Dao as a Unified Composition or Plurality: A Nihilism Perspective

This article departs from a mereological conceptualization of the Daoist metaphysical system in the Daodejing 道德經. I discuss what parthood status applies to dao 道. Whereas it is quite intuitive that you 有—the region of concrete objects—has parthood relationships and compositions (entities made from parts), the other, undifferentiated region, dao, poses a considerable problem. This problem can be characterized in the following way: (a) dao cannot be characterized as a particular composition, which entails that it does not include parts. However, (b) dao underpins compositions in you, which entails that it contains compositions or at least parts that make compositions in you. This generates a problem of how compositions are possible with an undifferentiated ontological foundation. I focus on one possible approach to this problem––mereological nihilism, according to which no composition is possible. Assuming nihilism entails dao composed of mereological simples––fundamental entities, which are not parts.


Introduction
This article analyzes dao 道 from the angle of mereology--the study of relationships between parts and the wholes that are made from them. My discussion is based on a mereological interpretation of the relation between dao and you 有 that constitutes a pivotal role in, if not a foundation of, the Daoist metaphysics in the Daodejing 道德經. In my article, Banka 2018, I propose to conceptualize dao and you as two metaphysical regions--of unrestricted and restricted composition respectively. What differentiates these two regions is how parts combine into wholes. According to unrestricted composition, for any two entities there is a composition, of which 1 3 these entities are parts. Restricted composition is determined by specific rules, for instance, physical adherence, forming a system, or even forming life. 1 Roughly speaking, composition rules can be understood as arrangements of parts. I claim that interrelation between these two regions can be conceptualized as an overlap, which consists in sharing parts in the way that the whole of you overlaps at least a portion of dao. 2 The aim of proposing this particular conceptualization is to further explore the Daoist metaphysical system by means of formal tools and provide integration between Daoist and Western contemporary metaphysics, especially on the analytic front.
In this article, I focus on what parthood status applies to the dao region. Whereas it is quite intuitive that you-otherwise the region of things or what we usually refer to as concrete objects-has parthood relationships and compositions (which include objects mapped by language, but not only), 3 the other region, dao, poses a considerable problem. This problem can be mereologically characterized in the following way: (a) dao cannot be characterized in terms of a particular composition (or compositions), which entails that it does not include parts.
However, (b) dao necessarily underpins any composition in you, which entails that it is either a composition (or compositions) or at least contains parts that make compositions in you.
Considering that (a) and (b) in the Daoist metaphysical system should have a monistic interpretation, the following problem arises: how are compositions possible with an undifferentiated ontological foundation? As already mentioned, I conceptualize dao in terms of unrestricted composition. In unrestricted composition, there can be an infinite number of composition rules. On the contrary, you is the region of restricted composition, where the composition is determined in accordance with a composition rule (or some finite composition rules). Compositions in you are part of dao. Considering the ontological dependence of you from dao, this overlap consists in you entirely overlapping a portion of dao. In other words, any part of a composition in you is also part of dao.
However, it can be argued that despite this parthood relationship with you, dao still remains indescribable in terms of composition determined by a particular composition rule. This generates alternative interpretations of dao, which even 1 For instance, the Solar System is a composition according to the rule of forming a system, but not physical adherence, whereas an analog watch movement complies with both composition rules. Forming life as a composition rule is proposed by Peter van Inwagen (van Inwagen 1990: 81-97). 2 For details, see Banka 2018Banka , 2022 Roughly speaking, language covers what we usually conceptualize as objects. However, in you, there are or can be compositions which exist beyond language by virtue of being counterintuitive, for instance, a composition made from the oldest tree in Italy and the pencil that I am holding now.

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Dao as a Unified Composition or Plurality: A Nihilism Perspective involve questioning its status of composition. This problem hinges upon determining whether it holds that both in you and dao there are parts, and if this is the case, whether parthood in the two regions is of the same type.
In this article, I tackle one such possible explanatory variant--mereological nihilism, according to which no composition is possible. Nihilism is formulated in the following way: 4 It can be seen that in nihilism parthood collapses into identity (Varzi 2019) and does not leave space for compositions of more than one part. On assuming nihilism, dao is composed of simples--ultimate entities that are not parts themselves, and that cannot be subdivided into parts. This bears consequences for you, which requires parthood for its compositions.
The question of parthood status in dao has at least a threefold implication for the Daoist metaphysical system in the Daodejing. First, from an inventory perspective, it allows the structure of the metaphysical region of dao to be understood: whether it is characterizable by unity, plurality, or some hybrid form of these two. Second, parthood status in dao is a cornerstone for describing the relationship between dao and you. Assuming that the you region is characterizable by composition, one would expect that the relationship with the dao region is of parthood character, and therefore it presupposes parthood in dao. However, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the difference between the two realms may consist in some parthood status differences, including the very existence of parts. Third, entertaining a case in which the dao region has no parts implies very important consequences for you. Considering that the two regions overlap, the lack of parts in dao would question the ontological standing of any composition in you. Consequently, the whole metaphysical universe would be reduced to, for instance, a collection of simples and the entities that we usually refer to as complex objects (compositions) would be delusive.
Apart from focusing on the parthood characteristic of dao, my discussion can also contribute to the discussion of the Composition as Identity thesis, according to which a composition is nothing over and above the parts that constitute it. 5 Considering the assumptions of the Daoist metaphysical model, this seems to be a both relevant and challenging issue. I start my discussion by explaining nihilism and showing the reasons for considering a nihilist perspective. Next, I will proceed to analyzing the arguments for and against nihilism. Finally, I will assess the argumentation and show how it matters for the Composition as Identity problem.

The Eligibility of Nihilism
Should dao be viewed in terms of mereological nihilism? On face value, this seems counterintuitive, but at a closer look, this option cannot be automatically dismissed and needs a thorough consideration.
The nature of mereological nihilism is opposite to unrestricted composition, otherwise known as mereological universalism. As already mentioned in the Introduction, nihilism claims that all entities are singles--entities that are not parts and cannot be decomposed into multiple parts. Hence, composition is impossible because there are no singles that enjoy the proper parthood status, which is indispensable for what we normally regard as composition. Proper parthood (PP) is defined in the following way: 6 Proper parts overlap our common intuitions regarding what parts are--they are present in compositions where it is impossible for a part to form a composition exclusively by itself. Thus, a metaphysical universe in which nihilism prevails has no parts and parthood relations. However, it should be noticed that the problem is not viewed in terms of parthood existence but differentiation in its status. Apart from the intuitive, "compositional" proper parthood, mereology also distinguishes the socalled improper parthood (P). In addition to embracing proper parthood, improper parthood also includes a special case, when a composition consists of only one part: 7 This extends parthood over simples-entities that can only be parts of themselves. It should also be noted that this parthood complies with reflexivity, a mereological axiom, according to which anything is part of itself. Thus, in a sense, a composition with a unique part is plausible. However, the composition at issue in this article is the proper part-based one.
One may have the intuition that nihilism presupposes metaphysical models with plurality of simples. However, we can and should also consider a case in which there is only one simple that does not enjoy the proper parthood status by virtue of exhausting the metaphysical universe in its singleness. As will be shown, this variant, combined with improper parthood, matters significantly in discussing the ontological status of dao. However, at this moment, let us only recapitulate that dao can be considered in the nihilist model as a plurality of simples or oneness that is not a unity.
