The Great Break 1927–28 and knowledge management for a modern sewer system in Petrograd/Leningrad (1918–1928)

The article deals with the process of knowledge management in the construction of urban infrastructure in Leningrad in the 1920s and the influence of political and economic factors on this process. At first, municipal engineering was included in the so-called circulation zone, i.e. those selected spheres of Soviet industry, science, and culture, where a relatively free exchange of technology and knowledge with leading Western firms and corporations was practised. Because of the Great Break and War Scare of 1927, municipal engineering was excluded from this zone. The main source to build this argument is archival material about the international expert commission on sewerage system construction of 1927. In the spring of that year, experts from the United States and Germany were invited to come to Leningrad. However, in the summer of that year, the War Scare cut off this cooperation. The article discusses the shaping of new knowledge management and the new industrial culture which emerged from the crisis.


Introduction
On February 23, 1927, the British foreign minister sent a note to the USSR, demanding the cessation of support for the Chinese government-in the form of an alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party-but this was declined. Great Britain then broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR (May 24-27). In China itself, the Kuomintang abruptly distanced itself from the communists, and during the Shanghai massacre (April 12) as many as five thousand people were killed. From the very beginning, the crisis symbolized for the USSR not only a serious failure of Stalinist foreign policy, but also an entire series of hostile actions by anti-Soviet forces, primarily the powerful Russian All-Military 1 3 Union (RAMU). Newspapers reported numerous operations in major cities: in Moscow, for example, a bomb was thrown into the pass office of OGPU (June 6). The next day, the USSR ambassador to Poland, V.L. Voykov, was mortally wounded at a Warsaw railway station. He was shot by B.S. Koverda, a White emigrant, who stated that this was his revenge on Russia. On the same day (June 7), an explosion at the Central Party Club in Leningrad, where a meeting of the philosophy section was under way, injured around 30 people. On the same day, the head of the Belarus OGPU, I.K. Opanskiy, was killed while on duty in Minsk (Shkarenkov 1987, pp. 143-182, Velikanova 2013, pp. 45-81, Ayrapetov 2020. As reports about all these attacks were published in newspapers with the corresponding, furious Soviet commentary, war seemed to be imminent and inevitable to the population. Soviet citizens started buying up stocks of goods from shops, and at the 15th Party Congress A.I. Mikoyan admitted that the USSR had suffered "the economic difficulties of the eve of war, without having a war." (Syezd 1962(Syezd , p. 1094). This period is referred to as the War Scare, or the fear of the government and Communist Party of the Soviet Union that war could break out very soon. Meanwhile, the USSR was categorically unprepared for war, given the state of the economy and the armed forces. Against a backdrop of domestic and foreign-policy crisis, a whole series of important political changes unfolded. This period, called the Great Break, included the defeat of the leftist opposition within the Party, a shift to a planned economy and collectivization. In particular, the crisis inevitably affected the urban infrastructure and utilities of the USSR, since funding for civil engineering had been drastically reduced, and many efforts involving knowledge and technology transfer had been suspended (Neutatz 2001).
European scientific and technological achievements in the field of urban economy (intracity public transport, street and house electric lighting, water supply and sewerage, etc.) had become an important part of knowledge circulation in the world (Hård and Misa 2010). Ideas about the "European city" were considered positively appropriate in Turkey, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires (later the USSR) and other countries (Hård and Misa 2010;Hein-Kircher 2020;Gantner et al. 2021). The shape of appropriation depended on many local conditions in different countries. The Stalinist USSR was a socialist system characterised by ideological dictatorship, and political confrontation with the leading industrial countries, as well as state management of the entire industry. Infrastructure construction in the USSR was also affected by specific geological and geographical issues. Knowledge and technological circulation between the USA, Germany and the USSR was generally developing to become an important component of industrialization (Shearer 1997), and continued virtually uninterrupted throughout the entire history of the Soviet Union (Sutton 1968;Sutton 1971;Sutton 1973;Bailes 1981; Thompson and Vidmer 1983;Lutz 2011;Miller et al. 2010). However, in a context with national Bolshevism in the USSR taking shape, with its distrust of foreigners (Brandenberger 2002), the normal circulation between western and soviet experts took the form of separate zones of circulation (Cohen 2010). Introducing this concept, Cohen emphasizes that interaction with foreign counterparts did not develop everywhere, but only in separate, carefully selected, highpriority areas of industry (Graziosi 1988;Dalrymple 1964;Shpotov 2002;Cohen 2003;Holliday 1979;Stent 1983;Sobolev 2000;Bailes 1981;Lyubavs´kiy 2016, pp. 23-25, 67-69, 90, 128-133, 170-173;Ihnatusha 2012;Shpotov 2009;Zhuravlev and Mukhin 2004;Zhuravlev 2000), science (Solomon 2006;Ratmanov and Bashkuev 2021) and culture (Ball 2003;Chubar´ian 2002). The Leningrad sewage system was first included in one of these zones of circulation, before being forcibly withdrawn. However, even after that, with all the restrictions, the circulation of knowledge within the USSR and with Western Knowledge acquisition as hiring experts (1918)(1919)(1920)(1921)(1922)(1923)(1924)(1925)(1926)(1927)(1928) The October Revolution 1917 brought many changes to the management of the communal services of Leningrad, but generally one can trace here the inclusion of this area in European knowledge circulation. Like most of the European cities that suffered through the First World War (Schott 2006;Lenger 2014, pp. 275-316), cities in the European part of Soviet Russia needed to restore their damaged infrastructure or build it anew. The program for the construction of urban engineering networks (Vernetzung der Stadt) (Schott 1999;, although a standard development phase for all major European cities at the end of the 19th and beginning of the twentieth centuries, was not completely executed in many Russian cities and towns, including St. Petersburg, before the First World War (Bater 1976, pp. 336, 360-369, 408-411;Nardova et.al. 2014, pp. 61, 199, 226, 240, 252). During the civil war and the associated devastation, the situation only deteriorated. But as early as in 1918-20, ambitious plans were being considered, such as the Moscow metropolitan underground (Neutatz 2001, p. 45), the resolution of the housing crisis in Petrograd (Obertreis 2004), the construction of next-generation homes for workers in Kharkov (Lyubavs´kiy 2016, pp. 57-70), and others.

