An anatomy of Turkish football match-fixing

While discussion on corruption in sport is intensifying and football match-fixing in particular is attracting increasing attention, new fixing scandals emerge offering new accounts of actors and corrupt practices within the football industry and the level of the external threat to the sport. The scandal exposure of fixed matches in Turkey in 2011sheds light on the fixing of 17 matches played in the 2010/11 football season and allowed for insights to the actors, structure and processes behind the fix. Following four criminal and seven disciplinary proceedings, the case is still pending appeal for its final decision, involving a total of 93 suspects and having already resulted in the exclusion of two teams from European competitions. The evidence collected by the authorities points towards a hierarchical criminal organisation led by the President of a football club that arranged and coordinated the fixing in order for his team to win the national Championship. The aim of this article is to provide an account of the organisation and coordination of match-fixing in Turkey, with its actors, specifics and criminal characteristics, while offering an examination of match-fixing for sporting success, the least documented type of match-fixing.


Introduction
The last ten years have seen the discussion on corruption in sport intensifying, as more incidents of corrupt and fraudulent actions within a number of sports have emerged. High profile incidents have uncovered the frequency and intensity of corruption, especially in professionalised competitive sports, such as football (Hill, 2010;Haberfeld and Sheehan, 2013;Brooks et al., 2013;Manoli et al., 2017) and athletics (O'Leary, 2013). In the latter, a number of widely documented scandals of athletes' doping have recently surfaced, triggering further investigations into the anti-doping test regime before and during major events, such as the Olympics, and even resulting in athletes being stripped off their medals and banned from participating in future competitions (Dijkstra, et al., 2016;Fincoeur et al., 2014;Paoli and Donati, 2014). Corruption in football has attracted equal, if not more, attention in recent years, with prominent scandals of bribery involving high level officials (e.g. FIFA, see Jennings, 2016) and cases of match-fixing in specific national contexts (e.g. Italy, see Di Ronco & Lavorgna, 2015; Greece, see Manoli and Antonopoulos, 2015;Manoli et al., 2017;the Netherlands, see Spapens and Olfers, 2015;Poland, Portugal and Brazil, see European Commission, 2012;Germany, see Feltes, 2013;Haberfeld and Sheehan, 2013) surfacing over and over again.
While, as recent scandals have demonstrated, corruption in sport can take many forms, match-fixing in football tends to attract the attention of both media and high profile individuals such as Ralf Mutschke, FIFA's head of security, who suggested that organised crime structures "recently switched from drug trafficking to match-fixing" (Mutschke 2013: ix-x). In his study of match-fixing in Belgian football, Declan Hill (2010) appears to be in agreement with Mutschke's statement, presenting a hierarchical, mafia-type structure within football that organises and manages the manipulation of matches on the basis of profit through gambling. On the other hand, Manoli and Antonopoulos (2015), through a detailed account of football match-fixing in Greece, describe a flat, web-type structure, formed through both long-term and short-term agreements made on the basis of either promise of reward or threat of harm. These entirely different organisational structures and incentives already captured within academia can allow us to suggest that match-fixing and its details can indeed take diverse forms and thus be manifested in various ways. Moreover, of interest are the accounts on the level of infiltration of 'organised crime' in football as this is manifestedamong other-by match-fixing. In September 2012, for instance, an EU-parliament special committee on 'Organised Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering' pointed out that "sports fraud is extremely interesting for organized crime due to its relatively high revenues and low sentences"…[criminal organizations have] "deeply penetrated the football establishment". (Fajon andBozkurt, 2012 cited in Feltes, 2013: 25). In addition, it was suggested during the hearings of the committee that "strong ties exist between the football establishment and criminal organizations especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. …Criminals have infiltrated in the clubs and federations and are operating from within, while using the clubs as covers for a multitude of criminal activities" (Fajon andBozkurt, 2012 cited in Feltes, 2013: 25).
However, and despite the attention match-fixing cases have attracted, academic research on the matter is still in its infancy. In fact, one could argue that the only theoretical frameworks available on match-fixing actors and processes come from the two above mentioned cases: Belgian football by Hill (2009) and Greek football by Manoli and Antonopoulos (2015), which were also considered for this study. This paper examines one of the most prominent cases of match-fixing in European football, the match-fixing case of Turkish football, often referred to as 'Şike Davası', in an attempt to further our understanding of the match-fixing phenomenon and its various manifestations, as well as the level of infiltration of organised crime in football. In particular, the case examined is considered one of the biggest scandals in Turkish football, involving 93 prominent figures of the sport.
Following the investigation of the Turkish police during the 2010/11 season, 31 of these individuals were imprisoned, due to their fixing related activities, initiating a number of legal battles. Rather than fixing for financial gains through betting, which has been a dominant theme of academic work in the field (Hill 2009;2010;Manoli and Antonopoulos 2015), the case offers an appropriate context to examine match-fixing for sporting success. Fixing for sporting success refers to the manipulation of the outcome of football matches in order for the overall competition/league to be won, and by extension for the financial benefits associated with that success (e.g. from participation in Champions' League, sponsors, etc.) to be obtained (Carpenter, 2014). This study hence adds to the limited academic work on matchfixing for sporting success, while offering a detailed account of the previously undocumented process of match-fixing in Turkey with its actors, specifics and criminal characteristics. In more detail, the analysis of the case focuses on the primary actors of a scheme, described in the criminal proceedings before the Turkish court, which comprised of several key individuals from one of Turkey's leading clubs, Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü (hereafter 'Fenerbahçe') and their match-fixing activities of specific games of the Turkish Super League (the Turkish first national football division, known as 'Süper Lig') during the second half of the 2010/2011 football season. It is also important to note that this paper does not aim to explain the political dimension of the Turkish match-fixing case, which has been already analysed in great detail albeit within the country (Başaran, 2013;Erkin, 2015;Uzun, 2015).
The paper procceds in four steps. Firstly, the overview of the case elaborating on the background and the subsequent legal and disciplinary proceedings is presented, with a view to provide a contextual setting for the analysis in the following sections. After the methodological approach adopted and the data used for the analysis are outlined, the process of match-fixing in Turkey is presented, followed by an examination of all key actors involved, including both the primary actors of the alleged 'criminal organisation' and the associated secondary actors. Finally, a discussion takes place in order to better contextualise the findings of this study.

