Dysfunctional democracy(ies): characteristics, causes and consequences

Democratic systems are currently facing multiple challenges. A central component of this is the disintegrating relationship between citizens and political actors; citizens simply do not feel represented by political actors any longer. As a result, we are seeing a decline in trust in politicians, increasing questioning of whether democracy is still the best political system, and the question of whether citizens are not also developing a changed understanding of democracy. Research into the underlying causes of these developments inevitably leads to an analysis of the outcomes resulting from political activities, which, in addition to the desired results, also produce unintended consequences due to the complexity of politics and society (Almond et al., p. 32–34). In this case, we speak of dysfunction or dysfunctionality. In this paper, which also serves as an introduction to the special section “Dysfunctional democracy(ies): Characteristics, Causes and Consequences.” we give a brief overview of the concept of dysfunctionality of democratic systems in order to distinguish it from considerations of the deterioration of the quality of democracy. The focus of our reflections is not the institutional consequences of the various challenges. The focus is on why democratic systems are unable to adapt adequately to the demands of a changing environment and thus produce unintended outcomes that harm the democratic political system.


Introduction
Numerous studies indicate that the democratic governments of both recent and consolidated democracies worldwide are undergoing various crises (Crouch 2021; Schäfer and Zürn 2021;Müller 2021;Manow 2020;Merkel 2020;Keane 2020;Przeworski 2019;Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019;Mounk 2018). At their core, these crisis phenomena revolve around an eroding sense of responsiveness between democratically legitimized representatives and their constituencies, which is increasingly reflected in declining levels of trust in politicians and growing skepticism about the adequacy of democratic structures and institutions. However, the fact that democracies experience crises is not a particularly surprising or new finding, as this issue was already articulated in the 1970s by Crozier et al. (1975).
At the same time, democratic systems-just like political systems in general-can never be found isolated in social space, but are embedded in it and thus exposed to numerous changes and challenges within and outside their societies. According to Easton's (1965) concept of the political system, it can be stated that every political system-and this also includes all democratic regimes-pursues the central goal of self-preservation. Therefore, Easton was interested in how systems manage to remain persistent even in times of crises. In other words, what institutional structures and decision-making processes are necessary for political systems, which are under constant pressure to adapt to maintain their essential democratic core?
In particular, the economic, social, cultural and political globalization processes that are simultaneously taking place at the moment pose enormous challenges to democratic regimes (Kessler 2016;Kessler and Steiner 2009;Kriesi et al. 2013). This is demonstrated by the debates on the balancing act between a free-market economy and protectionism, the debates on migration and asylum policy, the pluralization of societies and the associated changes in hitherto relatively stable patterns of cultural orientation, as well as processes of European integration or the discussions on the design of a global democracy (Archibugi et al. 2012). Moreover, it has become evident that fewer and fewer people trust democratic institutions (Foa and Mounk 2017) and that there is increasing democracy fatigue in some countries (Wuttke et al. 2020).
In the last decade, democratic systems and governments seem to have had increasing problems with withstanding such pressures and adapting adequately to challenges like the decline of responsiveness, social inequalities on the national level, and climate change or migration movements on the global level. Especially (rightwing) populist political leaders are responsible for the decline in the quality of democracy (Decker 2006), which can be described as "democratic regression" (Erdmann and Kneuer 2013;Schäfer and Zürn 2021), "democratic backsliding" (Waldner and Lust 2018;Norris 2017;Mechkova et al. 2017), "democratic deconsolidation" (Foa and Mounk 2017). However, these analyses focus primarily on the problems within democratic institutional frameworks that ensure democratic norms and principles: freedom, equality and rule of law or horizontal accountability (Morlino 2012;Lauth 2004;Merkel et al. 2003). It is often only recognized at second glance that the development of democracy in some states also leads to the erosion of entire democratic institutions, e.g., in Hungary (Smolka 2019).
These national and global developments describe potential symptoms (identity crisis, polarization, populism, nationalism, etc.), causes (climate change, globalization), and consequences (democratic regression) of a broader phenomenon that we call dysfunctional democracy. We define a dysfunctional democracy as a democratic regime that is unable to adapt adequately to the demands of a changing international and domestic environment and unintendedly produces outcomes that are detrimental to the democratic political system. Functional democracies are able to incorporate social, political and economic demands and support from their domestic political system as well as demands from economic and political exchange with other political systems and transform them into input, throughput and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1972).