3
The sewer system had been the most desired project for Imperial St. Petersburg (Bater 1976, pp. 360-368;Malinova-Tziafeta 2013, pp. 120-156), but it was not completed until the time of Stalin. All issues of municipal engineering fell under the responsibility of the Bolshevik state as early as the spring of 1918. The Petrograd authorities were struggling to bring order to the city, despite looming threats, including the prospect of mass hunger. The new municipal engineering organization which worked on the sewage project was named the Urban Engineering Department, OTKOMKhOZ (Izvestija 1918, p. 3). By the end of the 1920s, it had become powerful and multi-faceted. The Petrograd Sewer Agency (since 1932-the Trust Vodokanalizatsiya) became a part of the Urban engineering department , and then split into the Construction Department and the Exploitation Department. 1 This agency maintained close links with all state agencies and bodies: it received state funding, and it was given assistance to facilitate the recruitment of workers. 2 It is logical that knowledge management began to be developed here, and the stages of this process can be described in terms of the theory of the successful development of modern organizations. The Petrograd Sewer Agency needed to acquire new, valuable knowledge about planning and building a modern engineering project. So, knowledge acquisition involved hiring people with the necessary knowledge and expertise; and engaging outside consultants (Jones and Mahon 2018, pp. 23-24) was a first step here.
The main problem for public utilities (1918) was the emergency repair of collapsing roads. The rotten wooden logs of the old storm drains could not support the loads put on roads, and so the streets were pitted with deep holes that filled with untreated sewage. 3 Such repair operations became more than merely "plugging gaps", as they evolved into a preparatory stage for building a high-capacity, modern sewage collector system. The pipes were to be laid in compliance with a specific plan, and by March of 1919 the Petrograd Sewer Agency invited the engineer N.K. Chizhov to assist as a consulting expert. The justification was his own fame as "one of the greatest specialists in issues of sewer systems not only in Russia, but also abroad". 4 Before the revolution, he had been a renowned specialist in the field of sewer construction (Chizhov 1895). As a civil engineer, he held the rank of Current State Advisor (1908), and in accordance with his rank, he had been raised into the nobility and awarded a family crest (1917) (Obshchiy gerbovnik 1902, p. 36). The task before the engineer was to bring clarity to an accumulation of pre-revolutionary projects submitted to the State Duma's City Administerial Commission for the Construction of Sewers (1914). Certain aspects of these projects had already been approved, and there was no doubt about them. It had been decided to build a separate system: one network of pipes would remove rainwater from the streets, while another network would handle domestic and industrial waste. The first part (storm water drainage) was considered satisfactory, but the second, most important part (sewers to remove industrial and household wastewater) met with serious disagreements. For this reason, the design work was never finished. 5 It took the engineers a long time to reach a consensus due to the city's particularly difficult landscape. The city is located in the Neva Delta, on numerous islands (see Fig. 1). The engineers could not agree on many issues-in particular, whether it was necessary to build a sewer for each island, on methods for laying sewer pipes in wet soil, and the safe removal of domestic sewage from the city (Malinova-Tziafeta, pp. 127-136). Professor Chizhov's remit included considering the designs for this second system and issuing an expert solution.
Clearly, Chizhov was well-known and respected in the Sewers and Roads Agency. A letter was written to him in observance with all the rules of pre-revolutionary etiquette, addressed to his "Worshipful Sir, Nikolai Klavdievich," (Milostivyj gosudar' Nikolaj Klavdievic), although elsewhere in the same organization, co-workers were addressed in Fig. 1 The plan of Leningrad city, 1922Leningrad city, -1925 (Plan goroda Leningrada (po rayonam) sostavlennyy po noveyshim ofitsial`nym istochnikam. Gosudarstvennaya kartografiya: Leningrad, 1925). The red lines on the map represent the state tram lines the very simplest manner, with letters starting: "to com [rade]. Khakharev". In this correspondence, the officials at the Agency make reference to the achievements of the engineer, and his international reputation. Chizhov himself, in the manner of many of his colleagues in other areas of science and industry (Schlögel 1988, pp. 294-304;Schattenberg 2002, pp. 70-73;Obertreis 2017, pp. 147-156, especially 148), accepted the invitation immediately. 6 It is highly likely that engineers saw here a good opportunity to utilize their skills and abilities, in a way that also benefited the city and society at large.
And yet, the invitation of the nobleman Chizhov to such a responsible position cannot be considered commonplace. In general, the Bolsheviks were wary of the nobles and specialists "from the former" (i.e., from families with a relatively good income and those who hired persons for their business). OTKOMKhOZ invited other members of the old order to work. They were both professional engineers and just well-educated people who were able to quickly get a new profession right at the enterprise. Particularly noteworthy is the story of E. Rayevskaya, a theatre actress who was able to first learn drafting in a short time, and then work as an engineer in the design department. 7 In many ways, the invitation of such specialists was made necessary by the circumstances of the time. This was recognized by the leadership of OTKOMKhOZ. From 1927 onwards, these experts began to be replaced in Soviet industry by specialists from the children of workers and peasants, in a "classrelated" recruitment process (Chuykina 2000, pp. 167-169). However, the training of "new personnel" took time, so this process was delayed at many enterprises for a long time. A decisive campaign for the dismissal of specialists from the "former" came in 1932 and was associated with checks and investigations into the reasons why the plan for the construction of the city sewer had not been completed on time. 8 Then the organization had to dismiss most of its employees from noble, bourgeois and even rich peasant origins (Malinova-Tziafeta 2021).
However, the very fact of cooperation with colleagues "from the former" highlights the fact that city sewerage was important for the authorities-both from a practical and symbolic point of view. In public debate before the revolution, sewers had become a symbol of modernism and a key to resolving a cluster of public health issues. The inability of the pre-revolutionary city authorities to build sewers had been yet another demonstration of the weakness and sluggishness of Czarist rule as a whole. This was an idea that was repeated many times in public discourse in Czarist Russia, either in veiled forms, or stated unequivocally. Particularly heated public debates over the development of St. Petersburg were heard during the clashes between Petr Stolypin and the parliamentary opposition, which demanded greater authorities for city self-government (Stolypin 1991;Gran 1909, p. 193;Velikhov 1911, pp. 55-56). After the revolution, the Bolsheviks gave the public solid grounds to hope for the modernisation of the city. In the official documents of the Sewer Agency, and in newspaper articles (Gorodskoye blagoustroystvo 1918, p. 3), there were sporadic mentions of the hope that a new system of Bolshevik power would be installed under which, amongst other things, it would be possible to build "the right sewer system". 9 Bureaucrats and engineers of the 1920s were also primarily concerned with avoiding a repetition of the negative experiences of the pre-revolutionary period, i.e., once again indefinitely postponing the choice of a design, and construction itself. Practical issues were most salient in this thinking: the dangers of making another error in the organization of design work or rushing to select a design and developing the most precise construction plan possible. This second consideration remained as current as it was before the revolution, as the geographical conditions in Petrograd/Leningrad were highly complex: the city lies inside the delta of the Neva River, whose many arms carve the city into multiple islands. This theme can be seen in almost every justification of decisions made. 10 The construction of infrastructure would be a form of reproach to the previous government. Once again, this testifies to its powerful ideological potential and practical significance.
