The Modal-Epistemic Argument Self-undermined

In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten defends his Modal-Epistemic Argument (MEA) for the existence of God against various objections that I raised against it. In this article, I observe that Rutten’s defence fails for various reasons. Most notably though, the defence is self-undermining: the very claims that Rutten argues for in his defence yield novel counterexamples to the first premise of the MEA.


Introduction
This article is about the Modal-Epistemic Argument for the existence of God, developed by Emanuel Rutten (2014), criticized by Wintein (2018) and defended against this critique by Rutten (2022). In this article I demonstrate that Rutten's defence fails for various reasons. Most notably though, the defence is self-undermining, as explained below. But let me first present the (valid) argument that is at stake.

The Modal-Epistemic Argument (MEA)
P 1 For every FoCons proposition p that is true in some possible world w there is some possible world w (such that p is true in w and) such that there is a subject in w that knows R that p. P 2 It is not the case that there is a possible world in which there is a subject that knows R that there is no personal first cause. P 3 The proposition that there is no personal first cause is a FoCons proposition. C In every possible world there is a personal first cause.
A FoCons proposition is a first-order proposition that is consistently believable. A first-order proposition only states something about the world itself and not about the propositional attitudes of a subject. For instance, 'John went to Rotterdam' is a first-order proposition whereas 'John knows that he went to Rotterdam' is not. Consistently believable propositions are propositions for which it is not self-contradictory to believe them. Propositions such as 'There are no conscious beings' or 'Nothing exists' are not consistently believable.
Knowledge R refers to the very demanding conception of knowledge that Rutten employs in the MEA and according to which a proposition can be known R only when it is (i) deductively proven, (ii) self-evident, (iii) grounded in indisputable sensory or inner experience (including indisputable memory), or (iv) based on indisputable testimony. To illustrate that the conditions on 'knowing R that' are very demanding and to contrast it with our colloquial use of 'knowing that', consider proposition (1).
The population of New York is larger than that of Amsterdam. (1) Although I know that (1) is true, I do not know R that (1) is true. Nevertheless, (1) is knowable R as Rutten (2014) explains by considering a possible world with 'an extra-terrestrial civilization whose members can observe an extensive geographical area on our planet with the same immediacy and resulting degree of certainty as we can observe our hands'. A member of this extra-terrestrial civilization can know R (1) on the basis of indisputable observation, i.e. on the basis of knowledge source (iii). Hence, (1) is knowable R . A personal first cause is a personal being that is a first cause (of reality). An entity x is a first cause iff x is the direct or originating cause of everything else besides x, whereas x itself is not caused. Note that it follows directly from its definition that if a first cause exists, then it is unique.
In Wintein (2018) I present various objections to the MEA. I argue (a) that premise P 1 is false, (b) that premise P 2 is false and (c) that the MEA is effectively equivalent to the modal-epistemic Core argument, the latter argument being clearly untenable. In addition, I presented (d) a parody argument to the Core argument, in order to vividly illustrate the Core argument's flaws and, by extension, the flaws of the MEA. Rutten (2022) defends the MEA by arguing that my objections (a), (b), (c) and (d) all fail. In this paper I demonstrate that Rutten's defence against each of the four objections is wanting and that his replies to (b) and (c) are, in addition, selfundermining. That is, the very claims that Rutten is arguing for to rebut (b) and (c) can be turned against the MEA: they can be used to construct straightforward counterexamples to P 1 .
Rutten chooses to reply to (a), (b), (c), (d) in reverse order and I will respect Rutten's order in this paper. Thus, the next four sections of this paper deal with (d), (c), (b) and (a) respectively, after which a final section concludes.

The Parody Argument
It is important to realize that, in premise P 1 of the MEA, it is knowability R , i.e. knowable R by some subject in some possible world, that is at stake. As illustrated by our discussion of (1), the appeal to knowers R that exist in some possible world counterbalances the demanding conception of knowlegde R and secures the knowability R of lots of propositions. The knowability R of some (possibly true FoCons) propositions, such as 'there is a personal first cause' or 'the Flying Spaghetti Monster does not exist' is, prima facie, controversial, but Rutten (2014) argues that these are knowable R by a personal first cause. In fact, the knowledge R possibilities for a personal first cause, as envisioned by Rutten, seem endless. In Wintein (2018), I argue that Rutten is effectively committed to (*): (*) A proposition p is knowable R by some subject if and only if p is knowable R by a personal first cause.
Given (*), the MEA is equivalent to the (modal-epistemic) Core argument, which is obtained from the MEA by replacing 'subject that knows R ' with 'personal first cause that knows R ' throughout. The Core argument is clearly untenable. In Wintein (2018), I put forward the following parody argument to the Core argument in order to openly lay bare its flaw.

Parody Argument
K 1 All possibly true FolKri propositions are knowable R by Saul Kripke. K 2 The proposition that Saul Kripke does not exist is not knowable R by Saul Kripke. K 3 The proposition that Saul Kripke does not exist is a FolKri proposition. C K The proposition that Saul Kripke exists is necessarily true.
Here, a FolKri proposition is any proposition that is expressible by a sentence of a first-order predicate language with identity, without any predicate or function symbols and with a single constant symbol κ that refers to Saul Kripke. Thus the proposition that everything is self-identical, which can be expressed as '∀x(x = x)' is a true FolKri proposition. The proposition that not everything is identical to Saul Kripke, '¬∀x(x = κ)' is another true FolKri proposition. Now 'Saul Kripke does not exist', i.e. ¬∃x(x = κ), is a FolKri proposition which is possibly true 1 but clearly not knowable R by Saul Kripke. Indeed, the whole point of the Parody argument is that K 1 is trivially false, as this vividly illustrates that the same holds true for the first premise of the Core argument. Rutten (2022, p. 778) argues that the Parody argument is unsuccessful as a parody argument to the Core argument and claims that, 'contrary to premise P 1 , premise K 1 is obviously false'. To do so, Rutten correctly observes that for each natural number n, the proposition which states that there are exactly n objects, call this proposition World(n), is a FolKri proposition. For example: The Parody argument may be formally represented using the vocabulary of quantified modal logic. The natural, Kripke semantics for quantified modal logic is free, meaning that constants need not to have a referent in each possible world. As such, ¬∃x(x = κ) is a possible truth according to Kripke semantics for quantified modal logic.

Rutten then claims that:
There are many sufficiently large natural numbers n such that the FolKri proposition World(n) is possibly true and yet unknowable R by Saul Kripke. I conclude that Wintein's parody argument is not a successful parody argument against the modal-epistemic core argument. Rutten (2022, p. 778) So in particular, Rutten claims that for sufficiently large numbers n, World(n) is possibly true. However, now consider the following proposition, which is also known as Euclid's theorem: There are infinitely many prime numbers. (2) According to a compelling view, mathematical propositions are necessarily true, i.e. true in every possible world. One can argue that the (necessary) truth of (2) renders any World(n) proposition (necessarily) false: when there are infinitely many prime numbers, it is false that there are exactly n objects, so that any World(n) proposition is false. In a similar vein, one can argue that World(n) propositions are necessarily false by pointing to the necessary truth of a proposition like (3): There are infinitely many propositions. ( If World(n) propositions are necessarily false, Rutten's objection to the Parody argument completely fails. I believe, for the reasons just given, that World(n) propositions are necessarily false. Now, Rutten may reject those reasons. That is, he can deny that propositions such as (2) and (3) are necessarily true. Or, he can deny that (2) and (3) commit one to acknowledge the existence of infinitely many objects. But then, the above considerations reveal that Rutten's attempt to discredit the Parody argument forces him to embrace anti-realism about numbers, propositions, sets, and the like. This is a high price to pay and I am not sure whether it is a price that Rutten can pay: is anti-realism about numbers and propositions compatible with other philosophical commitments that a proponent of the MEA has to take on? I will not pursue this question as it can be side-stepped: a slight variation of the Parody argument will serve my purposes equally well and is immune to Rutten's 'objection from World(n) propositions'.
Let a Fol x Kri proposition be any proposition that is expressible by a sentence of a first-order predicate language with 1 variable x, with identity, without any predicate or function symbols and with a single constant symbol κ that refers to Saul Kripke. Let the Parody x argument be obtained from the Parody argument by replacing 'FolKri proposition(s)' with 'Fol x Kri proposition(s)' throughout. The Parody x argument is immune to Rutten's objection from World(n) propositions and fulfils the dialectical role of the (original) Parody argument equally well: it vividly illustrates that the modal-epistemic Core argument is untenable.

