Competition manipulation in international sport federations’ regulations: a legal synopsis

Manipulation of competitions has long plagued the sport industry, affecting almost every sport over time. While sharing certain common features, the regulatory provisions and procedural responses to this phenomenon by international federations (IFs), sports’ governing bodies, vary on many aspects, including the definition of the specific offence of “competition manipulation” itself, scope of application, especially in relationship to betting, categories of participants, mens rea elements such as recklessness and negligent behaviour, reporting obligations, aggravating and mitigating factors, and applicable sanctions across sports and within a sport/discipline. More nuanced items within internal disciplinary procedure also vary across federations, such as standard of proof and evidence. The purpose of this study is to offer a comparative synopsis of the regulations of 43 IFs governing Olympic and certain non-Olympic sports, to provide a critical overview of specific aspects of the above mentioned factors in the regulations and to identify areas of improvement for the future.


Context and relevance of study
Manipulation of competitions has long plagued the sport industry, affecting almost every sport over time, 1 propelled in particular by certain factors such as volume of bets and quantum of money involved, inconspicuous nature of certain leagues or matches, advent of the internet, ineffective state and other legislation and, most recently, spurred on by pandemic-related economic effects. 2 For manipulation offences in sport, primary action, whether or not in parallel with state authorities, is ordinarily initiated by the respective governing body in the sport ("sport justice") against an actor engaging in such an offence. 3 Initially, manipulation was an offence grouped with general corruption within codes of conduct or ethics, if at all-no consistent approach across federations was present. With the increase in prevalence and of its profile as a threat to integrity, as well as endeavours such as the IOC's issued studies, 4

and 2015
Olympic Movement Code on Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions ("IOC 2016 Code") serving as a model set of regulations compliant with leading international standards codified within the Council of Europe's Macolin Convention, 5 a number of international federations ("IF"s), adopted dedicated provisions or the IOC 2016 Code itself as a whole, such provisions continuing to apply to date.
Studying these IF's regulations and trends across them thus assumes immense importance, in no small part as their frequent application in the first instance often results in severe consequences in long-term ineligibility for athletes, often final or not appealed from, as seen below. The specificity of drafting within provisions has important implications, including for certainty of defining an offence and its elements (for instance, including reporting obligations or negligent behaviour); types and consistency in awarding sanctions across sports and within a sport/discipline for the same offence; as well as for more nuanced items within procedure such as evidence, notoriously problematic due to the clandestine nature of acts and limited investigative ability of sporting bodies compared to state bodies. This in turn is regularly seen to have implications within adjudication on elements such as standard of proof applicable, also increasingly codified, and when the burden of proof might shift from one party to another.

Scope
This study is limited to a review of IF regulations, and specifically the definition of manipulation therein, of all IFs with disciplines currently within the Olympic or Paralympic Games (a sub-set of all the federations recognized by the International Olympic Committee ("IOC")) as well as, for completeness and based on prevalence of relevant offences, a few additional bodies' regulations, international and regional. 6 Definitions of ancillary, but connected offences usually found defined together with the "core" offence of manipulation in applicable regulations, including (illegal) betting, (dealing in) insider information, (engaging in) corrupt conduct, failing to report and cooperate are briefly looked at, without particulars of specific regulations applicable and regulating betting or reporting regulations, where present, for example.
Cumulatively, 43 IFs (Olympic/Paralympic and Non-Olympic), 7 1 regional governing body's regulations (Union of European Football Associations, "UEFA") and certain other miscellaneous regulations such as the IOC 2016 Code and Tokyo 2020 Regulations are studied. All graphs include these 43 IFs studied. The study takes into account specific decisions issued by IF internal adjudicatory processes where relevant.
Each sport, IF, abbreviation for each IF, respective relevant applicable regulation (and provision therein, if needed), and its source are systematically listed in the Annex to this article. The study below looks at IF regulations as effective in December 2020. 8

Analysis method
Each IF's regulations (both specific to manipulation but also provisions from general procedure as would be applicable to manipulation offences) were assimilated and then comparatively analysed for elements within the definition (Part II below), parallel offences (Part III), sanctions (Part IV) and particulars of the specifically applicable dispute resolution processes (Part V). Statistical trends through noting common factors across these elements are represented as graphs to assess common features in how governing IFs regulations treat the same offences.

Existence of specific regulations for the offence of manipulation
The vast majority of IFs studied have specific regulations on the manipulation of sports competitions even if, for some 1 3 of them, these specific rules are limited to a few behaviours and provide that, for the rest, the IOC's 2016 Code applies ( Fig. 1). Federations that do not have specific dedicated regulations of their own generally refer to the IOC's 2016 Code, by incorporation or through adoption of its provisions verbatim either in entirety or in part (ICF,9 FIG,10 IHF,11 ISSF, 12 WCF, 13 WBSC 14 and WS 15 ). Only four federations do not provide for any specific rules in terms of the manipulation of sports competitions (IBSF, FIL, WDSF and IFSC) -which does not mean they do not punish match fixing categorically. Of these, one (FIL 16 ) nevertheless incorporates the IOC 2016 Code for limited purposes, another (IFSC 17 ) makes a reference to the IOC 2016 Code on its website as part of consent terms for athlete participation, and a third one includes certain provisions in its code of ethics (WDSF 18 ).
Most IF regulations defer to applicable rules at a "major event" (as defined), 19 such as any edition of the Olympic or Paralympic Games or a specific sport's world cup, for governance of offences occurring at that sport. For example, at the Tokyo 2020 summer Olympic and Paralympic Games of June 2021, the issued set of "ethics" incorporated in their entirety the IOC 2016 Code, 20 this code having been first applied at the games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016. 21 Thus, a manipulation offence would be treated under definitions provided by the code, as well as procedure specified therein.

