Researching far right extremism—a transdisciplinary, lifeworld, and political culture perspective

Far right extremism, understood as both an ideology of inequality and exclusion that manifests itself in attitudes and behavior as well as a heterogeneous movement, partially with affinity to violence, challenges and even threatens democratic societies. We argue that social science research on far right extremism contributes to strengthen democracy and civil society against this threat. By adopting a transdisciplinary, lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and political culture perspective, social science can contribute to this task and also help to overcome the fragmentation of the research field. In this article, we first provide an overview of current developments in social science research on far right extremism with a focus on Germany. Second, we outline five premises for such a transdisciplinary research perspective on far right extremism. Thus, we argue for adopting both a theoretical perspective built around the lifeword’ concept and methodological pluralism. Third, we propose four interrelated thematic clusters as a taxonomy of transdisciplinary research perspectives on far right extremism: a) Far right ideologies and knowledge constructions; b) Far right actors, organizations, and networks; c) Far right extremist discourses, (digital) media, and strategies in the public sphere; and d) political education, transfer, and implementation research regarding projects against far right extremism. Fourth, we argue that further institutionalization research on far right extremism is indispensable to make research on far right extremism more sustainable, to connect research with societal actors, and to utilize research results to strengthen society’s democratic resilience.

eine weitere Institutionalisierung unabdingbar ist, um die Forschung zum Rechtsextremismus nachhaltiger zu gestalten, die Forschung mit gesellschaftlichen Akteuren zu verbinden und die Forschungsergebnisse zur Stärkung der demokratischen Resilienz der Gesellschaft zu nutzen.Actors who attack and seek to abolish democracy, human rights, and pluralism in modern societies are, by definition, labelled as extremists (cf.Jaschke 2001, p. 25;Jesse 2018, p. 31 f.).Far right extremist actors propagate cultural forms of social order characterized, among others, by social asymmetries, patriarchal family ideas, exclusive collectives, and national, sovereign statehood (Birsl 2016;Virchow 2016;Salzborn 2018;Butterwegge et al. 2002;Jaschke 1994).Far right extremism is understood as both an ideology of inequality and exclusion as well as a violent, heterogeneous movement.It currently poses the strongest threat to democratic societies, not least because it denies the principle of equality by promoting fictitious narratives of homogeneous ethnical communities that have to be defended against the 'foreign', which is devaluated through processes of 'othering' (Said 1978) by constructing ideas of inferior ethnicities, cultures, faith, gender, or sexual orientation (Thiel et al. 2007;Johler et al. 2007; Kühne and Schönwald 2015;Heitmeyer et al. 1992).

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Traditionally, one of the core ideologies of far right extremism is based on antisemitic projections of a 'demonic, powerful and corrosive Jewish elite' as a main threat of one's communities.However, post-Nazi antisemitism manifests differently in particular social milieus.For example, antisemitic world views can also be found outside of far right extremism milieus, as they seem to be deeply rooted in modern societies (Salzborn 2022;Holz and Haury 2021;Salzborn 2010;Holz 2001;Postone 1982).
Far right ideologies are disseminated in form of re-interpreted historical narratives and distorted images of national-socialistic actions and actors.A typical strategy to disseminate extremist positions is to strategically position far right ideologies and narratives in the vicinity of conservative positions.One such strategy is the trivialization of the Shoa by describing it as only marginally relevant in modern history, descrbed also as "secondary antisemitism."Such strategies might seem initially to just be political criticism of the politics of Israel's government, but draw in fact on traditional antisemitic narratives.In this way, boundaries between far right ideologies and social mainstream, but also the far-left, are blurred.However, such "memory battles", like the battle around the memory of what happened during the Holocaust, are not only related to far right extremism but can be deciphered as a phenomenon of modernity, even if references to such battles are often made to traditional community ideologies (Decker and Brähler 2006).