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are strong reasons to presuppose composition in the Daoist metaphysical universe. Evidence for the existence of what is usually referred to as objects can be supported by the usage of wu 物 to describe what Pxy → PPx ∨ x = y 6 "For any x and any y, x is part of y and x is not y." 7 "x is proper part of y or x is y." PPxy ∶= ∀ x ∀y(Pxy ∧ x ≠ y) = y is produced and complemented by dao. For instance, in Chapter 1 of the Daodejing one reads that: The nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth; The Named is the mother of all things. (Chan 1969: 139) Leaving aside the nature of origination, what is produced from dao is the metaphysical region of things wu 物. This region can be conceived as a realm of concrete entities. It should be remarked that these entities do not entirely comply with our notion of everyday life objects. Wu should be understood more broadly as compositions. Additionally, the fact that not all compositions are expressed by language is not related to the idea that some of them are undifferentiated entities. The lack of linguistic tagging results from practice that has shaped language. This can be illustrated by compositions such as galaxies about whose existence we are unaware. 8 The concreteness of wu, which allows them to be qualified as compositions, is amplified by the fact that they are countable. It can already be seen in the above quotation, where "all things" are wanwu 萬物, literally "ten thousand things" (Rao 2007: 2). Although the usage of wan 萬 in this fragment and generally in classical Chinese does not necessarily denote an exact number, it does suggest the plurality of entities and their discreteness revealed by countability. 9 It can also be found that wu are understood as complex objects that break down into parts. In Chapter 11, which underscores the utility of dao within you, Laozi describes a cartwheel in the following way: Thirty spokes are united around the hub to make a wheel. (Chan 1969: 144) Obviously, the fragment is not particularly or deliberately mereologically oriented--for instance, it does not determine a particular composition rule or a parthood status that holds for wu-compositions. 10 However, the description directly testifies that things in the you region are analyzable in terms of compositions that are distinct entities and can be subdivided into smaller building units.
Following the above interpretation and assuming that composition, and concurrently parthood, prevail in the you region, one can express doubts about accepting nihilism, an ontological foundation that is quite the opposite. By far, from the perspective of you, nihilism is counterintuitive. However, this very fact does not rule out confronting the difference between dao and you, which is pivotal in Daoist metaphysics. For instance, its indispensable significance as an ontological and cosmological foundation is mentioned, among others, in Chapter 25: There was something undifferentiated yet complete, Which existed before heaven and earth. (Chan 1969: 152) Clearly, temporal antecedence is paired with a material difference--especially due to being undifferentiated, dao is likely to be juxtaposed with you conceived as compositions. The undifferentiated character of dao--hun 混 (Rao 2007: 63)--suggests a chaotic arrangement, which can be tentatively conceptualized as a state of noncomposition that can be explained by nihilism.
Additionally, methodologically speaking, assuming the principle of charity, the reconstruction should be consistent throughout the whole Daoist metaphysical universe. Thus, from the outset, a difference in parthood status in the dao region should be considered, which makes nihilism an eligible option.
In the following two sections of the article, I will analyze arguments for and against the nihilist structure of the dao region. I believe that these arguments offer a wide analytical spectrum that assures the inclusion of all relevant assumptions and features concerning dao.

Arguments for Mereological Nihilism
I start with arguing for nihilism. I believe that supporting the nihilist mereology in the dao region can be presented from several angles, as the below arguments (a) to (d).
To begin contrastively, let us consider an argument that follows on from the definition of unrestricted composition: (a) In the dao region, there are no compositions that fall under a specific composition rule (or a finite number of determined rules). Without a particular rule, we cannot talk about compositions and, consequently, how they decompose into their proper parts.
Whether dao is a realm of composition at all may indeed be questioned. In Chapter 14, dao is referred to as impossible to be named and reverting "to nothingness" (Chan 1969: 146), not ontological one, but literally "no-thingness" (wuwu 無 物) (Rao 2007: 34). This depiction should be complemented with a fragment from Chapter 25, where dao is described as "something undifferentiated yet complete" (Chan 1969: 152). Dao is here understood in terms of a thing (or things) (wu 物), whose difference from you hinges on undifferentiation. This shows that the two juxtaposed regions are furnished with entities of the same kind. What makes a difference is that you is a world of differentiated and discrete objects that can be qualified as compositions.
The above dissimilarity with the you region should not disqualify dao from a mereological conceptualization. This can be argued for by referring to the notion that dao is related to you by ontological priority, for instance in Chapter 1, where it is stated that everything within wu originated from dao (Chan 1969: 139). Furthermore, a fragment from Chapter 28 provides a metaphor of dao as an uncarved wooden block that is "turned into concrete things [qi 器] (… transformed into the myriad of things)" (Chan 1969: 154;Rao 2007: 71). It implies that the qualitative difference (or transformation) consists in assuming the features associated with what is commonly considered to be objecthood or "thingness." The difference not only accentuates the priority of dao but also suggests that the difference can be attributed to composition--not necessarily in the sense that you is the only region where it holds but that a compositional difference is in question. 11 However, this model leaves space for a nihilist doubt, which can be formulated in the following way: considering that dao can be mereologically accommodated and cannot be identified with any particular composition, is such a metaphysical model necessarily characterizable in terms of composition? It ought to be remarked that nihilism does not exclude reflexivity, which can be understood as a special type of composition with improper parthood, so the doubt specifically applies to whether parthood prevails "without," not "within" simples. Nevertheless, the nihilist doubt is of a very fundamental nature, as it questions the plausibility of unrestricted composition for dao.