Overview of the Turkish Match-fixing Case
The Turkish match-fixing case is one of the most prolific and scandalous events that has taken place in the history of football in Turkey, which was classed as the 28 th best in the FIFA world ranking at the time when the scandal broke (FIFA, 2017). The case was the result of an eight-month investigation (December 2010 to July 2011) by the Turkish authorities that involved wiretapping and technical and physical tracking of several individuals, who were suspected to form 'criminal organisations' to conduct match-fixing activities in the top two divisions of Turkish football, the Turkish Super League and the First League (known as '1. Lig'). A total of 17 matches played in the 2010/11 football season were suspected of being manipulated including 13 of the Turkish Super League and the final of the Turkish Cup (see Table 1). Consequently, on July 3 rd 2011, the Turkish police ran concurrent operations in 15 different cities, making several arrests which marked the commencement of the criminal proceedings that involved a total of 93 suspects. Following police interrogations, 31 of 93 suspects were arrested and sent to prison. Among them were individuals from prominent  prior to Legislation 6222 coming into force (in April 2011), according to the Court, the wiretaps and other physical evidences were not legally obtained by the court order and used to construe offences that legally did not exist, thus rendering the evidence inadmissible ((Judgment No: 2015/212, pp. 250-53). The Court also concluded that the illegality and inadmissibility were applicable even after Legislation 6222 came in force, and therefore there was a lack of legitimate evidence to prove the offences of match-fixing and incentive

Data and Methods
The The main limitation of this study is that the legal files used in this research, and in particular the evidence they contain, are the result of law enforcement activity, which in turn is the result of resource restrictions, the competency of agents, organizational priorities, and wider political priorities (see Kinzig 2004).