The Core Argument
The Parody argument illustrates the untenability of the Core argument, not of the MEA. However, if (*) is true, the MEA is equivalent to the Core argument so that the MEA is shown to be untenable by the Parody argument as well. Rutten (2022) argues that (*) is false by providing two types of counterexamples to (*): counterfactuals of libertarian freedom and what it is like to be propositions. I will show that Rutten's arguments for both cases are unsuccessful and that, in addition, his arguments pertaining to the first case are self-undermining.

Counterfactuals of Libertarian Freedom
A counterfactual of (libertarian) freedom (CLF) is a proposition of the form 'Agent S would (libertarianly) freely do action A in circumstances C'. With respect to CLFs, Rutten correctly remarks that: Counterfactuals of (libertarian) freedom for creaturely beings constitute a counterexample to (*) in case they are knowable R by a (libertarian) creaturely free agent but unknowable R by a personal first cause. Rutten (2022, p. 780) Indeed, these are the conditions under which CLFs constitute counterexamples to (*). Rutten, however, hardly provides an argument for the claim that these conditions are fulfilled. He does refer to a debate, in the philosophy of religion, about whether God knows CLFs and how such knowledge squares with God's providence 2 . According to one position in the debate, called Molinism 3 , God knows all CLFs. Thus, according to Molinists, CLFs do not constitute counterexamples to (*). Rutten (2022, p. 780) remarks that '[Molinist] accounts are problematic to say the least' and from this sole remark he infers that 'it might very well be that CLFs are not knowable R by a personal first cause'. So, Rutten's defence against my objections to the MEA involves a rejection of Molinism. This very fact will, for quite a few theists, seriously diminish the MEA's attractiveness.
But even if Molinism is mistaken and its failure would entail that CLFs are unknowable R by a personal first cause, it does not follow that (*) is false. For, to argue that CLFs constitute counterexamples to (*), one also needs to argue that CLFs are knowable R by some subject. Although Rutten (2022, p. 780) suggests that a CLF might be knowable R by the (libertarian) creaturely free agent S that is the subject of the CLF, no argument for this claim is to be found in Rutten (2022) at all. And yet such an argument is clearly needed. For, the knowability R by S of the proposition that S would (libertarianly) freely do A in C seems to contradict, at least prima facie, with the (libertarian) freedom of S. Indeed, if S knows R in advance what he would do when in C, it seems that S cannot be (libertarian) free to do as he sees fit once in C. Rutten does not discuss this tension between the knowability R of CLFs and libertarian freedom at all, let alone give any suggestion as to how to overcome it. Yet without an argument that resolves this tension, Rutten's remarks that CLFs constitute counterexamples to (*) are futile.
More importantly, let us now suppose that CLFs actually do constitute counterexamples to (*). In particular, suppose that for some action A and circumstances C, proposition (4) is knowable R by Saul Kripke but not by a personal first cause.
Kripke would (libertarianly) freely do action A in circumstances C. (4) Recall from §2 that Kripke exists, but not necessarily so, so that (5) is a possible truth.
Kripke does not exist.
(5) As the truth value of CLFs about Kripke does not depend on his (actual) existence, the conjunction of (4) and (5), which I'll denote as (4.5), is a possible truth as well. So then, as we are working under the assumption that (4) is only knowable R by Saul Kripke, (4.5), is unknowable R by any subject. Hence, if (4.5), is a FoCons proposition, it is a counterexample to P 1 . But clearly, (4.5), is a FoCons proposition. For one, I can consistently believe (4.5). For another, (5) is clearly a first-order proposition and Rutten (2022, p. 781) explicitly argues that CLFs are first-order propositions. Hence, arguing that CLFs are counterexamples to (*) in order to defend the MEA is self-undermining: if successful, it yields counterexamples to P 1 .