Sanctionable behaviour: the "manipulation"
At the outset, it is important to note that terms such as "manipulation", "match fixing" and "competition fixing" are often used interchangeably at the international level both in legislation and academically, 22 and this further differs at the national level. 23 Generally, it has been noted by several authors, 24 but also in jurisprudence at the federation level as well as the CAS level that many different behaviours might be brought under the term "manipulation", both ratione materiae and personae, 25 including conduct which might not otherwise be illegal, 26 or simply raise presumption of commission of an offence. 27 Across IFs studied, the term "manipulation" is widely used alongside other offences, with two basic types of definitions of structures for the specific offence, whether or not termed "manipulation" can be observed, while some, and notably prominent, federations, maintain unique definitions.
The first broad type reflects wording in the IOC 2016 Code 28 and the Macolin Convention, 29 making an offence any act or omission involving (as well as complicity-aiding, abetting, encouraging, conspiring or attempting an act which could "culminate" in an offence) the alteration of the course or result of a sporting competition or a part thereof, to remove whole or part of its unpredictable nature, whether or not for or any benefit (as defined) to the actor, or to a third party, and whether or not done intentionally, negligently or fraudulently. 30 Factors not relevant to this determination are usually listed including participation/attendance in the same event, outcome of event, nature of such outcome, receipt of consideration, effect on an actor's performance and violation of any technical rules. 31 The second type of definition which many federations have typically exist within older policies encompassing all types of conduct or ethics within which manipulation can be brought, even if framed after 2016. 32 Finally, there exist miscellaneous definitions, which are important to mention as they are notably present among IFs which see a large number of cases, such as FIFA 33 and ITF, 34 certain others which have high profile, 35 and new federations such as WDSF. 36 In case of the ITF's Tennis Anti-Corruption Program, 2020 ("TACP, 2020"), the manipulation offences are laid down as instances 22 Diaconu et al. (2021) in Part 2 "Terminology". 23 See report of the UNODC and IOC (2017, pp. 22-35) where terms such as "bribery in sporting contests" (United States) or "corrupt activities relating to sporting events" (South Africa) might also be used in state legislation. 24 See Palermo and Williams (2018, p. 1). 25 Beyond the scope of this article, see Diaconu et al. (2021) (2020). Although the language remains similar to the IOC 2016 Code, it is simplified, and structure of regulation different, notably including liability specifically for clubs, independent of definitions for "participants" or "benefits" seen below. See footnote 54 under Sect. 2.2.4 "Financial/nonfinancial purpose and receipt of Benefits". 34 The ITF brings manipulation under a broader definition of "Corruption Offences" under the TACP (2020), infra note 78; Rule 43 of the ITF Constitution (2020) mandated compliance with the IOC 2016 Code as well. 35 See FINA's definition under PMC 3.3 of the FINA Rules on Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions ("PMC Rules", 2016) being-"Directly or indirectly contriving or attempting to contrive the outcome or any other aspect of any Competition with the goal of obtaining a Benefit for oneself or for others." 36 Which includes broad language on altering the course or outcome of a competition or betting related offences within its Code of Ethics (undated, version 1.1). 1 3 of common occurrences within the sport of tennis based on how matches are often manipulated. 37

Active/passive
Regulations studied contain both active as well as passive manipulation of sports competitions. Moreover, 39 of the 43 federations include omission within punishable behaviour. 38 The IOC 2016 Code also has language that includes this which has then been adopted by IFs who have incorporated the code or adopted similar language. 39 In certain instances, common language is used across disciplinary offences or other violations to include within all of them the omission or passive contributions, bringing within its ambit aiding, abetting, other complicit, encouraging, inciting, inducing, assisting or concealing behaviour. 40

Intention/negligence
An intentional act is behaviour committed with conscience and will; conversely, negligent behaviour is committed without conscience and/or without will, while nevertheless remaining at fault through culpable improvidence that can be blamed on the perpetrator. 41 If intention is provided for by all the IFs that have regulated the manipulation of competitions (the only unclear situation being the IFSC 42 ), only some of them also incriminate negligent behaviours, either explicitly or through other texts (such as a code of ethics, for example) extending the scope of application to negligence (Fig. 2). 43 Among the IFs that do not expressly provide for negligence, some nevertheless provide for the punishability of negligence when certain conditions are met, such as a serious damage to the reputation of the sport or the concerned federation (IBSF 44 ), or by stating, for instance, that "ignorance" or "having made a mistake" are not a defence. 45

Result of competition/other parts of the event/course of the competition
Save for one IF (IFSC) where the applicable provisions are general ones not defining manipulation, 46 all applicable federation regulations contain language which covers offences related to manipulation which affect not only the final result of the event, competition or other activity participated in or bet on, but also the course or a component of such result of events, components of events or competitions, whether affected or not. 47

Financial/non-financial purpose and definition of "benefit"
The question arising here is whether the regulations aim to punish only those acts of manipulation that produce financial results or whether the punishability is extended to acts without immediate financial consequences. These include, for example, acts committed with the sole aim of obtaining a 37 Diaconu and Kuhn (2019, p. 9). The issue of negligence in sporting disputes has been discussed across various contexts including, for instance, liability for sporting injury (more of a "civil" nature), as well as disciplinary instances such as doping violations (more akin to a sanction-worthy or even criminal offence) where strict liability has increasingly been adopted for offences committed. For the former, see, for instance, Rosenthal (2004); for the latter, see McArdle (2015), the commencement of the debate having been discussed years prior-see Rigozzi et al. (2003, p. 39 qualification or setting a record. 48 Certain instruments, such as the Macolin Convention bring intangible benefits such as advancing in competition within "manipulation". 49 Yet, there remains is varying opinion on criminalization of acts such as tactical losses. 50 The study of IF regulations shows that both financial and non-financial objectives are in IF regulations' sights (usually present in the definition of "benefit"; Fig. 3). This aspect is usually a component of the definition of "benefit". Many IFs, particularly those having incorporated the IOC 2016 Code, 51 have definitions including the elements of (i) the direct or indirect (ii) receipt or provision of (iii) money or the equivalent. 52 Even those IFs which do not adopt the IOC 2016 Code definition strictly might still use this same definition of benefit. 53 IFs which structure their regulations more uniquely, including those whose regulations are prominently applied, may (or may not) have alternative ways to define and apply the term "benefit". FIFA, for instance, does not include the element of "benefit" within its definition of manipulation at all, 54  while the ITF's TACP, 2020 defines the more limited term "Consideration", 55 and ICC uses "Reward". 56