To connect with the social mainstream, far right extremist ideologies link to other exclusionary narratives and conspiracy theories found in the so-called "middle of society" (e.g.Jäger 1998;Butterwegge et al. 2002;Heitmeyer et al. 1992Heitmeyer et al. , 2002Heitmeyer et al. -2012;;Benthin 2004;Decker and Brähler 2006).As a result, far right extremist ideologies function as a confirmation of already existing xenophobic attitudes and fears of loss and deprivation (Wodak 2015;Nussbaum 2013, Strick 2021).In this sense, the danger of far right ideologies lies primarily in the fact that elements of its ideology can be so easily combined with public narratives about "cultural differences" and "social divisions" without lifting their social and linguistic camouflage.Studies on grouprelated misanthropy (Kahane 2012) show how widespread far right attitudes are in (German) society (Zick et al. 2016(Zick et al. , 2019(Zick et al. , 2021(Zick et al. , 2023;;Scherr 2011).This in turn leads to the phenomenon that people who would usually not describe themselves as far right or extremist are implicitly radicalized by sharing opinions that are actually core elements of far right extremist ideologies (Bednarz 2018;Claussen et al. 2021).
From a normative perspective, research on far right extremism not only serves academic purposes, but can also make democratic societies resilient against extremist attempts to transform them into authoritarian systems 1 .To do so, the ideological foundations of far right extremism as well as that of extremist networks and actors and dissemination mechanisms have to be uncovered.In this regard, special attention has to be paid how far right ideologies are embedded in everyday life, aesthetics, and culture 2 .This includes the examination of the various appearances of far right extremism (Fielitz and Marcks 2020;Strick 2021), their proximity to populist movements and the so-called Alt-Right (Gessenharter 1998;Fücks and Becker 2020;Hufer 2018;Müller 2016), as well as the cultural conditions of their reproduction in democratic societies (Kleffner and Meisner 2021;Probst 2020;Rieger-Ladich 2022).
In this article, we propose a research perspective on far right extremism that is inspired by the foregoing considerations.First, in Sect.2, we give a brief overview of current developments in research on far right extremism with a focus on Germany and illustrate the fragmentation of the research field.The state of research illustrates the need for integrating the different perspectives in this fragmented field of research.Section 3 outlines some premises of an integrative, transdisciplinary, multi-methods research perspective on far right extremism.In Sect.4, we propose four thematic clusters that should guide transdisciplinary research in the field, namely a) far right ideologies and knowledge constructions; b) far right actors, organizations, and networks; c) far right extremist discourses, (digital) media, and media strategies in the public sphere; and d) political education, transfer and implementation research to strengthen the society against the far right.Finally, in Sect.5, we discuss the need of institutionalizing research on far right extremism.We argue that research can only bring about social change if it is, on the one hand, properly institutionalized 1 For the debate on democratic resilience, see Holloway and Manwaring (2023); Lührmann and Merkel (2023); Boese et al. (2021); Burnell and Calvert (1999). 2 For culture and everyday life compare Soeffner (1988); Schütz and Luckmann (2003); Rohe (1994); Flaig et al. (1993); Voß (2000); Frankenberger et al. (2015).

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and if, on the other, interdisciplinary research networks exist that cooperate with institutions of practice.

Researching far right extremism (in Germany): multi-disciplined, yet fragmented agendas
Research on far right extremism is a "multifaceted field of research" (Virchow 2016, p. 5)3 , not only, but especially in Germany.This is already reflected in the different definitions and conceptualizations of far right extremism, which are characterized by a certain degree of ambiguity.By the so-called "normative school" (Backes and Jesse 1993), extremism is explicitly defined in relation to the free democratic basic order4 as the "rejection of the democratic constitutional state and its fundamental values and rules" (Backes and Jesse 1993, p. 40).The 'consensus definition' of far right extremism used in this school includes the dimensions of "advocacy of a far right authoritarian dictatorship", "chauvinism", "xenophobia", "antisemitism", "social Darwinism" and "trivialization of National Socialism" (Virchow 2016, p. 17).