Let us consider the nihilism claim that dao can be characterized by "reflexivity parthood only"--things are only parts of themselves. Accordingly, the lack of proper part-based composition in dao complies with its being beyond cognition, as this, according to the Daodejing, operates with differentiation. This can be showcased by descriptions of dao as empty and formless. 12 In this sense, nihilism would be compatible with the presumed lack of "internal structure"--specifically composition--in dao. It should also be noted that the quasientropic characteristic of dao remains consistent with nihilism. In fact, nihilism advocates a metaphysical model in which we can talk about a myriad of entities mereologically unrelated to one another.
A claim that would strongly fit the above nihilist arguments would be that the two metaphysical regions are disjunct. This can be supported by the tension between dao, where composition is impossible, and you, where it can be regarded as a generic feature. However, this disjunction would remain inconsistent with the fundamentals of Daoist metaphysics, where the two regions are necessarily interrelated. Nevertheless, assuming nihilism should not necessarily entail disconnecting the two regions. In fact, nihilism is important for the interrelation as the parthood overlap requires further investigation--the two regions sharing proper parts are ruled out. What overlap now are the proper parts in you, which in dao are improper ones. This asymmetry, however, concurrently establishes a linkage between the two regions that remains conceptualized in mereological terms. Thus, nihilism confined to dao is plausible on the condition of a further investigation of the twofold parthood status in dao and you.
One can conclude that the eligibility of (a) hinges upon whether the abovementioned twofold parthood status can be mereologically accommodated within the Daoist metaphysics framework. One option to be considered may be, for instance, the possibility of abandoning proper parthood for the whole metaphysical universe, which would enable conceptualizing the improper parthood overlap between dao and you. 13 Improper parthood includes proper parthood but also allows for the parthood with identity of the only part and a whole. Consequently, parthood sharing would be saved. However, the question of the relation between improper parthood and proper parthood in the overlapped part would require further investigation.
Another argument is focused on the you region: (b) Composition in you does not necessitate composition in dao.
Dao underpins anything in you, which is explicitly expressed in the opening lines of Chapter 42 (Chan 1969: 160). One can state that assuming simples in the former must exclude composition in the latter. This statement remains consistent with the parthood transitivity axiom, which says that if x is part of y, and y is part of z, then x is part of z. Accordingly, considering that composition would hold for you, and you is part of dao, any parts in you are parts of dao. But this is implausible because in dao, there is nothing apart from simples. Nihilism extending over the whole metaphysical universe can also be viewed from the other side: simples in dao cannot compose, and therefore, by virtue of sharing simples, you cannot have compositions.
Considering that nihilism in dao prevents parthood transitivity, and that the Daodejing presupposes composition in you, one can consider a different ontological standing of parthood for the two regions. This does not have to be tantamount to the "dao level" parthood relations being "true," whereas the "you level" are conventional. This problem can be approached by, for instance, attributing nomological laws to the you region. 14 As Daoism, and large parts of Chinese metaphysics, do not presuppose externality of laws (e.g., Cheng 1976), one requires an additional assumption that the nomological laws are understood as inherent in the entities.
The appropriacy of mapping nomological laws onto you can be supported by the Daodejing, which suggests the quasi-"natural" or "physical" 15 character of you, as opposed to dao. Apart from you being a differentiated product of dao, 16 dao is the cause that underpins you in any space-time, whereas the development of you is understood intrinsically. A fragment from Chapter 51 illustrates this interrelation: Tao produces them (the ten thousand things). Virtue [de 德] fosters them. 13 I discuss this issue in Banka 2022. 14 The necessity of these laws accords from metaphysical laws but is weaker at the same time (Kment 2021). 15 My describing these laws as "natural" and "physical" does not imply that you is necessarily describable by physics. In general, the laws can be understood as those that characterize the material world of discrete entities. 16 For instance, in Chapter 1 (Chan 1969: 139 (Chan 1969: 163;Rao 2007: 123) The metaphysical causation is complemented by what can be attributed to the processes that apply exclusively to you, constituted of physical objects with forms. This region can be conceptualized as the one in which nomological laws apply. Thus, both dao and you would agree in terms of metaphysical laws but you additionally would have intrinsic natural laws about composition.