What It Is Like to Be Propositions
What it is like to be a bat (cf. Nagel, 1974) refers to the subjective character or quality of the first-person experience of being a bat. Rutten argues that (*) is false as a personal first cause cannot know R what it is like to be a bat. More precisely: Further, it seems to me plausibly true that (at least part of) what it is like to be a bat can be expressed by a (complex) proposition q. But then proposition q is a counterexample to the left-to-right direction of (*). For q is possibly true and knowable R by a bat, but unknowable R by a personal first cause. So (*) is false. Rutten (2022, p. 779) Rutten does not provide any argument for the claims that (part of) what it is like to be a bat is propositionally expressible or that bats are capable of having propositional knowledge R . Rather, he presupposes these claims to formulate an argument (Rutten, 2022, p. 779) against (*) that can be phrased as follows: B 1 Only (beings sufficiently similar to) bats can know R q. B 2 A personal first cause is not (sufficiently similar to) a bat. ∴ q is unknowable R by a personal first cause.
Rutten takes it for granted that B 1 and B 2 are true. But plausibly, both premisses of his Bat argument are false, as I will now demonstrate.
As for B 2 , Rutten's conception of a personal first cause may very well be sufficiently dissimilar from that of a bat. However, the dissimilarity between a personal first cause and a bat does not follow from the definition of a personal first cause. To illustrate this, note that bats, on Rutten's account, are receptive to his four knowlegde R sources and capable of propositional knowledge R : bats are subjects. Now, consider a possible world w that is populated only by bats and bat-like creatures. It seems perfectly possible that this world w has a personal first cause who created 'all bats in his image'. Such a personal first cause then, would arguably be sufficiently similar to a bat. Such a personal cause would know R q. It might sound odd to assert that the personal first cause of the actual world, if it exists, is sufficiently similar to a bat. But such is irrelevant, as it is knowability R of q by a personal first cause that is at stake, not the knowability R of q by the personal first cause of the actual world.
As for B 1 , Rutten simply postulates that 'being sufficiently similar to a bat' is a necessary condition for a being to be able to know R q. However, this condition seems rather implausible when it is the knowability R of q by a personal first cause that is at stake. For a personal first cause, who 'sits at the ultimate root of all reality' as Rutten (2022, p. 784) puts it, is indeed a rather special being. In particular a personal first cause is the cause, or creator, of all bats. But, as a brief glimpse at the actual world reveals, a personal first cause may be the cause of so much more than just bats. Indeed, a personal first cause may be completely dissimilar to a bat as it is so much more than a bat. But exactly because it is so much more than a bat, a personal first cause may, in contrast to fish, birds, humans and other beings that are dissimilar to bats, know R q. Indeed, a personal first cause may know R q on the basis of its unique, indisputable bat-creating experience or intuition. Relatedly, Linda Zagzebski has argued 4 that God is omnisubjective, i.e. that, as Zagzebski (2016, p. 435) puts it, God has 'the property of consciously grasping with perfect accuracy and completeness every conscious state of every creature from that creature's own perspective, a perspective that is unique'. Indeed, Rutten's blunt assumption that B 1 is true is dialectically inappropriate.
So then, Rutten's appeal to q to argue against (*) is, like his appeal to CLFs, unsuccessful. As, in Rutten's argumentative strategy, q plays a role similar to that of CLFs, one wonders whether this appeal is also self-undermining. Prima facie the appeal is, indeed, self-undermining as q is unknowable R whenever (6) is true.
There are no bats or bat-like creatures (6) Although the conjunction of q and (6), which I'll denote as (q.6), is an unknowable R possible truth, (q.6) is a counterexample P 1 only if it is a FoCons proposition. Now, Rutten might argue that only bats and bat-like creatures can have cognitive access to q so that without bats, or bat-like creatures, no subject can believe q, know R q or have any other propositional attitude to q. If so, (q.6) is not consistently believable because it is not believable at all. An argument along the above lines might save Rutten from the charge that appealing to q is self-undermining.
However, in order for such an argument to work, the least that Rutten owes us is an account of his rather unorthodox notion of a proposition that allows him to assert that q is a proposition that is only believable by bats. For unorthodox a notion it is. For instance, in their Stanford Encyclopaedia article Propositions, McGrath and Frank (2020) acknowledge that there are many different ways in which proposition is understood. They then propose that the best way to proceed is to 'stipulate a definition [of proposition] and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat', which they do as follows: Propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions, including thought-and utterance-tokens, which presumably are not sharable, and concrete events or facts, which presumably cannot be false. These consequences fit well with contemporary usage. Our definition leaves open many of the questions dividing propositionalists: which additional roles are propositions fit to play? would propositions have to be mind-independent or abstract? what individuation conditions would they have? how would they relate to facts?
In order for Rutten's appeal to q to be non self-undermining, propositional attitudes to q must be exclusively reserved for bats. But then q is, in an important sense, non-sharable. Thus, one wonders how the notion of proposition that figures so prominently in the MEA ought to be understood. Without such understanding, it is hard to properly evaluate whether appealing to proposition q is self-undermining.

