The Yuktidīpikā on the Origin of the Vedas

In this article, I reconstruct the view of the Yuktidīpikā, the most detailed and profound commentary of classical Sāṃkhya, on the origin of the Vedas. A close reading of the text reveals that its unknown author wavered between at least two different views on this issue. The first view is that the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from prakṛti (primordial matter) at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world (kalpa) and merge into prakṛti during a cosmic dissolution (pralaya). The Yuktidīpikā is the first text in classical Sāṃkhya to state directly that the Vedas have no author. The second and opposite view is that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas. This view is expressed only indirectly. Besides reconstructing the above-mentioned views, I attempt to answer the question of whether by quoting Nirukta 1.20 the Yuktidīpikā communicates something about the origin of the Vedas. Illustrating Sāṃkhya thought by quoting this passage of the Nirukta, as well as proclaiming the idea that the Vedas are authorless, which became the “official” standpoint of the Sāṃkhya darśana, can be interpreted as elements of the Yuktidīpikā’s pioneering project to show that Sāṃkhya is not in conflict with the Vedas.


Introduction
In this article, I reconstruct and critically explain the view of the Yuktidīpikā (ca. 600-700 CE), 1 the most detailed, profound, and polemical commentary of classical Sāṁ khya, on the origin of the Vedas. The problem of the origin of the Vedas, vividly discussed in Indian philosophy, encompasses the following questions: Are the Vedas eternal? Do they have an author? How do they come into existence? The main contributors to this discussion are Mīmāṁ sā and its rival schools Nyāya and Vaiśeṡika. For Mīmāṁ sā, the Vedas are authorless and eternal; they were never created and will never be destroyed. According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṡika, the Vedas are created (in fact, recreated) by the primeval ṛṣis 2 or Īśvara 3 at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. What is the Sāṁ khya view presented in the Yuktidīpikā, one of the most important commentaries of this darśana?
The issue of the origin of the Vedas according to the Yuktidīpikā was touched upon by Ołena Łucyszyna in "Classical Sāṁ khya on the Authorship of the Vedas" (2012: 460-61). In that article, she quoted and considered the Yuktidīpikā definition of authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana) in which the Yuktidīpikā proclaims the idea that the Vedas are authorless. All passages of the Yuktidīpikā in which its still unidentified composer expresses his view that the Vedas have no author are cited in Hayato Kondō's article, "Reinterpretation of Tradition and Transmission: Āptavacana in the Yuktidīpikā" (2012-13: 142-43). In another article, entitled "Classical Sāṁ khya on the Relationship Between a Word and Its Meaning," Łucyszyna (2016: 310-15) analyzes two Yuktidīpikā passages from which we learn that the relationship between a word and its meaning is established by convention. In fact, these two passages provide indirect evidence that the Yuktidīpikākāra accepted the opposite view, namely, that the Vedas have an author. However, I have not discovered a separate and comprehensive study of the Yuktidīpikā view on the origin of the Vedas which takes into account all Yuktidīpikā evidence on the issue. In this article, I will undertake such a systematic study.

Two Opposite Views on the Origin of the Vedas View One
The first of these opposite views on the origin of the Vedas is that the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from prakṛti (primordial matter) at the beginning of a kalpa (a cycle of existence of the world). The evidence that the Yuktidīpikā supported the idea that the Vedas are authorless is provided in Yuktidīpikā 2 and 5. In the commentary on the fifth verse (kārikā) of the Sāṃkhyakārikā, while explaining Īśvarakṙṡṅa's definition of authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana), the Yuktidīpikā says the Vedas are "not preceded by the intellect/thought of a puruṣa" (a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka), 4 which means that the Vedas were not consciously composed by an author, either human or divine. In this passage, the Yuktidīpikā draws a distinction between the Vedas, being independent of any author and thus having an unquestionable authority, and the verbal testimony whose validity is based on the authority of its authors. 5 It is worth noting that in the same sentence in which the Vedas are called a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka, they are also characterized as "independent" (sva-tantra), "conducing to the highest good of a man" (puruṣa-niḥśreyasa-arthaṃ pravartamāna), and "pramāṇa which cannot be put into doubt" (niḥsaṃśayaṃ pramāṇam). In this context, the Vedas being "independent" (sva-tantra) can mean that they are independent of any author or that their scope of validity is independent (of the scopes of the two other Sāṁ khya pramāṇas-perception and inference), or both. All of these characteristics of the Vedas, appearing together in one sentence of the Yuktidīpikā, were applied to the Vedas by Mīmāṁ sā and express ideas developed first of all by this darśana. These characteristics are indicative of the influence of Mīmāṁ sā.
There is one more passage in the Yuktidīpikā in which the idea that the Vedas are authorless is formulated directly by the Sāṁ khya proponent. In the commentary on the second kārikā, the Sāṁ khya proponent describes the Vedas in exactly the same manner as the passage of the commentary on the fifth kārikā that I mentioned above. He characterizes them as "not preceded by the intellect of a puruṣa" (a-puruṣabuddhi-pūrvaka), "independent" (sva-tantra), and "conducing to the highest good of a man" (puruṣa-niḥśreyasa-arthaṃ pravartamāna). 6 In the same passage, the Sāṁ khya proponent also expresses the idea that the Vedas are authorless in an indirect way. He contrasts "the sentences of the Vedas" (veda-vākya), which cannot be put into doubt, with the "sentences composed by men" (pauruṣeya-vākya), which 4 Compare Vaiśeṣikasūtras 6.1.1: "In the Veda, composing sentences is preceded by the intellect/thought" (buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir vede ||). 5 Yuktidīpikā1998: 87.3-13. (Numbers refer to Wezler and Motegi's 1998 critical edition, which is cited by page(s) and line(s); thus, 40.10-12 means page 40, lines 10-12.) For the translation and analysis of the Yuktidīpikā commentary on the definition of authoritative verbal testimony, see Łucyszyna 2012: 460-61. 6 Yuktidīpikā1998: 39.18-19. can convey not only truth but also untruth, thus suggesting that the Vedas have no author. 7 The Yuktidīpikā is the first text in classical Sāṁ khya to state directly that the Vedas have no author. In most of the classical Sāṁ khya commentaries that preceded the Yuktidīpikā, that is, the Sāṃkhyavṛtti, Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti, and Gauḍapādabhāṣya, as well as in the Māṭharavṛtti, which was composed later than the Yuktidīpikā, it is suggested that the Vedas are authorless, but this idea was not explicitly formulated in these commentaries. 8 In classical Sāṁ khya, the idea of the authorless Vedas, which has become the "official" Sāṁ khya standpoint on the authorship of the Vedas, is directly stated also in Vācaspati Miśra's Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, the last classical Sāṁ khya commentary. 9 It is worth mentioning that the Sāṃkhyasūtras (ca. 1400-1500 CE) and Aniruddha's commentary on them called Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti (ca. 1400-1500 CE), important postclassical Sāṁ khya texts that aimed to revive Sāṁ khya after a long period of stagnation, not only proclaim that the Vedas have no author, but also present a polemic defending the conception of the authorless Vedas. 10 If the Vedas are not composed by any author, then how do they come into existence? The Yuktidīpikā does not explain how this may happen. Since, according to Sāṁ khya, every entity except puruṣa and prakṛti is a noneternal product of prakṛti, which merges into it during a pralaya (a cosmic dissolution), losing its own identity and distinction from prakṛti, the Vedas, too, must be a noneternal product of prakṛti. The authorless Vedas must evolve from prakṛti at the beginning of a kalpa and be destroyed at its end. Such a conception of the origin of the Vedas is formulated explicitly in the Sāṃkhyasūtras and Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti. According to these key postclassical Sāṁ khya texts, the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from prakṛti without the conscious effort of any author at the beginning of each cycle of the world's existence. 11

View Two
The second Yuktidīpikā view on the origin of the Vedas is that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas. This view, unlike the view that the Vedas have no author, is expressed only indirectly. It is evidenced by the introduction to the Yuktidīpikā, where it is said that Kapila, whom Sāṁ khya regards as its founder, creates names for the Sāṁ khya tattvas ("entities," the basic structural principles of 7 Yuktidīpikā1998: 40.10-12. The Vedas are described in the same manner in the statement of the opponent, an adherer of Mīmāṁ sā: in the commentary on the second kārikā, he says that the Vedas, which are "not preceded by the intellect of a puruṣa" (a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka) and "independent" (svatantra), "conduce to the highest good of a man" (puruṣa-niḥśreyasa-arthaṃ pravartate) (Yuktidīpikā1998: 32.13-14). 8 See Sāṃkhyavṛtti, Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti, Gauḍapādabhāṣya, and Māṭharavṛtti 5. reality) on the basis of direct insight into the nature of all of them. 12 According to the commentary on the second kārikā, the Sāṁ khya teaching of liberation through knowledge is identical with the highest teaching of the Vedas presented in the Upaniṡads. Therefore, the Sāṁ khya terms created by Kapila are the basic Vedic terms. The twenty-five tattvas of the Sāṁ khya system, whose own nature (svarūpa) is grasped by Kapila through the seer's cognition (ārṣeṇa jñānena), 13 constitute everything that exists. Kapila's perfect knowledge of the path of liberation and the distinction between prakṛti with its products and puruṣa, is, unlike the knowledge possessed by other creatures, inborn (sāṃsiddhika), not acquired (Yuktidīpikā 4,14 43, 15 and 69 16 ). He is also described as "born at the beginning of the world" (viśvaagra-ja) (Yuktidīpikā 1 17 and 69 18 ). 19 From all this it follows that the omniscient Kapila, appearing at the beginning of a kalpa, creates the primary linguistic convention and Sāṁ khya doctrine, the latter being identical with the quintessence of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṡads. In the introduction to the Yuktidīpikā, Kapila's role is similar to the role of Īśvara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika, who creates names and the Vedas at the beginning of a kalpa.