The process of match-fixing
A clear and well organised four step process was followed in order for the above mentioned matches to be fixed. The steps included in the process, as well as its peculiarities will be discussed below.

Initial meeting -match selection
As described within the legal files, the first step in the process of match-fixing was a meeting, between three individuals, the President and the Vice-Presidents of Fenerbahçe, which was mostly held in the training ground of the club. In this initial meeting, key topics were discussed, such as which games needed to be fixed, the possibility to manipulate their result and the level of payment to be offered. The matches selected fall under two categories; firstly, matches of Fenerbahçe with competitive balance between the team and its opponent; and secondly, matches with competitive balance between the runner-up teams for the Championship title and their opponents. Competitive balance, the premise that sporting contests must contain elements of unpredictability and thus an uncertain outcome, is a central element to any sporting contest (Freestone & Manoli, 2017). In both categories of matches, the existence of a high unpredictability of the result and the subsequent effect its outcome would have on the final ranking of the league table were the main criteria for the selection of particular matches to manipulate.
At this initial meeting, an agreement would be reached on the plan of action to follow in order for the desired results to be achieved, which actors of the 'organisation' to involve in the process of fixing the games, and who to initially approach in the opposion team.
Determining the selection of particular actors for the match-fixing process mostly depended were not related to all 13 games, but only to those games where their direct involvement in conducting activities of fixing or attempting the fix was proven.

Setting up & Gaining access
Following the initial meeting, the second step of the process involved communicating the plan of action to fix a particular game and the level of payments to be offered in return to the selected actors for each match. Generally, the officials of Fenerbahçe were the first to be  It is worth underlying that while these initial steps followed in this process resemble the initial steps in both the Belgian (Hill, 2009) and the Greek (Manoli & Antonopoulos, 2015) case, this highly organised procedure of carefully crafting and managing the division of tasks has not been documented before. All actors were in regular contact with the Vice-Presidents, informing them about their progress. This effective communication ensured that the activities of the sub-groups were coordinated and did not overlap. The actors used their personal network to approach the individuals in the opposition teams, making the access to them far from problematic. Commonly, the individuals selected were either players that were represented by the players' agents involved, or former players, managers and officials of Fenerbahçe who were now working for the opponents. If at any point a challenge appeared in penetrating the opposition team due to a possible lack of connections, external individuals were approached, for instance a player or a manager who used to either play or work for the opposition, in order for their network in the team to be utilised for the required access to be gained. The initial contact with these individuals was via phone, either text message or call, but followed with a meeting to discuss the details. For instance, in arranging the fix for the match against IBB on May 1 st 2011, the unlicensed players' agent of the 'organisation' contacted a player (striker) of IBB to negotiate the fixing. The player was represented by the unlicensed agent and not only gaining access was easy, but also arranging the fix required only two phone calls and an in-person meeting (which took place in a restaurant and was physically recorded by the Turkish Police -