The Case Against P 2
Premise P 2 of the MEA states that the proposition that there is no personal first cause is unknowable R . Rutten (2014) argues that the proposition that there is a personal first cause, which can be restated as (7), is knowable R : There is exactly 1 personal uncaused cause that created the world.
Indeed, Rutten argues that a personal first cause can know R (7) on the basis of intuition or the experience of creating the world. In Wintein (2018) I argue that if a personal first cause can know R (7), then the co-creators mentioned in (ii), call them A and B, can similarly know R (ii): (ii) There are exactly 2 personal uncaused causes that co-created the world.
But then, if A can know R (ii), A can deduce, and hence know R , that there is no (unique) personal first cause. Hence premise P 2 is false. Rutten (2022, p. 782) objects that my argument 'fails because there is a significant difference between both cases' and seeks to demonstrate that, although a personal first cause can know R (7), A cannot know R (ii). To me, Rutten's defence comes across as applying double standards of knowability R .
But at any rate, Rutten's defence is self-undermining. To see this, assume that Rutten's (2022) argument for the unknowability R of (ii) by A succeeds. Then, as A cannot know R (ii), it seems rather plausible that proposition (ii) must be unknowable R tout court. For, as being a co-creator of the world is not sufficient for knowing R (ii), and as (ii) implies that there is no personal first cause, it seems that no subject can know R (ii). But then (ii) is an unknowable R possible truth so that (ii)-which clearly is a FoCons proposition-is a counterexample to P 1 and Rutten's defence against my objection to P 2 is self-undermining. But now suppose that 5 whereas A (nor B) can't know R (ii) there still is some creature who can. Even this move will not help Rutten. For if it is possible for such a creature to know R (ii) then, as (ii) implies that there is no personal first cause, it is possible for such a creature to deduce that there is no personal first cause. But then it's possible for there to be a creature who knows R that there is no personal first cause, which establishes that P 2 is false.
So, Rutten's objection to my argument for the falsity of P 2 in terms of (ii) is self-undermining. One last resort for Rutten might be to object to my argument in a rather different manner: Rutten might seek to establish that proposition (ii) is, in fact, necessarily false. If so, he faces the following challenge, which I explained in Wintein (2018, p. 318): Indeed, given the notion of metaphysical im(possibility) to which Rutten appeals, (ii), must be considered as a possible truth. Or if not, Rutten would have to explain why (ii) is necessarily false whereas he regards [proposition (7)] as possibly (in fact necessarily) true.
To my mind, this challenge is insurmountable. But at any rate, an attempt to overcome this challenge by Rutten will force him to take up further philosophical commitments. It may very well be that these further commitments can also be shown to be self-undermining.