Thus, the ideological component is reflected here in the criticism of all City Dumas as a whole, rather than specifically the St. Petersburg Duma; although in more than 50 Russian towns and cities the local authorities did manage to build sewer networks (Bönker 2010, pp. 244-245). Overall, the goals and perspectives for the development of Petrograd differed little from the ideas of the doctors and hygienists who took the example of European cities as a standard. This is reflected not only in the drawings themselves and the specifications, but it can also be seen in the rhetoric in official documents. For example, an important decision by the OTKOMKhOZ introducing an additional tax in 1923 was directly justified as follows: "in order that it may be possible not only to support the development of the city in its current state, but also for it to be possible, in the shortest time possible, to raise it to the standard of Western cities." This line should in no way be considered a mistake: on the contrary, the phrase "Western cities" is overwritten with purple ink, covering the weaklyprinted word "Europe". 11 This means that the engineers of the early Soviet period, in justifying the project, continued to be guided by the good example of Europe. They were aware of domestic backwardness and tried to overcome it.

The new pattern for knowledge circulation and the International Commission of Experts (1927)
The War Scare of 1927 and the Great Break intervened in the process of knowledge transfer from the West to the USSR and influenced the knowledge management of the Leningrad Sewer Agency. This can be seen in archival materials concerning plans to convene an international commission of experts to discuss citywide sewerage projects. The commission was going to be convened a few months before the military alarm (May 1927), but as the crisis unfolded, plans changed drastically. The Commission was to have met for around three weeks, with a start date proposed for Spring 1928, though this was later postponed, until the idea was finally rejected (July 28, 1928). 12 The archival materials are indirect, but nevertheless important evidence of changes in the management and transfer of knowledge in the USSR. The invitation of consultants to discuss cases in any organization is a sign of its successful development. But the sudden rejection of external consultants speaks of the process of separation of knowledge from the pan-European circulation at a time when the process of knowledge acquisition had not yet been fully completed.
Leningrad's modern collector sewer system was built gradually. An experimental section on Vasilevskiy Island (see Fig. 2) was planned to be extended to cover the entire city, and it was decided to seek consultants for this complex project from among the leading specialists in the field, including foreigners. Initially, a complete separate sewerage system was designed both for Vasilevskiy Island and for the entire city, like the systems that had already been built in Moscow, Kharkov, and Odessa. Under the project, rainwater and relatively clean industrial water were transported through one pipe, while domestic wastewater was transported through another. Those and other water flows were dumped into the Neva without cleaning. This had been worrying both Sewer Agency and city officials since the 1920s, and they held periodic meetings to discuss the problem. However, the solution each time was only to move the discharge point for the waste water away from yacht marinas. A complete separate system was provided for the whole of Leningrad later, in 1940, by which time mechanical pumps had been provided. It was certainly imperfect, but it was mistakenly believed that the water around Leningrad could be cleansed simply by removing waste water to the nearby Gulf of Finland. Up until the 1950s, scientists believed that poorly treated sewage was washed away by the waters of the bay and did not pollute the Baltic Sea too much (Malinova-Tziafeta 2019). So, the Leningrad engineers preferred to The purpose of convening a commission of experts (the decree of the Lengubispolkom May 25, 1927) was to seek technical solutions that would make it possible to cheaply, quickly, and effectively build a network to dispose of household and industrial wastewater. 13 First, a list of 13 proposed candidates originated from the Leningrad experts themselves (4 foreigners from Germany and the USA and 9 Soviet experts from Odessa, Kharkov, Leningrad, Moscow). Then, the document was handed over to the head of the GubOTKOMKhOZ (the Leningrad Provincial Urban engineering department) and then on to the Presidium of the Leningrad Gubispolkom (the city executive authority). 14 There was no information on the archive file as to whether these documents were inspected by any secret services, although the list itself, once compiled for approval, may well have been forwarded to other agencies.
Such a Commission was not unusual for local municipal utilities. Members of the prerevolutionary City Duma offered several invitations to recruit foreign specialists, as well as sending their own colleagues abroad to study the strengths and possible weaknesses of sewer systems in European cities (Domontovich 1874, pp. 86-88, 100-109, 158-159). A major difference from the pre-revolutionary period was that in Leningrad, the funding and organization of the work was assumed by the state through the city authorities. Also, joint work between Soviet and foreign engineers proceeded on the design front in the 1920s (Cohen 2003), and also on urban infrastructure. One example is the Moscow metro: Siemens-Bauunion drew up designs for the Myasnitskiy radial (1926), while metro builders and engineers were sent to European cities to inspect the underground networks there (Neutatz 2001, p. 52). The Kharkov tractor factory and other city enterprises invited German workers and specialists for consultations (Lyubavs´kiy 2016, pp. 57, 67-69, 80, 126-133, 170-172), while America's Ford factories received workers from tractor factories on study trips (1926) (Vasilyev 1927).
Generally, the relationship between the Soviet side and Western firms in the 1920s was tense. Foreign business partners on several occasions expressed their dissatisfaction about how hard it was to reach agreement with the Soviets, as well as how inexplicable the supposed reasons for a failure of negotiations could sometimes be (Lutz 2011, pp. 17, 152-168, 198-199, 303-325, 349-350, 351-356). The convening of the expert commission, stopped halfway, shows some reasons for these tense relations and misunderstandings, which were common in the era of the Great Break 1927Break -1928 By the end of October 1927, Soviet and foreign engineers had been sent offers of employment and had already accepted them, politely and positively. Soviet engineers claimed the fee was not of interest to them: "I will be satisfied with a basic wage and per diem; the rest is at your discretion", wrote B. O. Botuk, chief engineer of the Odessa sewer system. The formalities turned out to be a far more significant issue. Professor P. S. Belov, Chief Engineer of the Moscow Sewer System, and the Chief Engineer of the Kharkov Sewer System D. S. Cherkes both requested an official letter be sent to their city branch of the Department for Public Utilities, with a request to release them for their work. Red tape was not a universal problem, however, as Botuk claimed: "the issue is resolved, letters will not be required". 15 Foreign experts corresponded over the costs of travel and the size of their fees.
