Abstract
In this paper, I address one recent objection to Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s functionalist argument for the extended mind thesis (EM). This objection is posed by Kengo Miyazono, who claims that they unjustifiably identify the original cognitive subject with the hybrid one in order to reach their conclusion about the mind extension. His attack consists of three steps: (a) distinguishing hybrid from traditional cognitive subjects based on the systems reply originally directed at Searle’s Chinese room argument; (b) pointing out that the conclusion of the functionalist argument for EM must be rephrased to state that there are hybrid, and not extended, systems with widely realized mental states; and (c) arguing that functionalist EM cannot justify the assumption about the identity of these two kinds of subjects without circularity. I argue that Miyazono’s main argument is ill-founded but that it, nevertheless, points out one important issue, namely, that we need further justification of the identity assumption, without which EM loses much of its flavor. Thus, I am going to challenge Miyazono’s argument, provide a reinterpretation of the argumentation in the EM debate, defend the possibility of wide and extended selves, and offer a justification of the identity assumption, which I find crucial not only for vindicating EM but also for differentiating EM from other similar theses, such as the thesis about group minds.
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Notes
Hybrid systems are wide cognitive systems comprised of biological organisms (or at least their relevant parts) and pieces of the organism’s environment that jointly form a supervenience base for relevant mental states or cognitive processes. I use the expression “hybrid system” instead of “extended system”, because it is neutral with respect to the claim that hybrid systems are extensions of traditional cognitive subjects, which is going to be challenged.
The thought that EM is about “normal human agents” is continuously present in works of Andy Clark, he writes: “I am slowly becoming more and more a cyborg. So are you” (Clark 2003, p. 3, emphases added), “Otto himself is best regarded as an extended system” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 18, emphasis added), etc.
While engrams are hypothesized physical traces of external stimuli in the brain, which constitute the physical basis of our memories, exograms are external symbolic memory devices which enhance our biological memory. The term “exogram” was introduced by neuropsychologist Merlin Donald.
In the same article Clark and Chalmers provide an argument for the extension of differently identified states and processes, namely, cognitive processes. They argue that a task of assessing the fit of a tetremino block in the game of Tetris can be typically done with a help of two different processes—mental rotation of the block, or manipulation of the buttons on a Tetris console or a computer. The first one is normally perceived as a cognitive process while the second one is not. By pointing to the possibility of a possession of a neural implant which functionally performs in a similar fashion as the physical manipulation of Tetris buttons, and assuming that we would be inclined to call this neural implant a part of our cognitive machinery, they conclude that by the Parity Principle we should regard the manipulation of the buttons as a part of the cognitive process. The only difference between the button manipulation and the neural implant performance is in a manner of their realization, one is external and the other internal, while their functions are identical. In sum, the Parity Principle gives grounds for arguing for the extension of both mental states and cognitive processes yielding two conceptually close hypotheses: EM and EC (Extended Cognition).
ONSB is a special case of (3’). Gertler generalized relevant claims about the particular belief about MoMA to all standing beliefs realized in the notebook (in accordance with (1) and (2)), thus the difference between our interpretation of PA and its premise (3’), and Miyazono’s interpretation and ONSB. Because this generalization is justified by (1) and (2), Miyazono’s conclusions about the application of SR to EM can be accordingly generalized from ONSB to (3’).
Searle (1980) associates this kind of response to Berkeley. The original response identified the relevant subject with the described system, and it was challenged by Searle’s objection that even if the person in the room internalizes the database and the instructions, she would still be unable to understand Chinese. Later versions of SR, sometimes called Virtual Mind Reply (see Cole 1991), do not identify the relevant subject with the system, but rather claim that this subject is realized by the system. One system can realize two or more subjects or persons, thus this version of SR avoids the internalization objection. The person in the room after memorizing the instructions, and the database, would be able to simulate a separate person who understands Chinese. Both of these versions are compatible with arguments that follow.
ONSB1 is a special case of (3) “The information in Otto’s notebook counts as standing beliefs”; ONSB2 is the consequence of the application of SR to Otto’s case; and ONSB is a special case of (3’).
Miyazono talks about “embracing SR” as one of the possible answers to his objection. He examines three such possible answers in his paper: defending the identity of Otto and the Otto-notebook system (or defending OAS), claiming that there are no selves, and embracing SR. For the purposes of this paper, I am going to address only the first and the last of these possible responses.