Possibility and Conceivability
In Wintein (2018) I invoked the following FoCons proposition to establish that P 1 is false: (i) The only conscious beings are naturally evolved animals and humans.
I argued that (i) is logically consistent and conceivable, that Rutten is committed to the view that logical consistency and conceivability conjointly guarantee metaphysical possibility and that (i) is unknowable R . It then follows that (i) is a counterexample to P 1 . Rutten (2022, p. 785) accepts that logical consistency and conceivability are conjointly sufficient for metaphysical possibility but adds that not any notion of conceivability serves as a criterion for metaphysical possibility. A suitable notion of conceivability requires that, in order for a proposition to be conceivable, we need an explanation of how that proposition can be true. The conceivability of (i) then requires an explanation of how matter could generate consciousness. And such an explanation is lacking: The fact is that we do not even have the beginning of a compelling model, mechanism or account that renders (i) conceivable [. . . ]. Rutten (2022, p. 786) In particular, so Rutten argues, neither the neuroscientific literature nor the philosophy of mind harbours the beginning of the required explanation: the hard problem of consciousness, i.e. to explain how matter could generate subjective inner experience, is very hard indeed 6 .
So in a nutshell, Rutten objects that he is not committed to accept (i) as a possible truth as it is inconceivable how matter could generate consciousness. Now Rutten is well aware that the claim that it is inconceivable how matter could generate consciousness invites the rejoinder that it is likewise inconceivable how consciousness could generate matter. However, he thinks that this rejoinder does not affect the status of the MEA: For I do not appeal to a possible world in which matter arises from consciousness in order to defend the [MEA's] premises or to refute objections against the [MEA]. Rutten (2022, p. 787) Now it may very well be that, thus far, Rutten has not appealed to possible worlds in which matter arises from consciousness in order to defend the MEA. The relevant question, however, is whether the MEA as such is defensible without appeal to such worlds. And the answer to that question is 'no'. To see this, consider the following proposition 7 : There is exactly 1 material object.
(8) Clearly, Rutten has to accept (8) as a possible truth. According to P 1 then, (8) must be knowable R . But, as the notion of knowability R is very demanding indeed, one wonders how (8) could be known R . How can a subject know R that there is exactly 1 material object? That is, how can a subject know R that there is 1 material object while ruling out the possibility that there are more such objects? To answer this question, we take our cue from Rutten's (2014) discussion of the knowability R of (9): A flying Spaghetti Monster does not exist.
In general, it is very hard to know R that something does not exist. In particular, in order to ensure the knowability R of (9), we need a very strong knower R . Rutten (2014, p. 396) appeals to 'a possible world in which [a personal first cause] exists and decides not to create anything'. In this world, the personal first cause knows R that a Spaghetti Monster does not exist as the first cause knows R that he did not create such a Monster. Hence, (9) is knowable R .
Similarly, it is very hard to know R that more than 1 material object does not exist. But in order to ensure the knowability R of (8), we may appeal a possible world in which a personal first cause exists and decides to create exactly 1 material object.
In this world, the personal first cause knows R that there is exactly 1 material object in virtue of its experience of creating exactly 1 such object. Hence, (8) is knowable R .
So to ensure the knowability R of propositions such as (8), we are bound to appeal to a personal first cause who decides to create (exactly 1) material object(s). Hence, pace Rutten, a cogent defence of the MEA's premisses needs to appeal to possible worlds in which matter arises from consciousness. Rutten (2022, p. 788) seems to anticipate the above objection when he writes that 'for the sake of argument assume that I need to provide a reasonable model of how matter could arise from consciousness'. He then seeks to provide such a reasonable model in terms of the following story: God created initially no concrete objects. In the beginning God formed abstract objects from his thoughts. Afterwards God reified or hypostatized these thoughts as separately existing abstract objects. These abstracta were subsequently transformed by God into non-substantive concrete particulars (e.g. one or more singularities, space-times having radius zero or virtual particles having mass and charge zero). From these non-substantive concrete particulars, God brought substantive concrete simple objects into being. These substantive concreta evolved over a long period of time into the world of concrete composite substances as we know it. Rutten (2022, p. 789) I do not have any qualms with a demanding notion of conceivability according to which neither neuroscience nor the philosophy of mind harbour reasonable models that render it conceivable how consciousness could arise from matter. However, given such a demanding notion of conceivability, the short story told by Rutten neither counts as a reasonable model that renders it conceivable how matter could arise from consciousness. To assert that it does is applying double standards of conceivability.

