Abstract
This paper is a critical discussion of Ernest Sosa’s recent analysis of reflective knowledge.
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Notes
Ernest Sosa, Judgment and Agency, Oxford University Press, 2015. Page references are to this work.
“<p>” will abbreviate “that p”, i.e. “the proposition that p”.
Field, H., Science Without Numbers, Princeton University Press, 1980.
Street, S., “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”, Philosophical Studies, 127(1):109–166 \(\cdot \) January 2006.
Williams, M., Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991.
I delivered the first draft of this paper at a symposium on Sosa’s book that took place in Bled (Slovenia) in June 2015, and I am very grateful for the valuable feedback I received from the participants, notably from Ernie himself. In addition I am pleased to thank Michael Williams for his characteristically insightful comments on my penultimate version. Finally I must express my appreciation for the helpful reactions and suggestions of the Synthese reviewers.
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Horwich, P. Sosa’s theory of knowledge. Synthese 197, 5225–5232 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1697-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1697-8