Establishing a governance threshold in small-scale fisheries to achieve sustainability

The lack of effective governance is a major concern in small-scale fisheries. The implementation of governance that encompasses the three pillars of sustainability (social, economic, and ecological) is still a worldwide challenge. We examined nine stalked barnacle fisheries (Pollicipes pollicipes) across Southwest Europe to better understand the relationship between governance elements and sustainability. Our results show that nested spatial scales of management, the access structure, co-management, and fisher’s participation in monitoring and surveillance promote sustainability. However, it is not the mere presence of these elements but their level of implementation that drives sustainability. Efforts should be placed in the accomplishment of a minimum combination of local scales of management, access rights through individual quotas, instructive-consultative co-management and functional participation. Surpassing this threshold in future governance structures will start to adequately promote social, economic and ecologically sustainability in small-scale fisheries. Supplementary Information The online version of this article at 10.1007/s13280-021-01606-x.

. Relationship between the governance score and the levels of the four governance elements analyzed per stalked barnacle fishery in Southwest Europe. Governance elements include the spatial scale of management (see levels in Table S3), co-management (Table S4), fisher's participation (Table S5) and the access structure (Table S6). Figure S2. Relationship between the number of sustainability attributes and the levels of the four governance elements analyzed per stalked barnacle fishery in Southwest Europe. Governance elements include the spatial scale of management (see levels in Table S3), co-management (Table S4), fisher's participation (Table S5) and the access structure (Table S6). Figure S3. Presence of sustainability attributes per group (GS= governance system, U= users system) per stalked barnacle fishery in Southwest Europe.  Table S2. Data used for the socioeconomic characterization of the stalked barnacle fisheries in terms of number of fishers, landings (volume and value) and ex-vessel price (Table 1).  Table S3. Broad spatial scales recognized for the biology and management of small-scale benthic resources (Orensanz et al. 2016). Scales are ordered from a higher to a lower degree of spatial detail.

Microscale (Patch)
Neighborhoods within local populations, usually corresponding to small portions of the fishing bed. Defined in the order of 1 kilometer

Mesoscale (Local)
At the level of local populations, usually corresponding to the scale of fishing beds. Defined in the order of 10s kilometers, but below the mean larval dispersal distance

Macroscale (Regional)
Aggregate of local populations, defined in the order of 10s-100s kilometers. Average larval dispersal of stalked barnacles has been estimated in 100 km using an Individual-Based Model (maximum pelagic larval duration was set in 60 days and several larval behavior scenarios were used) coupled to a hydrodynamic model (Nolasco, Dubert and Queiroga, unpublished data). Both models have been successfully tested before in other species in the same area (Domingues et al. 2012;Gomes et al. 2016) Table S4. Self-governance, co-management levels (Sen and Nielsen 1996) and centralized management fisheries description. Regimes are ordered from a higher responsibility level of fishers in the decision-making to a gradually decreasing one.

Fisheries regime Description
Self-governance* Government has done a total power devolution to the local users (e.g., traditional marine tenure systems)

Co-management
Informative Government has delegated authority to user groups, who are responsible for informing on the decisions taken

Advisory
Users advice government on the decisions to be taken and government endorses them

Cooperative
Government and users cooperate together as equal partners in decision-making

Consultative
Mechanisms exists for governments to consult with users but all decisions are taken by government

Instructive
Minimal exchange of information between government and users. Government informs the users on the decisions to be taken

Centralized management
Absence of mechanisms to dialogue with users * Some authors include self-governance or community-based management as a type of co-management Table S5. Description of participatory levels ordered from a higher participation of users to a gradually decreasing one. Fisher's participation is focused on the involvement of users in the monitoring, control and surveillance. Classification was originally designed for agriculture (modified from Pretty (1995).

Self-mobilization
Users participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems. Users develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used

Interactive participation
Industry driven partnership. Participation is a right, not just a just a mean to achieve goals. Often, industry produces independent management advice and voluntarily participates in monitoring design, data collection and analysis

Functional participation
Government driven partnership. Participation seen as a mean to achieve predetermine goals. Users might participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement tends to arise only after major decisions have already been made by external agents

Participation for material incentives
People participate by contributing resources, for example, labour, in return for food, cash or other material incentives. People have no stake in prolonging practices when incentives end

Participation by consultation
Users participate by being consulted or by answering questions.
External agents define problems and information gathering processes, and so control analysis

Passive participation
People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. Unilateral announcements by administration Table S6. The access structure ordered from the most to the least exclusive forms (Hilborn et al. 2005).