According to Hans-Gerd Jaschke (2001, p. 30), far right extremism can be defined as the "totality of attitudes, behaviors and actions, organized or not, which start from the racially or ethnically determined social inequality of people, demand ethnic homogeneity of peoples, and reject the equality requirement of human rights declarations, which emphasize the primacy of the community over the individual, start from the subordination of the citizen to the raison d'état, and reject the value pluralism of a liberal democracy and want to reverse democratization".Ursula Birsl characterizes the term "far right extremism" as an "umbrella term for movements and organizations (...) that are committed to an ideology of natural inequality with the inequality of people, authoritarianism and the acceptance of violence as a political means" (Birsl 2016, p. 254).Thus, the term far right extremism is not just used narrowly in the sense of the 'consensus definition', but also includes concepts such as right-wing populism and right-wing radicalism.Birsl argues that "neo-conservative, radical right and extreme right thinking unite ideologically an organic understanding of society and nation.This is how belonging, exclusion, and demarcation are defined.Internally, social and gender inequalities are understood as natural inequalities that assign individual members of society a place in the organism of society" (2016, p. 256;Heitmeyer et al. 1992).The same accounts for racist ascriptions.Far right extremism, as an ideology of inequality and exclusion and as a violent, heterogeneous movement, can be understood as the strongest threat to the free democratic basic order because it is fundamentally opposed to the principle of equality by propagating fictions of ethnic-homogeneous community and 'equalities' tied to imaginary affiliations (e.g.PEGIDA 5 or the Identitarian Movement).Research shows that such ideologies categorize groups of people based on ascribed 'origin', color of skin, culture, faith, gender, or sexual orientation and, based on those ascriptions, label them as 'others' (cf.Thiel et al. 2007;Johler et al. 2007) who are more or less explicitly considered inferior (Heitmeyer et al. 1992).At the same time, far right extremist actors mostly propagate ideas of social order that are characterized by social asymmetries, patriarchal notions of family, exclusive collectives, and national, sovereign statehood (Birsl 2016;Virchow 2016;Salzborn 2018;Butterwegge et al. 2002;Jaschke 1994).In this sense, the term 'Right' is a general term for the political spectrum to the right of democratic conservatism that includes "the entire political far right spectrum from the grey zone between right wing conservative and radical right circles to openly neo-Nazi subcultures" (Häusler 2016, p. 137).The far right, particularly, is characterized by "völkisch"-nationalist, racist, and antisemitic as well as authoritarian political ideas.Furthermore, it rejects the principle of social equality, and ethnicizes, culturalizes, and nationalizes social problems, "which is reflected in a policy of discrimination against minorities" (Häusler 2016, p. 137).Birsl and Häusler's definition of 'the Right' allows for a broader analysis of political cultures and lifeworlds that would neither describe themselves as far right nor follow extremist or hermetic worldviews or ideologies, but that tend to consent with far right ideas and ideologies.Much of the research concerning the far right that follows this perspective can be considered political culture research in the sense of Karl Rohe.For Rohe, political culture is a pattern of "basic assumptions (...) about the political world" (1994, p. 1) and can be understood as "the ideational design of a collective for its political life, filled with specific meaning" (1987, p. 39).A concept that takes up this perspective and integrates the ideational perspective is that of lifeworld ("Lebenswelt", see Schütz and Luckmann 2003).This approach is based on two premises: First, the lifeworld of an individual is limited by their experiences.An everyday horizon of experience emerges with an individual realm of reality and meaning and a specific stock of knowledge (Frankenberger et al. 2015, p. 154).As a consequence, everyday life is perceived and interpreted differently by each individual.Second, this 'individual reality' affects interests and everyday actions (Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 1991, p. 184).Thus, So, the lifeworld approach assumes that it is rather everyday experience that shapes knowledge and action than socio-demographic or socio-economic variables (see Flaig et al. 1993, p. 9;Frankenberger et al. 2015, p. 215), because interests and action are culturalized, since "a normal adult has acquired their interests and preferences [...] as a member of a historical society, and not as an unhistorical individual" (Schütz and Luckmann 2003, p. 506).As a consequence, lifeworld research "strives to revise assumptions about the thinking and actions of social groups by uncovering, in selective form, fundamentally new, unsuspected relationships and structures that determine political reality" (Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 1991, p. 185).
