Abstract
According to the Perceptual Analysis of Emotional Expression, behaviors express emotions by making them perceptually manifest. A smile is an expression of joy because an observer who sees a smile can see joy. A pout is an expression of grief because an observer who sees a pout can see grief. And a growl is an expression of anger because an observer who hears a growl can hear anger. The idea is not simply that expressions can enable the perception of emotion, but that expressions essentially do so. In the course of defending this analysis against challenges, I develop a novel account of the relationship between language and expression.
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Notes
As we shall see in §3.2, however, it is possible for coughing and wheezing to be expressions of emotion, but, in those cases, they will also enable the perception of emotion.
Classic formulations include Scheler (1970, p. 256, for commentary, see Gallagher and Zahavi 2012, pp. 201–204), Wittgenstein (1980, §570, for commentary, see Overgaard 2006), and Taylor (1979, pp. 73, 74, for commentary, see Campbell 1997, pp. 59–63). Recent formulations include Green (2007, pp. 84–93, 2010a), Bar-On (2004, pp. 264–284, 2010), Zahavi (2007), Smith (2015), and Newen et al. (2015).
Green (2007) defends this view. In his analysis of “self-expression,” which includes only those behaviors that signal and show an agent’s own occurrent mental state, Green argues that the enabling of perception is but one of three ways of showing. We can also show that we have an emotion by providing evidence of it, and show how an emotion feels by helping others to empathize with us. Green contends that agents can express their mental states via these other means of showing as well (2007, pp. 25, 212). Thus while Green agrees that emotional expressions can and sometimes do enable the perception of an agent’s occurrent emotions, he denies that all do so, and thus he denies that the enabling of perception is essential to self-expression (and, a fortiori, to expression more generally).
Charles Taylor is perhaps the only other philosopher to defend the perceptual claim specifically as a conceptual claim (Taylor 1979, pp. 73, 74). My version of the Perceptual Analysis differs from Taylor’s in several important respects, and answers objections that his version cannot. Bar-On (2004, 2010) defends a version of the Perceptual Analysis with respect to “natural expressions” of emotion, but not with respect to the expression of emotion more generally. See note 10, below, for my take on Bar-On’s view.
In note 27, below, I respond to what seems like an obvious objection to this claim, namely the possibility of expressing our emotions in writing.
Is it ever possible for one person to express another person’s emotions? I am tempted to say yes, as long as the first person “embodies” the second person, e.g. in a theatrical or musical performance. The actor who breaks down crying on stage during a production of Antigone isn’t expressing his grief; he’s expressing Creon’s grief, which he does by expressing grief while embodying Creon. Similarly, the violinist who plays a moving sonata may not be expressing her sadness, but rather the composer’s, whose subjectivity is embodied in the performance.
Green (2007, p. 12) distinguishes between three kinds of voluntary expressions: (1) those that are allowed to occur spontaneously without being willed, (2) those that are willed, and (3) those that are willed and overt. My category of “voluntary expressions” includes 2 and 3 but not 1.
An expression is “sincere” only if the expresser feels the emotion that she expresses. An expression is “non-sincere,” in turn, only if the expresser does not feel the emotion that she expresses. (See Green 1970, p. 556 for a helpful discussion of how the term “insincere” can be misleading in this context.) There are at least three ways in which an expression can be non-sincere: (1) a person can put on an expression when she feels no emotion; (2) a person can put on an expression that differs in kind from the emotion that she does feel; and (3) a person can put on an expression that differs in intensity from the emotion that she feels (Ekman and Friesen 2003, p. 141).
Alston (1965), Green (1970), Tormey (1971), Finn (1975), and Bar-On (2004), among others, insist that non-sincere expressions are not truly emotional expressions. Green (2007) argues that there are no such things as non-sincere self-expressions, although he allows for the possibility of non-sincere expressions more generally (see Green 2010b).