The view that the Vedas have an author is confirmed by the commentary on the sixth kārikā, where the Sāṁ khya proponent argues that the relationship between a word and its meaning is not natural but is established by convention. The assumption that the origin of all words is conventional leads to the conclusion that no text can arise in any other way than by the conscious effort of some author who knows the convention.
The passage of Yuktidīpikā 6 in which the author rejects the view that words have a natural and inseparable connection with their meanings is a part of the Yuktidīpikā's extensive polemics in which the author argues that authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana, śabda) cannot be reduced to inference (anumāna). 20 I shall cite the whole passage: 21 12 Yuktidīpikā1998: 7.16-27. This passage drew the attention of Bronkhorst (2011: 5-6) and Kimball (2011: 177 Moreover, because of the use in accordance with the wish (iṣṭa) [of a speaker]. An [inferential] sign is natural (svābhāvika): it is not possible to draw smoke away from fire and place it in water, air, sky, or anywhere else. But a word is used wherever a speaker intends (abhiprāya) [to use it]. For 22 Boldface type is used by the editors Wezler and Motegi to highlight vārttikas. They distinguish two levels of the text of the Yuktidīpikā, which function as integral parts of the same whole and probably belong to the same author: that of the vārttika and that of the bhāṣya. 23 According to the editors Wezler and Motegi, the text [kālāntare tu], bracketed by them and translated by me as "[or some other time]," is to be deleted. 24 Instead of sambandhāntaraṃ deśāntare 'nupalakṣitam, one of the manuscripts used by Wezler and Motegi has saṃbandho deśāntare 'nupalakṣitas ("[the genuine] relationship [between the word and its meaning] is not comprehended at another place"), which is probably a better reading (Yuktidīpikā1998: 101n15-16). 25 According to the Sāṃkhyakārikā, Sāṁ khya inference (anumāna) has two terms: an inferential sign (liṅga) and an inferential sign bearer (liṅgin). Liṅgin is an object to be proved by inference (see Sāṃkhyakārikā 5). This inference is different from the standard Indian inference (developed by the Buddhist and Nyāya logicians) with three terms: (1) inferential sign (liṅga)/reason (hetu)-the property being an inferential sign; (2) subject of inference (pakṣa)-a bearer of two properties: the inferential sign (liṅga) and the property to be proved (sādhya); and (3) that which is to be proved (sādhya)-the property to be proved by inference. The Yuktidīpikā does not draw a distinction between pakṣa and sādhya. Harzer rightly observes, "[T]he cow as a liṅgin may refer to both, the pakṣa and the sādhya. From the discussion one may presume that the term liṅgin refers to the pakṣa" (2006: 119n122). The author of the Yuktidīpikā holds that the word "cow," unlike a dewlap, is not a property of a cow. The word "cow" and an empirical cow, unlike a dewlap and a cow, are perceived separately; therefore, they exist separately and there is no inseparable relationship (which is the ground of any inference) between them. 26 Compare the passage of Mahābhāṣya 1.1.1. The editors of the Yuktidīpikā (Wezler and Motegi) refer to Kielhorn's edition of the Mahābhāṣya revised by Abhyankar: Mahābhāsya1962: 9.25ff. The editors use ‹ › to mark the text they added. example, the words like vṛddhi, commonly known [in the sense of] "growth of one's own body" (svāṅgābhyuccayā), etc., are [also] used [in the sense of] ā, ai, and au, 27 etc. (cf. Pāṅini 1.1.1). Therefore, these [words] are not an [inferential] sign. [You can argue], "There is no fault [in identifying a word with an inferential sign] because a word has the capacity (śaktitva) for denoting everything." The [opponent's] view may be [as follows]: "A word has the capacity for denoting everything, and an object (artha) has the capacity to be denoted by every [word]. Their capacity is limited through the act of man (puruṣa-vyāpāra). 28 How? 'Let this very word express this object. And let this very object be denoted by this word.' Such is the act of man. Therefore, the natural relationship (svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ) of a word [with its meaning] is manifested by the speaker's intention (apekṣā that as the capacity of a word denoting every object is limited through the intention of the speaker, in the same manner an [inferential] sign proving every object is separated from [any] other object through the intention of the speaker. It is not so that just as one word uttered in the world, depending on [its] use by man (puruṣa-viniyogāpekṣa), is capable of denoting every object, in the same manner one [inferential] sign is capable of making known 27 Vṛddhi is a grammatical term for the vowels ā, ai, and au constituting the third grade of vowel gradation. 28 Compare Kumārila Bhaṫṫa's Ślokavārttika 4.228. 29 Nakada's explanation of the opponent's view is worth quoting: "So not only the characteristic (liṅga)…is inherently connected (svābhāvika) with the thing (artha) which has the characteristic but also the word (śabda) is inherently connected with its meaning (artha), therefore the word (āpta-vacana, śabda) is inference (anumāna) too" (1970-71: 995 In this passage, the author of the Yuktidīpikā contrasts a word (śabda) with an inferential sign (liṅga). An inferential sign, which he characterizes as "natural" (svābhāvika), is naturally (inherently, by its nature) and inseparably connected to the sign bearer (liṅgin), that is, to the object to be proved by this sign. In illustrating the relationship between an inferential sign and the object to be proved by it, the author of the Yuktidīpikā gives the example of smoke and fire. Smoke, which is an inferential sign of fire, is inseparably connected to fire: it is impossible to pull smoke out of fire and locate it in water, air, sky, or any other place.