Negotiating the fix
Once the access to these actors was achieved, the next stage was to negotiate the fix.
Negotiations usually took place in meetings held in neutral locations, such as a restaurant or a hotel lobby. In the fixing of the match against IBB, arranging the fix involved the negotiations between the unlicensed agent and the player, concerning the currency of the payment. The initial discussion was in relation to the fee of US$100,000, but then the player changed his preference to €100,000 Euro. The negotionations, when a long-term relationship existed between the two members such as a player and his representing agent, were often short and relatively brief. For example, when the same unlicensed players' agent mentioned above was asked to access the player (goalkeeper) of Sivasspor who happened to be also represented by him. The two met in a restaurant in Istanbul and exchanged phonecalls in order to negotiate the fee of US$300,000 for fixing (Indictment No:2011/598 pp. 393-394, Judgment No: 2012. In some occasions the individuals approached (e.g. player, manager or team administator) refused to get involved in match-fixing, despite efforts to convince them. On these occasions, the unsuccessful actors would re-start the process by trying to access other individuals within the opposition teams. In essence, under Legislation 6222, once there is an agreement between the actors in place to manipulate a match, the offence of match-fixing is committed; whether the desired result the game is achieved is secondary and not taken into consideration. If the negotiations failed, i.e., players did not agree to the offer of fixing, or rejected it, then, it is still an offence but classed as 'attempted' under the Legislation.
The importance of dividing the organisation into multiple sub-groups for crucial games and approaching different individuals of the opponents simultaneously, thus increasing the possibility of the fix, illustrates the sophistication of the process followed, that involved taking into consideration the possibility that the negotiations might not reach an agreement.
This well-organised approach does not resemble either the Belgian (Hill, 2009) or the Greek (Manoli & Antonopoulos, 2015) case, which followed a less methodical and more spontanteous process.
It is important to note that within the legal files there exists no suggestion of any evidence of use of any threats or force to convince anyone to participate in match-fixing activities, unlike the above mentioned similar match-fixing cases. It is also worth underlining that the legal files do not specify any additional activities by the actors before or during the matches, such as the arrangement and coordination of the referees or interventions into the dressing rooms during half-time, specifically aiming to ensure the desired result is achieved.
Nevertheless, considering that Fenerbahçe won all the matches that were subject to match-fixing activities, it can be assumed that the actors were successful in their efforts of manipulating the matches that they targetted.

Post-fix payments
Payments in the overall process of match-fixing were generally made after each game. The Finance Director released the agreed payments to the Vice-President, who distributed money to the actors involved in the process of match-fixing of each particular match in order to make the actual payouts. Neither the President nor the Vice-Presidents ever made any direct payments.

Case peculiarities
One of the most peculiar and interesting aspects of the football match-fixing process in Turkey was the transfer promise made to some of the players of opposing teams as an incentive to participate in the fixing. This previously undocumented activity can be described as 'fixing through the promise of transfer' and it was based upon the exploitation of the position of Fenerbahçe as a club at the apex of Turkish football. Since playing for the Club is highly desirable to many players in Turkey, it was used as leverage in the process of fixing.
The promise of a transfer or the expression of interest by the Club was communicated to some of these important players in opposition teams or to their representatives, in order to manipulate the players' phychological state. What is important to note is that the transfer promise was made right before a match, in order for the overall strategy of manimulating the phychological state of the players to work. For example, before the games against The overall match-fixing process has some particular characteristics that are worth highlighting (Indictment No. 2011/598 pp.186-191, Judgment No. 2012. Firstly, particular measures were taken to avoid detection by the Turkish authorities. For example, mobile phone conversations were very brief and essentially limited to making arrangements for further communication in more secure settings. The specifics of fixing activities were discussed in the calls from landline numbers, which are more difficult to be wiretapped, or in face-to-face meetings. In addition, a particular brand of mobile phones was used, which was believed to assist in avoiding wiretapping by the authorities, and, in the case of meetings, 'safe' locations such as the training ground of Fenerbahçe or the business premises of the actors were often preferred. Secondly, during the conversations, the actors used codewords.
The matches to be fixed were referred to as 'farm field', 'construction' and 'court case', the players were called 'builders' or 'defendants', the President was referred to as 'the number one' or 'CEO', and the acceptance of match-fixing was described as 'drinking coffee' (Indictment No. 2011/598 pp.190-200, Judgment No. 2012. Thirdly, the payments were recorded in Fenerbahçe's accounts under a specific category of 'expenses' that disguised their true nature. Often, the payments were classified as repayments of personal loans made to the club by the Vice-Presidents or payments for match tickets (Indictment No.2011/598 pp.189, Judgment No. 2012.