Namely, if the “glue and trust” conditions could make a difference between the Otto-notebook system and the Mark-book system, perhaps they could be considered as sufficient for justifying OAS. Recall that arguing in favor of the difference between hybrid and biological systems was based on Sprevak’s example. So, if the Otto example is not analogous to it, then it might turn out that he is not different from the Otto-notebook system.
“OEB is the conjunction of two claims: OEB1: The belief that the museum is on 53rd Street is physically realized in the notebook. OEB2: It is Otto who believes that the museum is on 53rd Street.” (Miyazono 2017, p. 3524) .
I claim that step 1) and 2) are parts of the standard reasoning of the proponents of functionalist EM, although this is not always recognized. I add step 3), inspired by SR to EM.
Functional roles used for identification of mental states as they are often conceived in the philosophy of mind literature; simplified examples which single out typical causes and effects of a certain type of mental states with vague indicators of causal connections with other mental states that reflect their inferential relations. The use of such simplified examples in presenting functionalism is one of the main reasons for separating considerations about integration from those about common-sense functional roles, although, as it is going to be argued, integration assumption, at least in one of its forms, is implied by the functionalist theory of mind.
In fact, both Putnam, in his defense of machine state functionalism (1960), and Lewis (1972) characterize mental states holistically—Lewis by asking for the Ramsification of the whole psychological theory, Putnam by specifying every mental state with respect to the total state of the system. Although holism introduced new problems for functionalism, e.g. too chauvinistic characterizations of mental states, coarse-grained functionalism, even if not asking that every mental state should be defined in a relation to every other, kept the assumption that mental states are mutually connected and that they jointly produce appropriate behavior.
For more detailed treatment of cognitive integration see Menary (2007). Menary distinguishes between four types of bodily-environmental cognitive integrations: bodily couplings, epistemic actions, self-correcting actions, and cognitive practices.
Bearers of this information do not play appropriate roles in the “flow and transformation of information”, because they are not “intimately embedded in subtle and complex perceptual, memory and reasoning systems that have been evolved or developed in relation to each other, and that already meet whatever the criteria are for cognitive status”. (Wheeler 2010, footnote 8) This lack of cognitive integration thwarts the possibility of mental integration, because the dispositional beliefs with relevant informational content will not be able to play expected (postulated by common sense psychology) causal roles with other mental states of appropriate contents. Informational states in Martian’s head (and in Mark’s book) are not perceptually nor inferentially produced, they are not affected by the change of other informational states in the system, etc. The only reason given to consider them as cognitive or mental was that they are stored in the Martian’s head.
If we read PP wide enough it could be considered as supporting both (1) and (2), more precisely, examples used for the affirmation of its antecedent can be seen as confirming both integration of the relevant system and the mental status of its parts. The Otto-Inga scenario would show that information in Otto’s notebook “functions as” a dispositional belief because the notebook plays integrative functional roles in Otto’s mental life, and because specific information in it plays specific common-sense functional or causal roles used for identifying it as a particular kind of belief. The vague indicator “function as” used in the formulation of PP would refer to both partial functional roles used for the identification of mental states, and integrative functions, in Otto’s case the “glue and trust” conditions. This is why we are considering PP together with specific examples which support it (or as PA), as their role is to specify the kind of functionalism which is to be used in determining functional equivalence. Without further specifications PP is neutral with respect to the kind of functionalism that is to be used to establish mentioned equivalence, and it is compatible with both common sense functionalism and scientific or psycho-functionalism about the mind, as well as with functionalism about cognitive processes (PP combined with such functionalism leads to EC). Nevertheless, in defending EM, Clark and Chalmers commit themselves to common sense functionalism as the relevant kind of functionalism which can establish it.
To illustrate this claim it is sufficient to point out to the difference between EM and EC (see footnote 4), and that EC does not entail EM. Namely, there could be extended cognitive processes, which do not instantiate any mental states recognized by common sense functionalism.
By calling this view “functionalist” I do not intend to claim that Locke’s view is compatible only with functionalism as it appears in the philosophy of mind, but that persons are identified by functional properties.