Unlike the relationship between liṅga and liṅgin, the relationship between a word (śabda) and its meaning (artha), that is, the object denoted by it, is not inseparable. The Sāṁ khya proponent, substantiating the difference between a word and an inferential sign, gives three arguments to demonstrate that the relationship between a word and its meaning is not inseparable: (1) viparyayāt ("because of the change"); (2) deśa-niyamāt ("because of the restriction to a [particular] place"); and (3) iṣṭato viniyogāt ("because of the use in accordance with the wish [of a speaker]").
The first argument-viparyayāt ("because of the change")-is that a word can change its meaning in some other place. The Sāṁ khya proponent rightly points out that the same word can have different meanings in different geographical areas. The author of the Yuktidīpikā adduces the following possible objection from opponents: the meaning of a word does not change, but only seems to change; a word seems to change its meaning because people inhabiting other regions do not know its genuine meaning. The Sāṁ khya proponent replies to this objection by referring to perception (pratyakṣa): a word and the object denoted by it, for example, the word "cow" and an empirical cow, are often perceived separately from each other. The inseparable relationship between two things, which is the ground of inference, is always established by perception. In the case of a word and its meaning, perception proves that there is no inseparable relationship between them. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that a word does not change its meaning.
The second argument-deśa-niyamāt ("because of the restriction to a [particular] place")-is that a word, unlike an inferential sign, is local. The inseparable relationship between liṅga and liṅgin is a universal relationship: smoke is connected to fire in every geographical region and in every historical period. The author of the Yuktidīpikā gives concrete examples illustrating the local character of different words. For example, the word śavati denotes the action of going only among the people of Kāmboja, and the word dātra is used for a sickle only by northerners. In some regions, these words are not related to their meanings; therefore, the relationship between a word and its meaning is not inseparable.
The third argument-iṣṭato viniyogāt ("because of the use in accordance with the wish [of a speaker]"-is that a word can denote every object, and its relationship with this very meaning (object) is established through its use by the speaker. To illustrate this, the author of the Yuktidīpikā considers the meanings of the word vṛddhi. The word vṛddhi, commonly known in the sense of "growth of one's own body," is also used as a grammatical term for the vowels constituting the third (strongest) grade of vowel gradation. It seems very probable to me that the Yuktidīpikākāra chooses the technical term from Sanskrit grammar to illustrate his thought because the conventional character of many technical terms, that is, their being created by certain authors, was a well-known fact established by perception. If the conventional character of the relationship between many words and their meanings is obvious and it has always been possible to create new word-meaning relationships, then all words must be conventional in their origin.
According to the author of the Yuktidīpikā, the relationship between a word and its meaning is not natural and inseparable. The Yuktidīpikākāra holds that this relationship depends on the wish (iṣṭa)/intention (abhiprāya) of the speaker. It follows from this that the Vedas, which consist of words, cannot be a naturally occurring entity, that is, an entity evolving from prakṛti without the conscious effort of any author. In this passage, the Yuktidīpikākāra accepts the view that all words are conventional in their origin, though he does not use the word "convention" (samaya, saṃketa). If all words are conventional in their origin, the Vedas, like any other text, can arise in no other way than by the conscious effort of some author (or authors) who knows the convention.