Functioning democracies do not jeopardize their essential liberal core of freedom, political equality and political accountability (Morlino 2012) in the search for adequate responses to challenges and pressures to adapt, i.e. democratic principles remain intact despite institutional or procedural changes. However, if the challenges described above are met with populist or illiberal proposals, which as such do not contain any solutions, this core is threatened. Then it is no longer possible to speak of functioning or dysfunctional democracies. As soon as democratic principles are eroded, deformed or abandoned, albeit possibly in the sense of a reaction to challenges to the political system, democracies turn into defective democracies (Merkel et al. 2003) or democracies with adjectives (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Consequently, the aim is to systematically capture dysfunctions of democratic regimes in which it is not necessarily the democratic quality that is under pressure, but rather that the democratically functioning institutions no longer correspond adequately to their sociopolitical frameworks and therefore produce unintended or undesirable outcomes. The term also serves as a heuristic tool for us to embed the multiple strands of research that have produced and falsified numerous medium-range theories (Merton 1967) in a broader theoretical framework.
The concept of dysfunctional democracy is thus broader than the concept of defective democracy (Merkel et al. 2003). Whereas Merkel's approach focuses primarily on the democratic institutional structure that is central to the political will-formation and decision-making process, it places the relationships between the political system and its environment inside and outside society at the center of the analysis. It also considers the full range of system, process, and policy functions (Almond et al. 2008). Using the structural-functionalist Parsons (1971) or Almond et al. (2008) and system-theoretical considerations Easton (1957) and Luhmann (1984), we combine internal and external functional analysis here. While internal functional analysis (IFA) breaks the system down into its components and describes the functions of the system, external functional analysis (EFA) specifies the relationships between the system and its environment (Demri et al. 2008). Both approaches are relevant for analyzing dynamic, open systems such as democratic governments and scrutinizing their interactions with their environment.
This article introduces the Special Section on "Dysfunctional democracy(ies): Characteristics, Causes and Consequences." aims to systematize the debates and put the individual contributions within this debate into dialogue with each other. The introductory contribution here highlights the concept of dysfunctional democracy in the context of the public and academic debate to date. The introduction further uses the examples of globalization and populism to illustrate the implications of these two phenomena with respect to the functionality of democracy. A brief presentation of the contributions to this special issue forms the conclusion and connection.

Dysfunctional democracy-a glance at the public and scientific discourse
The term dysfunctional democracy appears in academic debates as well as in public debates. In the public debate, for example, functionality is often equated with efficiency and it is discussed to what extent democracies are consequently always dysfunctional because they operate less effectively than other forms of rule (Grau 2017). This viewpoint refers, in particular, to the disruption of the process and policy functions of the democratic regime (see below). The loss of power of parliaments and the gain of power by bureaucracies are also exemplary of a dysfunction of democratic structures. Here, too, the focus is on a disruption of the process func-tion. Others brings into play the growing distrust in political institutions, which points to a dysfunction between the political system and the value system (Ermert 2019). Strenger (2017) points to the electoral success of populist parties (disruption of the process function) as well as superficial political discourse (disruption of the system function). The term dysfunctional democracy also appears in academic debate (Merkel 2016;Coleman 2020). Bowen (2003) and Hirata (2004) write about dysfunctional democracies in Japan, Insaidoo (2012)  Analogous to the public discourse, we also find some aspects listed as dysfunctional elements of democracies that are similar to the previously mentioned characteristics. For example, Coleman (2020) points out that wealthy elites are more likely to assert themselves politically than the mass of various population groups that are not as solvent as this group. He also writes that the crisis of political trust with the election of populist parties has led to a threat to the functioning of democracy (2020, p. 216). He explains the rise of populism as follows: "This tension, rooted in a deep disconnection between political insiders and outsiders at the most basic levels of affective orientation, intellectual commitment, value preference and cultural attachment, is at the core of the populist implosions that have rocked contemporary politics." (Coleman 2020, p. 217) Democracies are dynamic systems. They are composed of institutions, procedures and organisations and thrive on the participation of citizens. All components of these systems are interdependent and change over time. These changes are triggered by incentive structures and demands from the external environment or by interest-driven change strategies of relevant economic, social and political actors within the democracy. The pace and scope of the adjustment processes are essentially determined by the respective actors. Governments and political parties play the main role, while parliaments, the judiciary and civil society tend to play a secondary role. If the institutions and procedures of the democratic state do not adapt to the functional requirements of their environment, they risk becoming dysfunctional. The performance of the government and the democratic system as a whole decline, and with it the population's subjective belief in legitimacy, which is partly nourished by the results of democratic decisions. However, the development of democratic institutions and procedures does not only follow a functional incentive to maintain the performance of a democratic system. Societal values, priorities and worldviews also change internally, challenging the adaptability of democratic systems. The democratic capacity for participation and decision-making procedures is measured above all by the extent to which they perceive these socio-cultural changes, allow them politically and test their suitability for democracy. [...] External as well as internal challenges to democracy thus not only put the ability of democratic systems to change to the test, but they are also a necessary, if not sufficient condition for the further development of democracy in a rapidly changing world (Merkel 2016, p. 5).