Political culture research then includes both attitude research and the reconstruction of political ideologies, language, and practices, including their historical and contextual manifestations.However, political culture research on far right extremism needs to have such a lifeworld perspective (Rohe 1994, pp. 1 ff.) that allows to conceive and analyze far right extremism as a phenomenon of political culture (Dudek and Jaschke 1984).This perspective has been adopted, further developed, and applied by scholars from different disciplines (e.g. von Trotha 1995;Herz 1996;Butterwegge 2001;Schwelling 2004;Diehl 2019;Finkbeiner and Trittel 2019).Consequently, every-day practices of stigmatization of minorities need to also be considered as the "affinity of parts of societal mainstream society for bits and pieces of right-wing extremist ideas (...)" (Virchow 2016, p. 7), like anti-semitism, racism, sexism, and classism.
This "multiformity" of research on far right extremism in Germany is reflected in the diversity of theoretical, disciplinary, methodological, and empirical approaches (Virchow 2016).This approach allows for the unmasking of, historical conjunctures.Until the 1980s, this research was primarily oriented towards actor-and organization-centred far right extremism in the direct aftermath of National Socialism.From the 1980s onwards, research on far right extremist attitudes (not only in extremist milieus but also in the general public), belief systems, and value systems emerged.Subsequently, it became more differentiated in order to grasp the phenomenon in its entire extent.In the 1990s, influenced by the far right extremist and racist violence of Hoyerswerda, Rostock-Lichtenhagen, Mölln, and Solingen, research tended to shift towards the study of far right violence.This went along with a methodological differentiation, as comparative analyses of far right extremist worldviews, analyses of social locations of the far right, and biographical, linguistic and media analyses emerged (cf.Virchow 2016, p. 12 f.);however, there was a general decline in publications on the far right between the 1990s and 2000s (Birsl 2016, p. 251).The meta-analysis of more than 5000 papers on far right extremism by Frindte et al. (2016, p. 46) summarizes this period as follows: "Findings suggest a complex relationship between far right extremist tendencies, perceived individual and social threat, disorientation, disintegration and authoritarian convictions on the part of far right extremist actors and fellow travellers".During the 2000s, they observe a shift towards the analysis of threat potentials emanating from far right extremism.Accordingly, studies on group-related misanthropy (cf.Heitmeyer 2002-2012, Zick et al. 2016) and the so-called "Mitte-Studien" on the spread of far right attitudes in Germany (e.g.Decker et al. 2016;Zick et al. 2023) dominated the field.The levels of analysis, however, became more differentiated (Frindte et al. 2016).At the micro level, mainly socio-psychological approaches to the analysis of patterns of individual attitudes and behaviors with regard to authoritarianism and social dominance can be found.At the meso level, research dealt with socialization effects and far right social movements and parties.At the macro level, last not least, basic conditions and opportunity structures of right-wing extremism came into view.
Overall, Frindte et al. (2016, pp.68 f) conclude that far right extremism is a differentiated and fragmented field of research that lacks a conceptual consensus on central research terms and methodologies and is characterized by competing theoretical schools and approaches.However, they also state that there are hardly any attempts to systematically compare empirical findings and integrate theories.In this sense, they argue for the development of a theory that is oriented towards the "threecomponent model" of Rosenberg et al. (1960).This model combines cognitive, affective, and connotative components.Thereby, the concept of collective identity could function as a frame of reference for connecting studies on the ideology, violence, attitudes, and social conditions of far right extremism (Frindte et al. 2016, p. 70).