Nirukta in the context of the Yuktidīpikā
Having presented the two opposite views on the origin of the Vedas, I shall now consider the Yuktidīpikā passage containing the famous quotation from Yāska's (fifth century BCE) Nirukta (1.20), 31 also cited in the Vṛtti on Bhartṙhari's (between 450 and 510 CE) 32 Vākyapadīya (1.5). 33 It may seem that by means of this quotation the author of the Yuktidīpikā says something about the origin of the Vedas. The quotation has drawn the special attention of many scholars, such as Wilhelm Halbfass (1991: 48n69), Albrecht Wezler (2001), Ashok Aklujkar (2009), Madhav M. Deshpande (2009: 164), and James Kimball (2016: 548), who have discussed its meaning in the context of the Nirukta, the Vākyapadīya together with its Vṛtti, 34 or the Yuktidīpikā. Detailed studies were undertaken by Aklujkar and Wezler. The 31 sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ | te 'varebhyo 'sākṣātkṛtadharmabhya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ | upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṃ granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣur vedaṃ ca vedāṅgāni ca | bilmaṃ bhilmam bhāsanaṃ iti vā | (Nirukta1998: 41-42). The Yuktidīpikā cites this excerpt, save for the last sentence. The last sentence (explaining bilma), as Wezler (2001: 241) rightly observes, forms the basis of the statement that follows the quotation in the Yuktidīpikā. The quotation found in the Yuktidīpikā deviates slightly from the text of the Nirukta: in the Yuktidīpikā, aparebhyaḥ and apare (which are the forms of apara, meaning "posterior," "later," "following," "inferior," "lower," "other") appear in place of avarebhyaḥ and avare (the forms of avara, meaning "inferior," "lower," "posterior," "later"). The same deviation occurs in the quotation appearing in the Vṛtti on Bhartṙhari's Vākyapadīya (see below). 32 The dates of Yāska and Bhartṙhari are given according to Coward and Raja (2001: 107, 121). Nirukta is quoted in the commentary on Sāṃkhyakārikā 51 in the context of defining the eight attainments (siddhi, "attainment," "perfection"), after characterizing the nature of the first three of them: ūha ("reflection," "reasoning," "consideration," "comprehension"), 35 śabda ("word," "utterance," "speech," "communication"), and adhyayana ("study"). 36 The passage in which the author of the Yuktidīpikā explains the first three siddhis and cites the Nirukta reads as follows: Of these [the attainment] named "comprehension" (ūha) [takes place] when one attains the desired aim by the power of discernment (vicāraṇa) 37 only, without perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative verbal testimony (āgama). This is the first attainment (siddhi) called "causing to cross [the ocean of saṃsāra]" (tāraka). It is called tāraka, for it causes one to cross (tārayati) the ocean of saṃsāra.
But when one who is obstructed in attaining [the desired aim] by himself attains [it] through the teaching (upadeśa) of a guru, this is the second attainment called "carrying across easily" (sutāra). Whence [is it called so]? Because through this they [that is, the disciples] easily cross the straits of worldly existence (bhava-saṃkaṭa) even now (adyatve 'pi).
But when one who is unable to attain [the desired aim] even through another's teaching attains [it] through study (adhyayana), this is the third attainment called "causing crossing [of the ocean of saṃsāra]" (tārayant). It is called tārayant because the act of crossing (tāraṇa-kriyā) [takes place] even now (adyatve 'pi), because it is unceasing (avyāvṛttatva), and because it has a large scope (mahā-viṣayatva). These are the three means by which living beings beginning with Brahmā attain the desired aim. And it is said: "There were seers having a direct insight into the nature [of things which is imperceptible to ordinary people] (sākṣāt-kṛta-dharman). They handed down 35 The meaning of the term ūha in the Yuktidīpikā is not clear. In the context of the passage cited below, it refers to an insight lying beyond the pramāṇas by which ordinary people acquire valid knowledge (pramā). In Yuktidīpikā 23, on the contrary, the commentator interprets knowledge achieved through ūha as knowledge of the distinction between guṇas and puruṣa obtained through pramāṇa(s). He distinguishes between this kind of knowledge and liberating knowledge of the distinction between guṇas and prakṛti which is "produced through practice" (abhyāsa-ja). The latter kind of knowledge is the liberating direct insight described in Sāṃkhyakārikā 64 (Yuktidīpikā1998: 192.7-14). For the translation and analysis of this passage, see Łucyszyna 2010Łucyszyna : 324-28. Kimball (2016 gives a different interpretation of this passage of Yuktidīpikā 23, but these interpretative differences need not be discussed here. In the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha, the Gauḍapādabhāṣya, Māṭharavṛtti, and Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, ūha means "reasoning," "reflection," "consideration" (in the Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, it means reflection on the basis of authoritative texts). In the Jayamaṅgalā, this term probably has the same meaning (the Jayamaṅgalā passage describing ūha is difficult to understand). As it follows from the editions of the Sāṃkhyavṛtti and Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti prepared by Solomon, an explanation of ūha is missing in the extant manuscripts. For the meaning of ūha in the Gauḍapādabhāṣya and Māṭharavṛtti, see Kimball 2016: 541-42. 36 The eight attainments are: ūha, śabda, adhyayana, duḥkha-vighātās trayaḥ ("three kinds of destruction of suffering"), suhṛt-prāpti ("gaining friends," "gaining [knowledge] from friend(s)"), and dāna ("giving," "donation," "charity") (Sāṃkhyakārikā 51). 37 Vicāraṇa-in the context of the cited passage, this term can also be translated as "mental grasp" or "contemplation." mantras by teaching (upadeśa) to the later ones (apara), destitute of a direct insight into the nature [of things] (a-sākṣāt-kṛta-dharma). The later ones, tired of [/disinclined toward] teaching, compiled this work, the Veda, and the Vedāṅgas for grasping a bilma (bilma-grahaṇāya)" [Nirukta 1.20]. Bilma [means] "understanding" (bhāsana); [thus] a special designation of a thorough understanding (saṃyak-pratibhāsa) is presented. 38 My translation of this passage is for the purposes of this study, and I shall not go into its terminological intricacies or all the richness and subtleties of its meaning. I would also like to emphasize that I interpret the quotation from the Nirukta as an integral part of this Yuktidīpikā passage describing the attainments.
