Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Mental Institutions

  • Published:
Topoi Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We propose to extend Clark and Chalmer’s concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions (e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on “objective spirit” which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are pieces of the mind, externalized in their specific time and place. These institutions are the products of shared mental processes. We then use these institutions instrumentally to do further cognitive work, for example, to solve problems or to control behavior.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Clark and Chalmers introduce these criteria around their discussion of belief. Clark (2008b) seems to generalize them to apply to all cognitive processes. Our argument here is that these are not necessary criteria that apply to all cognition, especially if one thinks of cognition in terms of cognitive processes and activities, e.g., problem solving, rather than in terms of mental states, e.g., beliefs.

  2. Much of the analysis in the Philosophy of Right turns on the concept of the will. Of this Hegel says, “The distinction between thought and will is only that between the theoretical and the practical. These, however, are surely not two faculties: the will is rather a special way of thinking, thinking translating itself into existence, thinking as the urge to give itself existence” (1949, Addition 4).

References

  • Adams F, Aizawa K (2001) The bounds of cognition. Philos Psychol 14(1):43–64

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark A (2008a) The frozen cyborg: a reply to Selinger and Engström. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 7(3):343–346

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark A (2008b) Supersizing the mind: reflections on embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, NY

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark A, Chalmers D (1998) The extended mind. Analysis 58.1:7–19

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hegel GWF (1949) Philosophy of right (trans: Knox TM), Clarendon, Oxford

  • Selinger E, Engström T (2008) A moratorium on cyborgs: computation, cognition, and commerce. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 7(3):327–342

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy, Cognitive Sciences and IST, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, 32816-1352, USA

    Shaun Gallagher

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, England, UK

    Shaun Gallagher & Anthony Crisafi

  3. Philosophy and Humanities, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, 32816-1352, USA

    Anthony Crisafi

Authors
  1. Shaun Gallagher
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Anthony Crisafi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shaun Gallagher.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gallagher, S., Crisafi, A. Mental Institutions. Topoi 28, 45–51 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9045-0

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9045-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation