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Social aspects of scientific knowledge

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Abstract

From its inception in 1987 social epistemology has been divided into analytic (ASE) and critical (CSE) approaches, represented by Alvin I. Goldman and Steve Fuller, respectively. In this paper, the agendas and some basic ideas of ASE and CSE are compared and assessed by bringing into the discussion also other participants of the debates on the social aspects of scientific knowledge—among them Raimo Tuomela, Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino. The six topics to be analyzed include individual and collective epistemic agents; the notion of scientific community; realism and constructivism; truth-seeking communities; epistemic and social values; science, experts, and democracy.

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Notes

  1. In this paper I cannot discuss David Bloor’s Strong Programme as an important strand of social epistemology (but see Niiniluoto 1999, pp. 252–267). For defenses of the Edinburgh school, see Kusch (2011, 2018).

  2. One of the referees fears that the treatment of knowledge production in terms of epistemic values may appear detached from “any overarching conception of humanity”. I argue below that applied research and technology (even though their truth claims are grounded in epistemic criteria as well) leave ample room for ethical, ecological, and social values which serve to promote the survival and well-being of humanity. Democratic science policy with educated citizens is the best warrant for the implementation of such humane values.

  3. I am grateful to Finn Collin for useful comments on my comparison of ASE and CSE.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, History, and Art Studies, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 24, 00014, Helsinki, Finland

    Ilkka Niiniluoto

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Niiniluoto, I. Social aspects of scientific knowledge. Synthese 197, 447–468 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1868-7

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