Participants, connected persons and beneficiaries (for own/for others)
Across the IFs, either the term "Participants", 57 "Connected Persons" 58 or alternative terms 59 might be used for the purposes of limiting which persons (and sometimes bodies) might be brought under the scope of the respective regulation, or could commit an offence thereunder. Some use a combination thereof, where the definition of a "Participant" will include that of a "Connected Person", but be a sub-set of "Persons" as defined, which in turn might be a sub-set then of a wider term encompassing additional persons who could commit manipulation (or other integrity offences). 60 The actors which might be brought under manipulation regulations or definitions vary across IFs; whether or not an exhaustive list of entities to who the regulations are applicable, and might extend from parties ranging from continental and member federations to individual athletes, judges/referees right up to anyone authorized to "co-operate, collaborate or participate" in a sport's activities. 61 Parties that aid, abet, encourage conspiring or contribute by their behaviour are also usually included within the scope of application. 62 Finally, certain IFs have extended possibility to bring additional persons within the ambit of their provisions, such as the ICC's Excluded Persons Policy, 2021. 63 Finally, ratione personae, through adjudicated IF decisions and on appeal, have been seen to include a range of actors as noted by authors before. 64 This could include both natural and legal persons, with clubs, often held strictly 55 Under Section B.4 of the TACP, 2020 as referring to "anything of value except for money." This is used in specific offences under the broader heading of "Corruption Offences" as defined under the TACP, 2020, extracted in Section 2.3 below, sub-sections D.1.d to D.1.g describing manipulation offences in specific, where in the term "money, benefit or other Consideration" are used in lieu of "benefit" as ordinarily found across IF regulations. 56 See Appendix-1 (Definitions) at of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code (2020, p. 28)-"A person acts "for Reward" if he/she arranges or agrees that he/she or some other third party will receive any direct or indirect financial or other benefit for that act (other than official prize money and/or contracted payments under playing, service, endorsement, sponsorship or other such similar contracts)…." 57 The IOC 2016 Code (Article 1.4), and consequently many IFs include three categories of persons within "Participants" being-a. athletes or participants in a sports event; b. athlete support personnel being an athlete's entourage assisting them at sporting functions; c. officials being owners, shareholders, executors and staff of entities organizing and promoting sport/clubs/recognition bodies, or referees, jury or other accredited persons (residual). 58 Per Regulation 6.3, of Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) in the WR Regulations Handbook (2016) "Connected Persons" may commit Anti-Corruption Offences; defined (under Regulation 6.2) as "International Player, Contract Player, International Match Official, Contract Player Support Personnel, any coach, trainer, selector, health professional, analyst, team official, administrator, owner, shareholder, director, executive, staff member and/or  where the defined term applicable to manipulation offences is "Basketball Parties" (Items 145-149 on p. 38), which includes all FIBA Divisions, national federations, clubs, cities or states involved in bidding, as well as Participants, Spectators and other "Persons" as defined, whether or not engaged in related activities whether paid or unpaid (p. 25). In turn, a "Participant" for purposes limited to that Code include players, agents, representatives, support personnel, other persons named in rosters, commissioners, game officials, miscellaneous persons with responsibilities (statisticians, interpreters, etc.), persons affiliated to FIBA or organizing committees, other persons in attendance at affiliated games. A "Connected Person" would be any person with who such person has a relationship likely to appear to a reasonable person to influence their objectivity, including family, partners or close personal friends. Persons include natural persons or an organization or another entity (bodies corporate, unincorporated associations or partnerships), whether or not with a separate legal identity (p. 24). 61 See, for example, Section I.2.C, of the WS Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct (2019) on p. 4 which lists exhaustively entities to include potentially within the realm of actors who could be liable all possible entities. 62 Rule 3.4 of the IIHF Code of Conduct (2021) includes "Knowingly assisting, aiding, abetting, attempting, covering up or otherwise being complicit in the commission of any acts or omissions" as "General Violations" over and above a specific manipulation offence. The IOC 2016 Code includes these elements under Article 2.7.2 which exists to assist in determining by laying out elements relevant (or not relevant) to whether an offence has been made out. 63 Under Annexure 2, para 3 to the ICC's Anti-Corruption Code for Participants (amended January 1, 2021), extending the definition of "Participants" to those who would not ordinarily fall within it but who "pose a genuine threat to the integrity of cricket"; instances of such situations are provided under para 4. 64 For instance, Diaconu et al. (2021) in Section 6.2 (Ratione Personae) list across CAS awards, most on appeal from IF decisions and applying their regulations, which parties, including athletes, referees, clubs and their officials (and clubs due to their officials), have been convicted of manipulation. liable for acts of their personnel or representatives, as seen most recently in the case of Kenyan club Zoo FC 65 and confirmed in other cases by CAS awards on appeal. 66 This distinction/categorization is also used in certain regulations to vary which sanctions are awarded for the same offence. 67 These actors, i.e. those to be proceeded against committing prohibited acts, might, or might not be "beneficiaries" of such conduct. Thus, as regards the beneficiaries of the manipulation, the question arises as to whether the act is punishable only if it brings a benefit to the perpetrator (as defined) or if it is also punishable when it is committed for the benefit of a third party. Such distinction is either found in the within the definition of the term "manipulation" itself, 68 or through the language of the provision implicitly. 69 Here again, the intention of most IFs is clearly to target both situations in their regulations (Fig. 4).
Connected to the definition of a "Participant", and relevant to where/the jurisdiction in which manipulation offences take place, is the definition of what type of situation such regulations come into play. Certain IFs bring all types of activities within their purview, 70 while others limit operations of manipulation specific regulations only to certain "Competitions". 71 Finally, as also mentioned above many IFs make deference to major event rules for manipulation offences there. 72

Relationship to, and definition of "betting"
It is observed that most IFs punish manipulation-related offences in both betting and non-betting sporting contexts (Fig. 5), 73 and usually, betting-related offences are independently defined within the same set of regulations, 74 with the act of betting itself being an independent defined term, whether termed "bets", "betting", "sports betting" or "wager". 75 In only few instances, betting specific regulations are present without there being a corresponding wider provision to define or sanction all other forms of manipulation. 76  tion Fixing applicable regulation title mentions that it is in the "Specific Context of Betting") and the IFSC (whose Disciplinary Appeals Rules, 2019 talk of "betting and gambling offences" (p. 34), as well as Article 10 of its statutes defining "illegal and irregular betting". WTF and UIPM also contain "Betting" within the title of their respective regulations.

