The *Yuktidīpikā* on the Origin of the Vedas

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Abstract In this article, I reconstruct the view of the *Yuktidīpikā*, the most detailed and profound commentary of classical Sāṃkhya, on the origin of the Vedas. A close reading of the text reveals that its unknown author wavered between at least two different views on this issue. The first view is that the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from *prakṛti* (primordial matter) at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world (*kalpa*) and merge into *prakṛti* during a cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*). The *Yuktidīpikā* is the first text in classical Sāṃkhya to state directly that the Vedas have no author. The second and opposite view is that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas. This view is expressed only indirectly. Besides reconstructing the above-mentioned views, I attempt to answer the question of whether by quoting *Nirukta* 1.20 the *Yuktidīpikā* communicates something about the origin of the Vedas. Illustrating Sāṃkhya thought by quoting this passage of the *Nirukta*, as well as proclaiming the idea that the Vedas are authorless, which became the “official” standpoint of the Sāṃkhya *darśana*, can be interpreted as elements of the *Yuktidīpikā*’s pioneering project to show that Sāṃkhya is not in conflict with the Vedas.

Keywords *Yuktidīpikā* · classical Sāṃkhya · the Vedas · authorless (*apauruṣeya*) · Kapila · *Nirukta*

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Introduction

In this article, I reconstruct and critically explain the view of the *Yuktidīpikā* (ca. 600–700 CE),¹ the most detailed, profound, and polemical commentary of classical Sāṃkhya, on the origin of the Vedas. The problem of the origin of the Vedas, vividly discussed in Indian philosophy, encompasses the following questions: Are the Vedas eternal? Do they have an author? How do they come into existence? The main contributors to this discussion are Mīmāṃsā and its rival schools Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. For Mīmāṃsā, the Vedas are authorless and eternal; they were never created and will never be destroyed. According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the Vedas are created (in fact, recreated) by the primeval *ṛṣi*² or Īśvara³ at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. What is the Sāṃkhya view presented in the *Yuktidīpikā*, one of the most important commentaries of this *darśana*?

The issue of the origin of the Vedas according to the *Yuktidīpikā* was touched upon by Olena Łucyszyna in “Classical Sāṃkhya on the Authorship of the Vedas” (2012: 460–61). In that article, she quoted and considered the *Yuktidīpikā* definition of authoritative verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*) in which the *Yuktidīpikā* proclaims the idea that the Vedas are authorless. All passages of the *Yuktidīpikā* in which its still unidentified composer expresses his view that the Vedas have no author are cited in Hayato Kondō’s article, “Reinterpretation of Tradition and Transmission: *Āptavacana* in the *Yuktidīpikā*” (2012–13: 142–43). In another article, entitled “Classical Sāṃkhya on the Relationship Between a Word and Its Meaning,” Łucyszyna (2016: 310–15) analyzes two *Yuktidīpikā* passages from which we learn that the relationship between a word and its meaning is established by convention. In fact, these two passages provide indirect evidence that the *Yuktidīpikākāra* accepted the opposite view, namely, that the Vedas have an author. However, I have not discovered a separate and comprehensive study of the *Yuktidīpikā* view on the origin of the Vedas which takes into account all *Yuktidīpikā* evidence on the issue. In this article, I will undertake such a systematic study.

¹ The extant classical Sāṃkhya texts comprise the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (ca. 350–450 CE) by Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the following eight commentaries on it: the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha (composed around 500 CE; translated into Chinese by Paramārtha between 557 CE and 569 CE); the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* (ca. 500–600 CE); the *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti* (ca. 500–600 CE); the *Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya* (or the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*; ca. 500–600 CE) by Gauḍapāda; the *Yuktidīpikā* (ca. 600–700 CE); the *Jayamaṅgalā* (ca. 700 CE or later); the *Mātharavṛtti* (ca. 800 CE or later) by Māthara; and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* (ca. 841 CE or ca. 976 CE) by Vācaspati Miśra. The dates and chronological order of Sāṃkhya texts mentioned in this article are given according to Larson (1987: 15–18, 19–22). On the date of the *Yuktidīpikā*, see also the valuable observations of Mejor (2004). According to the recent and thorough research of Acharya (2006: xxviii), Vācaspati Miśra, the author of the last commentary of classical Sāṃkhya, flourished between 950 and 1000 CE.

² In the earlier texts. See *Nyāyasūtras* together with Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.7–8 and 2.1.68; *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*; 6.1.1–2.

³ In the later texts. See, for example, Candrānanda’s *Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti* 6.1.2; Vyomaśiva’s *Vyomavati* (Varadachari 1977a: 429, 447); Vācaspati Miśra’s *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṇikā* 2.1.68; Udayana’s *Ātmatattvaviveka* (Varadachari 1977b: 555–56); Udayana’s *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (Potter and Bhattacharya 1977: 569, 588); Śāṅkara Miśra’s *Upaskāra* 1.1.3; and Annambhaṭṭa’s *Tarkasaṃgraha* and its autocommentary *Tarkadīpikā* 62.

Two Opposite Views on the Origin of the Vedas

View One

The first of these opposite views on the origin of the Vedas is that the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from *prakṛti* (primordial matter) at the beginning of a *kalpa* (a cycle of existence of the world). The evidence that the *Yuktidīpikā* supported the idea that the Vedas are authorless is provided in *Yuktidīpikā* 2 and 5. In the commentary on the fifth verse (*kārikā*) of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, while explaining Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition of authoritative verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*), the *Yuktidīpikā* says the Vedas are “not preceded by the intellect/thought of a *puruṣa*” (*a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka*),⁴ which means that the Vedas were not consciously composed by an author, either human or divine. In this passage, the *Yuktidīpikā* draws a distinction between the Vedas, being independent of any author and thus having an unquestionable authority, and the verbal testimony whose validity is based on the authority of its authors.⁵ It is worth noting that in the same sentence in which the Vedas are called *a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka*, they are also characterized as “independent” (*sva-tantra*), “conducting to the highest good of a man” (*puruṣa-niḥśreyasa-arthaṃ pravartamāna*), and “*pramāṇa* which cannot be put into doubt” (*niḥsaṃśayaṃ pramāṇam*). In this context, the Vedas being “independent” (*sva-tantra*) can mean that they are independent of any author or that their scope of validity is independent (of the scopes of the two other Sāṃkhya *pramāṇas*—perception and inference), or both. All of these characteristics of the Vedas, appearing together in one sentence of the *Yuktidīpikā*, were applied to the Vedas by Mīmāṃsā and express ideas developed first of all by this *darśana*. These characteristics are indicative of the influence of Mīmāṃsā.

