Abstract
This paper shows that temperance is the highest order risk preference condition for which spreading N independent and unfair risks provides the highest level of welfare than any other possible allocations of risks. These results are also interpreted through the concept of N-superadditivity of the utility premium. This paper provides a novel application of temperance, not in terms of two risks as it is common, but in terms of N risks.
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Notes
Obviously, the lottery \((0,X_{1}+X_{2},X_{3})\) is equivalent in terms of welfare to the lottery \((X_{1}+X_{2},0,X_{3})\) that is equivalent to the lottery \((X_{1}+X_{2},X_{3},0)\) since lotteries are three state equiprobable lotteries.
Risks spreading refers, throughout the paper, to spreading the N risks each over N states.
Note that under simple and usual regularity conditions (u defined over \( \mathbb {R}^{+}\), non-satiation and bounded marginal utility tending to plus infinity), item (b) of Proposition 1 holds when the DM is only temperate without requiring risk aversion and prudence (see Menegatti 2014, Propositions 2 and 3). Indeed, under these simple conditions, Menegatti (2014) shows that prudence implies risk aversion and that temperance implies prudence.
In item (b) of Proposition 1, we assume that each \(X_{i}\) is dominated by 0 via second-order stochastic dominance as it is usual in economics since Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Note that second-order stochastic dominance implies stochastic dominance of higher orders. Consequently, our results hold in cases where \(X_{i}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}-s}0\)\(\forall s\ge 3\). If, instead of the Rothschild and Stiglitz assumption, we assume that \(X_{i}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}-s}0\) with \(s\ge 3\), it is easy to show that item (b) of Proposition 1 writes then as follows: for all mixed risk averse from 1 to 2s decision-makers (\((-1)^{n+1}u^{(n)}>0\)\(\forall n=1,\ldots ,2s\)) when \( X_{i}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}-s}0\).
In the case where the L background risks are not introduced in each state, they can be then considered as additional risks. The DM faces then \(N+L\) risks. If we assume \(\tilde{\epsilon }_{l}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}0\) with \(k=1,2,\) i.e. if we assume that these risks share the same properties as \(X_{i}\) for all i, this case brings us back to the previous remark (i.e. the case with a number of risks greater than the number of states).
References
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Louis Eeckhoudt as well as two anonymous referees for valuable comments and discussions. This research has benefited from the financial support of IDEXLYON from Université de Lyon (project INDEPTH) within the Programme Investissements d’Avenir (ANR- 16-IDEX-005).
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The proof uses the theorem of Eeckhoudt et al. (2009) and its corollary.
Theorem
(Eeckhoudt et al. 2009) Suppose that\(Y_{i}\) dominates \(\eta \)\(_{i}\) via \(n_{i}\)th order stochastic dominance for\(i=1,2\) (\(\eta _{1}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{n_{1}}}Y_{1}\)and\(\eta _{2}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{n_{2}}}Y_{2}\)) and suppose that\(\eta _{1},\eta _{2},Y_{1},Y_{2}\)are mutually independent risks. The 50–50 lottery\([\eta _{1}+Y_{2},Y_{1}+\eta _{2}]\)dominates the 50–50 i \([\eta _{1}+\eta _{2},Y_{1}+Y_{2}]\) via \((n_{1}+n_{2})\)th order stochastic dominance.
Corollary
(Eeckhoudt et al. 2009) Suppose that\(Y_{i}\)dominates\(\eta _{i}\) via \( n_{i}\)th order Ekern dominance for\(i=1,2\) (\(\eta _1 \preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{n_1}} Y_1\)and\(\eta _2 \preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{n_2}} Y_2\)) and suppose that\(\eta _{1},\eta _{2},Y_{1},Y_{2}\)are mutually independent risks. The 50–50 lottery\([\eta _{1}+Y_{2},Y_{1}+ \eta _{2}]\)dominates the 50–50 lottery\([\eta _{1}+ \eta _{2},Y_{1}+Y_{2}]\) via \((n_{1}+n_{2})\)th order Ekern dominance.
When \(Y_{1}=Y_{2}=0\) and using the Expected Utility Theory model, the EST (2009) theorem and its corollary, respectively, can be rewritten as follows:
EST (2009) Theorem: the inequality \(E[u(x+\eta _{1})]+E[u(x+\eta _{2})]\ge u(x)+E[u(x+\eta _{1}+\eta _{2})]\) holds for all utility function u such that \((-1)^{(s+1)}u^{(s)}>0\)\(\forall s=1, \ldots , n_{1}+n_{2}\).
EST (2009) Corollary: the inequality \(E[u(x+\eta _{1})]+E[u(x+\eta _{2})]\ge u(x)+E[u(x+\eta _{1}+\eta _{2})]\) holds for all utility function u such that \((-1)^{(n_1+n_2+1)}u^{(n_1+n_2)}>0\).