As previously mentioned, a predominant strand of research based on political culture research focuses on the attitudinal dimension of far right extremism.Based on surveys and questionnaires developed and further improved over the last three decades, cross-sectional studies have examined the prevalence of far right extremist, authoritarian, and group-related misanthropic attitudes in society.This has allowed insights into not just the social groups in which such attitudes can be found, but also into how the prevalence of such attitudes has changed over the years (Heitmeyer 2002-2012, Decker et al. 2016;Zick et al. 2016).For example, Zick et al. (2023) measure far right extremist attitudes using 18 items measuring if individuals favor right-wing dictatorships, national chauvinism, the trivialization of Nazism, Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism, and Social Darwinism (Zick et al. 2023, p. 64 f).In their recent "Mitte-Studie", Zick et al. (2023) show that number of people with a closed far right extremist world view has more than tripled from 2014 (2.5%) to 2023 (8.3%) and that in 2023, more than 20% are in what they call an ideological 'greyzone', meaning that they at least partly buy into far right extremism.This includes people from all age cohorts, political self-positioning, and party affiliation, but with clear peaks on the political right.In addition, similar studies give an overview of the spread of conspiracy narratives, populism, and authoritarian attitudes and demonstrate that these as well as the facets of group-related misanthropy (racism, antisemitism, sexism, and classism) are positively correlated with far right extremism, while trust in institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and political self-efficacy are negatively correlated (Zick et al. 2023, p. 70ff).Similarly to the "Mitte-Studien", the so-called "Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studien" (Leipzig Studies in Authoritarianism, latest: Decker et al. 2022) use 18 categories to capture and measure far right extremist attitudes.Their results are in line with those of Zick et al., even if the more recent developments are not yet measured due to altering survey waves of the two studies.Together, these and similar studies provide a dense picture of attitudes around far right extremism, their prevalence in society over time, and the socio-demographic factors with which they are related.Due to methodological constraints of survey research, however, this existing data lacks the inclusion of more complex everyday life and cultural aspects or causal mechanisms of how far right extremist ideologies have become so favorable and how they are disseminated, adopted, and reproduced in very diverse social milieus.This points at the necessity to triangulate methods and theoretical approaches in research on far right extremism, as we will illustrate later.Eicker (2021), for example, argues that the various approaches to explain far right extremism have to be systematically ordered, not at least due to a low level of institutionalization of the research field, despite a large number of publications (see also Biskamp 2019).Salzborn (2018) considers the disintegration of research perspectives as the main reason for the unsatisfactory state of knowledge in the field K of research on far right extremism.In his opinion, approaches to authoritarianism, socialization, and gender related to far right extremism are not sufficiently differentiated, while research on right-wing movements that are based on actor theories are too strongly focused on elites and thus unsuitable to provide broad insights.Similarly, he argues that approaches like modernization, disintegration, and individualization cannot plausibly explain why people become far right extremists: "Ultimately, this means that the phenomenon of far right extremism eludes a general explanatory theory-building insofar as far right extremism accompanies modernity and its institution-building and thus also democratization processes, but both far right extremism and the institutions of modernity are subject to a permanent change" (Salzborn 2018, p. 273).

Integrating disciplinary perspectives, and developing a transdisciplinary approach for researching far right extremism
As illustrated above, research on far right extremism in Germany has become more and more differentiated, detailed, specialized, and thus fragmented.Regarding future research, the challenge is to build a research framework that allows for connecting the diverse perspectives and insights that exist in the current research landscape.
One way of integrating these different approaches is to regard cognitive, affective, and evaluative elements as aspects of political culture (Almond and Verba 1963), and to investigate the processes that (re)produce these elements in everyday life and culture.To do so, a lifeworld perspective is essential because it allows researchers to focus on everyday culture and collective knowledge to understand the political and lifeworld dimensions of far right extremism and how it is embedded in social spaces.Taking into account that far right extremist groups see themselves as social groups with similar values, principles of life organization, and mentalities, we suggest speaking of, following Stefan Hradil's definition of milieus ( 2006), "far right extremist milieus" that are characterized by a "far right extremist interpretation of the world" and "far right extremist ideas".In order to analyze the various dimensions of far right extremist milieus in their local, regional, national, and international manifestations appropriately, we argue that we need a transdisciplinary, long-term approach.It allows to grasp everyday life aesthetics and culture, far right extremist 'knowledges', and their discursive framings (Berger and Luckmann 1969;Schütz and Luckmann 2003;Frankenberger et al. 2015Frankenberger et al. , 2019;;Hopf et al. 1995;Kreter 2019).In this sense, several premises