Other offences related to the manipulation of a sport competition
Under the provisions of regulations applicable to manipulation offences, most federations also define connected, overlapping or other corruption-related offences or sanctionable behaviour. In some cases, it is an overarching previous provision found within applicable regulations such as a code of ethics, prior to a specific set of regulations on competition manipulation being issued. These provisions remain most relevant in situation where no independent manipulation provision is yet defined. 77 These could include behaviour under "bringing the sport into disrepute", "serious misconduct", and similarly worded behaviour. Very notably, ITF, under the TACP and the ITF Constitution brings all connected conduct under a robust definition termed "Corruption Offences" which includes as well all the ancillary sanctionable conduct described below. Article D.1 of the TACP reads: " Usually, the offences of betting on competitions defined to be of a specific interest to the subject of the regulation (see above), corruption or corrupt conduct through the acceptance of a defined set of "benefits" whether or not connected to manipulation, and (dealing in-including using, disclosing or receiving any benefit in connection with) insider information are separately defined, over and above the above described offence of competition manipulation. To note, is the distinction made between betting in general and the specification of only certain kinds of betting as prohibited. 79 Certain federations also bring under the same regulations the prohibition of receipt of gifts or benefits by officials, often above a certain value. 80 Finally, failure to report, disclose and cooperate with investigations are also independently defined as a related offence across many federation regulations. 81 In some instances, the offence might be specific to the sport-a relevant recent example is WDSF, where the margin of subjectivity in awarding scores across disciplines is policed specifically to curb the ability for manipulation to occur, through a common applicable code of ethics, with an independent provision within the code prohibiting direct or indirect influence of the course or result of a competition as well. 82 Another example of specific provisions is the prohibition from participation in events organized by betting operators by the ISU. 83  Finally, it is worth making note of the structure under UEFA's regulations due to the sheer number of cases adjudicated under their rules as applicable to clubs. 84 Independent provisions remain present for other actors, 85 with connected liability for clubs. 86 Before 2007, manipulation was proceeded against under common disciplinary rules, 87 where a residuary provision captured all offences not specifically defined. 88 Determined to not see clubs involved in manipulation participating in the League without consequence, 89 since 2007, UEFA tied eligibility to prior involvement in fixing introducing a two-stage process: a primary administrative/eligibility measure, excluded a club for a single season of competitions; 90 and a secondary disciplinary/sanctionary measure, which has no maximum duration in sanction, the primary being awarded impact on the latter. 91

IOC's sanctioning guidelines
To achieve some degree of harmonization among the very disparate IF regulations, the IOC has published in 2018 Guidelines for Sports Organizations on the Sanctioning of Competition Manipulation (the "IOC Sanctioning Guidelines"). 92 This document proposes a coordinated approach on key aspects, such as factors which influence sanctions for match fixing (aggravating and mitigating), and importantly, on the level of sanctions for four key offences: betting, manipulation of sport competitions and corrupt conduct, inside information and failure to report and/or to cooperate.
For example, for the "core" offence of manipulation of sport competitions and corrupt conduct, 93 the IOC Sanctioning Guidelines recommend a sanction of "approx. 4 years ban and fine" for the betting-related offence, and "approx. 2 years ban and fine" for the non-betting-related offence. Also, under the IOC Sanctioning Guidelines, recommended aggravating/ mitigating factors globally to consider are: (1) whether the Participant is betting on a competition she/he is participating in; (2) the number and size of the bets; and (3) addiction to betting or other specific personal circumstances. 94 Another offence considered in the IOC Sanctioning Guidelines is the failure to cooperate, which has two faces: (1) failure to report, meaning that the participant has failed to report, at the first available opportunity, full details of any approaches or invitations received by himself or by another participant to engage in conduct or incidents that could amount to match fixing (Article 2.5 of the IOC 2016 Code), and (2) failure to cooperate with authorities during the investigation, including obstructing such investigation (Article 2.6 of the IOC 2016 Code). For failure to report or to cooperate, the IOC generally recommends a sanction of "0-2 years ban and a fine"; however, for obstructing the investigation (including concealing, tampering with, or destroying any relevant documentation or other information), the recommended sanction is slightly more severe, i.e. "1-2 years ban and a fine". Naturally, mitigating/aggravating factors may apply.
These recommendations have had an important impact on the sanctioning regime applied by Olympic and non-Olympic IFs, many of which have chosen to incorporate them in their own regulations on match fixing. This is explained in details hereinafter. 84 See "Integrity", UEFA, available at https:// www. uefa. com/ insid euefa/ prote cting-the-game/ integ rity/# legal frame work (April 10, 2021); the eminence of the regulations and their evolution has been discussed in detail in Garcia Silvero (2018, p. 6). 85 Article 12 of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (2020 edn.), covering manipulation and betting, the result and course of an event, for gaining an advantage for themselves or a third person, sharing insider information, reporting obligations inter alia, pp. 14 and 15. 86 Article 8 "Responsibility" within the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (2020 edn.) 87 Articles 15 and 16 of the UEFA Statutes (1993 edn., "1993 UEFA Statutes"). 88 "Unforeseen circumstances" under Article 28 of the 1993 UEFA Statutes; the case of Royal Sporting Club Anderlecht v. UEFA, TAS 98/185 was the appeal of a UEFA Executive Council decision to the CAS, who then decided that judicial functions could not be undertaken by Executive Bodies in this manner. 89 Garcia Silvero (2018, p. 9). 90 Then Article 50(3) on "Non-Admission" of the UEFA Statutes (amended in 2007, valid to date), states "The admission to a UEFA competition of a Member Association or club directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level can be refused with immediate effect, without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures". This is reflected in the regulations of each of UEFA's leagues (Champions League, Europa League and the Women's Champions League) under Articles 4.02 and 4.03 of each of their regulations. Article 4.02 states, inter alia, that "If, on the basis of all the factual circumstances and information available to UEFA, UEFA concludes to its comfortable satisfaction that a club has been directly and/or indirectly involved, since the entry into force of Article 50 (3)