But as soon as the Sewer Agency received the responses, it began to consider which of the foreign experts were truly worth inviting, and which of the offers should be cancelled. Financial considerations played an important role here. Engineer Harrison P. Eddy (Boston, USA) claimed the highest fee for his time: 500 USD per day (totalling 10,500 dollars), as well as living expenses in Leningrad for three weeks. His letters and a telegram are neatly attached to the archive file. His candidacy was rejected and considered beyond the budget of the Commission. Obviously, such figures were beyond the resources of the Leningrad sewer system. The German experts Dr. Ingenieur Theodor Heid (Darmstadt) and Prof. Ewald Genzmer (Technische Hochschule, Berlin) asked for 1,500 German Marks and 3000 USD respectively; their candidacy was discussed at length and entered into the budget. However, following a resolution by I. G. Rudakov, head of the Department for Public Utilities (OTKOMKhOZ), to reduce costs, it was decided to sacrifice the candidacy of Professor Genzmer (December 12, 1927). 16 It is worth noting here that the financial difficulties were most likely unforeseen, and could not have been taken into account earlier, when the city authorities took the decision to convene the expert commission, i.e., in May of 1927. Otherwise, it is not clear how they expected to fund a visit by four leading foreign experts. Finances, however, were just one issue that would impact the fate of international cooperation around the Leningrad water system.
The affair could indicate a mistrust of foreign experts. This was typical for the Stalin era, although there are no references to this in the materials of the Leningrad Sewer Agency before this time. Political rhetoric in technical documents was highly unusual. Engineers and professors strived to present their views on technical issues in the most comprehensive and succinct form possible. However, in the case of the expert commission, three specialists spoke out almost simultaneously about the invitation of foreign specialists being something that was generally neither sensible nor timely. It is particularly noteworthy that this took place after official invitations had been sent out. Clearly, this fact was triggered by some new circumstances. In the text of the invitations, translated into English and German, there was not even a hint that the experts could expect any competition between themselves, or rejection. For example, Engineer Harrison P. Eddy sent two copies of his signed contract. Even stranger was the sudden and protracted silence on the Soviet side, that lasted more than a year-and this was in response to a letter from an expert agreeing to cooperate! Engineer Heid, for example, never received any answer at all, and suspected that his letter had been intercepted by the German political police (die politische Polizei) and for this reason resent his letter 13 months later. 17 So, the idea of inviting foreign experts was challenged by the Leningrad engineers, who were responsible for compiling materials for the international commission. However, even though the fate of the whole enterprise remained dubious, the immense preparatory work was continuing at full speed. That confirms again that the work of the Agency's leadership had met a snag. The initial plan was to present, for appraisal by the experts, the 35 designs of the sewage system in Petersburg/Leningrad, that had been drawn up in schematics and blueprints even before the revolution, together with all the information available on the construction of concrete sewers in Leningrad, in addition to explanatory notes, sketches and drawings describing the local terrain and features of the city. A monthly bonus was established, of 2250 roubles, for completing the work diligently and on time. An additional 17 engineers and draughtsmen were recruited, and to maintain their productivity a summertime request was made for ventilation fans, and then for new and larger premises. The entire task was to take at least 5 months. 18 So, after all of this was prepared for the foreign guests, why was it decided not to invite them?

The economic and political reasons for the changes in knowledge management
To find the reasons for de-inviting the foreign experts, let us turn to the intra-agency correspondence at the end of November 1927. The first mention of an ambivalent attitude towards foreign experts appears in notes by Engineer A. Reyneke, head of the construction section, and Design Engineer Professor N.K. Chizhov. Both memoranda were drawn up to outline the optimal work plan for the commission, to exclude fruitless discussions about details, and immediately focus the discussion on the most critical area. The arguments that Chizhov and Reyneke used were in many ways similar. The true reason for convening the expert commission, in their opinion, was to garner recommendations for simplifying construction and to drive down costs, whilst maintaining the highest level of effectiveness. A cautious attitude to foreigners, and to experts from other cities, is indirectly expressed in the document, rather as a strong argument for thorough preparatory work and a clear demarcation of the issues for discussion. Reyneke wrote: "when inspecting the Leningrad sewer system, Russian engineers have a deficient, and sometimes perverted view of the situation. This is to be expected from foreign engineers. If the local conditions are not elucidated fully […], then the expert commission will, volens nolens, produce an insufficiently elaborated solution, which may be open to different interpretations". 19 In his note Chizhov, who was generally less trenchant in his assessments, avoids criticizing the experts, although a little later recommends withdrawing the invitation to Professor Genzmer, and instead establishing a monthly bonus for the large number of Soviet design engineers compiling materials for the final meetings of the expert commission. In truth, this was not an initiative of Chizhov himself, but rather the execution of a resolution by his immediate superior, I. G. Rudakov, to reduce the total costs. 20 The final justification for de-inviting the foreigners was formulated in the document "On foreign expertise" (no earlier than March 9, 1928). Below the text, we find the flamboyant signature of Professor N. M. Ushakov, chairman of the subcommittee, although the nature of the document is clearly policy focused. It may have originated from powerful agencies, such as the Obkom (The Leningrad Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) or OGPU. Obviously, it was a new general political directive, which the management and employees of the Sewer Agency had to correctly interpret. The text is precise and deceptively simple, with deliberate repetition of key words and terms in a way that is reminiscent of Stalin's speech, and for this reason deserves reproduction at length: "The construction of facilities has brought onto the agenda the issue of the formats and means of obtaining foreign expertise. Certain adverse examples of foreign expertise sometimes trigger dissatisfaction among Russian experts, and lead, in individual cases, to doubt in the utility of such foreign expertise. […].
Of particular attention is the circumstance, that the largest and most complex construction efforts abroad are executed by individual companies, which keep secret the methods they have developed to execute works, and for this reason in some specific cases the foreign expertise may be limited to mere general overviews or the proposal that one or other company is engaged to conduct the work. Foreign experts' lack of familiarity with our labour conditions, production methods and systems for the supply of materials, and the option of utilizing certain mechanical resources, very often leads to extremely expensive, or even impossible solutions, causing dissatisfaction and a negative attitude to foreign expertise.
Finally, it must be noted that in certain specific cases, the selection of foreign experts is conducted without sufficient consideration as to whether their profile matches the conditions of one project or another, which has been a reason for their insufficient authority when resolving complex issues.
Considering all the circumstances indicated, we can conclude that the invitation of foreign experts can be conducted only when all preliminary materials required for planning an installation make it possible for the corresponding decision to be taken. At the same time, foreign expertise must also provide specific solutions only for those issues that can pose a challenge for Russian specialists, which mainly concerns those constructions, or component parts thereof, where Russian practice does not offer sufficient experience […]".
A very similar resolution had been signed by the subcommittee a few weeks prior to that "policy" document (February 19, 1928). In both documents, the shortcomings of foreign expertise are described in a similar fashion: a specialist arrives for a short period, is unfamiliar with the local conditions, and as a result either gives an excessively general conclusion, or proposes that a number of expensive, additional survey efforts are conducted. Thus, the Leningrad sewer system suddenly turned out to be too complex for foreign eyes: "The invitation for foreign engineers to join the experts to discuss design projects for building Leningrad sewers, in the opinion of this Meeting appears to be superfluous considering, as experience has shown, that individuals unfamiliar with local conditions, such as foreigners, unable to navigate them sufficiently, are unable to provide the advice and supply actionable opinions, given the entire range of our technical capabilities and our local conditions. For example, the arrival of foreign engineers specializing in sewer systems in the past (Binnie, Imbear et al.) produced no practical results and left no discernible mark".