It should be noted that dysfunctionality is not explicitly defined and is also used for very different democratic regimes (consolidated democracies and defec-tive democracies) (Merkel et al. 2003). While the authors in the analysis of the case studies examined above would argue in favor of applying political science's established conceptions of hybrid regimes, the considerations on dysfunctionality of established democracies appear appealing precisely when it comes to describing and analyzing the dysfunctions. Dysfunctions can obviously occur at very different points in the political system (e.g., the legislature or policy outcomes). This conceptual breadth and imprecision initially make the concept of dysfunctional democracy problematic and difficult to apply. Since it can nevertheless be helpful in the debate on the crisis of democracy, the conceptual fragments will be taken up and theoretically linked back to our main argument.
Although Merkel (2016) himself does not make any explicit reference to the systems theory considerations of Almond (2015), Almond et al. (2008) or Easton (1965) in his brief reflections on dysfunctional democracy, the core considerations of these theoretical currents are clearly implicit in his reflections. Merkel (2016) makes the fundamental point that democracies become dysfunctional when they fail to adapt to systemic and environmental challenges. It is precisely this argumentation that will be taken up and developed further below.

Structural functionalist considerations on dysfunctional democracies
Governments have many tasks, from building and running education and health systems to maintaining law and order and waging war. In order to fulfil these various tasks, "governments have specialized agencies or structures, such as parliaments, bureaucracies, administrative agencies and courts. These structures perform functions that in turn enable the government to formulate, implement and enforce its policies. The policies reflect the goals; the agencies provide the means to achieve them" (Almond et al. 2008, p. 31).
But similar structures can have very different functions in different political systems. Parliaments exist in Germany, France and Great Britain, for example, but also in China. Everywhere, their members make speeches and vote on future public policy. But while parliaments in Germany, France and Great Britain are essential institutions in the political decision-making process, the Chinese Congress only meets for short periods of time and ratifies decisions which are mainly made in advance by the communist party leadership (Almond et al. 2008, p. 31-32). Political systems do not differ in the functions they have to fulfil, but they do differ in the establishment of specific structures and the function they are supposed to fulfil. Almond et al. (2008, p. 32-35) distinguish three groups of functions that they believe all political systems must provide: 1. process functions: interest articulation, interest aggregation, policymaking, policy implementation and adjudication 2. system functions: political socialization, political recruitment, political communication 3. policy functions (= outputs): extraction, regulation, distribution; Almond et al. (2008, p. 38) also refers to this as "policy performance". Almond et al. (2008, p. 33) point out two core aspects of the structural functionalist approach. First, the same structures perform varying functions in different countries. Second, structures usually do not have a monopoly on a function, but rather a function is performed by different structures. If we now take a look at these three bundles of functions, we can assume that dysfunctions can occur in all three areas. Thus, dysfunctions can occur in the process functions, in the system functions and in the policy functions and thus the output produces (un)intended outcomes.
First, one can assume that not all structures perform the functions equally well, but that there is variance in terms of how fit structures are for their specific functions. Second, one can assume that over time the structures that perform the functions will change. Adaptation processes occur that either increase or weaken functionality. Thus, we have to assume a dynamic model, i.e. diachronic comparisons to get a special relevance. Finally, third, if a function is implemented by several structures, there may be frictions between these structures, which can ultimately result in dysfunction.
In particular, outcomes are of particular importance in the question of dysfunctionality. Outcomes reflect the ways in which policy interacts with the national and international environment (Almond et al. 2008, p. 35). These effects of policy decisions can be both intended and unintended. If unintended outcomes dominate, i.e., the laws passed do not achieve their purpose and may have unexpected side effects, then readjustments are necessary. In this context, it must be evaluated why the outputs do not unfold their effect. According to Almond et al. (2008, p. 38), the causes can be found at the "underlying cultural, economic, and technological levels" (Almond et al. 2008, p. 38). Thus, it is not only the inputs in the sense of demand and support from society and the international system or the initiatives of political leaders and bureaucrats that are significant. Similarly, the structures that carry out the functions of the political process and implement the inputs are not significant on their own. Conditions in the internal environment, conditions and events in the larger external world, and simple chance can undo the best thought-out programs and plans (Almond et al. 2008, p. 38). This means that on all three levels, the process functions, the system functions and the policy functions, there must be a permanent comparison with the framework conditions and a check whether the answers and solutions offered by the political system are still adequate and appropriate, otherwise dysfunctions will occur.