The nomological character of composition would entail two important things for the you region. First, composition is not conventional due to being inherent in the entities that constitute the you region. Second, composition is not accidental in the sense of consistently operating in a finite number of actual entities or temporally; it must also extend over past and future, as well as any possible objects that can be originated. 17 Introducing nomological necessity helps accommodate the standing of composition as part and parcel of the you region. Composition thus conceived, by virtue of being nomological, does not necessitate composition in dao, where only metaphysical laws hold. Possible objections would address how you would concurrently agree composition and non-composition. Some kind of solution would have to consist in weakening nihilism. For instance, dao could be described as improper parthood, which would allow for possible worlds with nomological nihilism. In this weak sense, the nihilism of dao could be preserved.
Another argument is also based on the relation between dao and you, and it concerns causation: (c) Assuming internal causation in dao, 18 its simples have the potential for any composition. But this is not tantamount to proper parthood status in dao as there are no parts prior to compositions. This argument is based on the nature of causation in Daoist or, even more generally, a large part of Chinese philosophy. Chung-ying Cheng describes it with three principles: holistic unity, internal life-movements, and organic balance. The second one is particularly relevant here, as it underscores that all things in the metaphysical universe have "intrinsic life-force which moves them in a way in which motion is not imposed from other things or a God but is derived from the inexhaustible source of energy of life, which is the Way" (Cheng 1976: 12). Exclusion of the external laws and locating cause in dao complies with a mereological interpretation that causal relations are parthood relations. It departs from that sharing parts between dao and compositions in you does not require any extrinsic factors; entities in you are compositions by virtue of their intrinsic characteristics. 19

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The above causation model enables the shared parts to be viewed from two sides. Regarding the effect, the parts are proper. However, in terms of dao, which is the cause, proper parthood is not necessary. One can interpret dao in favor of nihilism by remarking that compositions are only originated in you. In this way, simples from dao "become" proper parts in you. It is left to the specific understanding of the "intrinsic life-force" to solve the very problem of changing parthood status. One of the possible options would be to assume that while constituting composition in you, the simples acquire the proper status of parthood. 20 This would also comply with nihilism in the dao region because the simples cannot be proper parts by virtue of not composing anything there.
Another argument can be based on counting status: (d) Counting is conventional and bears no ontological commitments for both regions. Therefore, we should abandon it in differentiation of dao and you. In this way, the numerical disagreement between one dao and plural you is not metaphysical. This affects the composition status in you.
We can assume that counting belongs to a conventional inventory of the world: we count things for practical reasons, but how we count has no ontological commitment. The conventional character of counting can be illustrated by many possible ways of counting compositions. For instance, we can count apples per item or by weight. Part inventories also reveal a considerable variation. Consider counting the parts of a car--it can be dissected into physically separable, functional, or, say, the exterior and interior parts. Let us assume that counting in you is conventional. This means that determining the number of parts in compositions is no longer possible. Does this refute the ontological standing of compositions? One might state that the number of parts in a composition is indeterminate, which does not deny the status of composition. In other words, the possible counting of parts may stretch from one to infinity. In this way, we should also consider an option in which a composition has a unique part, which rules out proper parthood. In such a case, nihilism in dao does not cause inconsistency, as proper part-based composition in you would only be of a conventional character.
Besides the idea that nihilism would hold for both metaphysical regions, introducing simples in you would solve the "linguistic problem" of composition. We tend to assume that naming decides to some extent what is composition and what is not. For instance, it is not problematic to recognize a stone heap as a composition. However, this is not the case if we consider a different candidate for composition, made of, say, three stones located in Australia, on the Moon, and on Mars. We can justify it by saying that there is no name for such a thing. This justification is very weak though; it suffices to consider some compositions that have not been discovered until now, such as some stellar systems. On accepting nihilism, the linguistic mapping of, and more importantly, legitimizing of, the metaphysical universe becomes arbitrary.