In the case \(N=2\), Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, respectively, coincide with the EST theorem and its corollary. To prove the result in the case of N risks with \(N \ge 3\), we use the property of convolution stability of \(SD_{k}\) (see Propositions 3–11 in Denuit et al. (1998) for more details):
Convolution stability propertySuppose two random independent variables \(X_1\) and \(X_2\)such that \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}0\) and \(X_{2} \preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}0\) for all\(k=1,2\), then\(X_{1}+X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}} 0\) for all\(k=1,2\).
We make the proof of Eq. (6) by steps. Let us rewrite Eq. (6) as follows:
where indexes \(1,2,\ldots , N-1\) indicate the different steps. In step 1, we show the first part of the preference relation, \(\Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N} \Bigr )\succeq _1 \Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-1}\Bigr )\), in step 2 we show the second part of the preference relation, \(\Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-1}\Bigr ) \succeq _2 \Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-2}\Bigr )\), in step 3 we show the third part of the preference relation, \(\Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-2}\Bigr ) \succeq _2 \Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-3}\Bigr )\), etc.
Step 1\(\Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N}\Bigr )\succeq _{1}\Bigl ( \{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-1}\Bigr )\) (P1)
The left-hand side term of (P1) writes as \(\sum _{i=1}^{N}E[u(x+X_{i})]\). In the set of N risks \(X_{i}\), we choose two risks that we name \(X_{t}\) and \(X_{l}\), and that we regroup into a single risk \(X_{t}+X_{l}\) in the right-hand side term of (P1). Using this, (P1) rewrites as
for all \(t\le N\), \(l\le N\), \(t\ne l\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\) that is equivalent to
which holds following EST (2009) theorem for all u such that \( (-1)^{(s+1)}u^{(s)}>0\)\(\forall s=1,\ldots ,2k\) if \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{2}\), \(k=1,2\). This inequality also holds following EST (2009) corollary for all u such that \(u^{(4)}<0\) in the particular case where risks are zero-mean risks, i.e. \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{2}\).
In the expression \(\sum _{i=1}^{N}E[u(x+X_{i})]+E[u(x+X_{t}+X_{l})]+u(x)\) (with \(t\le N\), \(l\le N\), \(t\ne l\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\)), we can consider that we have \((N-1)\) risks. Indeed, let us write \(X_{i}^{1}=X_{i}\)\( \forall i=1,\ldots ,N-2\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\), and \( X_{N-1}^{1}=X_{t}+X_{l}\), then the above expression can be equivalently rewritten as \(\sum _{i=1}^{N-1}E[u(x+X_{i}^{1})]+u(x)\) with \(X_{i}^{1}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}0\)\(\forall i\), for all \(k=1,2\) following the convolution stability property. Using the same technique as the one used at the beginning of step 1 to rewrite \(\sum _{i=1}^{N}E[u(x+X_{i})]\), the expression \( \sum _{i=1}^{N-1}E[u(x+X_{i}^{1})]+u(x)\) can thus be equivalently rewritten as \(\sum _{i=1}^{N-1}E[u(x+X_{i}^{1})]+E[u(x+X_{t}^{1})]+E[u(x+X_{l}^{1})]+u(x)\) for all \(t\le N-1\), \(l\le N-1\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\).
Step 2\(\Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-1}\Bigr )\succeq _{2}\Bigl ( \{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-2}\Bigr )\) (P2)
Following the same methodology as the one used in step 1, (P2) rewrites equivalently as
for all \(t\le N-1\), \(l\le N-1\), \(t\ne l\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\) that is equivalent to
which holds following EST (2009) theorem for all u such that \( (-1)^{(s+1)}u^{(s)}>0\)\(\forall s=1,\ldots ,2k\) if \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{2}\), \(k=1,2\). This inequality also holds following EST (2009) corollary for all u such that \(u^{(4)}<0\) in the particular case where risks are zero-mean risks, i.e. \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{2}\).
In the expression \( \sum _{i=1}^{N-1}E[u(x+X_{i}^{1})]+E[u(x+X_{t}^{1}+X_{l}^{1})]+2u(x)\), we can consider that we have \((N-2)\) risks \(X_{i}^{2}\) (i.e. \((N-3)\) risks \( X_{i}^{1}\) and 1 risk \(X_{t}^{1}+X_{l}^{1}\)). Thus, it can be equivalently rewritten as \(\sum _{i=1}^{N-2}E[u(x+X_{i}^{2})]+2u(x)\) with \(X_{i}^{2}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}0\) for all \(k=1,2\) following the convolution stability property. It can also be rewritten as \( \sum _{i=1}^{N-2}E[u(x+X_{i}^{2})]+E[u(x+X_{t}^{2})]+E[u(x+X_{l}^{2})]+2u(x)\) for all \(t\le N-2\), \(l\le N-2\), \(t\ne l\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\).
Step 3\(\Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-2}\Bigr )\succeq _{3}\Bigl ( \{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-3}\Bigr )\) (P3)
Following the same methodology as the one used in step 2, (P3) rewrites equivalently as
for all \(t\le N-2\), \(l\le N-2\), \(t\ne l\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\) that is equivalent to
which holds following EST (2009) theorem for all u such that \( (-1)^{(s+1)}u^{(s)}>0\)\(\forall s=1,\ldots ,2k\) if \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{2}\), \(k=1,2\). This inequality also holds following EST (2009) corollary for all u such that \(u^{(4)}<0\) in the particular case where risks are zero-mean risks, i.e. \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{2}\).
