



# Correction to: Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values

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## Correction to: Theory and Decision

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In Sect. 3.3, the terms “one-person” and “(n – 1)-person” were incorrectly updated by mistake during the correction stage in the online published article. The correct sentences are given below:

Proportionately decreasing redistribution in one-person unanimity games (PDR<sup>1</sup>): For any  $(N, u_i), (M, u_j) \in G$ , with  $i, k \in N$ ,  $i \neq k$ ,  $2 \leq |N|$ ,  $j, \ell \in M$ ,  $j \neq \ell$ , and  $2 \leq |M|$ ,  $|N|f_k(N, u_i) = |M|f_\ell(M, u_j)$ .

Proportionately decreasing redistribution in (n – 1)-person unanimity games (PDR<sup>n-1</sup>): For any  $(N, u_{N \setminus i}), (M, u_{M \setminus j}) \in G$ , with  $i \in N$ ,  $3 \leq |N|$ ,  $j \in M$ , and  $3 \leq |M|$ ,  $|N|f_i(N, u_{N \setminus i}) = |M|f_j(M, u_{M \setminus j})$ .

The original article has been corrected accordingly.

We apologize for the error introduced during the production process.

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The original article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09781-1>.

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