Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things?

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

I discuss Edouard Machery’s claim that philosophers and psychologists when using the term ‘concept’ are really theorizing about different things. This view is not new, but it has never been developed or defended in detail. Once spelled out, we can see that Machery is right that the psychological literature uses a different notion of concept. However, Machery fails to acknowledge that the two notions are not only compatible but complementary. This fits more with the traditional view according to which philosophers and psychologists are merely interested in different aspects of the same kind. The main aim of this paper is then to show how precisely the two notions of ‘concept’ relate. Distinguishing them resolves the long-standing debate on whether concepts can be prototypes and allows me to formulate success conditions of a theory of categorization that are independent of the success conditions of a theory of concepts.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. I use capital letters to denote concepts, single quotation marks to denote words and italics for emphasis and to denote properties.

  2. I call this view “categorization invariantism” in order to distinguish it from a different theory in philosophy of language called “semantic minimalism” or “invariantism” (e.g., Borg 2012). Similarly, I speak of “categorization contextualism” in order to distinguish contextualists about categorization devices like Barsalou (1987) or Prinz (2002) from semantic contextualists like Travis (2008) or Recanati (2010).

  3. However, what is stored in a categorization device may contribute to or even explain the intuitive truth conditions of a sentence (see Del Pinal 2016 for what I take to be a similar claim).

  4. In the following I use a deliberately simplified version of prototype theory. I want to show that even this simple version (e.g., Rosch 1983) is immune to the common objections often raised against it. Updated versions can be found in Hampton (2000, 2006), Rosch (2011) or Del Pinal (2016).

  5. Although such an argument can be made of course. Del Pinal (2015), for instance, argues that epistemic content (what he calls c-structure) does not need to determine a concepts’ reference.

  6. I focus on a very strict understanding of these requirements (as demanded by Fodor 1998 for instance) in order to show that even they are compatible with the more relaxed requirements of a theory of categorization devices. I do not want to rule out that the many attempts to show how context-dependence is compatible with the idea of compositionality (e.g., by Hampton and Jönsson 2012; Del Pinal 2015 or Recanati 2010) have been successful. However, I would like to add that most of these attempts aim to explain the compositionality of linguistic expressions and not necessarily of concepts. Moreover, at least Del Pinal seems to discuss the compositionality of his notion of a c-structure, which does not determine the reference of an expression. Arguably this notion is very similar to my notion of categorization device. So, one might argue that the compositionality of the c-structure of an expression only needs to meet the success conditions for a theory of categorization devices and not of concepts.

  7. This constraint, too, has been challenged for instance by Prinz (2012).

  8. Again, this notion of categorization compositionality has little to do with the notion of compositionality in philosophy of language and mind. For the more common notion of compositionality see for instance Szabó (2012).

  9. It may be that categorization is not explained in terms of beliefs and that categorization devices do not contain them. In this case categorization devices do not consist of concepts, but for instance of non-conceptual perceptual representations. I do not want to rule this out. My argument is merely that often psychologists explain categorization by attributing beliefs to people even if these beliefs are presented in terms of lists of features. Only in such cases is the relation between concepts and categorization devices as argued here.

References

  • Barsalou, L. W. (1987). The instability of graded structure: Implications for the nature of concepts. In U. Neisser (Ed.), Concepts and conceptual development: Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization (pp. 101–140). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barsalou, L. W. (2012). The human conceptual system. In M. Spivey, K. McRae, & M. Joanisse (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of psycholinguistics (pp. 239–258). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borg, E. (2012). Pursuing meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (1979). Individualism and the mental. Midwest studies in philosophy,4(1), 73–121.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carey, S. (2009). The origin of concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cruse, A. (1999). Meaning in language: An introduction to semantics and pragmatics. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Del Pinal, G. (2015). Dual content semantics, privative adjectives and dynamic compositionality. Semantics & Pragmatics,8(7), 1–53.

    Google Scholar 

  • Del Pinal, G. (2016). Prototypes as compositional components of concepts. Synthese,193(9), 2899–2927.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, K. (2010). Unity amidst heterogeneity in theories of concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,33(2–3), 210–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. A. (1989). Why there still has to be a language of thought. In P. Slezak, & W. R. Albury (Eds.), Computers, brains and minds (pp. 23–46). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. A. (1998). Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. (2004). Having concepts: A brief refutation of the twentieth century. Mind and Language,19(1), 29–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frege, G. (1948). Sense and reference. The Philosophical Review,57(3), 209–230.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hampton, J. A. (2000). Concepts and prototypes. Mind and Language,15(2–3), 299–307.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hampton, J. A. (2006). Concepts as prototypes. Psychology of Learning and Motivation,46, 79–113.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hampton, J. A., & Jönsson, M. L. (2012). Typicality and composition a lity: The logic of combining vague concepts. In M. Werning, W. Hinzen, & E. Machery (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of compositionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. A. (1972). Naming and necessity. In D. Davidson & G. Harman (Eds.), Semantics of natural language (pp. 253–355). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lalumera, E. (2010). Concepts are a functional kind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,33(2–3), 217–218.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laurence, S., & Margolis, E. (1999). Concepts and cognitive science. In S. Laurence & E. Margolis (Eds.), Concepts: Core readings (pp. 3–81). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1970). General semantics. Synthese,22, 18–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Löhr, G. (2017). Abstract concepts, compositionality, and the contextualism-invariantism debate. Philosophical Psychology,30(6), 689–710.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machery, E. (2005). Concepts are not a natural kind. Philosophy of Science,72(3), 444–467.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machery, E. (2009). Doing without concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machery, E. (2010a). Précis of doing without concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,33(2–3), 195–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machery, E. (2010b). Replies to my critics. Philosophical Studies,149(3), 429–436.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machery, E. (2015). By default: Concepts are accessed in a context-independent manner. In L. Margolis & S. Laurence (Eds.), The conceptual mind: New directions in the study of concepts. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machery, E. (2017). Philosophy within its proper bounds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machery, E., & Lederer, L. (2012). Simple heuristics for concept combination. In M. Werning, W. Hinzen, & E. Machery (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of compositionality (pp. 81–106). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Margolis, E. (1998). How to acquire a concept. Mind and Language,13(3), 347–369.

    Google Scholar 

  • Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2010). Concepts and theoretical unification. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,33(2–3), 219–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2011). Learning matters: The role of learning in concept acquisition. Mind and Language, 26(5), 507–539.

    Google Scholar 

  • Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2014). Concepts. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/concepts/>.

  • Mazzone, M., & Lalumera, E. (2010). Concepts: Stored or created? Minds and Machines,20, 47–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Michael, J. (2017). Putting unicepts to work: A teleosemantic perspective on the infant mindreading puzzle. Synthese, 194(11), 4365–4388.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. G. (1998). A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More Mama, more milk, and more mouse. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,21(01), 55–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, G. (2002). The big book of concepts. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pagin, P. (2012). Communication and the complexity of semantics. In M. Werning, W. Hinzen, & E. Machery (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of compositionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. (2002). Furnishing the mind: Concepts and their perceptual basis. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. J. (2012). Regaining composure: A defense of prototype compositionality. In M. Werning, W. Hinzen, & E. Machery (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of compositionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J., & Clark, A. (2004). Putting concepts to work: Some thoughts for the 21st century. Mind and Language,19(1), 57–69.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and reference. The Journal of Philosophy,70(19), 699–711.

    Google Scholar 

  • Recanati, F. (2010). Truth-conditional pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rey, G. (1983). Concepts and stereotypes. Cognition,15(1), 237–262.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rey, G. (1985). Concepts and conceptions: A reply to Smith, Medin and Rips. Cognition,19(3), 297–303.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rey, G. (2009). Review of E. Machery, doing without concepts. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (Online journal. Epub: 2009.07.15.) Available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/doing-without-concepts/.

  • Rey, G. (2010). Concepts versus conceptions (again). Behavioral and Brain Sciences,33(2–3), 221–222.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale: Erlbaum. Reprinted in: Margolis, E. and Laurence, S. (Eds.) (1999). Concepts: Core readings. Cambridge: MIT Press.

  • Rosch, E. H. (2011). Slow lettuce: Categories, concepts, fuzzy sets, and logical deduction. In R. Belohlavek & G. Klir (Eds.), Concepts and fuzzy logic (pp. 89–120). Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, E. E., Medin, D. L., & Rips, L. J. (1984). A psychological approach to concepts: Comments on Rey’s “concepts and stereotypes”. Cognition,17(3), 265–274.

    Google Scholar 

  • Szabó, Z. (2012). The case for compositionality. In Markus Werning, Wofram Hinzen, & Edouard Machery (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of compositionality (pp. 64–80). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Travis, C. (2008). Occasion-sensitivity: Selected essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Werning, M. (2005). Right and wrong reasons for compositionality. In M. Werning, E. Machery, & G. Schurz (Eds.). The compositionality of meaning and content (Vol. 1, pp. 285–309). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wynne, C. D. (2001). Animal cognition: The mental lives of animals. New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yli-Vakkuri, J. (2018). Semantic externalism without thought experiments. Analysis,78(1), 81–89.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I thank Dimitri Mollo, Edouard Machery, Geert Keil, Juan Loaiza, Markus Werning, François Recanati, Michael Pauen, Richard Moore, Matthias Unterhuber and both anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

Funding

This publication is funded by the DFG-Graduiertenkolleg “Situated Cognition”, GRK-2185/1.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr University of Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, 44780, Bochum, Germany

    Guido Löhr

  2. Institut Jean-Nicod, Ecole Normale Superieure, 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005, Paris, France

    Guido Löhr

Authors
  1. Guido Löhr
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Guido Löhr.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Löhr, G. Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things?. Synthese 197, 2171–2191 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1798-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1798-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation