



## Correction: Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games

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In the original publication of the article, the author noticed the errors in the panel of Fig. 4.

The figure titles and axes labels of panels (b) and (c) have turned out to be unrecognizable format in this article. Figure 4 should have appeared as shown below.

The original article has been corrected.

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
The original article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8>.

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**Fig. 4** Introspection dynamics in the linear public goods game with peer rewarding. Here, a game with three asymmetric players, each having 16 possible strategies, is studied. Players cooperate in a linear public goods and then reward each other in the next stage after everyone’s contribution is revealed. In the first stage, players can condition their cooperation on the information they have about their co-players’ rewarding strategies. For a full description of the model, please see the section on rewarding. In this example, players 1 and 2 are identical in all aspects while player 3 differs from them in only a single aspect. Here, Eq. (7) is used to plot the exact probability with which players cooperate and reward cooperation in the long run. There are three types of asymmetry for player 3. **a** First, the case where player 3 has a high cost of rewarding compared to players 1 and 2,  $0.7 = \gamma_3 > \gamma_1 = 0.1$ . **b** Then, the case where player 3 is less productive than their co-players,  $1.2 = r_3 < r_1 = 2$ . **c** Finally, the case where player 3 has less information about co-players’ rewarding strategies than the others, that is,  $0.1 = \lambda_3 < \lambda_1 = 0.9$ . For all plots, a high value for the selection strength,  $\beta = 10$ , is considered. Unless otherwise mentioned, the following parameters are maintained for all panels:  $c_i = 1$  (individual cost of cooperation),  $r_i = 2$  (individual productivity),  $\gamma_i = 0.1$  (individual cost of rewarding), and  $\lambda_i = 0.9$  (individual information about co-players’ strategies). In panels (a) and (b), the reward value is  $\rho = 0.3$  while for panel (c), the reward value  $\rho = 1$

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