Challenges arising from globalization-the interdependence of subsystems and the susceptibility to dysfunctionality
Precisely because the subsystems of the environment, of which the political system is one, are interdependent, the conceptualization of dysfunctional democracies attempted here appears to make sense. This interdependence can be illustrated by the challenges that are now emerging, for example, as dysfunctions in the demo-cratic system as a result of globalization. Globalization, which has taken place in the last three decades as a kind of hyper modernization, has been accompanied by manifold consequences and effects, among other things at the economic level, but also at the societal, institutional and cultural level (= value level). On all these levels, globalization has generated 1 pressure for change. The new global capitalism is putting pressure on the West in particular because emerging economies (for example, in Asia) represent serious economic competition and are thus gaining political influence. Furthermore, wars and crises partially (co-)caused by the West are being carried back to Europe in the form of waves of refugees, economic dependencies or environmental disasters, for example. At the same time, national policies based on liberal democracy are becoming increasingly opaque as responsibilities shift away from the nation-state to international actors due to the liberalization of the market and transnationalization processes associated with globalization, especially in the form of European integration and Europeanization. Globalization has also been accompanied by policies of neoliberalization and the dismantling of the welfare state and the individualization of globalization risk (Schäfer and Zürn 2021;Schäfer 2015). Social inequality and the shifting of social conflict lines, for example between cosmopolitans and communitarians (Merkel and Zürn 2019) or between liberal globalists and supporters of authoritarian-populist parties (Schäfer and Zürn 2021), increasingly lead to political inequality and therein a dysfunctionality of current democracies becomes apparent. This dysfunctionality is described as a representation gap or a lack of responsiveness of parliaments. Those who are socio-economically better off are better represented in the political system than those who are socio-economically worse off. The feeling of not being heard is therefore quite real. In addition, there is an increasing disempowerment of parliaments in favour of non-majoritarian institutions, in which the socio-economically better-off are more strongly represented and can thus strengthen their cosmopolitan politics. Schäfer and Zürn (2021) speak here of cosmopolitan selectivity.
Within society, such epochal changes are certainly expressed as a cultural conflict at the level of values and social integration. The massive processes of social change create a collectivity and identity gap and political polarization (see Bein and Hornziak in this Special Section). For some, postmodernity marks the beginning of new freedoms, which were made possible by new working conditions and relationships, changing values, and, as a consequence, new lifestyles. For others, postmodernity means a dissolution of fixed family forms, existing solidarity ties and other evolved structures and identities.
The consequence is insecurity and disorientation. Other communities fall into this collectivity and identity gap, such as the traditional family, associated conservative values, home as a local community, and other closed forms of community (Rippl and Seipel 2018, p. 240). Cosmopolitan and postmaterialist values are rejected, and in terms of a cultural backlash (Inglehart and Norris 2016), the value shift of the 1970s is reversed. Instead of the liberal values of tolerance and self-actualization, there is now a preference for exclusionary cultural and identity policies that rely on national protectionism, social closure, and anti-liberal attitudes now.
These developments can be observed in the rise of nationalism in North America and many European countries, and even in racism and xenophobia. The creation of "in-groups" as a new community is inevitably accompanied by the creation of "out-groups" through demarcation. Furthermore, dissatisfaction and insecurity are accompanied by the search for scapegoats. These "out-groups" can be the "corrupt elites" or those who are responsible for the misery, but they can also be weaker groups in society, such as migrants. It is precisely at this point that populism, as one of the most frequently discussed consequences of dysfunctional democracies, serves the emerging needs for identity, belonging and community. Because of their postulated claim to know the "will of the people" alone and to represent it in a politically appropriate way (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017), they restore a sense of belonging and social identity to people who feel isolated and excluded. In this way, they respond to a need for political clarity and for leadership that propagates and enforces decisions perceived as correct (Spier 2006, p. 37-39), since the current elites, who were elected to power, seem to no longer stand up for the interests of their electorate (Eribon 2018).