In the quotation from the Nirukta, it is said that seers (ṛṣi), "having a direct insight into the nature [of things]" (sākṣāt-kṛta-dharman), transmitted mantras by teaching (upadeśa) to "the later ones" (apara), "destitute of a direct insight into the nature [of things]" (a-sākṣāt-kṛta-dharma), 39 and that these "later ones" compiled "this work" (imaṃ grantham), the Veda, and the Veda ancillaries (vedāṅga). By "this work," Yāska meant the Nighaṇṭu, the collection of Vedic words explained in his Nirukta.
In the context of the Yuktidīpikā, scholars interpret this quotation as an illustration of either the third attainment, or the second and third attainments, or all of the first three attainments. According to Aklujkar (2009: 85), the Nirukta is cited to explain the third (adhyayana) siddhi. Wezler writes that the Nirukta is "quite evidently quoted in order to give a particularly significant example for the operation of the second and third of the siddhis" (2001: 240). Kimball holds that the Nirukta is cited "apparently to illustrate the nature of these three siddhis by relating ūha to the knowledge of the Vedic ṛṣis who have 'the qualities [of things] placed [directly] before the eyes' (sākṣātkṛtadharman), and relating śabda and adhyayana to the transmission of Vedic knowledge through the guru-śiṣya relationship and through composed texts, respectively" (2016: 548).
The point on which the three scholars agree is that the quotation from the Nirukta functions in the Yuktidīpikā as an illustration of some of the siddhis, and I subscribe to their opinion. As to the question of which siddhis are exemplified by this 38 tatroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam arthaṃ vicāraṇabalenaiva pratipadyate sādyā siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate | tārayati saṃsārārṇavād iti tārakam | yadā tu svayaṃ pratipattau pratihanyamāno gurūpadeśāt pratipadyate sā dvitīyā siddhiḥ sutāram ity apadiśyate | katham | sukham anenādyatve 'pi bhavasaṃkaṭāt tarantīti | yadā tv anyopadeśād apy asamarthaḥ pratipattum adhyayanena sādhayati sā tṛtīyā siddhis tārayantam ity apadiśyate | tad etat tāraṇakriyāyā adyatve 'py avyāvṛttatvān mahāviṣayatvāt tārayantam ity apadiṣṭam | ta ete trayaḥ sādhanopā‹yā› yair ā brahmaṇaḥ prāṇino 'bhipretam arthaṃ prāpnuvanti | āha ca "sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ | te 'parebhyo 'sākṣātkṛtadharmebhya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ | upadeśāya glāyanto 'pare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṃ granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣur vedaṃ ca vedāṅgāni ca" (Nir. 1.20) iti | bilmaṃ bhāsanaṃ saṃyakpratibhāsāya viśiṣṭaḥ saṃketa uktaḥ | (Yuktidīpikā1998: 251.12-252.2). 39 It is not clear why the Yuktidīpikā reads asākṣātkṛtadharmebhya instead of asākṣātkṛtadharmabhya, deviating thus from the Nirukta (cited in footnote 31) and the Vākyapadīya's Vṛtti (cited in footnote 33). Can it be a mistake that should be corrected in a critical edition? This deviation probably does not influence the meaning. For the meaning and possible translations of sākṣāt-kṛta-dharman, see Ruegg 1994;Wezler 2001: 223-30;Aklujkar 2009: 12-28. The Yuktidīpikā on the Origin of the Vedas 249 quotation, I agree with Kimball that it illustrates all of the first three siddhis. The first attainment-ūha-takes place when one achieves liberating knowledge (that is, the "seeing" [darśana] of the distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti with its products) 40 by the power of mental discernment (vicāraṇa) which is beyond the pramāṇas applied by ordinary people, and this discernment corresponds to the seers' direct insight into the imperceptible reality. The second attainment-śabdaoccurs when one who is unable to come to liberating knowledge through such extraordinary mental discernment (vicāraṇa) achieves this knowledge through the upadeśa of a guru, and in the quotation from the Nirukta, "the later ones" (apara), destitute of the direct insight into the imperceptible reality, attain liberating knowledge in this very way, that is, through the upadeśa (of the seers). The third attainment-adhyayana-takes place when one who is unable to achieve liberating knowledge through another's teaching (upadeśa) achieves it through study (adhyayana), and in the Nirukta quotation, "the later ones" (apara), "tired of teaching," probably because of the limited learning capacity of those they tried to teach, compile for them the texts to study. Hence, the first attainment characterizes the seers; the second characterizes "the later ones" taught by the seers; and the third characterizes all those for whom "the later ones" compiled the texts. In addition to these correspondences, the assumption that the Nirukta quotation illustrates all of the first three siddhis is confirmed by the following fact. The Yuktidīpikā author cites the Nirukta not immediately after the description of the third attainment, but after the summarizing sentence (coming after this description) in which he states that by the above three means, living beings attain their aim. 41 In my opinion, it is rather unlikely that by quoting the Nirukta, the Yuktidīpikā author aims to communicate something about the origin of the Vedas. Even if he touches on this issue (indirectly), it is not clear whether the primeval Veda was merely perceived by the ṛṣis, and thus has no author, or, as in earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika, was created by them on the basis of their direct insight into the reality imperceptible to ordinary people.