The key actors of match-fixing
The analysis of the data of the Turkish legal files suggests that a number of individuals were involved in the manipulation of matches during the scandal, a number of whom were convicted for their involvement and in fact charged for their role in the 'criminal organisation' of match-fixing that was led by the President of Fenerbahçe. In particular, the criminal indictment (No.2011/598, pp.186-191), the decision of the Istanbul 16 th High Criminal Court Examining the legal files further, while taking the classifications and similar investigations of match-fixing processes and actors presented by Hill (2009) and Manoli and Antonopoulos (2015) into consideration, the key actors involved in the match-fixing process will be discussed below. For the purposes of our analysis, the individuals involved in the organisation in question are described as 'primary actors' of the case as they were convicted of both offences under the Legislation 6222 and section 220 of the Turkish Panel Code. The individuals who were convicted for match-fixing activities as per the Legislation 6222 but not for involvement with the 'criminal organisation' are referred to as 'secondary actors' of the case. In other words, the conviction for one or both offences is the distinguishing factor between the two categories of actors. The primary actors in the Turkish football match-fixing scheme included:

President of
• The President of Fenerbahçe: The 'criminal organisation' was established and led by the President of Fenerbahçe. As the leader of the organisation, according to the legal files, the President was the key actor making strategic decisions regarding the matches to be fixed and the level of payments to be offered in return. Manoli and Antonopoulos (2015)  17), as it was described above in the process of the fixing.
• The Vice-Presidents of Fenerbahçe: Two Vice-Presidents were close confidants of the President, operating directly below him as the seconds-in-command within the hierarchy of the organisation. They communicated the orders of the President to others within the organisation, coordinated the fixing activities of the group during the overall process of match-fixing, and reported back to the President. One of the Vice-Presidents was also directly responsible for managing the payments that were made in return for the fix. In particular, he organised the distribution of money to the others in the organisation and coordinated payments to the opponents.
• The Finance Director of Fenerbahçe: Working in conjunction with the Vice-Presidents, the Director of Finance was responsible for releasing payments from the accounts of the club to the Vice-President who was in charge of money distribution.
The Finance Director also recorded all payments made and ensured they were all accounted within the books of the club in a manner that disguised their true nature.
Additionally, the Club lawyer, who was also part of the 'criminal organisation' led by the President of Fenerbahçe, also had links with Sedat Peker whom he had represented in the past (Indictment No:2011/598, p. 193;Judgment No: 2012/71, p. 63). Interestingly, and despite Peker's ties with 'mafia' type activites, his connection to the Turkish match-fixing case was limited to being used by other members of the 'organisation' indirectly and often unknowingly, primarily for his reputation and his intimidation capital (Indictment No:2011/598, p. 193;Judgment No: 2012/71, p. 63).
A hierarchical relationship existed within each of the two groups of individuals as well. The club officials worked closely with the Vice-Presidents assisting them in making strategic decisions related to specific activities required in fixing the games, such as who to initially contact in the opposition team (specific players, coaches or team administrators) and the way of physical payments to be arranged. The club officials also assisted in deciding which members of the organisation would work for the fixing of individual games and often became a communication channel between the Vice-Presidents and the other members throughout the fixing process, although the Vice-Presidents communicated directly with every member involved in the process as well.

Secondary Actors
The secondary actors of the math-fixing process included players, presidents, and club officials of opposing teams. The diversity of these actors was potentially due to the fact that attempts were made to manipulate the result of a high number of matches and in order to do so a high volume of secondary actors were targeted in order for the expected result to be achieved. As previously underlined, the secondary actors were not part of the criminal organisation directly, and were thus convicted only for match-fixing activities as per Legislation 6222 but not for involvement with the 'criminal organisation'; they nevertheless played an active and important role in the overall process of match-fixing.
Players were key secondary actors due to their power to manipulate the result of a Therefore, he was personally known by the primary actors who utilised his network to access the players in the teams and to fix the games. The primary actors' ability to reach out an exented number of secondary actors in the process underscores the strength of their network in Turkish football.