The rejection of foreign expertise appears in the archive to be an initiative of the experts themselves. The files include no orders to that effect by the authorities. Subsequently, the refusal of foreign companies to cooperate in this area was also explained by reference to a decision at a meeting of the sub-committee. 21 Such a demonstrative execution by the authorities of the "collective will" was a typical aspect of Soviet culture. This was barely reflected in the records, although the actual 'rules of the game' were perfectly well known to citizens-particularly those occupying managerial posts or significant positions in Soviet agencies. The mood of the day was constant expectation of orders, or even hints, from the Obkom, while within that body, eyes turned to even higher levels of power (Yurchak 2005, pp. 43-44). As the Soviet historian Professor E.V. Tarle, famous for his studies of Napoleon, would have said: "If they would tell us only, what to dance" ["skazali by, chto tantsevat´"] (Ganelin 2006, p. 15). Historical research into the time makes clear the sudden change of course with respect to cooperation with foreigners: it was abruptly decided that foreign expertise was inexpedient, although previously specialists had painstakingly prepared for this meeting, picking out the questions to be asked. Clearly, there must have been concrete grounds for such action.
In the 'policy' document, and in the resolution, there is the occasional mention of economic issues, and so it is worth turning to the memorandum by A. Reyneke, considered above. Reyneke, as a construction manager who knew the relevant economic aspects well, about three or 4 months prior to the drafting of both documents (i.e., November 20, 1927) indicated the new crisis circumstances in the Soviet economy: "the unquestioned necessity to reduce the import of foreign-made parts to a minimum, the overloading of our factories with orders, the obvious inexpediency of long-term loans and the impossibility of counting on major subsidies for building sewer systems […]". 22 Clearly, this is not only about international consulting in the field of urban water infrastructure: on the contrary, crisis phenomena are evident on a national scale. It is therefore logical that the economic crisis would also impact the fate of other major projects. For example, the design of the Moscow metropolitan railway network in 1928-1931 was suspended, with a major public scandal and a hard-hitting article in the Pravda newspaper. The project was of exceptional importance for the city, but required massive investment, and the situation, it appears, was described very accurately by Reyneke in his memorandum. The Moscow city parliament (Mossovet), which had promoted the idea of the metro, had faced scathing criticism specifically for the poor timing of the expensive construction, while in the city and the country there had been an urgent need for new factories and housing (Neutatz 2001, pp. 56-58). Modern historians have convincingly shown that at just the same time (1927)(1928)(1929) the supply of food and other goods to the population was deteriorating (Osokina 1999), and not just in the provinces, but also in Moscow (Rogovin 1992, pp. 273-274). In some cases, this triggered open dissatisfaction with the production policies of the authorities (Ferretti 2010, pp. 29-44), as well as the notorious "Bread Strike" among peasants (1927), as a result of which less than two thirds of the previous year's volume of grain was processed (Rogovin 1992, pp. 274-276). The events around the sewer projects show, however, that the invitation of experts was hindered specifically by unforeseen circumstances, while the economic crisis continued to grow at an increasing speed.

The securitization of knowledge management at the Leningrad sewer agency
The "War Scare", i.e., the acute political crisis of 1927, which almost ended in a new war, also played a role in the convening of the Commission (Velikanova 2013, pp. 45-117). Domestic policy priorities had also changed dramatically. On June 24, the Central Board of OSOAVIAKhIM (The Society for the Assistance of Defence, Aircraft and Chemical Construction) adopted a resolution on military training for workers. In industry, the emphasis was placed on strengthening discipline and boosting productivity. Stalin himself clearly announced new goals and objectives for another wave of industrialization, speaking openly about the USSR lagging behind capitalist countries both economically and technologically (Stalin 1954a, b), and the urgent need to achieve rapid industrial growth: "The independence of our country cannot be upheld unless we have an adequate industrial basis for defence» (Stalin 1954a, b;Pravda 1928).
Some of the direct consequences of integrating rapid rates of growth were ominous trials of bourgeois experts and disruptors. The first of these was the "Shakhty Trial" (spring of 1928), which targeted mining engineers developing coal production in the mines of Donbass (Beyrau 1998, p. 65;Blyum et al. 2012;Krasil'nikov et al. 2011;Pivnenko 1995;Scott 1973). The French researcher Sabine Dullin convincingly demonstrated that the trial was in many ways a reaction to foreign-policy tensions. For example, accusations were levelled not only against Soviet experts, but also against invited foreign specialists, specifically engineers from Germany. However, there were no British or French experts under investigation, although repressions against the English could have been expected given the nature of the political crisis. The author considers that the trial, which was far from receiving unanimous support in the Politburo, also became a warning to major foreign companies not to mix economics and politics. European companies attempted to form a common international association to operate with the USSR, making orders more expensive, and hindering the Soviets from leveraging competition between companies (Dullin). A little later, the management of MGZhD (engineers building the Moscow metro) would come up before a court (1930). This trial was related to the Industrial Party Trial, where engineers were accused of sabotage and prolonging design work. D. Neutatz notes with regret that this harsh accusation was not completely justified. Design work did indeed last several years, while Siemens-Bauunion had needed no more than about three weeks to design the Myasnitskiy radial (one single branch line of the metro) (Neutatz 2001, p. 59). Apparently, the authorities were not inclined to consider the fact that for Soviet engineers the design was a completely new affair, while for Germans this was to some degree a routine re-interpretation of something they had previously studied in detail. The threat of a lawsuit also hung over the design department of the Leningrad Sewer Agency. However, the engineers managed to prove the bias and incompetence of the accusers, i.e., journalists of the "Pravda" newspaper, and justify themselves. More on this is discussed in the next section.
Another consequence of the crisis were cooked-up trials against alleged spies for helping the White Guard and European espionage networks (the 'Academicians' [Akademicheskoe Delo] was the most notorious case) (Ananich et al. 1993;Ananich et al. 1998;Lepekhin and Tsamutali 2015;Ananich and Paneyakh 1999a, b;Paneyakh 2003), as well as the persistent promotion of patriotism (Brandenberger 2002;Nikonova 2010;Golubev 2008;Akimchenkov 2015). Such trends were only reinforced over time. H. G. Wells, on another visit to the USSR (1934) noted with unconcealed disappointment: As I saw one personality after another in Moscow, I found myself more and more disposed to a psycho-analysis of this resistance which is thrown up against any real creative forces coming in from the West. It is very marked indeed. […] There is a strong, incorrigible patriotism beneath this Russian situation, even more effective because it is disguised, just as there was an incorrigible French patriotism beneath the world-fraternisation of the first French revolution (Wells 1967).