General sanctions
The sanctions provided for by the various regulations of the international federations are of several kinds. They range from warning (with or without a period of probation) to exclusion for life, including reprimand, disqualification, return of award, fine, suspension, 95 among others (Fig. 6). Most include provisional suspension pending investigation. 96 Sanctions could also be categorized or listed differently for when applied to a natural person or to a legal persons/entity. 97 Fines are foreseen in almost all the IFs' regulations to sanction competition manipulation. Sometimes its amount is fixed according to the advantage received by the offender, 98 sometimes it is limited by a maximum amount (which can vary according to whether it is imposed on a natural person or a legal entity 99 and/or according to the seriousness of the act committed 100 ) and sometimes it is unlimited/unspecified in amount. 101 Furthermore, some regulations provide that it may be combined with other sanctions, 102 or factors like financial hardships should be factored into the amount. 103 Under the terms ban, suspension or ineligibility, one means a ban on participating in the future sporting events or administrative functions, a future that may be very limited in time but also very . 96 These could include suspensions, the decision to video record a competition, the decision to change the referee or judges just prior to the commencement of a competition, and in certain cases where there is particular risk to the reputation of the sport. Further, they may or may not be counted toward the final sanction issued-see Article 4.1 to 4.3 of the WKF Code on Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions (2016). Similarly, FIFA's Disciplinary Code (2020-Article 48) and Code of Ethics (2020-Articles 84 and 85), provide that "necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice, to maintain sporting discipline or to avoid irreparable harm, or for reasons of safety and security" even without hearing parties, and subject to a maximum 90 days, which may be extended to aid investigations. 97 100 See for example limits based on seriousness of the offence under section 164.14 of the FEI's General Regulations (24th edn., Jan 2020, p. 39) which follow a gradation system of low end (CHF 1000 to CHF 1500), mid-range (CHF 2000 to CHF 3000), top-end (CHF 5,000 to CHF 10,000) to max (CHF 15,000); and FIH (ranging between CHF 500 and CHF 20,000). the fine is prescribed but the primary sanction remains a ban from football related activities for a minimum of five years (and/or a fine). 103 Fines should be staggered on this basis-under Article 29 of the FIH Integrity Code (2018) of which Article 9 is the FIH "Anti-Corruption Code" which includes betting and manipulation offences, to which common sanctions as present in the rest of the FIH Integrity Code apply. distant, if not unlimited. 104 All the IFs know such suspensions that can range from temporary to perpetual, including suspensions whose duration is fixed or proportionate to the fault committed, sometimes limited in terms of both their minimum and maximum. 105 These suspensions can also be total (in the sense that they apply to any activity related to the sport supervised by the federation) 106 or partial (i.e. limited to certain activities supervised by the federation). 107 Annulment of the result, deductions of points, return of awards and/or expulsion from the current competition, bans from venues or removal from held positions/membership from a body are also widely known sanctions in the regulations of the federations. 108 In addition to this, some federations now award restitution, education and rehabilitation programmes, social work, reprimands (sometimes public ones), payment of procedural costs, compensation to victims, an administrative fine (independent of the fine imposed as a penalty), etc. The most "positive" measures envisaged (in the sense that they encourage the promotion of human beings rather than their stigmatization, elimination and punishment), i.e. rehabilitation programmes, education and social work, are provided for by the FINA, 109 FIFA,110 IBU,111 WKF 112 and UEFA. 113 It is important to note that the type of sanction present in regulations of IFs assumes significance as it is, in most cases, deemed final even if appealed from (usually to the CAS). 114 It is not interfered with based on the rationale of IF having expertise in the field unless found to be grossly and evidently disproportionate or irrational, 115 the CAS having upheld a majority of decisions appealed to it from the IF dispute resolution mechanisms, including life bans. 116

Specific sanction of life bans
The question of life bans assumes importance given this finality in awarding such bans. Recent (2021) manipulationrelated decisions at the IF level have mostly seen life bans or very long, career ending bans-this is at least the case across the most prominent sports/IF from a match-fixing perspective being FIFA, 117 ITF (5 life bans in 2021) 118 and the ICC. 119 BWF, for example, has also awarded life bans (to a sponsor/brand representative and three athletes for coordinating and organizing the fixing) and lengthy bans (six to 105 ITTF's Handbook (2020) under Regulation 6.9 (p. 182) tackles manipulation offences with limits on ineligibility based on the type of offence (betting, manipulation, corrupt conduct, inside information, or other violations) ranging from two years to four years (Article 6.9.7.3.2, p. 190). 106 Article 7.1.j of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2019) allows for the option of a "ban from taking part in all football-related activities" as a disciplinary sanction. 107 Similarly, Articles 7.1.h and 7.1.i of the same FIFA Code of Ethics (2019) allow for the issuance of a limited ban from dressing rooms/the substitute's bench or from entering a stadium. 108 Section I.3.A of the WS Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct (2019, pp. 4 and 5). 109 PMC 5.1.3 of the FINA PMC Rules (2016) provides for "Education and Rehabilitation" as a sanctions and a precondition to eligibility to participate after a period of ineligibility issued. 110 Article 7.1.f of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2019) provides "social work" as a potential disciplinary sanction. 111 Article 9.1.9 of Chapter E on Procedures for the Investigation and Prosecution of Violations of the IBU Integrity Code as part of the IBU's Integrity Code (2019) under which manipulation offences are brought, allows the Disciplinary Tribunal to prescribe "mandatory education sessions" as a potential sanction for offences. 112 Article 5.1 of the WKF Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions (2016) lists "education" as one of the possible sanctions that might be awarded under the code and the Disciplinary and Ethics Code (2016). 113 Community football service under Articles 6.1.r (associations and clubs) and 6.2.h (individuals) of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (2020 edn.). 114 See Diaconu et al. (2021) under Section 8 on Sanctions, where it is observed that most CAS awards confirm findings of federation bodies, and particularly in manipulation offences. 115 See, for example, the award of the CAS in Butt, infra note 148 at paras 56-57, 60, 66-69 and 74 -75. 116 See Diaconu et al. (2021) under Section 8 on Sanctions. 117 See FIFA sanctions available at https:// www. fifa. com/ who-weare/ legal/ integ rity/ leadi ng-cases/, including Mwamelo, infra note 124 (15 year ban), with 9 other life bans in 2019. 118 See ITIA sanctions available at https:// itia. tennis/ news/ sanct ions/-April 27, 2021. The CAS also upheld the sanction awarded to Juan Carlos Sanchez of eight years of suspension with a fine of USD 12,500 and legal costs of CHF 3000-https:// itia. tennis/ news/ sanct ions/ cas-uphol ds-sanct ion-for-juan-carlos-saez/ (April 27, 2021). Prior bans include 2020 include the life-ban awarded to Ukrainian player Mr. Stanislav Poplavsky for multiple fixing instances between 2015 and 2019-https:// itia. tennis/ news/ sanct ions/ stani slav-popla vskyy-recei ves-lifet ime-ban-tennis/ (April 27, 2021) and Algerian player Aymen Ikhlef for ten breaches of the TACP (2020) being four instances of match fixing, two instances of soliciting other players not to use their best efforts, three instances of failure to report a corrupt approach and one charge of failing to cooperate with the TIU investigation-https:// www. itia. tennis/ news/ sanct ions/ alger ian-tennisplayer-banned-life/ (April 27, 2021). 119 United Arab Emirates' captain Mohammed Naveed and player Shaiman Anwar Butt were awarded eight year bans from all forms of cricket in March 2021-https:// www. icc-crick et. com/ media-relea ses/ 20697 68 (April 27, 20210), with the teammate Qadeer Ahmed Khan (banned for five years); similarly, Sri Lanka's Dilhara Lokuhettige (eight years), Nuwan Zoysa (six years) were also sanctioned in April 2021 (see https:// www. icc-crick et. com/ media-relea ses/-April 27, 2021). This is in addition to the high profile case of Zimbabwean Heath Streak (discussed below in infra note 130). 104 Proportionality of sanctions issued for disciplinary offences given these factors have been questioned in the past by practitioners and academics; see (in manipulation context) Diaconu et al. (2021) and (in the context of doping) Rigozzi and Quinn (2019); in certain cases, IFs provide guidance on life-bans-FIH, for example, states that lifebans are only to be issued where "particularly serious breach" has occurred-Article 27.1.8 of the FIH Integrity Code (2018).