TURF
Long-term ownership rights over an area and its resources to particular users group excluding others from access. Rights that in some cases may come close to ownership

IQs (Individual Quotas)
The licenses granted do not only allow access but contain a proportion of the total catch or effort. IQs might be transferable or not. The most significant element is that by specifying what proportion of the resource each participant may catch, the race-tofish is eliminated. The participants can then concentrate on reducing the costs of fishing and increasing the value of the product, both of which lead to increases in profitability

Limited entry
There is usually a fixed number of licenses issued and to participate in the fishery one must either purchase a license from an existing participant or receive one through for example, a merits ranking. In limited entry fisheries there is no guarantee of catch, licenses simply permit the right to participate. Licenses might include a maximum catch per fisher to reduce harvest

Open access
Any individual wishing to go fishing can do so, often with the purchase of a license for a nominal fee. Regulations of a gear and season are often introduced to reduce the level of harvest. Most commercial fisheries go through this period at their initial stages Table S7. Attributes known to promote long-term sustainability in co-managed fisheries (Gutiérrez et al. 2011). Definition, group (RS= resource system, RU= resource units, GS= governance system, U= users system) and the potential direct/indirect effects of each attribute are provided. For each attribute a reference to the table that justifies its presence or absence across the stalked barnacle fisheries in SW Europe is included.

Long-term sustainability attributes
Group Name Definition Gutiérrez et al. 2011 Potential direct/indirect effects Gutiérrez et al. 2011

Co-management in law
Co-management is supported by laws and decrees in the National Constitution Gives users and their institutions the legal right to participate in the comanagement process through management plans, enforcement of rules, etc.

Local authorities support
Local government encourages, supports, and participates in the comanagement process Facilitates the process of implementation of comanagement at the local level S11 GS

Long-term management policy
Refers to sustainability in time and stability of management plans and/or management institutions Implementation of a long-term policy in a comanagement context generates a great incentive to fishers to adhere to and get involved with enforcing regulations, thus reducing the probability of occurrence of freeriders, illegal fishing, and short-term, profit maximizing behaviors S12 GS

Scientific advice
Implies scientific advice and participation of Universities, NGOs or governmental institutions in the implementation of the co-management system Scientific knowledge and advice on the ecology and resilience of targeted stocks play important roles in guiding co-management policies and governance development processes. Quality and quantity of information is improved through cooperation and information flow S13 GS

Monitoring, control and surveillance
Fishery control, monitoring and surveillance by co-management authorities/institutions Favors reliable information flow from fishers to policy makers, lowering monitoring, enforcement and transaction costs, and providing continuous fine-grained signals about resource status (adaptive co-management) S14 GS

Global catch quotas
Resources are managed through assignment of global catch quotas (e.g. TACs) Reinforces co-management if allocated together with other management tools in a context of management redundancy. Requires legislation and enforcement of legal frameworks, and cooperation of fisher-communities, which need to be adapted to countries and idiosyncrasies S15 GS

Individual or community quotas
Resources are managed through individual, transferable or not, or community fishing quotas designed and implemented within the co-management regime Creates incentives to selfmanagement, self-enforcement and community empowerment S16 GS

TURF Formal Territorial Users Rights of Fishing
Generates a sense of exclusive use and ownership among fishers, who perceive they are receiving the equivalent of a "land grant" which has the form of a highly productive aquatic area S17 GS

Spatially explicit management
Separate areas of management and/or spatially-explicit tools (e.g., rotational harvest strategies) Enhances the probability of comanagement success, particularly in spatially-structured stocks with low mobility, where the spatial distribution patterns of abundance are heterogeneous, and the spatial dynamics of the fishing process follows closely spatial variations in abundance at the scale of small subareas S18 GS

Minimum size
Minimum size regulations, through mesh sizes, traps, hooks, etc Reduces fishing mortality of undesired individual sizes and increases survival of spawning stocks. Particularly useful under comanagement regimes when implemented with the active participation of fishers, promoting compliance with regulations S19 GS

Protected areas
Formal no-take areas, marine reserves and/or protected areas with a considerable degree of fishermen/communities involvement (community-based reserves) Enhances fisheries management and conservation of biodiversity, particularly in multi-species or on sedentary stocks, or for which broader ecological impacts of fishing are an issue. Successful use of protected areas in a comanagement context required in this study a caseby-case understanding of the spatial structure of impacted fisheries, ecosystems and human communities.

Seeding or restocking
Includes       Scientific advice has been occasionally involved in decisionmaking. Examples include in 2011 the cease of the rotational schemes and the reduction of the resource size limit asked by the harvesters with support from the scientists. Participation of institutions that provide scientific advice in a project that promotes the implementation of comanagement (see Table S10 Table S24. Self-enforcement.

Fishery Presence/Absence Description Source
Morbihan Absence -

Galicia Presence
Fishers invest their own resources in the enforcement of the resource by setting a local surveillance services (marine guards directly hired by the cofradías but co-paid between fishers/cofradía and fisheries administration), collaborating with governmental officers to prevent poaching. Fishers also participate in the enforcement activities personally. However, users often declare that many cases go unpunished or with small fines Freire 2003 Macho et al. 2013 Own expertise

Asturias-West Presence
Fishers occasionally carry out surveillance in special interest areas.