In the expression \(\sum _{i=1}^{N-2}E[u(x+X_{i}^{2})]+E[u(x+X_{t}^{2}+X_{l}^{2})]+3u(x)\), we can consider that we have \((N-4)\) risks \(X_{i}^{3}\) (i.e. \((N-2)\) risks \( X_{i}^{2}\) and 1 risk \(X_{t}^{2}+X_{l}^{2}\)). Thus, it can be equivalently rewritten as \(\sum _{i=1}^{N-3}E[u(x+X_{i}^{3})]+3u(x)\) with \(X_{i}^{3}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}0\) for all \(k=1,2\) following the convolution stability property. It can also be rewritten as \( \sum _{i=1}^{N-3}E[u(x+X_{i}^{3})]+E[u(x+X_{t}^{3})]+E[u(x+X_{l}^{3})]+3u(x)\) for all \(t\le N-3\), \(l\le N-3\), \(t\ne l\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\).
Step m\(\Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-(m-1)}\Bigr )\succeq _{m}\Bigl ( \{X_{i}\}_{N}^{N-m}\Bigr )\) (Pm)
(Pm) rewrites equivalently as
for all \(t\le N-(m-1)\), \(l\le N-(m-1)\), \(t\ne l\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\) that is equivalent to
which holds following EST (2009) theorem for all u such that \( (-1)^{(s+1)}u^{(s)}>0\)\(\forall s=1,\ldots ,2k\) if \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{2}\), \(k=1,2\). This inequality also holds following EST (2009) corollary for all u such that \(u^{(4)}<0\) in the particular case where risks are zero-mean risks, i.e. \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{2}\).
In the expression \( \sum _{i=1}^{N-(m-1)}E[u(x+X_{i}^{m-1})]+E[u(x+X_{t}^{m-1}+X_{l}^{m-1})]+mu(x) \), we can consider that we have \((N-m)\) risks \(X_{i}^{m}\) (i.e. \((N-m-1))\) risks \(X_{i}^{m-1}\) and 1 risk \(X_{t}^{m-1}+X_{l}^{m-1}\)). Thus, it can be equivalently rewritten as \( \sum _{i=1}^{N-m}E[u(x+X_{i}^{m})]+E[u(x+X_{t}^{m})]+E[u(x+X_{l}^{m})]+mu(x)\) with \(X_{i}^{m}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}0\) for all \(k=1,2\) following the convolution stability property.
Step N-2\(\Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{3}\Bigr )\succeq _{N-2} \Bigl ( \{X_{i}\}_{N}^{2}\Bigr )\)\((P(N-2))\)
\((P(N-2))\) rewrites equivalently as
for all \(t\le N-(N-3)\), \(l\le N-(N-3)\), \(t\ne l\), \(i\ne t\) and \(i\ne l\) that is equivalent to
which holds following EST (2009) theorem for all u such that \( (-1)^{(s+1)}u^{(s)}>0\)\(\forall s=1,\ldots ,2k\) if \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{2}\), \(k=1,2\). This inequality also holds following EST (2009) corollary for all u such that \(u^{(4)}<0\) in the particular case where risks are zero-mean risks, i.e. \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{2}\).
In the expression \(\sum _{i=1}^{N-(N-3)} E[u(x+X_i^{N-3})] + E[u(x+X_t^{N-3}+X_l^{N-3})] +(N-2)u(x)\), we have 2 risks \(X_i^{N-2}\) (1 risk \(X_i^{N-3}\) and 1 risk \(X_t^{N-3}+X_l^{N-3}\)). Thus, it can be equivalently rewritten as \(\sum _{i=1}^{2} E[u(x+X_i^{N-2})] + (N-2) u(x)\) with \(X_{i}^{N-2} \preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}} 0\) for all \(k=1,2\) following the convolution stability property.
Step N-1 \(\Bigl (\{X_{i}\}_{N}^{2}\Bigr )\succeq _{N-1} \Bigl ( \{X_{i}\}_{N}^{1}\Bigr )\) \((P(N-1))\)
\((P(N-1))\) rewrites equivalently as
\(\sum _{i=1}^{2}E[u(x+X_{i}^{N-2})]+(N-2)u(x)\ge E[u(x+X_{1}^{N-2}+X_{2}^{N-2})]+(N-1)u(x)\) which holds following EST (2009) theorem for all u such that \((-1)^{(s+1)}u^{(s)}>0\)\(\forall s=1,\ldots ,2k \) if \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {SD}}_{k}}Y_{2}\), \( k=1,2\). This inequality also holds following EST (2009) corollary for all u such that \(u^{(4)}<0\) in the particular case where risks are zero-mean risks, i.e. \(X_{1}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{1}\) and \(X_{2}\preceq _{{\text {Ekern}}_{2}}Y_{2}\).
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Courbage, C., Rey, B. On temperance and risk spreading. Theory Decis 88, 527–539 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09737-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09737-0