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12 years with fines to other involved athletes), 120 which are most certainly also career ending for an elite athlete, though similar bans for retired athletes, but who are likely to be involved in the sport as coaches, administrators in the future, could be argued to be insufficient as a deterrent. The most severe sanctions outside of sport (life terms, for example) are often awarded based on the gravity of a crime and only in the rarest of rare circumstances (or equivalent jurisdictional test)-thus the regularity of these in sport, if equivalent, may be debated, and has been applied with more nuance or limited to a range for other disciplinary offences, such as for doping, for example. 121 Further, it is noted that, from a comparative perspective, life bans are similar to certain criminal or administrative sanctions, such as the interdiction to practice one's profession or, to some extent, to lifetime detention. A lifetime ban in this context hence equals a type of "sporting death" of the respective person. However, unlike in most similar cases in criminal/administrative law, in sport there are no possibilities to periodically review the sentence with a view to reducing it and to reinserting the banned persons into their sport, nor is there a possibility to obtain grace, in exceptional circumstances. Mutatis mutandis, one may recall that, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court on Human Rights Article 3 (interdiction of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the European Convention of Human Rights must be interpreted as requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the sense of a review which allows domestic authorities to "consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds". 122 While potentially a stretch, this is relevant as further rights considerations are sought to be brought into IF regulations. 123 It is thus arguable that awarding a life ban (especially as a first punishment, in the absence of a gradual scale of sanction) without any concrete possibility to reduce it in the future, raises serious issues as to its proportionality and its compatibility with fundamental principles of law.
Additionally, the issuance of life bans with this regularity requires consideration at the purpose of sanction in these contexts-whether retributive, deterrence or rehabilitation. Having noted the option of rehabilitative sanctions such as social work and education as well that a choice is made to issue life bans indicates a retributive and deterrent approach, which might serve the purpose of keeping such elements out of sport for such time to make sport clean (for the society), but not for assisting the individual. In such cases, the purpose of disciplinary sanctions in sport, could be seen to be different from that in the context of criminal law in society, otherwise.
The question of purpose however, remains independent of the consideration of proportionality, also significant as federation decisions are often final (as noted above). This made determination of the quantum an important exercise. To this end, IF bodies may consider aggravating and mitigating factors, or other guidelines, as discussed below, if so codified. Such factors may also sometimes result in the CAS concluding differently. 124