have guided research on far right extremism as a societal phenomenon: 1.As already mentioned, research on far right extremism as political culture research can build on and strengthen various approaches (e.g.Rohe 1987;von Trotha 1995;Herz 1996;Butterwegge 2001;Schwelling 2004;Diehl 2019;Finkbeiner and Trittel 2019).It includes both attitude research and the reconstruction of practices, political ideology and language, and historical developments.By adding a lifeworld perspective, this approach allows to capture not only concepts of (political) order but also basic orientations, bodies of knowledge, and standards of judgement that exist in far right extremist milieus (Rohe 1994, pp. 1ff.).2. The focus on everyday culture and collective knowledge enables to understand how political far right extremist attitudes and practices are embedded in more general societal structures.Far right cultures and milieus are intertwined and sometimes overlap with non-extremist lifeworlds.Hence, far right extremism is not socially isolated or detached from "mainstream" milieus, but often rather closely intertwined with and embedded in social and political thought of the so called "middle of society", as studies on far right attitudes show (SINUS 1981;Decker and Brähler 2018;Zick et al. 2023) 6 .However, understanding far right extremism does not only require the analysis of its political, social, and historical context, but also of the groups and institutions that are particularly affected and/or attacked by it.3. Social media plays a crucial role both in the dissemination of far right extremist ideas and the communication between far right extremist actors.The "interpretations of the world" that these actors spread on and through social media are aimed at the devaluation of certain groups, (re)produce and legitimize exclusionary norms, and deny diversity as a social reality.Since social media communication is per se characterized by reduced complexity, social media is particularly suited to disseminate exclusionary ideology (Carter 2018;Gerbaudo 2018;Mudde 2007) that is directed at ethnic and religious minorities including Jews and Jewish Life in Germany, migrants, feminists, and LGBTQIA+ communities.Furthermore, the typical imagery found in social media connects to everyday life aesthetics of non-extremist milieus and therefore helps to mobilize further target groups and to shift public discourse "to the right".4. A society's susceptibility to (far right) extremist ideas is especially apparent in uncertain times marked by multifaceted crises.The social construction of "enemy groups" is a means of scapegoating government and minorities for societal crises in order to disseminate far right extremist ideas in non-extremist milieus, as the rise of social protest movements around Corona and PEGIDA show.Thus, protest and protest cultures of non-extremist origin have to be a vital part of far right research, particularly with regard to the question to what extent far right extremist criticism of modernization and democracy has been established in the "middle of society".
The complexity of the phenomenon under research advocates for an integration of different research perspectives and disciplines, including their different methodologies, such as political science, sociology, cultural studies, history, religious studies, media and communication studies, and educational studies.
Furthermore, political culture research must include representative surveys to record political attitudes considering socio-demographic characteristics and politically relevant current events.Complex multivariate statistical methods, such as multi-level, cluster, contrast group, and latent class analyses, can assist researchers of far right extremism in describing patterns of attitudes as well as implicit and explicit racist and anti-gender positions for society as a whole or for specific population groups (Stockemer et al. 2021;Berning and Ziller 2022;Zick et al. 2023).Similarly, media and communication studies analyzing communication data such as social media threads or chatgroups must play a relevant role in far right research (Heft et al. 2019;Correctiv 2020;Guhl et al. 2020;Fernholz 2022;Rau et al. 2022).
Surveys, and quantitative media analysis, in general, however, come with some caveats.First, far right extremists usually do not participate in surveys.Second, survey-based methods are only suitable to a limited extent for collecting in-depth data in far right extremist lifeworlds.Here, a broad spectrum of qualitative, phenomenological, interpretative, coding, and discourse-analytical methods are needed to complement quantitative methodology and to enable insights in specific lifeworlds.Participatory observation should be applied as well as qualitative social media analyses, such as social media monitoring, digital ethnography (Ardévol and Gómez-Cruz 2014;Volk 2022Volk , 2023)), discourse analysis (Jäger 1996), multi-modal discourse analysis (Hakoköngäs et al. 2020;Forchtner and Kølvraa 2017), and biographical mapping (Schubring et al. 2019).These methods enable a deeper understanding of everyday beliefs, aesthetics, modes of communication, and networking strategies typical for far right communication.Social science and psychology experiments can also be applied for analyzing decision-making, media use patterns, and attention studies (Kubbe 2020).Lastly, quantitative and qualitative research perspectives should be triangulated.Triangulating quantitative and qualitative data improves the reliability and validity of research findings (Pickel 2009;Maggetti 2020).It combines the depth of qualitative insights with the breadth of quantitative data, offering a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the research topic.In this sense, triangulation enhances credibility, validates results, compensates for methodological limitations, and helps researchers to interpret data on far right extremist lifeworlds more accurately (Flaig et al. 1993;Maase 2022).