The associated political discontent between the citizens and the state is also justified, for example, by concrete economic dislocations, yet the phenomenon itself points to specific dysfunctionalities in representative democracy (Manow 2020, p. 13). Established instances of articulation and representation, such as parties, parliaments and the media, have experienced a loss of functional capacity and legitimacy, and the decisive frame of reference, i.e. the state and its institutions, have lost significance (Manow 2020, p. 21). Democracy as we know it has consequently lost its functionality to some extent, otherwise, as Runciman (2018) aptly puts it, there would be no populist countermovement (Manow 2020). Nevertheless, populism is not intended to represent the main problem of democracy in this special section, but rather to be seen as an indicator of the specific dysfunctions of contemporary democracy (Manow 2020, p. 22-24). Democratic systems respond to these challenges in different ways. Kaina argues that democracies, in their attempt to be a force for good, try to regain their functionality and rely on human fervor to do so. Skzypek, on the other hand, states that instead of dealing with the causes of dysfunctionality, governments tend to only combat the symptoms, for example by banning extremist and populist parties. The characteristics and causes of dysfunctionality described here have led to disenchantment with politics and political parties and a loss of trust, and in some cases even to alienation and aversion to the idea of democracy. This is reflected both in the declining voter turnout that has been observed for several decades and in the dwindling numbers of political party membership.
What we can observe today behind the crisis of representative democracy are the potential limits of liberal democracy itself, as well as its identity crisis in the face of dwindling social cohesion and increasing sociopolitical polarization.
The contributions to the Special Section summarized below address the characteristics, causes and consequences of dysfunctionality from different perspectives and thus make an important contribution to the debate on the (dys)functionality of democratic systems.

Contributions
Viktoria Kaina's article addresses a wide range of current problems and challenges for democracy. The main argument is that human fervor produces a number of outcomes that are detrimental to liberal democracy. Human fervor has two sides, Kaina argues: it is the great driving force for human progress, prosperity and welfare, the acquisition of knowledge and the pursuit of happiness, but at the same time it also motivates people to tyranny and despotism, dogmatism and hatred, ruthlessness and cruelty. Therefore, we need a form of government that will save us from the dark part of human passions. Liberal democracy was invented to be just such a moderate form of government. Recently, however, it has been showing signs of dysfunctionality. The paper addresses two causes of the emergence of dysfunctional democracy. First, it addresses the limited capacity of liberal democracy to deal with "untidy" problems. Second, it discusses various symptoms of overburdened institutions. In doing so, Kaina also shows why liberal democracy faces the emergence of "tragic" institutions. In the conclusion, the author offers some reflections on the crucial question of how we can recognize a dysfunctional liberal democracy when we see one.
Simon Bein's article on "The Dysfunctional Paradox of Identity Politics in Liberal Democracies" follows the systems-theoretical argumentation suggested as a theoretical basis for this Special Section. The paper draws on the crisis literature of contemporary democracy studies and attempts to diagnose the state of contemporary democracies by identifying as a new aspect the "identity crisis of Western democracies." Indeed, a resilient collective identity could be crucial for the cohesion of a society in times of increasing polarization of opinion, growing social diversity, and increasing socioeconomic inequality in high-income democracies. Against this backdrop, the author of the paper offers an interesting perspective on the challenges facing contemporary democracies by linking the phenomenon of collective identity to the question of dysfunctional democratic governance. As a result of his work, the author is able to show that the current identity crisis is related to the concepts of modernity and liberalism. Second, he identifies the pek deals with the question of whether the concept of militant democracy offers democratic systems a possibility to defend themselves against undemocratic forces within. The starting point for this consideration is Skrzypek's observation that post-communist democracies in Central Eastern Europe established democratic systems that suffer from various dysfunctionalities mentioned in the introduction. Considering that some of these countries have applied measures of militant democracy (banning extremist political parties and restrictions on freedom of speech and the press), it is reasonable to assume that the dysfunctionality results from the ineffectiveness of the instruments of militant democracy or their replacement by a quasi-militant democracy. To verify this connection, Skrzypek poses three questions (p. 6), with particular emphasis on the third question: What was the impact of the political regime's dysfunction on the use of militant democracy and what does it mean in practice? He concludes that the more extensive the dysfunctionality and misapplication of militant restrictions, the greater the risk that sovereignty of the nation will be undermined.
The final paper in this special section is a case study on Poland and examines in more detail the relationship between affective political polarization and the dys-functionality of democracy. Sonia Horonziak argues that political polarization does not only affect the political and institutional sphere, but also the relationship between citizens and the state. As a result, this can lead to declining trust and the strengthening of populist rhetoric. Based on a critical and systematic analysis of the empirical evidence of the political, legal, and cultural changes, the author aims to trace their significant impact on the restructuring of Poland's democratic quality. It is concluded that it is too short-sighted to link the democratic turn in Poland exclusively to the change of government or to some selected conflicts. Rather, the root of the problem is the inability to adjust to international and social changes due to ideological positions. The necessary national and transnational dialogue, which requires attentiveness and political flexibility, is thus stifled the beginning.