There is one more passage in the *Yuktidīpikā* in which the idea that the Vedas are authorless is formulated directly by the Sāṃkhya proponent. In the commentary on the second *kārikā*, the Sāṃkhya proponent describes the Vedas in exactly the same manner as the passage of the commentary on the fifth *kārikā* that I mentioned above. He characterizes them as “not preceded by the intellect of a *puruṣa*” (*a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka*), “independent” (*sva-tantra*), and “conducting to the highest good of a man” (*puruṣa-niḥśreyasa-arthaṃ pravartamāna*).⁶ In the same passage, the Sāṃkhya proponent also expresses the idea that the Vedas are authorless in an indirect way. He contrasts “the sentences of the Vedas” (*veda-vākya*), which cannot be put into doubt, with the “sentences composed by men” (*pauruṣeya-vākya*), which

⁴ Compare *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* 6.1.1: “In the Veda, composing sentences is preceded by the intellect/thought” (*buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir vede* ||).

⁵ *Yuktidīpikā* 1998: 87.3–13. (Numbers refer to Wezler and Motegi's 1998 critical edition, which is cited by page(s) and line(s); thus, 40.10–12 means page 40, lines 10–12.) For the translation and analysis of the *Yuktidīpikā* commentary on the definition of authoritative verbal testimony, see Łucyszyna 2012: 460–61.

⁶ *Yuktidīpikā* 1998: 39.18–19.

can convey not only truth but also untruth, thus suggesting that the Vedas have no author.⁷

The *Yuktidīpikā* is the first text in classical Sāṃkhya to state directly that the Vedas have no author. In most of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries that preceded the *Yuktidīpikā*, that is, the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyasaptavṛtti*, and *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, as well as in the *Mātharavṛtti*, which was composed later than the *Yuktidīpikā*, it is suggested that the Vedas are authorless, but this idea was not explicitly formulated in these commentaries.⁸ In classical Sāṃkhya, the idea of the authorless Vedas, which has become the “official” Sāṃkhya standpoint on the authorship of the Vedas, is directly stated also in Vācaspati Miśra’s *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, the last classical Sāṃkhya commentary.⁹ It is worth mentioning that the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* (ca. 1400–1500 CE) and Aniruddha’s commentary on them called *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* (ca. 1400–1500 CE), important postclassical Sāṃkhya texts that aimed to revive Sāṃkhya after a long period of stagnation, not only proclaim that the Vedas have no author, but also present a polemic defending the conception of the authorless Vedas.¹⁰

If the Vedas are not composed by any author, then how do they come into existence? The *Yuktidīpikā* does not explain how this may happen. Since, according to Sāṃkhya, every entity except *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is a noneternal product of *prakṛti*, which merges into it during a *pralaya* (a cosmic dissolution), losing its own identity and distinction from *prakṛti*, the Vedas, too, must be a noneternal product of *prakṛti*. The authorless Vedas must evolve from *prakṛti* at the beginning of a *kalpa* and be destroyed at its end. Such a conception of the origin of the Vedas is formulated explicitly in the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* and *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*. According to these key postclassical Sāṃkhya texts, the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from *prakṛti* without the conscious effort of any author at the beginning of each cycle of the world’s existence.¹¹

View Two

The second *Yuktidīpikā* view on the origin of the Vedas is that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas. This view, unlike the view that the Vedas have no author, is expressed only indirectly. It is evidenced by the introduction to the *Yuktidīpikā*, where it is said that Kapila, whom Sāṃkhya regards as its founder, creates names for the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* (“entities,” the basic structural principles of

⁷ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 40.10–12. The Vedas are described in the same manner in the statement of the opponent, an adherer of Mīmāṃsā: in the commentary on the second *kārikā*, he says that the Vedas, which are “not preceded by the intellect of a *puruṣa*” (*a-puruṣa-buddhi-pūrvaka*) and “independent” (*svatantra*), “conduce to the highest good of a man” (*puruṣa-niḥśreyasa-arthaṃ pravartate*) (*Yuktidīpikā*1998: 32.13–14).

⁸ See *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyasaptavṛtti*, *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, and *Mātharavṛtti* 5.

⁹ See *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* 2 and 5. The relevant passages of the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyasaptavṛtti*, *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, *Mātharavṛtti*, and *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* are considered in Łucyszyna 2012.

¹⁰ See *Sāṃkhyasūtras* and *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* 5.41–50.

¹¹ See *Sāṃkhyasūtras* and *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* 5.45–50.

reality) on the basis of direct insight into the nature of all of them.¹² According to the commentary on the second *kārikā*, the Sāṃkhya teaching of liberation through knowledge is identical with the highest teaching of the Vedas presented in the Upaniṣads. Therefore, the Sāṃkhya terms created by Kapila are the basic Vedic terms. The twenty-five *tattvas* of the Sāṃkhya system, whose own nature (*svarūpa*) is grasped by Kapila through the seer's cognition (*ārṣeṇa jñānena*),¹³ constitute everything that exists. Kapila's perfect knowledge of the path of liberation and the distinction between *prakṛti* with its products and *puruṣa*, is, unlike the knowledge possessed by other creatures, inborn (*sāmsiddhika*), not acquired (*Yuktidīpikā* 4,¹⁴ 43,¹⁵ and 69¹⁶). He is also described as "born at the beginning of the world" (*viśva-agra-ja*) (*Yuktidīpikā* 1¹⁷ and 69¹⁸).¹⁹ From all this it follows that the omniscient Kapila, appearing at the beginning of a *kalpa*, creates the primary linguistic convention and Sāṃkhya doctrine, the latter being identical with the quintessence of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṣads. In the introduction to the *Yuktidīpikā*, Kapila's role is similar to the role of Īśvara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who creates names and the Vedas at the beginning of a *kalpa*.

The view that the Vedas have an author is confirmed by the commentary on the sixth *kārikā*, where the Sāṃkhya proponent argues that the relationship between a word and its meaning is not natural but is established by convention. The assumption that the origin of all words is conventional leads to the conclusion that no text can arise in any other way than by the conscious effort of some author who knows the convention.