Researching (far right) everyday life culture and politics: transdisciplinary clusters
To integrate research on the multi-faceted phenomenon "far right extremism", a transdisciplinary perspective has to be applied.To organize cooperative transdisciplinary research, we propose the following four thematic clusters.The thematic cluster "Far right Ideologies and knowledge constructions" comprises research on far right extremist knowledge constructions; on ideological, cultural and religious foundations of far right extremist thought and action; as well as far right extremist identity and attitudes.Values, attitudes, and preferences typical of far right thought are based on socially stable collective constructions of reality that are difficult to deconstruct through preventive moral and value education.To this day, antisemitism is a prototypical belief system among far right extremist ideologies of inequality, even when far right extremists camouflage their antisemitism.Far right extremist "knowledge" ties in with widely held bodies of knowledge that are radicalized in the context of migration, cultural difference, capitalism, and the state of domination (cf.Balibar and Wallerstein 1990).Here, the ideological battle of the so called 'Alt Right' is a good example of how radicalized ideas of order and 'cultural hegemony' deviate from established ideology.In this sense, the thematic cluster also comprises research on the (often hidden) dissemination of far right extremist ideas wrapped in everyday knowledge in non-extremist milieus, and how these ideas have the power to mobilize even individuals or groups outside of far right extremist milieus.In this context, systematic analyses of far right extremism must include veiled and alienated forms of antisemitism.While violence-affirming antisemitism is no longer a basic ideological feature, especially among the Alt Right (BfV 2020), numerous antisemitic narratives remain.These narratives include conspiracy myths (such as the "Great Exchange" allegedly controlled by George Soros) and anti-Zionist constructions of reality.Consequently, researchers of German far right extremism must investigate the question of how antisemitic ideologies are transferred to other groups and (sometimes hidden behind staged Jew-friendliness and Israel solidarity) spread in everyday life discourses.More generally, this points to the necessity to analyze mechanisms of the diffusion of values, attitudes, and ideological foundations of political regimes (Åberg and Denk 2020; Deutsch and Welzel 2016;Lauth 2015).
The second thematic cluster focuses on "Far right Actors, Organisations, Networks" as manifestations of far right agency.Here, ideational and economic (re)production of far right extremist "knowledge" is captured by researching far right extremist actors, their strategies, and their (economic) foundations broadly grouped as follows: 1) core (leadership) persons in the far right scene come into focus; 2) political parties (in Germany, e.g."Die Heimat" formerly known as NPD, AfD, Neue Stärke Partei, III.Weg) and other membership-based organizations such as citizens' militias, "Reichsbürger", and far right hooligans; 3) an alternative far right extremist educational infrastructure ranging from social work and adult education to institutions such as the "Institut für Staatspolitik" and other think tanks (Pfahl-Traughber 2022); 4) women and their roles in (post-)modern far right extremist movements (Birsl 1994(Birsl , 1996;;Bitzan 2011;Glaser and Radvan 2021); 5) positions in governmental and non-governmental institutions occupied by far right actors threatening democracy from within and without (Gomolla et al. 2018); and last, (inter-) national networks of actors and organizations and economic structures (Braun and Hörsch 2013; Fuchs and Middelhoff 2019).These complex networks and "far right threat alliances" (Heitmeyer et al. 2020) must be researched intensively, particularly with regard to their print and merchandising products (Virchow 2017).Furthermore, it is necessary to research far right actors regarding their mediatization and networking activities via digital networks that also reach into civic publics (Fernholz 2022) in order to be able to develop strategies for action and countermeasures against far right mobilization and propaganda.Thus, these 'threat alliances' not only pose a considerable threat to democracy in general, but also endanger individuals and groups marked as "anti-people" by resorting to contacts, information, money, and weapons provided by far right extremist networks.
