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A Two-Level Hierarchical Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Application to International Climate Change Negotiations

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Abstract

A novel two-level hierarchical graph model is developed to analyze international climate change negotiations with hierarchical structures: the negotiations take place between two nations and between each nation and its provincial governments. The two national government are two decision makers at the top level. Within each nation, the two provincial governments negotiate with the national government at the lower level. The theoretical structure of this novel model, including decision makers, options, moves, and preference relations, are developed. The interrelationship between the stabilities in the two-level hierarchical graph model and the stabilities in local models are investigated by theorems. These theorems can be utilized to calculate complete stabilities in the two-level hierarchical graph model when the stabilities in local graph models are known. The international climate change negotiations as the illustrative example is then investigated in detail. The extra equilibrium, uniquely obtained by this novel methodology, suggests that opposition may still be from one provincial government when the national government does not sign the international climate agreement and implements existing environmental laws. Compared with other approaches, this novel methodology is an effective and flexible tool in analyzing hierarchical conflicts at two levels by providing decision makers with strategic resolutions with broader vision.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for carefully reading this paper and having provided meaningful suggestions which helped improve the quality of paper. This paper should be dedicated to Dr. Ye Chen who was a coauthor and passed away in June, 2019.

This research was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 71601096, China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant No. 2019M661838, the Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities (China) under GrantNo. NS2020061, and theNatural Science Young Scholar Foundation of Jiangsu, China, under Grant No. BK20160809.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China, 211106

    Shawei He, Haiyan Xu & Ye Chen

  2. College of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China, 211106

    Shawei He

  3. Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1

    Keith W. Hipel

  4. Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 6C2

    Keith W. Hipel

  5. Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 6C2

    Keith W. Hipel

Authors
  1. Shawei He
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  2. Keith W. Hipel
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  3. Haiyan Xu
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  4. Ye Chen
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Shawei He, Keith W. Hipel, Haiyan Xu or Ye Chen.

Additional information

Shawei He is associate professor of Management Sciences at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA), Nanjing, Jiangsu, China. Dr. He received his BA in industrial engineering (2008), MASc in systems engineering (2011) from NUAA, and PhD in systems design engineering (2015) from the University of Waterloo. His research interests include the modelling of societal and environmental conflicts and group decision making. He is Member of Technical Committee of Conflict Resolution Section in IEEE Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. Dr. He has published peer-reviewed articles in highly ranked journals such as European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on SMC: Systems, and Group Decision and Negotiation.

Keith W. Hipel is university professor of systems design engineering at theUniversity ofWaterloo, Past President of the Academy of Science (Royal Society of Canada (RSC)), Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, and Fellow of the Balsillie School of International Affairs. Dr. Hipel received his BASc in civil engineering (1970), MASc in systems design (1972), and the PhD in civil engineering (1975) from Waterloo. His interdisciplinary research interests are the development and application of conflict resolution, multiple objective decision making and time series analysis techniques from a systems system-of-systems engineering perspective. Dr. Hipel is Foreign Member of the United States National Academy of Engineering (NAE) and holds Fellow designations with IEEE, RSC and five other professional organizations. He is recipient of the JSPS Eminent Scientist Award (Japan), Sir John William Dawson Medal (RSC), NorbertWiener Award (IEEE), Jiangsu Friendship Medal, and three honorary doctorate degrees.

Haiyan Xu is professor with the College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, China. She received her BSc degree from Nanjing University, China, and her Master’s of Mathematics and PhD degrees from the University of Waterloo in Canada. Her current research interests in Game Theory and Optimization include the development of normal algebraic techniques for conflict resolution and methods for optimization with applications in environmental management and finance. She is Member of the Production and Operations Management Society.

Ye Chen was professor of Management Sciences at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA), Nanjing, Jiangsu, China. Dr. Chen received his Master degree from Tianjin University, PhD degree from the University of Waterloo. Dr. Chen’s research interests included multiple criteria decision making, optimization theory, and E-commerce.

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He, S., Hipel, K.W., Xu, H. et al. A Two-Level Hierarchical Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Application to International Climate Change Negotiations. J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng. 29, 251–272 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-019-5448-2

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