The passage of *Yuktidīpikā* 6 in which the author rejects the view that words have a natural and inseparable connection with their meanings is a part of the *Yuktidīpikā*'s extensive polemics in which the author argues that authoritative verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*, *śabda*) cannot be reduced to inference (*anumāna*).²⁰ I shall cite the whole passage.²¹

¹² *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 7.16–27. This passage drew the attention of Bronkhorst (2011: 5–6) and Kimball (2011: 177). For the translation and a detailed analysis of the whole passage, see Łucyszyna 2016: 310–14.

¹³ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 7.23.

¹⁴ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 67.20–68.2, 75.19–24.

¹⁵ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 233.31–234.9.

¹⁶ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 267.13.

¹⁷ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 8.20.

¹⁸ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 267.14.

¹⁹ According to the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, Kapila appears at the beginning of a *kalpa*, endowed with the perfect knowledge of the twenty-five *tattvas* (see the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha, *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*, *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, *Mātharavṛtti* 1, and all the extant classical commentaries on *kārikā* 43). This knowledge is an inseparable part of his nature, which distinguishes Kapila from other creatures (see the commentaries on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 43).

²⁰ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 100.10–105.9.

²¹ This passage was briefly analyzed in Łucyszyna 2016: 315.

Moreover, [a word (*śabda*) is not an inferential sign (*liṅga*)] **because of the change.**²² An [inferential] sign does not change [its connection to a particular sign bearer (*liṅgin*)] at some other place, but the change is observed in the case of a word. The very same word at some other place [or some other time]²³ does not convey its meaning, but expresses other meaning. [You can argue], **“It is because of not knowing the relationship [between the word and its meaning].** It may be so: other [that is, the genuine] relationship [between the word and its meaning] is not comprehended at another place; that is why there is the [seeming] change of the word meaning.”²⁴ **This is irrelevant because of the difference of an [inferential] sign [from a word].** [It is] not [the case] that when a perceptible (*pratyakṣābhimata*) [inferential] sign bearer (*liṅgin*), such as cow, is perceived, [its inferential] sign (*liṅga*) [such as dewlap located on it] is not perceived. But the word [“cow”] is not perceived on the cow which is being perceived.²⁵

Moreover, **because of the restriction to a [particular] place.** It is not observed that an [inferential] sign has a restriction to a [particular] place, but in the case of a word, there is a restriction to a [particular] place. For instance, [the verb] *śavati* is used [in the sense of] “action of going” only among the people of Kāamboja; *raṁhati* [is used in the same sense] among easterners. In a like manner, [the word] *dāti* is used for a sickle ‘among easterners’,²⁶ [but] *dātra* [is used for it] among northerners (cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.9.25ff.) [and] not anywhere else. Therefore, a word is not an [inferential] sign.

Moreover, **because of the use in accordance with the wish (*iṣṭa*) [of a speaker].** An [inferential] sign is natural (*svābhāvika*): it is not possible to draw smoke away from fire and place it in water, air, sky, or anywhere else. But a word is used wherever a speaker intends (*abhiprāya*) [to use it]. For

²² Boldface type is used by the editors Wezler and Motegi to highlight *vārttikas*. They distinguish two levels of the text of the *Yuktidīpikā*, which function as integral parts of the same whole and probably belong to the same author: that of the *vārttika* and that of the *bhāṣya*.

²³ According to the editors Wezler and Motegi, the text [*kālāntare tu*], bracketed by them and translated by me as “[or some other time],” is to be deleted.

²⁴ Instead of *sambandhāntaram deśāntare ’nupalakṣitam*, one of the manuscripts used by Wezler and Motegi has *sambandho deśāntare ’nupalakṣitas* (“[the genuine] relationship [between the word and its meaning] is not comprehended at another place”), which is probably a better reading (*Yuktidīpikā* 1998: 101n15–16).

²⁵ According to the *Sāmkhyakārikā*, Sāmkhya inference (*anumāna*) has two terms: an inferential sign (*liṅga*) and an inferential sign bearer (*liṅgin*). *Liṅgin* is an object to be proved by inference (see *Sāmkhyakārikā* 5). This inference is different from the standard Indian inference (developed by the Buddhist and Nyāya logicians) with three terms: (1) inferential sign (*liṅga*)/reason (*hetu*)—the property being an inferential sign; (2) subject of inference (*pakṣa*)—a bearer of two properties: the inferential sign (*liṅga*) and the property to be proved (*sādhya*); and (3) that which is to be proved (*sādhya*)—the property to be proved by inference. The *Yuktidīpikā* does not draw a distinction between *pakṣa* and *sādhya*. Harzer rightly observes, “[T]he cow as a *liṅgin* may refer to both, the *pakṣa* and the *sādhya*. From the discussion one may presume that the term *liṅgin* refers to the *pakṣa*” (2006: 119n122). The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* holds that the word “cow,” unlike a dewlap, is not a property of a cow. The word “cow” and an empirical cow, unlike a dewlap and a cow, are perceived separately; therefore, they exist separately and there is no inseparable relationship (which is the ground of any inference) between them.

²⁶ Compare the passage of *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1. The editors of the *Yuktidīpikā* (Wezler and Motegi) refer to Kielhorn’s edition of the *Mahābhāṣya* revised by Abhyankar: *Mahābhāṣya* 1962: 9.25ff. The editors use < > to mark the text they added.

example, the words like *vrddhi*, commonly known [in the sense of] “growth of one’s own body” (*svāṅgābhyuccayā*), etc., are [also] used [in the sense of] *ā*, *ai*, and *au*,²⁷ etc. (cf. Pāṇini 1.1.1). Therefore, these [words] are not an [inferential] sign. **[You can argue], “There is no fault [in identifying a word with an inferential sign] because a word has the capacity (*śaktitva*) for denoting everything.”** The [opponent’s] view may be [as follows]: “A word has the capacity for denoting everything, and an object (*artha*) has the capacity to be denoted by every [word]. Their capacity is limited through the act of man (*puruṣa-vyāpāra*).”²⁸ How? ‘Let this very word express this object. And let this very object be denoted by this word.’ Such is the act of man. Therefore, the natural relationship (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*) of a word [with its meaning] is manifested by the speaker’s intention (*apekṣā*).”²⁹ **This [objection] is irrelevant. Why? Because of the undesirable conclusion [that is, the conclusion which is undesirable for the opponent] (*prasaṅga*) that [a word] is completely (*sutarām*) different from inference.** If [you] state this, it follows that a word is completely different [from inference]. For [it is] not [the case] that as the capacity of a word denoting every object is limited through the intention of the speaker, in the same manner an [inferential] sign proving every object is separated from [any] other object through the intention of the speaker. It is not so that just as one word uttered in the world, depending on [its] use by man (*puruṣa-viniyogāpekṣa*), is capable of denoting every object, in the same manner one [inferential] sign is capable of making known

²⁷ *Vrddhi* is a grammatical term for the vowels *ā*, *ai*, and *au* constituting the third grade of vowel gradation.

