day was strongly supported by politicians, the clergy and believers. Among the supporters of the new holiday, the wife of then President Dmitrii Medvedev, Svetlana Medvedeva, took a particularly prominent position. Currently, she is head of the organizing committee and responsible for the events during that day: a big festival that is organized in Murom with show artists from all over Russia and a fair in the city center. Local politicians also use the opportunity to participate and have joined. At the same time, a religious festive day takes place in and around the Holy Trinity monastery in Murom. During the day, I observed many pilgrims visiting the town of Murom and taking part in processions or prayers, venerating the relics and icon of Saints Peter and Fevroniia or joining the meals provided in the K cafeteria of the monastery. During speeches and events on that day, many occasions are used for fostering anti-Western sentiments and for reinforcing a genuine Russian cultural identity. Saints Peter and Fevroniia are described as anti-Valentine and as a way to emphasize the exclusivity and superiority of Russian cultural and moral values over a degenerated West (sometimes pejoratively called 'gayropa'). This clearly indicates the first and second characteristics of fundamentalism mentioned in Pollack et al. (2022). The West, then, is characterized by sinful homosexuality and a lack of protection for families and their needs, which can be understood as an indicator for the third characteristic of fundamentalism: the claim for universal validity. Finally, this then put into practice by radically changing the present (characteristic four).
The Russian Orthodox Church takes a particular active role during these events and so they can be understood as a moral norm entrepreneur in the way described by Kristina Stoeckl (2016). She applied the notion of norm entrepreneurship or norm protagonism to the ROC in her analysis of human rights. In this way, she emphasized the normative agency of the church and the creation of "a new cognitive frame called 'traditional values'" (Stoeckl 2016, p. 133). In the last years, this became increasingly important in the context of family issues too. Here, as in the case analyzed by Stoeckl, the ROC emphasizes its role to preserve the Apostolic Christian tradition. Accordingly, the orientation seems to be backward looking and conservative. At the same time, however, the way that this movement connects to global initiatives is very modern. As a result, an ambivalent tendency between conservative and modern orientation is visible which corresponds with a claim to universal superiority. This pertains to the rigorist content inside such fundamentalist circles and emphasizes the unique tradition of Orthodoxy paired with a self-understanding of being the sole and only heir of the true Apostolic church. Again this claim to universal superiority is obvious. But this also limits opportunities for agency considerably because it disparages other actors or groups. Consequently, the envisioned cooperation with the political sector is restricted and leaves little room for the clergy to take decisions based on prudence and compromise. As a result, the ROC is important for rhetorical support but remains a weak instrument for political purposes (Elsner 2017, p. 217;Koellner 2021;Stoeckl 2017Stoeckl , p. 7, 2020b. Here the multivocality and the strength of rigorist circles inside the Church have a strong effect on the efforts of the ROC as a whole.
Telling examples for this are the efforts of the ROC to take a leading role within the group Orthodox Churches and among conservative circles beyond the Russian Federation. In both cases, the attempts of the ROC received substantial support of Russian diplomacy. Joining the forces of Church and state aimed at setting the agenda within those groups and for finding a way to counterbalance the Western liberal agenda.
One example for this is the World Congress of Families. Recent analysis has shown that the initiative for this began in 1995 with the visit of pro-family activist Allan Carlson, at that time president of the Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society in Rockford (Illinois in the United States) to Moscow (Stoeckl 2020b, pp. 224-227). In Moscow, he met with Professor Anatoly Antonov from Moscow State University, a family sociologist and demographer, and many other persons. As a result of this and other interactions, a Russian chapter of the World Congress of Families developed that initiated campaigns in the field of family issues and fought abortion. In those initiatives, however, the Russian Orthodox Church as the most important religious institution was largely absent. It was only later that the ROC became more involved in such initiatives (Bluhm and Brand 2018) and acted as a coconvener of the Family Congress 2014 in Moscow (Stoeckl 2020b, pp. 228-229). Nevertheless, it is important to note that even at the culmination point, the run up for the Family Congress in Moscow in 2014, the initiative largely was up to the transnational networks of Alexei Komov and his personal background (Stoeckl 2020b, p. 231). Even worse, the World Congress of Families finally left the initiative because of the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Until today, the Russian Orthodox Church has a strong internal opposition with a strong rigorist section that opposes any interfaith cooperation or ecumenical efforts for doctrinal and dogmatic reasons. Consequently, the ROC is of limited use only when it is attempting to use ideological convergences for political agenda setting or soft power initiatives in the Russian world and beyond (see also Elsner 2017;Stoeckl 2017). With my interpretation, I agree with the emphasis on entanglements between politics, business and the ROC inside Russia mentioned by Stoeckl (2020b, p. 224; see also Koellner 2013Koellner , 2021 but I am more hesitant to acknowledge the importance of transnational networks. To be sure, such networks do exist but have a highly personal character and represent individual networks instead of institutional relations.
To sum these findings up, it can be said that the ROC is clearly trying to improve its standing within fundamentalist circles and aims at taking a leading position inside the Russian Federation and beyond but met with considerable challenges. Tensions inside the Church and a strong rigorist opposition with claims for superiority and universal validity prevented further developments in this direction. Moreover, the growing importance of the fundamentalist section inside the ROC suggests that this process will not change in the near future and precludes too close relations to other crucial actors.

Conclusion
In this article, attention has been drawn to the growing importance of fundamentalist currents in contemporary Russia and the role of Orthodox Christianity in that context. Based on findings from ethnographic fieldwork and further research, it has been argued that religious fundamentalism in contemporary Russia incorporates very strong orthodox contents that have been related to the notion of rigorism. Examples for this include the conflict between the monastery and the factory for preservatives or the reference to traditional moral values. On the one hand, fundamentalism, then, is a force that draws on notions of traditionalism and conservatism but is very modern in itself. It is important for mobilization and can be understood as countermovement that conveys and supports important messages against liberal and other trends in society. It is described as restoring the past by changing the present. In so doing, however, the notion of rigorism is important because of a self-understanding of Orthodox Christianity as the sole and only true heir of the ancient Apostolic church. In that understanding, important characteristics of fundamentalism such as K a claim to exclusive truth, superiority or universal validity become visible. Consequently, anything has to be done to keep the 'sacred tradition' and to prevent any secular interference which leaves little room for maneuvering and compromise. Even prudent decisions are rejected because they are perceived to be incompatible with the image of the Church although Orthodox Christianity has a strong emphasis on religious practice as such. This has clear consequences for the position of the ROC in society and vice versa the state: it is an important ally on the ideological level but has limited opportunity for taking advantage of these ideological convergences for practical implementation. This is one of the crucial specifics of fundamentalism in the context of Orthodox Christianity in contemporary Russia and stresses the importance fundamentalism with its claims for exclusive truth, superiority, universal validity and a mobilization for changing the present.
Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4. 0/.