Aggravating and mitigating factors
Aggravating and mitigating factors are usually listed in connection with sanctions, independent of factors listed as relevant (or "not relevant") to establishing manipulation. Usually, these include age/youth/experience/inexperience, disciplinary record/prior violations, number of breaches, significance of benefit, potential to affect course/result, whether breach was part of a broader scheme, admission of violation/ cooperation/assistance/remorse 125 (Fig. 7), and could also include, the nature of the breach(es), the degree of fault, the harm that the breach(es) has/have done to the sport, the need to deter future breaches, and other specific factors. 126 Certain guidelines on sanctioning require, for example, considerations of "level of responsibility or …equity". 127 120 See Pavitt (2021) 121 The World Anti-Doping Agency's World Anti-Doping Code (2021), for instance, provides a ranges and factors relevant to sanctioning across the offences. 122  Certain federations provide for a strict tabulated range per sanctions based on how a specific manipulation offence is committed. 128 Such factors may be seen in the regulations themselves, 129 or even specifically applied in adjudication based on fact-the ICC's ACU has taken into account cooperation, admission of breach, remorse, good prior record, lack of substantial damage to commercial value or public interest or matches and interestingly, the lack of effect on the outcome of the match concerned, in mitigating sentences. 130 Similarly, the CAS takes into account such factors should an IF decision be overturned. 131 It is interesting to note that certain federations make a distinction in their applicable codes between sanctions awarded for the same offences depending on factors involved (independent of the definition of the crime) such as-"fraud" (intentional breach), "fault" (whether or not intentional), "involvement" (indirect) and "attempting" (result agnostic) in their sections addressing sanctions. 132 Similar structure  (Items 8,9 and 11). Certain subjective unspecified "exceptional circumstances" might be considered when sanctioning as listed under Article 23. 129 In addition to FIH above, see also, for example the Article 9 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (2020); such factors include "nature of the offence; the substantial interest in deterring similar misconduct; the offender's assistance to and cooperation with the Ethics Committee; the motive; the circumstances; the degree of the offender's guilt; the extent to which the offender accepts responsibility, and whether the person mitigated his guilt by returning the advantage received, where applicable. 2. In case of mitigating circumstances, and if deemed appropriate taking into account all circumstances of the case, the Ethics Committee may go below the minimum sanction and/or decide to hand down alternative sanctions…" Under the FIFA Disciplinary Code (2019), Article 24 specifies that "The judicial body determines the type and extent of the disciplinary measures to be imposed in accordance with the objective and subjective elements of the offence, taking into account both aggravating and mitigating circumstances… …When determining the disciplinary measure, the judicial body shall take into account all relevant factors of the case, including any assistance of and substantial cooperation by the offender in uncovering or establishing a breach of any FIFA rule, the circumstances and the degree of the offender's guilt and any other relevant circumstances. …In exercising its discretionary powers, the relevant FIFA judicial body may scale down the disciplinary measure to be imposed or even dispense with it entirely." 130 ICC Anti-Corruption Code-in the matter of proceedings between the ICC and Mr. Heath Streak, dated March 29, 2021 available at https:// resou rces. pulse. icc-crick et. com/ ICC/ docum ent/ 2021/ 04/ 14/ e06b3 7f8-65cb-4d0b-811b-d7bc0 bbe3c 2a/ Decis ion-of-the-ICC-28-March-2021. pdf (April 5, 2021) at para. 33. 131 See supra note 124 on CAS alteration (reducing) of sanctions in FIFA DRC decisions; in Mwamelo mitigating factors included comparatively small amounts, singular attempt at manipulation, a first offence, incitement by a third party, and the fact that a less harsh sentence could achieve the same purpose. 132 Item 4.A "'Level of Responsibility" under the WS Code of Conduct and Code of Ethics (2019, p. 5 and 6) categorizes the levels of responsibility into these four categories.
can also be observed in certain IF's sentencing guidelines applicable to all disciplinary offences specific to certain forms of cheating found in a sport such as bridge. 133 It might be contested that the myriad factors that are present for consideration across federation guidelines result in a large amount of discretion with only vague guidance on how it is to be exercised. Comparing awards within, across sports and with other processes under law providing varied outcomes, compounds this further. 134 Finally, it may also be observed that factors specified are often repetitive, with certain factors (non-cooperation, for instance) being offences unto themselves.

Existence of separate dispute resolution procedure
Another question is whether there are procedures specific to an IF and, more particularly, whether there is a procedure designed to deal with cases of sports competition manipulation separately. While federation-specific procedure exists in all IFs, only some of them have an independent procedure for match-fixing cases (Fig. 8). This even if some of them know certain specific details while mainly applying a common procedure to all sports offences.

Internal and external levels of regulation
Sanctions for competition manipulation may intervene at different levels. First, as noted above, disciplinary sanctions are applied by sports bodies, according to their internal (private) sanctions system ("sport justice", the sanctions being based in contract 135 ). Second, sanctions, including criminal, may be applied by public authorities ("state justice"). Depending on the applicable national law, the latter may be of a civil, administrative/disciplinary or criminal nature. 136 These are considered complementary. 137 Because they are different in their nature, these sanctions may be applied simultaneously without violating the ne bis in idem principle. 138 Disciplinary sanctions issued in initial proceedings by federations internally (the process looked at later in this section) may be challenged in front of the sports bodies' internal jurisdictional bodies and in arbitration proceedings. The jurisdictional bodies created by sport associations around the world pursue the same goal: to settle disputes, to mediate and to guarantee the correct interpretation of sporting rules and regulations. 139 At  138 This has been observed multiple times, though an argument could be made on whether further thought should be given to this principle's operation across various levels of adjudication in a sport and parallel to criminal proceedings-see Diaconu et al. (2021) at p. 44; the same concerns have also been raised previously in Palermo and Williams (2018, p. 21). 139 See Valloni and Pachmann (2013). 140 Leading cases prosecuted by FIFA are listed here with the relevant decisions-https:// www. fifa. com/ who-we-are/ legal/ integ rity/ leadi ng-cases/ (April 8, 2021). Most recently the decision issued in September, 2020 awarding a life-time ban and fine of CHF 100,000 to Marco Antonio Trovato Villalba, President of Olimpia, a Paraguayan club for manipulation and failure to cooperate under Article 18 and Article 20 respectively of the FIFA Disciplinary Code (2019) for two matches in 2018 and 2019-see https:// www. fifa. com/ who-we-are/ news/ the-fifa-disci plina ry-commi ttee-sanct ions-marco-anton io-trova to-villa lba-for-mat (April 8, 2021). The FIFA Appeal Committee had 3 decisions connected to manipulation in 2019/2020 (reduced number due to Covid-19)-see FIFA Disciplinary and Ethics Report 2019/2020, available at https:// resou rces. fifa. com/ image/ upload/ disci plina ry-ethics-report-2019-20. pdf? cloud id= hnuvy rpsxc u5lll v6sxy (April 9, 2021). 141 The cases arising from UEFA are listed chronologically under "Integrity" here, available here https:// www. uefa. com/ insid euefa/ prote cting-the-game/ integ rity/# cases (April 5, 2021). 142 See Section 5 of Diaconu et al. (2021) which lists each case before the CAS.
Outside of these, notable federations which regularly issue internal decisions include the ITF through the International Tennis Integrity Agency ("ITIA") which administers the TACP, 2020. At the time of study, the ITIA lists 23 instances of persons serving sanctions not amounting to life bans and 26 instances of persons serving life bans (one such decisions being for life bans for three persons). 143 Tennis governing bodies 144 overall had also had three cases appealed to the CAS where two life bans and one 5-year ineligibility awarded by tennis governing bodies were upheld. 145 Finally, but not in the least, the ICC has pronounced four decisions through its internal disputes mechanism already on corruption and fixing offences in 2021. 146 More recently, 2 cases have involved awarding 8 years of ineligibility each for conduct violating many provisions of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, including dealing in insider information. 147 Certain ICC awards are also examples of awards that have been appealed to the CAS and issued alongside ongoing state proceedings, with parallel state proceedings, each factoring in the other. 148 Among the international arbitration tribunals, the CAS was the most solicited insofar as disciplinary match-fixing proceedings are concerned, being the forum to which most federations provide for appeals from their internal disciplinary proceedings. 149 As of the time of study, the cases dealt with by the CAS concerned five different sports. 150 The CAS awards may be ultimately challenged in front of the Swiss Federal Tribunal ("SFT"), on the limited grounds enumerated the applicable provisions of the Swiss Federal Statute of Private International Law. 151 As of the time of study, the SFT had not adjudicated any case related to competition manipulation in appeal from a CAS award.