²⁸ Compare Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa’s *Śloka-vārttika* 4.228.

²⁹ Nakada’s explanation of the opponent’s view is worth quoting: “So not only the characteristic (*liṅga*)...is inherently connected (*svābhāvika*) with the thing (*artha*) which has the characteristic but also the word (*śabda*) is inherently connected with its meaning (*artha*), therefore the word (*āpta-vacana*, *śabda*) is inference (*anumāna*) too” (1970–71: 995). I supplemented the quotation with the Sanskrit terms in parentheses.

³⁰ *kiṃ cānyat | viparyāyāt | na hi liṅgaṃ deśāntare viparyeti | śabdasya tu dr̥ṣṭo viparyayaḥ | sa eva hi śabdo deśāntare [kāṇtāntare tu] svārthaṃ na pratīyayaty arthāntaram ca praśaṃsati | sambandhānupalabdher iti cet | syād etat | sambandhāntaram deśāntare ‘nupalakṣitam | tasmāc chabdarthaviparyaya iti | etad anupapannam liṅgavaidharṃyāt | na hi pratyakṣābhimatasya liṅgina upalabdau gavāder liṅgaṃ nopalabhyate | śabdas tūpalabhyamāne gavādau nopalabhyate | tasmān na liṅgam |*

kiṃ cānyat | deśāniyamāt | na hi liṅgasya deśāniyamo dr̥ṣṭaḥ | asti tu śabdasya deśāniyamaḥ | tad yathā śavatrī gatikarmā kāmbojeṣu eva bhāṣyate | raṃhatīḥ prācyesu tathā dātīr lavanārtho ‘prācyesu’ dātram udīcyesu (cf. Mbhāṣya 1.9.25ff.) nānyatra | tasmān na śabdo liṅgam |

kiṃ cānyat | iṣṭato viniyogāt | svābhāvikaṃ liṅgam | na hi dhūmo ‘gner apakṣya śakyate ‘psu vāyav ākāṣe ‘nyatra vā viniveśayitum | śabdas tu yatra yatra vaktur abhiprāyas tatra tatra viniveśyante yathā vr̥ddhyādayaḥ śabdāḥ svāṅgābhyuccayādīṣu prasiddhā ādaiḥ (cf. Pāṇ 1.1.1) viniveśyante | tasmān na te liṅgam | sarvābhīdhānaśaktitvāc chabdasvādoṣa iti cet | syān matam | sarvābhīdhānaśaktiḥ śabdaḥ sarvābhīdheyaśaktiḥ cārthaḥ | tayoh puruṣavyāpāreṇa śaktyavacchedaḥ kriyate | katham | ayam eva śabdo ‘yārthasya pratīyako bhavatu | ayam eva cārtho ‘nena śabdenābhīdhīyatām | etāvati puruṣavyāpārah | tasmāc chabdasya svābhāvikaḥ sambandho vaktrapekṣayā vyajyate iti | etad apy anupapannam | kasmāt | sutarām anumānād arthāntaratvaprasaṅgāt | evam api kalpayitvānumānāt sutarām śabdasyārthāntaratvam āpadyate | kasmāt | na hi yathā vaktrapekṣayā sarvārthasya sataḥ śabdasya śaktyavacchedas tathā sarvārthaṃ liṅgaṃ vaktrapekṣayārthāntarād avacchidyate | yathā caikaḥ śabdo jagaty evam uditāḥ puruṣaviniyogāpekṣaḥ sarvam artham abhidhātum samartho ‘na’ tathāikaṃ liṅgaṃ kayācid yuktā sarvārthapratīyānasamartham | tasmān na śabdo liṅgam | (Yuktidīpikā 1998: 101.12–103.7.)

every object through some reasoning. Therefore, a word is not an [inferential] sign.³⁰

In this passage, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* contrasts a word (*śabda*) with an inferential sign (*liṅga*). An inferential sign, which he characterizes as “natural” (*svābhāvika*), is naturally (inherently, by its nature) and inseparably connected to the sign bearer (*liṅgin*), that is, to the object to be proved by this sign. In illustrating the relationship between an inferential sign and the object to be proved by it, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* gives the example of smoke and fire. Smoke, which is an inferential sign of fire, is inseparably connected to fire: it is impossible to pull smoke out of fire and locate it in water, air, sky, or any other place.

Unlike the relationship between *liṅga* and *liṅgin*, the relationship between a word (*śabda*) and its meaning (*artha*), that is, the object denoted by it, is not inseparable. The Sāṃkhya proponent, substantiating the difference between a word and an inferential sign, gives three arguments to demonstrate that the relationship between a word and its meaning is not inseparable: (1) *viparyayāt* (“because of the change”); (2) *deśa-niyamāt* (“because of the restriction to a [particular] place”); and (3) *iṣtato viniyogāt* (“because of the use in accordance with the wish [of a speaker]”).

The first argument—*viparyayāt* (“because of the change”)—is that a word can change its meaning in some other place. The Sāṃkhya proponent rightly points out that the same word can have different meanings in different geographical areas. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* adduces the following possible objection from opponents: the meaning of a word does not change, but only seems to change; a word seems to change its meaning because people inhabiting other regions do not know its genuine meaning. The Sāṃkhya proponent replies to this objection by referring to perception (*pratyakṣa*): a word and the object denoted by it, for example, the word “cow” and an empirical cow, are often perceived separately from each other. The inseparable relationship between two things, which is the ground of inference, is always established by perception. In the case of a word and its meaning, perception proves that there is no inseparable relationship between them. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that a word does not change its meaning.