Another Modal-Epistemic Argument
Rutten (2022, p. 789) further claims that even without a model which explains how matter could arise from consciousness, 'the MEA would not be defeated' by proposition (i). The claim that Rutten advances, however, pertains to the following argument: The Actualized Modal-Epistemic Argument (MEA @ ) P @ 1 For every FoCons proposition p that is true in the actual world w @ there is some possible world w (such that p is true in w and) such that there is a subject in w that knows R that p. P 2 It is not the case that there is a possible world in which there is a subject that knows R that there is no personal first cause. P 3 The proposition that there is no personal first cause is a FoCons proposition. C @ In the actual world w @ there is a personal first cause.
So the MEA @ relies on P @ 1 which, in contrast to P 1 , only claims that all actual propositions are knowable R . Correspondingly, the conclusion of the MEA @ reports the actual, in contrast to the necessary, existence of a personal first cause. Rutten (2022, p. 789) remarks that whereas (i) may be counterexample to premise P 1 of the MEA, it would be dialectically inappropriate to claim that (i) is a counterexample to P @ 1 . For, in order to do so, one must assert that (i) is not just possibly true, but actually true., which is question-begging in the present context, so that . . . . . . we still have a modal-epistemic argument for God's actual existence [i.e. the MEA @ ] even though it now no longer follows that God exists in all possible worlds. Rutten (2022, p. 789) Indeed, the MEA @ is another argument than the MEA, arguing for another, weaker, conclusion. But let me conclude this paper on the MEA by making some remarks on the MEA @ .
It is, indeed, much harder to present counterexamples to P @ 1 than it is to present counterexamples to P 1 . For in order to present some proposition p as a counterexample to P @ 1 one must assert that p is actually true while unknowable R . Now, I do not want to assert that (i), which is a counterexample to P 1 , is actually true. To do so would be improper, as plausibly, 8 it is proper to assert that p (is actually true) only if one knows that p. And surely, I do not know (i). So effectively, a convincing counterexample to P @ 1 must be a proposition that is known to be true yet unknowable R . And such propositions seem hard to come by. For if one knows p, isn't there always some possible world which harbours some subject, say a personal first cause, who can be said to know R p?
Not always. Or, at least not when we buy into Rutten's account of CLFs. To see this, consider any subject, say Gödel, that is deceased. Let CLF G be any (actually) true CLF specifying that Gödel would, when in circumstances C, (libertarianly) freely perform action A. According to Rutten, Gödel knows R CLF G in possible worlds in which he is alive and kicking, whereas CLF G is unknowable R for subjects other than Gödel. As Gödel is deceased, the conjunction of CLF G with the proposition that Gödel is deceased is an actual truth. Yet clearly it is unknowable R , as neither a deceased Gödel nor anyone else can know this conjunction. Hence, P @ 1 is false. To be sure, the counterexample to P @ 1 that I presented is a contrived one and fully depends on Rutten's controversial and self-undermining account of CLFs. In order to get rid of the presented counterexample to P @ 1 , Rutten could simply give up his account of CLFs. Or, Rutten could further restrict his first premise by excluding CLFs from its scope. That is, he could trade in P @ 1 for a premise which says that all firstorder, consistently believable, non-CLF involving 9 propositions that are actually true are knowable R . What about the resulting, amended version of the MEA @ ? Should we accept the actual existence of a personal first cause on the basis of this argument? Well, as the MEA @ exploits the false P 2 and is still subject to the problems discussed in the 'The Parody Argument' and 'The Core Argument sections, we clearly shouldn't. But even if, 'for the sake of argument', we neglect all these problems we shouldn't, as I will now demonstrate.
Above, we discussed that, owing to the shift to the knowability R of actual truths, it becomes rather hard to present uncontroversial counterexamples to P @ 1 . However, a further consequence of the shift to actual truths is that, in order to defend P @ 1 , one no longer needs a personal first cause to ensure the knowability R of propositions such as (7) or (8). Indeed, it would be improper to assert that (7) or (8) are actually true so that a proponent of P @ 1 has no duty to account for the knowability R of propositions such as (7) or (8) in the first place. Indeed, a proponent of P @ 1 only has to account for the knowability R of actual truths. And the knowability R of such truths does not require such a strong knower R as a personal first cause.
I claim that all actual truths are knowable R by a flying Spaghetti Monster. As a first example, consider a mundane actual truth such as (1). As discussed in §1, Rutten claims that (1) is (not knowable but) knowable R by appealing to a possible world in which there is 'an extra-terrestrial civilization whose members can observe an extensive geographical area on our planet with the same immediacy and resulting degree of certainty as we can observe our hands'. Surely then, there is also a possible world with a flying Spaghetti Monster who has similar abilities and who can know R (1). Indeed, the epistemological R possibilities for a flying Spaghetti Monster may vary widely across possible worlds so that, plausibly, each actual truth is knowable R by some flying Spaghetti Monster in some possible world. This observation suggests the following argument.