The skillful mediatization strategies and activities of far right extremist actors and groups underscores the necessity to research "Far right extremist discourses, (digital) K media and strategies in the public sphere" as a third thematic cluster.Here, research should focus on the dissemination of far right extremist worldviews in contemporary societies.This includes identifying actors, structures and forms of networking, narratives, strategies, resources, and resonances of far right (digital) communication that serve as core "drivers" of far right discourses.Particular attention should be paid to digital media, which-as 'inward' and 'outward' communication (Kaiser and Rauchfleisch 2019)-serve the multiple purposes of networking, strategy discussion, identity formation, mobilization, radicalization, the coordination of online and offline action, and the acquisition of financial resources.Digital media also enable the mainstreaming of far right narratives, the dissemination of far right extremist ideologies of inequality, and the orchestration of the resulting attacks and their subsequent trivialization (also by mainstream media, see Kruse et al. 2022).Digital media also fosters the recruitment of supporters as well as the implementation of hate and disinformation activities against persons or groups considered as opponents (Rau et al. 2022, p. 14).Researchers should also consider that far right extremist politics are both movement and organization.In other words, they can act spontaneously and/or in an interweaving of organizational and subcultural dynamics.Analyses of far right extremist communicative practices in (digital) publics should ultimately aim to improve the ability of political decision-makers as well as the political and educational institutions of members of civil society to cope with far right extremism.Also, media companies and providers of infrastructure (e.g.platforms, app stores) should be sensitized to the threat dynamics posed by far right extremist actors in (digital) publics and encouraged to promote an associated assumption of responsibility.Another important field of research is the nature of algorithms that on the one hand contributes to promoting circulating far right extremist content but on the other could be used-in form of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-to identify and research far right extremist content.
Given the broad influence that far right extremism in general, and individual actors in particular, can exert on society in general, the fourth thematic cluster "Political Education, Transfer and Implementation Research" should address questions of democratic resilience.This includes the translation of research results into transferrable and educational formats as well as the implementation and evaluation of their impact.Also, social science research should inherently contribute to political education on far right extremism.In this context, the aim of responsible social science should be to make visible to a broad public how right-wing extremist knowledge production and dissemination work.This includes the examination of the formation of authoritarian thought and action, the socializing effects of far right narratives and knowledge, and conditions of forming anti-democratic attitudes.Also, the roles of binary gender socialization, polarization, and social media-use in developing affinity for violence, (digital) misogynist practices, (Kracher 2020;Johannsen 2021) and other violent expressions of far right ideologies should be closely examined.Similary, research should explore whether and to what extent normative disappointments in expectations regarding the validity of dominant concepts of masculinity render individuals, especially young men, more receptive to far right extremist patterns of interpretation.Laslty, the role played by (young) women in far right subcultures should be investigated, as they especially use and participate in everyday life and aesthetic forms of disseminating and masking far right ideologies (Bitzan 2011;Knüpfer et al. 2020;Sorce and Renz 2022;Glaser and Radvan 2021;Amadeu Antonio Stiftung and Radvan 2013;Lehnert and Radvan 2016;Priester 2009).The extent to which social science education and political education can contribute to reach out to those who are prone to far right narratives but do not yet have developed a closed far right extremist worldview should be analyzed.These analyses should also investigate which circumstances encourage people to turn away from far right extremism and ways to strengthen resilience of civil society and state institutions towards far right extremists ideologies.the monitoring and transfer platform MOTRA 12 .Only a few of the research clusters at several universities across Germany are funded permanently.Unfortunately, the lack of a sustainable institutionalization of transdisciplinary research on the far right at German universities means that most research on far right extremism relies on temporary funding.One positive exception is the newly founded Institute for Research on far right extremism IRex at the University of Tübingen.
Institutionalization of research comes with several benefits.First, funding cannot be easily removed when an area of research falls out of or when political tides are turning.Second, it enables mid-to long-term cooperation and development of more complex research strategies.Third, it fosters the training of new academic generations in the field and thus ensures continuity in research.Fourth, institutionalized research structures are more suitable to establish sustainable transfer and implementation networks with state and society.In order to design interventions against the far right and to impact society, it is essential to link research and social perspectives by involving the perspectives and interests of individuals and groups affected and attacked by the far right in developing research questions as well as in implementing transfer projects.Also, to reduce "implementation breaks" (van Ackeren and Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia 2011), implementation research should be a vital part of research.Finally, research on the far right should aim to promote (civil) social and (democratic) political competencies to act against far right extremism and to support those who are affected by far right extremist attacks.
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