The second argument—*deśa-niyamāt* (“because of the restriction to a [particular] place”)—is that a word, unlike an inferential sign, is local. The inseparable relationship between *liṅga* and *liṅgin* is a universal relationship: smoke is connected to fire in every geographical region and in every historical period. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* gives concrete examples illustrating the local character of different words. For example, the word *śavati* denotes the action of going only among the people of Kāmbhoja, and the word *dātra* is used for a sickle only by northerners. In some regions, these words are not related to their meanings; therefore, the relationship between a word and its meaning is not inseparable.

The third argument—*iṣtato viniyogāt* (“because of the use in accordance with the wish [of a speaker]”)—is that a word can denote every object, and its relationship with this very meaning (object) is established through its use by the speaker. To illustrate this, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* considers the meanings of the word *ṛddhi*. The word *ṛddhi*, commonly known in the sense of “growth of one’s own body,” is also used as a grammatical term for the vowels constituting the third

(strongest) grade of vowel gradation. It seems very probable to me that the *Yuktidīpikākāra* chooses the technical term from Sanskrit grammar to illustrate his thought because the conventional character of many technical terms, that is, their being created by certain authors, was a well-known fact established by perception. If the conventional character of the relationship between many words and their meanings is obvious and it has always been possible to create new word-meaning relationships, then all words must be conventional in their origin.

According to the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, the relationship between a word and its meaning is not natural and inseparable. The *Yuktidīpikākāra* holds that this relationship depends on the wish (*iṣṭa*)/intention (*abhiprāya*) of the speaker. It follows from this that the Vedas, which consist of words, cannot be a naturally occurring entity, that is, an entity evolving from *prakṛti* without the conscious effort of any author. In this passage, the *Yuktidīpikākāra* accepts the view that all words are conventional in their origin, though he does not use the word “convention” (*samaya*, *saṃketa*). If all words are conventional in their origin, the Vedas, like any other text, can arise in no other way than by the conscious effort of some author (or authors) who knows the convention.

Nirukta* in the context of the *Yuktidīpikā

Having presented the two opposite views on the origin of the Vedas, I shall now consider the *Yuktidīpikā* passage containing the famous quotation from Yāska’s (fifth century BCE) *Nirukta* (1.20),³¹ also cited in the *Vṛtti* on Bhartṛhari’s (between 450 and 510 CE)³² *Vākyapadīya* (1.5).³³ It may seem that by means of this quotation the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* says something about the origin of the Vedas. The quotation has drawn the special attention of many scholars, such as Wilhelm Halbfass (1991: 48n69), Albrecht Wezler (2001), Ashok Aklujkar (2009), Madhav M. Deshpande (2009: 164), and James Kimball (2016: 548), who have discussed its meaning in the context of the *Nirukta*, the *Vākyapadīya* together with its *Vṛtti*,³⁴ or the *Yuktidīpikā*. Detailed studies were undertaken by Aklujkar and Wezler. The

³¹ *sākṣātkṛtadharmaṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuh | te 'varebhyo 'sākṣātkṛtadharmaḥ upadeśena mantrān samprādūh | upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṃ granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣur vedaṃ ca vedāṅgāni ca | bilmaṃ bhilmaṃ bhāsanam iti vā |* (*Nirukta*1998: 41–42). The *Yuktidīpikā* cites this excerpt, save for the last sentence. The last sentence (explaining *bilma*), as Wezler (2001: 241) rightly observes, forms the basis of the statement that follows the quotation in the *Yuktidīpikā*. The quotation found in the *Yuktidīpikā* deviates slightly from the text of the *Nirukta*: in the *Yuktidīpikā*, *aparebhyah* and *apare* (which are the forms of *apara*, meaning “posterior,” “later,” “following,” “inferior,” “lower,” “other”) appear in place of *avarebhyah* and *avare* (the forms of *avara*, meaning “inferior,” “lower,” “posterior,” “later”). The same deviation occurs in the quotation appearing in the *Vṛtti* on Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya* (see below).

³² The dates of Yāska and Bhartṛhari are given according to Coward and Raja (2001: 107, 121).

³³ “*sākṣātkṛtadharmaṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuh te 'parebhyo 'sākṣātkṛtadharmaḥ upadeśena mantrān samprādūh upadeśāya glāyanto 'pare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṃ granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣur vedaṃ vedāṅgāni ca | bilmaṃ bhilmaṃ bhāsanam vā*” *iti |* (*Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*1966: 24–25).

³⁴ It looks like the question of the authorship of the *Vṛtti* on Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya* is still open. In the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, we read, “It seems likely that Bhartṛhari also composed the commentary called *vṛtti* on at least the first two chapters of the *Trikāṇḍī*” (Coward and Raja 2001: 121).

Nirukta is quoted in the commentary on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 51 in the context of defining the eight attainments (*siddhi*, “attainment,” “perfection”), after characterizing the nature of the first three of them: *ūha* (“reflection,” “reasoning,” “consideration,” “comprehension”),³⁵ *śabda* (“word,” “utterance,” “speech,” “communication”), and *adhyayana* (“study”).³⁶

The passage in which the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* explains the first three *siddhis* and cites the *Nirukta* reads as follows:

Of these [the attainment] named “comprehension” (*ūha*) [takes place] when one attains the desired aim by the power of discernment (*vicāraṇa*)³⁷ only, without perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and authoritative verbal testimony (*āgama*). This is the first attainment (*siddhi*) called “causing to cross [the ocean of *saṃsāra*]” (*tāraka*). It is called *tāraka*, for it causes one to cross (*tārayati*) the ocean of *saṃsāra*.

But when one who is obstructed in attaining [the desired aim] by himself attains [it] through the teaching (*upadeśa*) of a *guru*, this is the second attainment called “carrying across easily” (*sutāra*). Whence [is it called so]? Because through this they [that is, the disciples] easily cross the straits of worldly existence (*bhava-saṃkāṣa*) even now (*adyatve 'pi*).