Despite the fact that even the far-sighted and observant Wells clothed his thinking about Soviet patriotism in the terminology of metaphysics, actually the phenomenon was accompanied by very concrete trends in economics and foreign policy: economic crisis, the threat of war, and the activation of spies and saboteurs. To this list, we can also add the general vulnerability of the country as a whole, and certain (industrial) facilities and infrastructure in particular.
The crisis of 1927-28 had wholly predictable consequences for the Leningrad sewer system, which was then under construction. In the 1930's it was declared a strategic facility, of importance for the city's defence. However, the curious hiccough over inviting foreign experts in the summer of 1927 suggests that this engineering infrastructure had already begun to be shrouded in secrecy. It is possible that the reason for the reluctance to invite foreign experts was not only the high travelling expenses and salaries, but also sewer system secrecy. Theoretically, an enemy invasion could make the sewage system a target and an easy way to contaminate and poison the whole city. 23 This security explanation is evidenced by the creation of the Secret Department of the Trust (1927). There was a branch of the OGPU in every major enterprise, that scrupulously verified employees' reliability and loyalty to the authorities. For example, from 1927 and into the 1930s, it was considered whether leading engineers who were not Party members could be replaced by others, promoted from the ranks of workers. 24 Strict secrecy was observed, even during professional discussions about foreign technology. Just 1 year after a very open discussion about German and American equipment, the very character of such documents underwent a fundamental change. The minutes of the meeting of the commission of engineering and technical sections 'on the application of achievements in foreign equipment and materials for such technologies' (January of 1929), which consisted of several dozen pages, contains no concrete information either about the type of equipment or the country or company developing it. 25 In proposing the use of foreign techniques in a specific case (for example, discussing the height of the kerb between the road surface and the pavement), the engineers expressed themselves in the most abstract way: "in our conditions, the kerbs must be higher than foreign ones and installed more securely." Moreover, the engineers themselves studied the technical documents in strict secrecy. They received texts at OSOAVIAKhIM to be read only after signing, and to be returned immediately after work had been completed. 26 Subsequently, at the beginning of the 1930s, these measures were complemented by numerous instructions and safety rules associated, inter alia, with the protection of Trust facilities from possible attack by saboteurs (who were especially active in 1932). 27 In addition, training sessions were organized, where Air Defence teams, fire and civil protection personnel drawn from regular employees (193) trained in measures to protect facilities from aerial bombardment. 28 Western and Russian historians are often inclined to suspect the authorities of deliberately exaggerating the crisis and spy-mania (Alekseyev 2010) with the objective of mobilizing the population behind a reinforced labour regime (Meyer 1978). However, one can barely claim that there was no threat of war or sabotage attacks-perhaps not in 1927, but in the near future in general. More than this, in reporting numerous cases of sabotage, the authorities effectively discredited the work of their own secret services, demonstrating that they had been unable to prevent a series of assassinations. The infrastructure of Leningrad was in a particularly vulnerable situation, as up until the Soviet-Finnish War (1939), Leningrad was located just 40 kms from the Finnish border. Incidentally, a sabotage group that conducted the explosion in a Leningrad club had even entered USSR territory via the Sestra River, reaching Pargolovo, where they caught a suburban train to penetrate the city without being detected (Shkarenkov). The fact that the fears of the authorities were not in vain is confirmed by memoirs published more recently. There were people living in Leningrad and the surrounding area who were against communist rule, and who for this reason readily supported the occupying Nazi forces in 1941 (Budnitskiy 2014). Clearly, these phenomena yet further revealed the depth of the "War Scare' of 1927. Prior to the crisis, back in 1926, secrecy was far less of a consideration, and when planning a radial branch of the Moscow metro (also a strategic facility of the city infrastructure), German experts from Siemens-Bauunion were provided with all the data and drawings they needed (Neutatz 2001, p. 52).

Knowledge acquisition under the crisis: defensive strategies
Despite the securitization of industrial culture and restrictions in communication with foreign specialists, the sewer system in Leningrad still needed a free circulation of knowledge, consultations and perhaps cooperation with foreign engineers and companies, as well as the study of the water infrastructure of European and American cities. This can clearly be ascertained from the subsequent documents on approving the design of sewers for industrial and domestic wastewater. It must be remembered that the 'policy document' did not propose completely ending contacts with foreign construction companies, but simply that meetings should now take place in Germany or another country: To prevent ambiguity and uncertainty in the solutions of foreign experts, it is necessary to introduce certain ideas and formats for such expertise. First, and prior to inviting foreign experts, Russian specialists should be sent abroad to study all similar installations and the management of such work. After such a familiarization process, consultation should be conducted abroad with the most respected specialists on those issues which are associated with the greatest challenges in the practice of the Soviet Union. Only after such a consultation can the question be answered as to whether it is necessary to invite foreign experts (March 9, 1928). 29 This instruction reflected the hope of reducing the dependency of Soviet industry on foreign technology-an important objective, given the possibility of a military conflict. The new mode of interaction made it possible to save money on inviting experts, while Soviet engineers could first study machinery and mechanisms in the field, before deciding to order such products, and so on. This also conformed with the new Stalinist industrial culture. However, in practice this abrupt upheaval of the usual patterns of cooperation only brought greater confusion to relations with foreign colleagues.
In line with the 'policy document', Engineer I.L. Kusakin and Chief Engineer K.S. Semenov of the Leningrad sewer system were sent to Germany. Their work mission included studying sewers in situ, meeting engineers in person, and forging contacts with German construction companies. However, Semenov was given the response in the Berlin office of Siemens-Bauunion that talks regarding facilities within the USSR were conducted exclusively in the company's representative office in Moscow. That office had a strong interest in cooperation and offered to send its employees to Leningrad at any convenient time, for talks. In fact, they had already attempted to make personal contact with the leadership of the Leningrad OTKOMKhOZ. Employees even came as far as Leningrad, but both Soviet officials reported themselves off sick, and the meeting did not take place.
Such an escape response, dodging undesirable contacts with foreigners, was typical for Soviet managers, but looked disconcertingly odd to foreign colleagues. During an official meeting between J.P. Sartre and Soviet academics, during his visit to the USSR (1955), a discussion started between the French philosopher and B.G. Reizov, correspondent member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a French literature expert. Sartre invited his colleague to a restaurant to continue the discussion over dinner, but his counterpart politely thanked him, left and vanished. Those accompanying the French writer in civilian clothes searched the building, but without success. Later, the correspondent member admitted that he had hidden in the ladies' toilets, to be sure that no-one would come looking for him. Such caution was not excessive: he knew that an unsanctioned dinner could bring immense difficulties for his career, while permission or even instructions for every single meeting with foreigners had to be acquired from officials (Ganelin 2006, p. 109).