Discussion
A number of observations can be made on the basis of the data obtained on the Turkish match-fixing scandal. Firstly, unlike the relatively recent case of football match-fixing scandal in Greece also known as Koriopolis (a pun name on the Italian scandal Calciopoli and the Greek word 'korios' or phone-tap), which involved match-fixing networks with a naturally defined horizontal 'structure', with participants on these networks many times acting on improvisation, and individuals or small groups forming temporary collaborations in order for their shared objective to materialise (Manoli and Antonopoulos, 2015), in Turkey a different image emerges. Specifically, the business of Turkish matchfixing points towards a relatively rigid organisation, coordination, hierarchy and so on. The perception that the match-fixing structure is a criminal organisation is affected by the involvement of the hierarchical structure that has existed as a legal business, i.e., Fenerbahçe, in an illegal scheme.
Secondly, although we are not in the position to verify the root and nature of the relationship between and among the various actors involved in the match-fixing scheme, what can be safely argued is that at the core of many of these collaborations lie the legitimate business connections that are forged within Fenerbahçe. The club is effectively the context in which legal business relationships transform into illegal business relationships, and the platform upon which 'loyalty' (functional for match-fixing activities and necessary for secrecy) is borrowed (von Lampe, 2007). What von Lampe (2007) calls a 'social microcosm' of illegal entrepreneurs is of critical importance to the success of match-fixers. In contrast to other contexts, such as -for instance-Belgium, the primary actors are not 'foreigners', the 'Others' (Hill, 2010) but native individuals, who are embedded in the Turkish football industry. As such they cannot be perceived as exogenous to the sport industry which are trying to infiltrate in order to make profit. Rather they are endogenous individuals who run legitimate companies and who would thus have been cleared by relevant Turkish Government regulations, such as the Fit and Proper test. 5 As a result, a question can be raised on the potential introduction of similar Government regulations as regards their applicability on such occasions, since, as it is illustrated in this case, match-fixing is not always the product of 'organised criminals' that infiltrate sport, but rather a criminal activity organised by the individuals embedded in the sport.
When intermediaries, who are not directly related to the Club, are involved in the match-fixing process, they allow for the expansion of the reach of the hierarchical structure, that is the football club itself. The lack , however, of formal structure and permanence among those intermediaries acts as a self-protective mechanism to prevent detection through the control of the flow of information about the important, core actors involved in the scheme. As we saw, for instance, neither the President nor the Vice-Presidents ever paid those involved in match-fixing directly. The embeddedness of the match-fixing actors and process in legal businesses (i.e. Fenerbahçe) meant that payments for match-fixing activities were absorbed relatively easily in the normal workings of the club. As mentioned earlier, payments to individuals involved in match-fixing were recorded under the club accounts as the repayments of the club's personal borrowings from the Vice-President. The case of matchfixing in Turkey offers yet another example of how legitimate businesses provide for a very convenient (and already existing) setting for criminal finances management (see Kleemans and van de Bunt, 2008).
Many of the match-fixing activities described earlier in this article took place within the confines of the corporation that is Fenerbahçe, which afforded a relatively low visibility.
Moreover, many of the match-fixing activities involved actions of numerous individuals and departments within the particular football club, resulting in a diffusion of the responsibility (see Ruggiero, 1996). The particular case of football match-fixing in Turkey exemplifies the blurred boundaries between 'organised crime' and 'corporate crime'. There is an overlap between 'corporate crime' and 'organised crime', making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish one from the other. It has been suggested that the two are variants of the same type of crime and as such they should be analysed jointly (von Lampe, 2016;van Duyne and Block, 1994). In some cases, the ways legitimate corporations, such as Fenerbahçe, operate would justify such joint analysis. There is a symbiosis between criminal businesses and legitimate corporations exemplified not only by the criminal activities in which Fenerbahçe officials/employees were involved in within the confines of the legal business but also relevant activities within a criminal network that transcended the corporate boundaries of the club.
Our account on Turkish match-fixing offered elements of the social organisation of Turkish match-fixing on the basis of the 'Şike Davası' scandal during the 2010/2011 football season and highlighted that the phenomenon of match-fixing internationally can take diverse forms some of which are potentially yet to be uncovered (see Di Ronco and Lavorgna, 2015).
Clearly, additional research on the topic is necessary.