But when one who is unable to attain [the desired aim] even through another’s teaching attains [it] through study (*adhyayana*), this is the third attainment called “causing crossing [of the ocean of *saṃsāra*]” (*tārayant*). It is called *tārayant* because the act of crossing (*tāraṇa-kriyā*) [takes place] even now (*adyatve 'pi*), because it is unceasing (*avyāvṛttatva*), and because it has a large scope (*mahā-viśayatva*). These are the three means by which living beings beginning with Brahmā attain the desired aim. And it is said: “There were seers having a direct insight into the nature [of things which is imperceptible to ordinary people] (*sākṣāt-kṛta-dharman*). They handed down

³⁵ The meaning of the term *ūha* in the *Yuktidīpikā* is not clear. In the context of the passage cited below, it refers to an insight lying beyond the *pramāṇas* by which ordinary people acquire valid knowledge (*pramā*). In *Yuktidīpikā* 23, on the contrary, the commentator interprets knowledge achieved through *ūha* as knowledge of the distinction between *guṇas* and *puruṣa* obtained through *pramāṇa*(s). He distinguishes between this kind of knowledge and liberating knowledge of the distinction between *guṇas* and *prakṛti* which is “produced through practice” (*abhyāsa-ja*). The latter kind of knowledge is the liberating direct insight described in *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 64 (*Yuktidīpikā* 1998: 192.7–14). For the translation and analysis of this passage, see Łucyszyna 2010: 324–28. Kimball (2016: 552–54) gives a different interpretation of this passage of *Yuktidīpikā* 23, but these interpretative differences need not be discussed here.

In the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha, the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, *Mātharavṛtti*, and *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, *ūha* means “reasoning,” “reflection,” “consideration” (in the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, it means reflection on the basis of authoritative texts). In the *Jayamaṅgalā*, this term probably has the same meaning (the *Jayamaṅgalā* passage describing *ūha* is difficult to understand). As it follows from the editions of the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* and *Sāṃkhyasaptatvī* prepared by Solomon, an explanation of *ūha* is missing in the extant manuscripts. For the meaning of *ūha* in the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* and *Mātharavṛtti*, see Kimball 2016: 541–42.

³⁶ The eight attainments are: *ūha*, *śabda*, *adhyayana*, *duḥkha-vighātās trayāḥ* (“three kinds of destruction of suffering”), *suhr̥t-prāpti* (“gaining friends,” “gaining [knowledge] from friend(s)”), and *dāna* (“giving,” “donation,” “charity”) (*Sāṃkhyakārikā* 51).

³⁷ *Vicāraṇa*—in the context of the cited passage, this term can also be translated as “mental grasp” or “contemplation.”

mantras by teaching (*upadeśa*) to the later ones (*apara*), destitute of a direct insight into the nature [of things] (*a-sākṣāt-kṛta-dharma*). The later ones, tired of [/disinclined toward] teaching, compiled this work, the Veda, and the Vedāṅgas for grasping a *bilma* (*bilma-grahaṇāya*)” [*Nirukta* 1.20]. *Bilma* [means] “understanding” (*bhāsana*); [thus] a special designation of a thorough understanding (*saṃyak-pratibhāsa*) is presented.³⁸

My translation of this passage is for the purposes of this study, and I shall not go into its terminological intricacies or all the richness and subtleties of its meaning. I would also like to emphasize that I interpret the quotation from the *Nirukta* as an integral part of this *Yuktidīpikā* passage describing the attainments.

In the quotation from the *Nirukta*, it is said that seers (*ṛṣi*), “having a direct insight into the nature [of things]” (*sākṣāt-kṛta-dharman*), transmitted *mantras* by teaching (*upadeśa*) to “the later ones” (*apara*), “destitute of a direct insight into the nature [of things]” (*a-sākṣāt-kṛta-dharma*),³⁹ and that these “later ones” compiled “this work” (*imaṃ grantham*), the Veda, and the Veda ancillaries (*vedāṅga*). By “this work,” Yāska meant the *Nighaṇṭu*, the collection of Vedic words explained in his *Nirukta*.

In the context of the *Yuktidīpikā*, scholars interpret this quotation as an illustration of either the third attainment, or the second and third attainments, or all of the first three attainments. According to Aklujkar (2009: 85), the *Nirukta* is cited to explain the third (*adhyayana*) *siddhi*. Wezler writes that the *Nirukta* is “quite evidently quoted in order to give a particularly significant example for the operation of the second and third of the *siddhis*” (2001: 240). Kimball holds that the *Nirukta* is cited “apparently to illustrate the nature of these three *siddhis* by relating *ūha* to the knowledge of the Vedic *ṛṣis* who have ‘the qualities [of things] placed [directly] before the eyes’ (*sākṣāt-kṛtadharman*), and relating *śabda* and *adhyayana* to the transmission of Vedic knowledge through the *guru-śiṣya* relationship and through composed texts, respectively” (2016: 548).

The point on which the three scholars agree is that the quotation from the *Nirukta* functions in the *Yuktidīpikā* as an illustration of some of the *siddhis*, and I subscribe to their opinion. As to the question of which *siddhis* are exemplified by this

³⁸ *tatroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam arthaṃ vicāraṇabalenaiva pratipadyate sādya siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate | tārayati saṃsārārṇavād iti tārakam | yadā tu svayaṃ pratipattau pratihanyamāno gurūpadeśāt pratipadyate sā dvitīyā siddhiḥ sutāram ity apadiśyate | katham | sukham anenādyatve 'pi bhavasamkātāt tarantūti | yadā tv anyopadeśād apy asamarthaḥ pratipattum adhyayanena sādhayati sā tṛtīyā siddhis tārayantam ity apadiśyate | tad etat tāraṇakriyāyā adyatve 'py avyāvṛttatvān mahāviṣyatvāt tārayantam ity apadiśam | ta ete trayah sādhanopāyā yair ā brahmaṇaḥ prāṇino 'bhipretam arthaṃ prāpnvanti | āha ca “sākṣāt-kṛtadharmaṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuh | te 'parebhyo sākṣāt-kṛtadharmaṇebhya upadeśena mantrān sampraduḥ | upadeśāya glāyanto 'pare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṃ granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣur vedaṃ ca vedāṅgāni ca” (Nir. 1.20) iti | bilmaṃ bhāsanaṃ saṃyakpratibhāśāya viśiṣṭaḥ saṃketa uktaḥ | (Yuktidīpikā 1998: 251.12–252.2).*

³⁹ It is not clear why the *Yuktidīpikā* reads *asākṣāt-kṛtadharmaṇebhya* instead of *asākṣāt-kṛtadharmaṇbhya*, deviating thus from the *Nirukta* (cited in footnote 31) and the *Vākyapadīya*'s *Vṛtti* (cited in footnote 33). Can it be a mistake that should be corrected in a critical edition? This deviation probably does not influence the meaning. For the meaning and possible translations of *sākṣāt-kṛta-dharman*, see Ruegg 1994; Wezler 2001: 223–30; Aklujkar 2009: 12–28.

quotation, I agree with Kimball that it illustrates all of the first three *siddhis*. The first attainment—*ūha*—takes place when one achieves liberating knowledge (that is, the “seeing” [*darśana*] of the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* with its products)⁴⁰ by the power of mental discernment (*vicāraṇa*) which is beyond the *pramāṇas* applied by ordinary people, and this discernment corresponds to the seers’ direct insight into the imperceptible reality. The second attainment—*śabda*—occurs when one who is unable to come to liberating knowledge through such extraordinary mental discernment (*vicāraṇa*) achieves this knowledge through the *upadeśa* of a *guru*, and in the quotation from the *Nirukta*, “the later ones” (*apara*), destitute of the direct insight into the imperceptible reality, attain liberating knowledge in this very way, that is, through the *upadeśa* (of the seers). The third attainment—*adhyayana*—takes place when one who is unable to achieve liberating knowledge through another’s teaching (*upadeśa*) achieves it through study (*adhyayana*), and in the *Nirukta* quotation, “the later ones” (*apara*), “tired of teaching,” probably because of the limited learning capacity of those they tried to teach, compile for them the texts to study.

Hence, the first attainment characterizes the seers; the second characterizes “the later ones” taught by the seers; and the third characterizes all those for whom “the later ones” compiled the texts. In addition to these correspondences, the assumption that the *Nirukta* quotation illustrates all of the first three *siddhis* is confirmed by the following fact. The *Yuktidīpikā* author cites the *Nirukta* not immediately after the description of the third attainment, but after the summarizing sentence (coming after this description) in which he states that by the above three means, living beings attain their aim.⁴¹

In my opinion, it is rather unlikely that by quoting the *Nirukta*, the *Yuktidīpikā* author aims to communicate something about the origin of the Vedas. Even if he touches on this issue (indirectly), it is not clear whether the primeval Veda was merely perceived by the *ṛṣis*, and thus has no author, or, as in earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, was created by them on the basis of their direct insight into the reality imperceptible to ordinary people.

Why does the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* choose this citation to illustrate Sāṃkhya thought? I think that the inclusion of this quotation in the text of the *Yuktidīpikā* is an element of an important project of the *Yuktidīpikākāra* which Shujun Motegi calls an attempt at “reconciliation with the Vedas” (2006: 54).⁴² This project is realized by the *Yuktidīpikā* author mainly in the commentary on the second *kārikā*, in the vast polemics with Mīmāṃsā on the highest goal of man and the means of achieving it. The *Yuktidīpikā* is the first classical Sāṃkhya text that endeavors to substantiate that the Vedas comprise not only ritual parts, but also the highest science of liberation through knowledge.

⁴⁰ *Yuktidīpikā* 1998: 253.11.

⁴¹ By this aim, liberation (*kaivalya*, literally “isolation [of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*]”) is meant; see the end of the commentary on this *kārikā* (*Yuktidīpikā* 1998: 253.12–13).

⁴² Such reconciliation was badly needed. It is difficult not to agree with Ham who writes, “The Sāṃkhyas, with their critique of the Vedic cultural norm, went to an extreme and, by doing so, risked their membership in the loose association of Brahmanical intellectual circles, collectively termed ‘*āstika*’” (2016: 137).

Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in the first two *kārikās* of his *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, along with all classical Sāṃkhya commentators explaining these *kārikās*, claims that the Sāṃkhya means of eliminating suffering (*duḥkha*) through the discriminative knowledge (*vijñāna*) of *prakṛti*, its products, and *puruṣa* is superior to the Vedic (*ānuśravika*) means because the Sāṃkhya means lead to the complete and final elimination of suffering, whereas by performing a Vedic ritual, a human being will continue to remain in *saṃsāra* and experience suffering. This distinction between the Sāṃkhya means and the Vedic means suggests that Sāṃkhya and *śruti* conflict with one another, for none of the classical Sāṃkhya authors before the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* observed that the Vedas contain more than just ritual parts. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā*—for the first time in classical Sāṃkhya history—attempts to show that the Vedas comprise not only ritual parts, but also those parts that teach the path of liberation through knowledge; that according to *śruti*, the science of liberation through knowledge is the highest science, for it leads to the complete and final elimination of suffering; and that Sāṃkhya is identical with this highest science of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṣads (*Yuktidīpikā* 2).⁴³

The first view on the origin of the Vedas presented above, according to which the Vedas have no author, and thus possess an unquestionable authority, differing in this respect from all other kinds of authoritative verbal testimony, is, too, an integral part of this project to reconcile Sāṃkhya with the Vedas.⁴⁴

What characterizes the *Yuktidīpikā* passage quoting the *Nirukta* as a part of this project to reconcile Sāṃkhya with the Vedas? The passage contains the following implications which indicate that it is a part of this project. The Vedic seers achieved liberating knowledge (of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*) in the most perfect way—their attainment (*siddhi*) called *ūha* is the first, that is, the most excellent among the attainments. The Vedic seers transmitted their knowledge to other people, destitute of the capacity to achieve it through *ūha*, and the latter ones achieved liberating knowledge thanks to the seers' *upadeśa*. The people taught by the Vedic seers compiled the Vedas, encompassing the science of liberation, as well as the texts explaining them, and it is now possible to achieve liberating knowledge through study of the Vedas. It follows from this passage that the Vedas contain the highest science of liberation through the discriminative knowledge of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, and therefore should be respected, and that Sāṃkhya is a Vedic doctrine.

When Yāska, cited in the *Yuktidīpikā*, referred to “this work” (*imaṃ grantham*), he meant the *Nighaṇṭu* commented on in his *Nirukta*, but the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* could have alluded to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* commented on in his *Yuktidīpikā* and suggested in this way that both the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and *Yuktidīpikā* were works explaining the Vedas.

I consider the passage quoting the *Nirukta* to be a part of the *Yuktidīpikā*'s project to reconcile Sāṃkhya with the Vedas, for this passage implies that the Vedas teach the highest science of liberation through knowledge. It is worth noting, however,

⁴³ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 35.9–54.16.