Why does the author of the Yuktidīpikā choose this citation to illustrate Sāṁ khya thought? I think that the inclusion of this quotation in the text of the Yuktidīpikā is an element of an important project of the Yuktidīpikākāra which Shujun Motegi calls an attempt at "reconciliation with the Vedas" (2006: 54). 42 This project is realized by the Yuktidīpikā author mainly in the commentary on the second kārikā, in the vast polemics with Mīmāṁ sā on the highest goal of man and the means of achieving it. The Yuktidīpikā is the first classical Sāṁ khya text that endeavors to substantiate that the Vedas comprise not only ritual parts, but also the highest science of liberation through knowledge.
Īśvarakṙṡṅa, in the first two kārikās of his Sāṃkhyakārikā, along with all classical Sāṁ khya commentators explaining these kārikās, claims that the Sāṁ khya means of eliminating suffering (duḥkha) through the discriminative knowledge (vijñāna) of prakṛti, its products, and puruṣa is superior to the Vedic (ānuśravika) means because the Sāṁ khya means lead to the complete and final elimination of suffering, whereas by performing a Vedic ritual, a human being will continue to remain in saṃsāra and experience suffering. This distinction between the Sāṁ khya means and the Vedic means suggests that Sāṁ khya and śruti conflict with one another, for none of the classical Sāṁ khya authors before the author of the Yuktidīpikā observed that the Vedas contain more than just ritual parts. The author of the Yuktidīpikā-for the first time in classical Sāṁ khya history-attempts to show that the Vedas comprise not only ritual parts, but also those parts that teach the path of liberation through knowledge; that according to śruti, the science of liberation through knowledge is the highest science, for it leads to the complete and final elimination of suffering; and that Sāṁ khya is identical with this highest science of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṡads (Yuktidīpikā 2). 43 The first view on the origin of the Vedas presented above, according to which the Vedas have no author, and thus possess an unquestionable authority, differing in this respect from all other kinds of authoritative verbal testimony, is, too, an integral part of this project to reconcile Sāṁ khya with the Vedas. 44 What characterizes the Yuktidīpikā passage quoting the Nirukta as a part of this project to reconcile Sāṁ khya with the Vedas? The passage contains the following implications which indicate that it is a part of this project. The Vedic seers achieved liberating knowledge (of the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa) in the most perfect way-their attainment (siddhi) called ūha is the first, that is, the most excellent among the attainments. The Vedic seers transmitted their knowledge to other people, destitute of the capacity to achieve it through ūha, and the latter ones achieved liberating knowledge thanks to the seers' upadeśa. The people taught by the Vedic seers compiled the Vedas, encompassing the science of liberation, as well as the texts explaining them, and it is now possible to achieve liberating knowledge through study of the Vedas. It follows from this passage that the Vedas contain the highest science of liberation through the discriminative knowledge of prakṛti and puruṣa, and therefore should be respected, and that Sāṁ khya is a Vedic doctrine.
When Yāska, cited in the Yuktidīpikā, referred to "this work" (imaṃ grantham), he meant the Nighaṇṭu commented on in his Nirukta, but the author of the Yuktidīpikā could have alluded to the Sāṃkhyakārikā commented on in his Yuktidīpikā and suggested in this way that both the Sāṃkhyakārikā and Yuktidīpikā were works explaining the Vedas.
I consider the passage quoting the Nirukta to be a part of the Yuktidīpikā's project to reconcile Sāṁ khya with the Vedas, for this passage implies that the Vedas teach the highest science of liberation through knowledge. It is worth noting, however, 43 Yuktidīpikā1998: 35.9-54.16. 44 To quote Motegi's opinion about the Yuktidīpikā interpretation of the Sāṃkhyakārikā (5) definition of authoritative verbal testimony (āpta-vacana): "It is to be surmised that by means of this interpretation the author of the Yuktidīpikā sought to differentiate the Vedas from all other reliable sources and show that they are exceptional in their reliability" (2006: 53).