The Spaghetti @ Argument
S 1 For every (non-CLF involving) FoCons proposition p that is true in the actual world w @ there is some possible world w (such that p is true in w and) such that there is a flying Spaghetti Monster in w who knows R that p. S 2 It is not the case that there is a possible world in which there is a flying Spaghetti Monster who knows R that there is no flying Spaghetti Monster. S 3 The proposition that there is no flying Spaghetti Monster is a FoCons proposition. C S In the actual world w @ there is a flying Spaghetti Monster.
The Spaghetti @ argument clearly is valid. Its second premise is a tautology and its third premise is trivially true. So the soundness of the Spaghetti argument all boils down to its first premise. 10 Let us discuss a couple of instantiations of S 1 . The proposition that there are no flying objects may not be knowable R by a flying Spaghetti Monster but, as birds testify, neither is it actually true. The proposition that there is, or is not, a personal first cause may not be knowable R by a flying Spaghetti Monster. But to suggest that these propositions are counterexamples to S 1 is inappropriate. For to assert that there actually is, or is not, a personal first cause, is only appropriate if one knows this to be the case. Finally, to assert that the proposition that there is no flying Spaghetti Monster is a counterexample to S 1 is dialectically inappropriate. For this assertion boils down to a blunt denial of the conclusion of the Spaghetti @ argument.
Indeed, dialectically appropriate counterexamples to S 1 are very hard to come by. The large epistemic R potential of a flying Spaghetti Monster ensures that all propositions of which it is dialectally appropriate to assert that they are actually true, are knowable R by such a Monster. But then, as S 2 and S 3 are uncontroversial, it 'follows' that a flying Spaghetti Monster actually exists. Still, it is odd to accept the actual existence of a flying Spaghetti Monster on the basis of the Spaghetti @ argument. Similarly, it is odd to accept the actual existence of a personal first cause on the basis of the MEA @ .

Concluding Remarks
In Wintein (2018) I presented various objections to Rutten's (2014) Modal-Epistemic Argument (MEA) for the existence of God. Rutten (2022) has defended his argument against my objections but, as I showed in this paper, Rutten's defence against each of my objections is wanting while two of his replies are, in addition, self-undermining. Indeed, the very claims that Rutten is arguing for to rebut my objections can be used to construct straightforward counterexamples to the first premise of the MEA.
At the end of his paper, Rutten (2022) suggests that my objections to the MEA do not carry over to the MEA @ , an argument which has the actual (instead of the necessary, as the MEA has it) existence of God as its conclusion. At the end of this paper, I presented the Spaghetti @ argument, whose argumentative and rhetorical structure mirrors that of the MEA @ . The conclusion of the Spaghetti @ argument is that a flying Spaghetti Monster actually exists.

Conflict of Interest The author declares no competing interests.
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