⁴⁴ To quote Motegi's opinion about the *Yuktidīpikā* interpretation of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (5) definition of authoritative verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*): “It is to be surmised that by means of this interpretation the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* sought to differentiate the Vedas from all other reliable sources and show that they are exceptional in their reliability” (2006: 53).

that Kapila's status in the *Yuktidīpikā* is higher than the status of the Vedic ṛṣis mentioned in this passage. The seers attain liberating knowledge (through *ūha*), whereas Kapila does not need to acquire it, for it is inborn (*sāmsiddhika*) to him (*Yuktidīpikā* 4⁴⁵, 43⁴⁶, and 69⁴⁷). In the commentary on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 43, the *Yuktidīpikākāra* says directly that *ūha* does not take place in the case of Kapila, as his perfect knowledge originates together with his subtle and physical body.⁴⁸

Conclusion

The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* wavers between at least two different views on the origin of the Vedas. The first view is that the authorless but noneternal Vedas evolve from *prakṛti* at the beginning of a *kalpa* and merge into *prakṛti* during a *pralaya*. The *Yuktidīpikā* is the first classical Sāṃkhya text to state directly that the Vedas have no author and to distinguish clearly between the Vedas, being independent of any author, and thus having the highest, unquestionable authority, and verbal testimony whose authority depends on the authority of its author. The ideas and terminology of the passages in which the *Yuktidīpikākāra* affirms the authorlessness of the Vedas confirm that he was influenced by Mīmāṃsā.

The second and opposite *Yuktidīpikā* view on the origin of the Vedas is that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas set forth in the Upaniṣads. This view is expressed only indirectly. Omniscient Kapila, appearing at the beginning of a *kalpa*, creates the primary linguistic convention and Sāṃkhya doctrine, the latter being identical with the highest teaching of the Vedas, and his role is similar to the role of Īśvara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who creates names and the Vedas at the beginning of creation.

The *Yuktidīpikā* contains the famous citation from Yāska's *Nirukta* (1.20), and it may seem that by means of this quotation, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* communicates ideas about the origin of the Vedas. The *Nirukta* is cited in the context of defining the eight attainments (*siddhi*), and the citation functions as an illustration of the first three of them. It is rather unlikely that by quoting the *Nirukta*, the *Yuktidīpikākāra* intends to say something about the origin of the Vedas. Even if he touches on this issue indirectly, it is not clear from this passage whether the primeval Veda was perceived by the seers, and thus has no author, or, as in the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, was created by them on the basis of their insight into imperceptible reality. The *Yuktidīpikā* passage containing the quotation from the *Nirukta* can hardly be regarded as supporting either of the two views presented above.

Why does the *Yuktidīpikākāra* select this quotation to illustrate Sāṃkhya thought? The inclusion of this citation in the text of the *Yuktidīpikā* can be explained as a part of his important and pioneering (that is, new to Sāṃkhya) project to

⁴⁵ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 67.20–68.2, 75.19–24.

⁴⁶ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 233.31–234.9.

⁴⁷ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 267.13

⁴⁸ *Yuktidīpikā*1998: 233.31–234.4. On this passage, see Kimball 2016: 550.

reconcile Sāṃkhya with the Vedas. The passage quoting the *Nirukta* implies that the Vedas teach the highest science of liberation through the discriminative knowledge of *prakṛti* with its products and *puruṣa*, and therefore should be revered, and that Sāṃkhya is a Vedic doctrine. The first view on the origin of the Vedas considered above, too, is a part of this project to reconcile Sāṃkhya with the Vedas.

Which of these opposite views on the origin of the Vedas accords with Sāṃkhya doctrine? The first view, based on the idea of the authorless Vedas and influenced by Mīmāṃsā, presupposes that not only the Vedas, but also the words and linguistic sounds that constitute the Vedas evolve from *prakṛti* at the beginning of a *kalpa* and exist (actually, not potentially) until the next *pralaya*. This view is not in agreement with the Sāṃkhya system. For Sāṃkhya, each particular sound (linguistic as well as nonlinguistic) is a unique and transient modification (*vikāra*) or manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of *prakṛti* that comes into actual existence only once; it is not something that can be manifested many times—by different speakers (or other causes), at different times, and in different places.⁴⁹ The second view, according to which the Vedas have an author, is grounded on the assumption that the origin of all words is conventional. I think that this view is compatible with the Sāṃkhya system. However, in accepting it, Sāṃkhya had to develop a theory of universals—not only of universals of things, but also of universals of words and linguistic sounds—to explain how language learning and communication are possible. It is difficult to find a place for a universal as a separate ontological category in the Sāṃkhya system, but Sāṃkhya could admit universals as general notions.⁵⁰

Why does the *Yuktidīpikā*—and Sāṃkhya in general—accept as its “official” standpoint that view on the origin of the Vedas which is in conflict with the Sāṃkhya doctrine, namely, the first view, which holds that the Vedas have no author, evolving from *prakṛti* spontaneously? The second *Yuktidīpikā* view, which holds that Kapila is the author of the highest teaching of the Vedas, implies that the status of Sāṃkhya is not lower and may even be higher than the status of the Vedas. Such a view, if stated directly, could hardly enhance the reputation of Sāṃkhya as a school of philosophy that recognizes the authority of the Vedas. The first view, on the contrary, maintains the highest and most distinguished status of the Vedas, and therefore is the proper choice to secure a place for Sāṃkhya in Indian intellectual history. This is why the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* affirms the first view as the

⁴⁹ See Łucyszyna 2016: 304–5, 316–19.

⁵⁰ Indian philosophers were aware that the word-meaning relationship making language learning and communication possible cannot be based on word and meaning understood as unique and transient entities. For this reason, the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, rejecting the Mīmāṃsā conception of everlasting words, introduced the conception of universals of words. Pind (1991) holds that the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga, too, was aware of the problem. Pind shows that according to Dignāga, the relationship between a word and its meaning is the relationship between a word universal (*śabda-sāmānya*) and a meaning universal (*artha-sāmānya*), that is, the relationship between types, not between “their individual realizations (*artha-śabda-viśeṣa*),” which “are claimed not to constitute such a relation because they have not previously been observed together” (1991: 270). For Dignāga, unlike for the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, a universal is not something existing independently of our minds. Classical Sāṃkhya did not develop a theory of universals. It also did not develop a theory of word meaning. On word meaning and universals in classical Sāṃkhya, see Łucyszyna 2016: 305–9.

“official” standpoint of the Sāṃkhya *darśana*, including it in his pioneering project to reconcile Sāṃkhya with the Vedas.

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