Applicable procedure within a federation
At the federation level, each international federation contains a distinct dispute resolution mechanism through which disciplinary matters are processed-i.e. a manipulation offence sought to be proceeded against by any of these federations in any discipline of any Olympic sport, has a defined channel under through which it can and will be addressed. Among these, some federations have procedures unique to manipulation offences, 152 some have a combination of specific regulations and certain provisions applicable from common procedures or sanctions, or make specific exemptions. The rest have common processes for all disciplinary and/or other disputes within the federation 153 . Across federations, these procedures are found in dedicated regulations addressing manipulation offences, where, for instance their [above described] definitions are located. If not, the other sources of applicable provisions are spread across (and more commonly prior to the IOC's 2016 Code) the federation's common code of ethics, or overarching statutes/constitution. Certain bodies have more specific reporting, investigation, prosecution and adjudication rules which are applicable. 154 Procedural rights are laid down across most federation regulations and include the right to be informed, right to fair timely and impartial trial, right to a written defence and the right to be accompanied and/or represented. Most federation also provide which authority is to investigate and stages of progress from investigation to adjudication, for which burden and standard of proof is then described, as well as certain specific circumstances in which burden may shift. 155 The standard of proof may range from balance of probabilities to comfortable satisfaction (sometimes specifically stated as greater than a balance of probability but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt, 156 the same as seen at the CAS) with a prevalence of the latter. Certain rules specifically address the standard of admissibility of different types of evidence, sometimes with an illustrative list, as well as whether or not ordinary judicial rules on admissibility are applicable.
Keeping in line with this, certain IFs regulations, in line with certain CAS awards, 157 state categorically that applicable procedure is not intended to be subject to or limited by requirements and legal standards applicable to criminal proceedings or employment matters but was independent and autonomous. 158 Finally, limitation periods are also described ranging from as few as 3 years 159 to no statute of limitations on such offences, 160 with certain independent procedure for "smaller" offences. 161

Conclusions
This research has allowed us to identify the following takehome points in IF regulations as they apply to competition manipulation.
First, quantitatively, it was found that, as of the time of study, the vast majority of the 43 studied IFs have adopted regulations on the manipulation of sports competitions, either by producing their own detailed regulations or by reference to the IOC's 2016 Code.
Second, on the regulations' substance, it was found that applicable provisions across the offences, as at the time of being studied, remain, in their majority, robust, relevant and updated. This may also be considered an indicator of the elaborate thought given to tackling this offence relative to othersheightened attention is seen in certain sports, such as tennis or cricket, a high profile, visible sports, with many cases and high susceptibility. Even so, within regulations, the existence, or lack thereof, of a specific set of regulations, or dispute resolution mechanism assumes relevance given, as noted otherwise in awards of the CAS, or decisions of other bodies such as FIFA's DRC that evidence within manipulation is sought to be hidden, IF investigative powers are not the same as national authorities, the offence being considered serious and the objective of preserving integrity and competition very crucial. 162 The most important variations across sports concern basic definitions of the offence, and various elements thereof, as well as the quantum of sanctions (fines and importantly ineligibility and bans), which vary vastly. In this respect, it is important to note that the prevalence of life bans is significant, particularly in the context of proportionality (certain sports having a much smaller maximum ban), impact on athlete careers and the presence of alternative sanctions rooted in rehabilitation.
Yet, on a more general level, it was found that there exists disparity in detail or attention within IF regulations, which could indicate the relative significance associated by sport administration in addressing manipulation-related offences, compared to the treatment of other integrity-related offences, and in particular doping. 163 163 Further, even in other major event regulations, there is seen a heightened specific focus on certain offences, leaving out corruption; most recently, see the governing Regulations issued for the 30th Winter Universiade 2021 which was to have been held in Lucerne in December 2021, available at https:// www. fisu. net/ medias/ fichi ers/ regul ations_ wu2021_ lucer ne_ 20200 120. pdf, April 10, 2021). opinions have called for re-prioritization of manipulation offences, which in recent times might have slipped in public conscience in the absence of "large-scale" scandals, or increased regulation. 164 Third, it was concluded that further consistency in procedural provisions across sports is desirable, aided by having uniform procedural standards applicable within a sport for various offences and across sports, given also, that sanctioning could work at various levels. This is also relevant in the light of increasing calls for protection of rights of parties and more specifically athletes, in internal IF adversarial processes.
Last, as a look to the near future, it is noted that newer threats within sports would need more regulatory attention-digital currency being one such example. 165 Alongside this, growth in certain sports post new challenges. There has been a noted increase in ongoing investigations and sanctions issued across eSport, 166 and corresponding efforts to combat manipulation therein, 167 for example. The eSports Integrity Coalition and International Esports Federation regulations are regularly applied but have limited applicability amidst complex ownership, affiliation and governance structures across publishers, national bodies and players, as well as the different context of manipulation (such as through edoping). This makes encapsulating potential actions in a conventional definition challenging in this context. This research has been made possible due to the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF-100011_192497). 164 See, for example, Sir Richard McLaren's opinion in Match-fixing, not doping, poses greatest risk to sport, Reuters (2015). 165 See for examples issues discussed at forums such as the CSCF Foundation for Sport Integrity and IntegriSport Erasmus+ project which ran from 2019 to 2020-see https:// cscfs port. com/ media-state ment-proje ct-closi ng-confe rence-sports-manip ulati ons-and-crimi nalactiv ities-impac ting-sport/ (April 10, 2021).