(4) is added to safeguard the numerical identity of a person against cases where one person is duplicated by sci-fi devices such are teleporters.
Psychological connections between X and Y are established if X’s mental states have been caused by Y’s mental states, or if Y’s mental states have been caused by X’s mental states. Also, to secure psychological continuity, there has to be “enough connectedness” between X and Y, one psychological connection would not be sufficient. (Parfit 1984, p. 206) It is also important to note that not any causal connection between mental states would suffice. Causal relations have to be psychologically relevant, meaning that causes and effects should be semantically dependent. Intentional mental states are individuated by their semantic content, and relevant connections will be sensitive to this content (for instance, my belief that I should exercise more will be psychologically connected to my belief that exercising is healthy, my desire to be healthy, and so on). Mental states of the person-in-the-room and the whole system are not connected in this way. Narrow person’s beliefs that she should organize symbols in some particular way are not psychologically connected to the wide person’s belief that, for instance, the weather is nice.
I will say more about the plausibility of such systems in Sect. 6.3. While consideration of such possibility cannot be attributed to Hutchins himself, there are authors (Theiner 2014; Huebner 2014) who base their reasoning on the plausibility of full-blown group or collective minds, at least partly, on Hutchins’s insights about cognitive distribution.
Olson’s objection can be generalized to all claims which presuppose the existence of wide selves. In that manner, his argument can be so rephrased to become an argument against the possibility that the Otto-notebook system is a subject of wide mental states (without specifications whether he is identical to Otto or not).
If minds are to be conceived in this way, and external states are not really mental, then Olson’s argument would be an argument against EM, and not an argument against the inference that extended selves are implied by EM. Other option for Olson would be to allow that there are two minds, one extended with all mental states, and one narrower which is a proper subject of these states, but this would be a strange view to defend.
How robust Olson sees the mind as a subject is illustrated in his claim that if we reject the view that it is simply an organism that thinks this will lead us to “full-on substance dualism: a dualism of psychological and biological beings.” (Olson 2011, p. 488) This way of thinking about minds could be one of the reasons why he rejects the idea that persons could be identical with their minds, and defends biological accounts of personhood further supported with arguments such as the Too Many Thinkers Argument.
Interestingly enough, Clark and Chalmers claim quite the opposite, that shrinking of the mind would lead to a bundle view, and that taking the extended view gives a more (explanatory) robust view of the subject “Otto himself is best regarded as an extended system, a coupling of biological organism and external resources. To consistently resist this conclusion, we would have to shrink the self into a mere bundle of occurrent states, severely threatening its deep psychological continuity.” (1998, p. 18).
Wilson and Lenart (2014) base their claim that extended mind does not imply extended self on Wilson’s work (2004), and briefly quote that “characterization of wide realizations preserves the idea that properties with such realizations are still properties of individual subjects” (Wilson 2004, p. 141; Wilson and Lenart 2014, p. 433). This is why I continue with Wilson’s justification of this claim from (2004).
In Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario, Oscar from Earth, and Oscar* from Twin Earth are in different mental states, although core realizations of their mental states are identical and within the boundaries of their bodies.
If there would be two or more persons sharing mental states and their body, there would have to be double or multiple attributions of agency in particular cases. Who would be held responsible for paying a bill in a restaurant, one or the other person, or both? Mackie says “that it just seems crazy to suppose that there are two psychological lives going on where I am now”. (1999, p. 375).
Original intentionality is also derived in a sense that it derives its meaning from Mother Nature (Dennett 1987).
I can attribute different desires and beliefs to my cat in explaining her behavior, but that does not mean that she has, or is capable of having propositional attitudes.
This presents a second indirect argument against Miyazono, because if he grants that the Otto-notebook system is a self, and that it is not Otto, then Otto will perish in the process of hybridization.
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Acknowledgements
I thank Brian Leahy, Andrej Jandric and Vojislav Bozickovic for carefully reading and commenting on previous versions of the manuscript. Their suggestions and observations helped to greatly improve it. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and valuable suggestions that shaped the final version of this article.
Funding
This research was supported by the Ministry of education, science and technological development of the Republic of Serbia under the project “Dynamical systems in nature and society: philosophical and empirical aspects” (179041).
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Milojevic, M. Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity. Synthese 197, 2143–2170 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1797-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1797-5