On the other hand, the decision by Siemens-Bauunion to only come into contact with the Soviet representatives on Soviet territory, and not to show their own facilities, also appears to be less than innocent. Clearly, the Germans also anticipated defending their business interests, commercial secrecy, and copyright behind their technological achievements. However, as deals with the USSR were probably profitable for Germany (Makarenko 2013;Hilger and Meyer 1953, p. 221), the Siemens-Bauunion Moscow office decided to elucidate the situation through official channels. A letter was sent directly to the supreme leadership of the public utilities sector, i.e., the Scientific and Technical Board of the highest council of the People's Economy of the RSFSR. From there, a letter was sent to the head of the Leningrad City Department for Public Utilities, and then to the Sewer Agency. Sewer system engineers responded to the official inquiry with the aid of an extract from old meeting minutes (March 9, 1928) stating that convening an expert commission could be considered inopportune. 30 Such a bureaucratic manoeuvre allowed the Agency to precisely fulfil the instructions of the Soviet 'policy document' and maintain the appearance of taking a democratic decision: according to the documents, the deciding opinion was that of the experts, i.e., the designers and builders. Science in engineering is very closely related to practice: designers needed to know about the latest in European industrial production, how they function and how specialists respond to them, how much they cost-but direct discussion with colleagues proved difficult due to the restrictions caused by the crisis. Then, for knowledge acquisition, another route began to be used.

Transforming western knowledge embedded in technology
As sociologists Argote and Ingram showed, embedding knowledge in technology has been proved to be an effective way of transferring knowledge (Argote and Ingram 2000)-and the Soviet sewer engineers were forced to use the same method to acquire knowledge. It was necessary while the declining access to foreign expertise left several technological problems unresolved. This directly affected the efficacy of the sewers as a system, in addition to issues of urban pollution.
In 1927 it was discovered that the pipes (see Fig. 3) of the main collector of the network, which had been laid in 1925-26 on Vasilevskiy Island, leaked. To study the phenomenon, a survey was commissioned, which revealed various forms of damage: 1. Mechanical damage; 2. Leaching phenomena; and 3. Damage caused by insufficient care taken in conducting the work. Multiple defects were identified in the pipe joint seals. The second reason was considered to be the most hazardous, as it could indicate that the concrete was not of an appropriate type for sewer pipes. If it was ascertained that the concrete leaked into their immediate environment, then the body of the pipes themselves could allow liquid to pass through, and the pipes could leak along their entire length. This would completely contaminate the soil across the city, as the problem was only worsening over time. The engineers did not have a clear solution for this problem-they needed to study the problem and do their own research. Meanwhile, the topic was seized upon by journalists, and Pravda newspaper published a scoop on "Show candidates" (May 19, 1928) stating that the recentlylaid Leningrad sewer was ineffective and even dangerous for citizens (Pokazatel´nyye kandidaty 1928). Considering that many engineers, including Professor Ushakov, Professor Chizhov and Reyneke now fell under the definition of "bourgeois specialists" the situation itself now looked like sabotage. A most serious threat now hung over the Agency. The engineers could not have failed to appreciate this, as at the same time the "Shakhty Trial" was resonating across the country (April 1928), and similar articles in Pravda usually preceded show trials. No trial against the sewer engineers took place, however. The Agency considered the article to be defamatory, and in its written response offered arguments pointing to numerous factual errors and even fabrication by the journalists. In part, it was also indicated that construction was under the tireless supervision of academics, and the complex situation required constant analysis. 31 The question of what to do with the leaking concrete pipes remained unanswered, however. During his visit to Germany, engineer Kusakin met with German Engineer Geysler and asked him to respond to questions from the Leningrad engineers in writing, if it turned out to be impossible to convene an expert commission. 32 The German engineer was happy to cooperate. With respect to the pipe material, he explained that there was not yet any complete protection for concrete from the aggressive impact of groundwater, and so using such a material in boggy, acidic soil was not desirable. Experience shows that a smooth, polished concrete surface resists the environment better than a coarse surface. However, in Germany earthenware pipes were used, or concrete pipes with an earthenware surface. Upon his return, Kusakin read a letter from Geysler at a meeting of the expert subcommittee. All the members considered that, overall, they did not see fundamentally new ideas in this expert assessment, and the documents show that subsequent discussions took a very different path.
The problem was that Soviet engineers were unable to rapidly replace the supplier and procure earthenware pipes, especially during an economic crisis and a drive to boost the nation's defences. So, they had to decide what to do with the concrete pipes they already had in stock. These had been manufactured by the 'Barrikada' factory, and the need to completely change a product type, had first to be convincingly demonstrated by conducting a whole series of experiments. Thus, Soviet academics had to develop innovations themselves, and verify the products at the factory itself in order to adapt the inappropriate material to suit the job. 33 The reason for this effort was the crisis conditions, and the particularities of the economy and industrial production in the country. Fortunately for the engineers, it turned out that it was not the concrete body of the pipe itself that was leaking, but only the joints between the pipes. It was decided to coat them with an additional layer of pozzolan cement. Pozzolan is used as a hydraulic additive to lime, giving it the ability to harden in wet conditions.
The recommendations of the 'policy document' were also wholly logical, therefore, from the viewpoint of the current economic situation. First, they made it possible to save money on inviting experts, as sending Soviet engineers only involved travel costs. Second, it was indeed true that the recommendations of foreign engineers could not always be implemented. The text does not refer to the prestige of the Socialist state, which could have been undermined by superfluous explanations about the economic or technological problems, or considerations of secrecy, although these certainly could have been taken into account. In his letter, Geysler assessed that the refusal to convene an expert commission reflected jealous competition by Soviet engineers, i.e., rather in terms of patriotism, rejecting everything Western 34 -phenomena which H. G. Wells had had occasion to observe in Moscow. Geysler affirmed that he "does not intend whatsoever to conduct that in-situ 31 TsGA SPb f. 3167, op. 1, d. 290, l. 129-134 ob., 139, 139 ob., 140. 32 Unfortunately, the file does not contain information about the name, place of work and residence, or even the German spelling of the surname. It is not known whether this was indeed the engineer Heinzmer? Genzmer?, whom the expert commission wanted to invite, but then rejected the idea. 33 TsGA SPb f. 3167, op. 1, d. 290, l. 93, 98, 180 ob.-182, 184, 184 ob. 34 Unfortunately, the case file does not include the original of the letter, and the translation is of such poor quality that one can suspect the work of someone who had not previously encountered translations and had a poor knowledge of the German language. The verbs do not agree with the subjects, while the grammatical structure of German is reproduced with Russian words. Other, earlier letters from Germany are given work, due to opposition from the colleagues working there […] In Germany […] not only would no serious specialist take offense if he were to be working together with others in such a situation but, moreover, he sees in the work of an experienced colleague an oftensought reduction in responsibility". If he were to be invited to work in Leningrad, he would hope solely, "to fertilize […] the young and earnest technology of a large neighbouring country with the experiences, on which we [the Germans, O.M.T.] have found ourselves to be working for two more generations". 35 Discussions about this part of the letter at the Leningrad Sewer Agency, if there were any, are not recorded in the minutes of the meeting.
Meanwhile, the striving of Soviet sewer engineers for independence was for more than ideological considerations. Under conditions of crisis and limited opportunities for knowledge acquisition, the management of the enterprise and the engineers themselves were forced to place their main hope on the innovative capacity of their Design and Construction Departments. Innovative capacity is the ability to use new knowledge to create new engineering solutions, that is, that the ability of engineers to fill in the missing knowledge with their own new developments in this area. Such a strategy is quite consistent with the turbulent situation in which the USSR and the enterprise itself found themselves. In a crisis, the success of any enterprise depends on the formation of a transformational culture which supports innovation, transformation, and risk-taking (Jones and Mahon 2018, p. 74).
This leads us to a discussion of a different and significant technological issue, specifically that of pumping stations. The complicating factor was that the volume of wastewater in industrial enterprises constantly increased (in certain cases to as much as forty times that initially stated in the design). This meant that one could expect the sewer system to soon be unable to handle the volume of wastewater, and it would be necessary to introduce far-reaching changes in the design specifications. In such circumstances, it is of particular importance to bring powerful pumping stations on line. At the Agency, work had already begun to design new stations, however foreign experience would be far from superfluous for the engineers. At one meeting, they themselves recognized that, at the Agency, the available information about foreign stations was highly restricted. Professor Ushakov expressed regret that engineers Kusakin and Semenov had not been tasked, in good time, to acquire designs from various companies abroad. Professor Chizhov responded that Semenov had actually secured the design for one such station. However, this facility was not sufficiently powerful, and the company had not specified which parts were used in its construction. In response, Ushakov supposed that the order for the production of small and medium-sized stations had to be transferred to some foreign company, and only after this would Soviet engineers be able to obtain the real-world data needed to build the remaining stations. Chizhov proposed looking instead at the products of American companies, as in Germany they had been commissioned very recently, less than a year previously, and they had not yet proven their worth in practice. 36 Clearly, a detailed consultation with an American engineer could have assisted in this question. However, during a time of political stand-off between the countries, and severe competition between private companies who had no intention of 'gifting' their Soviet colleagues with their own achievements, such cooperation would be extremely expensive. The above quote from the notes of Reyneke (November 1927) shows that in the Agency, people were aware of the low probability of securing additional investment for sewer works, as such an enterprise is already an expensive proposition for the state. The solution was to copy or creatively elaborate Western technologies (Kharuk 2019, pp. 14-16;Lyubavs´kiy 2014, pp. 351;Noviy eksponat 2017). Soviet professors and engineers openly discussed the purchase of equipment with the goal of subsequently manufacturing their own products.
Thus the need to collaborate with Western engineers in order to discuss technical problems was acute. The stage of knowledge acquisition during the construction of the sewer was not completed, although the matter required a constant free circulation of knowledge. But, since it was difficult, Russian engineers tried to get knowledge about European innovations not in the form of drawings and diagrams, but already embodied in specific machines and mechanisms. Thus, embedding knowledge in technology was really an effective way of transferring (Argote and Ingram 2000) and acquiring knowledge. At the same time, the main hope was placed on innovative capacity, as an obvious way out of a difficult situation in design and construction in the USSR, which was also quite consistent with the modern theory of knowledge management.

Conclusion
Large-scale changes in the politics and economy of the USSR, caused by foreign policy factors (War Scare 1927 and the Great Break), had an impact on the sphere of civil engineering and urban infrastructure. The idea of a "European city" and the construction of urban sewerage, which was generally common to the whole world, was appropriated by each country in its own way. In the USSR, foreign and domestic political factors intervened in the relatively free circulation of knowledge (1927), and the construction of urban sewage infrastructure was excluded from the circulation zone.
In the period 1918-1928, the Leningrad Sewer Agency had organized an important stage in the development of a new organization for the design and construction of sewerage: knowledge acquisition. The leadership recruited leading specialists and personnel capable of on-the-job training, regardless of their undesirable noble and bourgeois origins and connections. In addition, the convocation of an international commission with the invitation of foreign experts was being prepared. It is obvious that the construction of sewerage was important for the leadership of the city and municipal services. They were quite willing to invest significant money in knowledge circulation and to bypass the ideological barriers of inviting employees from undesirable backgrounds to leading positions.
However, the War Scare of 1927 and the internal political crisis disrupted this relatively free circulation of knowledge. Funding for civil engineering was drastically reduced and knowledge management and industrial culture were securitized. This was expressed primarily in the direct control of enterprises by the secret services (OGPU), distrust of Western specialists and the restriction of direct contacts with them. All this directly affected the project of sewer construction, because the knowledge acquisition process had not yet been completed. The leadership of the Leningrad Sewer Agency began to use defensive strategies for gaining knowledge. Escape strategies and the expectation of a "signal" from the authorities regarding communication with foreign colleagues became a noticeable characteristic of the industrial culture of the USSR.
Since the free circulation of knowledge was disrupted, engineers were forced to obtain the necessary knowledge not from direct communication and not even always from written sources, but from knowledge embodied in manufactured products. The responsibility was placed on the innovative ability of the company's engineers. The Soviet solution was to copy Western technology and then to organise domestic production of similar material. On the one hand, this was justified by the peculiarities of Soviet industry in the 1920s, which found it difficult to manufacture a new and more modern range of products. On the other hand, instead of using machinery and material that was well-known in the West, Soviet engineers had to dismantle samples and prototypes, and use them to build home-grown machinery. This meant that they made mistakes, reworked designs and even had to rebuild facilities that had already been built. This was how they overcame their lack of resources, but all of this postponed the completion of construction work.
The case of the construction of the Leningrad sewer shows that the circulation of knowledge from Germany and the USA in the construction of urban infrastructure did not lose its relevance even in the period of political and economic crisis. However, the crisis created a special securitized knowledge management system in the USSR, the influence of which was felt throughout the history of the country.
Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. The study was supported by the German foundation Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).

Conflict of interest
The author required to disclose financial or non-financial interests that are directly or indirectly related to the work submitted for publication.

Ethical approval
The authors work has not been published before, it is not under consideration for publication anywhere else, its publication has been approved at the Institute of Eastern Europe (Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany).
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