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Dao as a Unified Composition or Plurality: A Nihilism Perspective

Arguments against Mereological Nihilism
Now let us see how nihilism in dao can be questioned. I believe that the disproval centers around the main three arguments that I present in this section. It can be roughly said that the arguments against nihilism are more fundamental than those in favor of it in terms of calling for strict consistency with Daoist metaphysical assumptions. The first of them can be formulated in the following way: (a) Dao includes all possible compositions, and therefore nihilism is implausible.
On an unspecified level, whatever originates in you comes from dao. This is explicitly formulated in, for instance, Chapters 1, 42, and 51 (Chan 1969: 139, 160, 163). Considering that Daoism is a monistic system, it is unlikely that some fundamental ontological transformation, such as new substantial qualities, can emerge from dao. This raises a justified doubt concerning composition emerging from nihilism. On a specific, mereological level, the origination consists in sharing parts between dao and you, which complies with substantial consistency. A qualitative change of parthood that would entail nihilism in dao and construction in you verges on aporia, as the overlap would have parts that are proper and nonproper at the same time. The explanation that parts can have a twofold status by virtue of forming a composition or not does not dismiss its being self-contradictory. Additionally, on the metaphysical side, an explanation would have to be offered for how a twofold part, without external forces acting upon it, can concurrently be part of two considerably distinct entities: a collection of simples and composition. This seems extremely challenging, not only in the Daoist context.
In my own interpretation, dao is describable by mereological universalism. This does not only provide consistency with you completely overlapping part of dao. Unrestricted composition accommodates the intrinsic character of causality, since the origination of any composition in you takes place "within" dao. This is explained by referring to overlap, but in fact, proper extension is clearer for this metaphysical case. According to proper extension, x, that is part of y, is not y in the sense that it does not compose y solely by itself. Substituting x for you and y for dao, the particular character of the overlap consists in that you is entirely part of it. There is no objection that you as a particular composition (or compositions) is included in unrestricted composition. However, it seems logically and metaphysically impossible to preserve such an island within a collection of simples.
To sum up briefly, Daoist metaphysics does not seem to presuppose a transformation that allows the status of simples. It claims that some part of dao becomes a "natural world" of things, and it is unlikely that these entities no longer follow dao in favor of some different "laws" that apply to composition. This is guaranteed by the sameness of parts and the intrinsic causality that holds for the whole metaphysical universe.
An important argument to be considered is strictly connected with one of dao's fundamental characteristics--oneness: (b) Nihilism would involve the annulment of dao with oneness as numerical status, which would change for plurality. Thus achieved noncomposition rules out a plurality-within-oneness solution.
The oneness of dao cannot be downplayed as a metaphor--its lack thereof would contradict the cosmological (or protometaphysical) assumption concerning the universe present in almost the whole of classical Chinese philosophy. The oneness cannot be separated from undifferentiation. It is well described in a fragment from Chapter 28, where dao is compared to a piece of uncarved wooden block (pu 樸). This numerical status is not to be taken for an ultimate singularity, as the block can be cut into separate "concrete things" (qiju 器具) (Chan 1969: 154;Rao 2007: 71). 21 This can also be confirmed by the opening line of Chapter 62, where dao is described as "the storehouse of all things" (dao zhe, wanwu zhi ao 道者, 萬物之奧) (Chan 1969: 168;Rao 2007: 151).
Moreover, the oneness constituted from plurality cannot be accommodated as a collection or an abstract set of ultimate entities, as their interrelation constitutes a concrete dynamic unity, similar to the cosmos. Following the wooden block analogy, it is a concrete mereological object made of concrete objects rather than an entity of a different ontological status. Although nihilism accords with concreteness, it does not comply with the consolidated aspect of dao.
One can argue that the numerical status of dao as oneness can be undermined by claiming that cardinality is conventional. Thus, oneness can be disregarded as a nonmetaphysical characteristic. It no longer matters if dao is a single entity or a collection of entities. In this respect, nihilism would appear as an option. This argument, however, still misses the unity aspect, which is paired with oneness in Daoist metaphysics. In fact, it is less important if dao constitutes oneness in terms of counting. What cannot be dismissed is its functional, organismic oneness, which nihilism would prevent.