Conclusion
The author of the Yuktidīpikā wavers between at least two different views on the origin of the Vedas. The first view is that the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from prakṛti at the beginning of a kalpa and merge into prakṛti during a pralaya. The Yuktidīpikā is the first classical Sāṁ khya text to state directly that the Vedas have no author and to distinguish clearly between the Vedas, being independent of any author, and thus having the highest, unquestionable authority, and verbal testimony whose authority depends on the authority of its author. The ideas and terminology of the passages in which the Yuktidīpikākāra affirms the authorlessness of the Vedas confirm that he was influenced by Mīmāṁ sā. The second and opposite Yuktidīpikā view on the origin of the Vedas is that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṡads. This view is expressed only indirectly. Omniscient Kapila, appearing at the beginning of a kalpa, creates the primary linguistic convention and Sāṁ khya doctrine, the latter being identical with the highest teaching of the Vedas, and his role is similar to the role of Īśvara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika, who creates names and the Vedas at the beginning of creation.
The Yuktidīpikā contains the famous citation from Yāska's Nirukta (1.20), and it may seem that by means of this quotation, the author of the Yuktidīpikā communicates ideas about the origin of the Vedas. The Nirukta is cited in the context of defining the eight attainments (siddhi), and the citation functions as an illustration of the first three of them. It is rather unlikely that by quoting the Nirukta, the Yuktidīpikākāra intends to say something about the origin of the Vedas. Even if he touches on this issue indirectly, it is not clear from this passage whether the primeval Veda was perceived by the seers, and thus has no author, or, as in the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṡika, was created by them on the basis of their insight into imperceptible reality. The Yuktidīpikā passage containing the quotation from the Nirukta can hardly be regarded as supporting either of the two views presented above.
Why does the Yuktidīpikākāra select this quotation to illustrate Sāṁ khya thought? The inclusion of this citation in the text of the Yuktidīpikā can be explained as a part of his important and pioneering (that is, new to Sāṁ khya) project to reconcile Sāṁ khya with the Vedas. The passage quoting the Nirukta implies that the Vedas teach the highest science of liberation through the discriminative knowledge of prakṛti with its products and puruṣa, and therefore should be revered, and that Sāṁ khya is a Vedic doctrine. The first view on the origin of the Vedas considered above, too, is a part of this project to reconcile Sāṁ khya with the Vedas.
Which of these opposite views on the origin of the Vedas accords with Sāṁ khya doctrine? The first view, based on the idea of the authorless Vedas and influenced by Mīmāṁ sā, presupposes that not only the Vedas, but also the words and linguistic sounds that constitute the Vedas evolve from prakṛti at the beginning of a kalpa and exist (actually, not potentially) until the next pralaya. This view is not in agreement with the Sāṁ khya system. For Sāṁ khya, each particular sound (linguistic as well as nonlinguistic) is a unique and transient modification (vikāra) or manifestation (abhivyakti) of prakṛti that comes into actual existence only once; it is not something that can be manifested many times-by different speakers (or other causes), at different times, and in different places. 49 The second view, according to which the Vedas have an author, is grounded on the assumption that the origin of all words is conventional. I think that this view is compatible with the Sāṁ khya system. However, in accepting it, Sāṁ khya had to develop a theory of universals-not only of universals of things, but also of universals of words and linguistic sounds-to explain how language learning and communication are possible. It is difficult to find a place for a universal as a separate ontological category in the Sāṁ khya system, but Sāṁ khya could admit universals as general notions. 50 Why does the Yuktidīpikā-and Sāṁ khya in general-accept as its "official" standpoint that view on the origin of the Vedas which is in conflict with the Sāṁ khya doctrine, namely, the first view, which holds that the Vedas have no author, evolving from prakṛti spontaneously? The second Yuktidīpikā view, which holds that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas, implies that the status of Sāṁ khya is not lower and may even be higher than the status of the Vedas. Such a view, if stated directly, could hardly enhance the reputation of Sāṁ khya as a school of philosophy that recognizes the authority of the Vedas. The first view, on the contrary, maintains the highest and most distinguished status of the Vedas, and therefore is the proper choice to secure a place for Sāṁ khya in Indian intellectual history. This is why the author of the Yuktidīpikā affirms the first view as the 49 See Łucyszyna 2016: 304-5, 316-19. 50 Indian philosophers were aware that the word-meaning relationship making language learning and communication possible cannot be based on word and meaning understood as unique and transient entities. For this reason, the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṡikas, rejecting the Mīmāṁ sā conception of everlasting words, introduced the conception of universals of words. Pind (1991) holds that the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga, too, was aware of the problem. Pind shows that according to Dignāga, the relationship between a word and its meaning is the relationship between a word universal (śabda-sāmānya) and a meaning universal (artha-sāmānya), that is, the relationship between types, not between "their individual realizations (artha-śabda-viśeṣa)," which "are claimed not to constitute such a relation because they have not previously been observed together" (1991: 270). For Dignāga, unlike for the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṡikas, a universal is not something existing independently of our minds. Classical Sāṁ khya did not develop a theory of universals. It also did not develop a theory of word meaning. On word meaning and universals in classical Sāṁ khya, see Łucyszyna 2016: 305-9.
The Yuktidīpikā on the Origin of the Vedas 253 "official" standpoint of the Sāṁ khya darśana, including it in his pioneering project to reconcile Sāṁ khya with the Vedas.