The final argument is based on the ontological continuity of the two regions: (c) Nihilism would call for consistency: in you, there would be no compositions either.
There are two foundations for this argument. The first one is metaphysical--the system is monistic. This rules out interpretations similar to Plato's forms and their reflections, which would be more helpful in solving this inconsistency between the two regions. As the metaphysical universe is made from the same elements, it is hardly conceivable how their ontological status would change depending on which region they are located in. It may be that some compositions are restricted to a particular region, but this should be accommodated by nomological laws instead. The other foundation is mereological. The pivotal aspect of the interdependence of the two regions is that they share parts. A given part in a composition can simultaneously be a part of another composition (or even other compositions). However, it is impossible for it to concurrently be a simple, regardless of which region it belongs to.

Conclusions
The question of composition in dao from the perspective of nihilism leads to two main concluding remarks. First, although dao avoids determinacy, nihilism goes too much against the grain of Daoist metaphysics to be accepted. As has been shown, on the metaphysical level, it seems very unlikely to accommodate the option that singles are converted into proper parts. Similarly implausible are entities that assume different compositional statuses depending on the metaphysical region, especially if one considers that the dao-you relation is an overlap--the two parthood identities would have to be simultaneous.
Second, subordinating proper parthood under nomological laws that hold in you is also a problematic solution. Separating you governed by the laws that are particular to this region and consistent with the metaphysical dao level appears to be worth considering. However, one has to consider the mereological nature of the relation between the two regions: the overlapped parts would still have to be proper regardless of the region. On the contrary, the nomological character of composition would remain mereologically consistent with dao as unrestricted composition--nomological composition would be attributed to a particular composition rule (or rules). The problem also seems interesting in terms of exploring the possible worlds around the you region, which stands for actuality.
As mentioned in the Introduction, a substantial motivation for considering a nihilist perspective is the undifferentiated character of dao juxtaposed with you, which can be largely characterized in terms of composition. The difficulties generated by nihilism lead to the conclusion that the difference has to be attributed to the character of the composition rather than its holding in the dao region. As mentioned before, I believe that dao is unrestricted composition.
Considering the aporetic character of nihilism revealed by the arguments for and against it, one may question this particular option. As mentioned in the Introduction, there are reasons for considering parthood relations in dao and you as different. Nihilism is a legitimate candidate due to the introduction of a precompositional foundation. Showing that it fails to meet other fundamentals of Daoist metaphysics also matters in terms of motivating further discussion in the direction of composition.
Apart from the implications relevant to the parthood status in dao, analyzing the nihilist variant contributes to other aspects of the Daoist metaphysics. One of them is the question of counting. There are reasons for discussing what particular 1 3 counting should be applied to inventories of parts and compositions in you. However, it is plausible that inventorying dao is irrelevant. It does not imply that dao as unrestricted composition has no cardinality; infinite cardinalities would comply with the undifferentiated character of dao and underpin inventories in you. What is more important is their unification in dao as a "generic" mereological composition--oneness.
Nihilism also brings to attention the Composition as Identity principle, according to which a composition is nothing over and above its parts. Considering nihilism introduces an extreme case in which a composition in you would in fact be identical with the simples that underpin it. Although nihilism has been ruled out, the example highlights the question how Composition as Identity can be accommodated, if at all, in Daoism. 22 Of particular relevance would be the case of you overlapping the whole of dao. It would be highly counterintuitive to state that you as a composition is identical to the "dao parts" that it entirely shares.
Another important aspect is the nature of overlap, particularly the implication that the overlap occupies the same part of reality. This case can be viewed against the Extensionality principle, according to which there cannot be two compositions with the same proper parts. 23 There is no problem with extensionality within you, where we have proper parts. A possible way to accommodate dao would be to endow it with proper parthood, in which case the overlap of the two regions would be one and the same composition. However, this identity seems inconsistent with the interdependence between dao and you. Although, as has been shown, the overlap of dao made of simples and all proper parts from you is implausible, nihilism sheds light on an important aspect of the Daoist metaphysics, which perhaps suggests that extensionality should be abandoned.