Had I more space, I would also demonstrate that the Perceptual Analysis outperforms another competitor, namely the Hydraulic Analysis of Emotional Expression, or the view that a behavior expresses an emotion just in case the emotion causes that behavior to occur. Though less popular than the Evidential Analysis, the Hydraulic Analysis has enjoyed a recent resurgence following Bar-On’s (2004) spirited defense of it. Very briefly, Bar-On distinguishes between “expressing” as a process and “expression” as a product, and argues that a behavior counts as an emotional expression just in case it was produced by the process of “airing,” “voicing,” “pressing out,” or “giving vent to one’s present state” (2004, pp. 241, 257). Less metaphorically, a person expresses an emotion whenever her behavior “comes directly from” that emotion (2004, p. 254), which is to say that the emotion is either a brute or rational cause of that behavior (2004, p. 249). Any behavior brought about through this process is, accordingly, an “expression” of that emotion. I see two major problems with the Hydraulic Analysis. First, insincere expressions cannot be caused by the emotions they express. Second, coping behaviors are caused by emotions, yet do not express them (see below). Thus, the Hydraulic Analysis is both too narrow and too broad.
See, for instance, Britton (1957, p. 101), Green (1970, p. 551), Tormey (1971, p. 43), Bach and Harnish (1979, p. 15), and Davis (1988, p. 280, 2003). Green’s (2007) analysis of self-expression overlaps with the Evidential Analysis insofar as he claims that signaling and showing-that a person experiences an emotion (namely by providing evidence of it) is sufficient—though not necessary—to express that emotion.
I assume that if the weaker modal claim is false, then the stronger conceptual claim must also be false.
Stout (2010) objects to Green’s claim, although I am persuaded by Green’s (2010a) subsequent response (see also Bar-On 2010). Green (2007, p. 89) goes on to add that, in some cases, observers may require certain conceptual capacities in order to perceive an emotion in its expression. I think this is a mistake. Certain conceptual capacities may be necessary to perceive a behavior as emotional, but not to perceive an emotion via part-whole perception. In another mood, Green (2007, p. 141) appears to agree.
Although my formulation of the Perceptual Analysis can overcome this objection, any formulation that takes the enabling of perception-as to be necessary for expression will have difficulty doing so (e.g. Taylor 1979). Green’s analysis of self-expression can accommodate individual-typical self-expressions (2007, pp. 89, 140, 141), but not individual-atypical self-expressions.
Alston (1965), Green (1970), Tormey (1971), Finn (1975), and Bar-On (2004), among others, insist that non-sincere expressions are not truly emotional expressions. Goodman (1976), Bach and Harnish (1979), Taylor (1979), Davis (1988, 2003), and Eriksson (2010), among others, take it to be equally obvious that expressions can be non-sincere.
The fact that a behavior resembles a component of an emotion does not entail that the behavior is not a component of an emotion. On my view, natural expressions resemble characteristic components of emotions whereas idiosyncratic expressions do not, although both are in fact components of emotions.
Davis (1988, 2003), Bar-On (2004), and Green (2007) offer spirited defenses of the claim that language is a means of emotional expression. A more comprehensive defense of the claim that language is not a means of emotional expression would need to address their arguments directly, a task that I must unfortunately put off for another day.
Bar-On (2004, p. 299) makes a strong case for linguistic utterances becoming components of mental states as they become habitual responses to specific stimuli. Thus, if “Ouch!” or “That hurts!” is a spontaneous response to stubbing one’s toe, then it is as much a component of pain as is a wince. However, I follow psychologists in classifying expressions as components of emotions only if they are coordinated changes in the somatic nervous system. Since the production of language is never such a change, I conclude that linguistic utterances are never components of emotions.
The best candidates for language that enables the perception of someone as emotional would be metaphors and poetry. My take, however, is that metaphors and poetry typically evoke emotions without expressing them.
As I read her, Bar-On responds to this objection by giving up on the Perceptual Analysis. She argues that linguistic expressions replace non-linguistic ones, and that, while the latter do indeed enable the perception of emotion, the former do not. Rather, the former express emotion by being produced by the same kind of causal process that produces the latter. See note 10 for more on Bar-On’s view, and why I disagree with it.
Indeed, clinicians who specialize in prosody disorders, which impair individuals’ ability to inflect their speech with emotional tones of voice, conclude that such individuals cannot express their emotions in speech at all (Marchi et al. 2012).
Surely we can express our emotions in writing. However, when we write, we record only what we wish to say, and not how we wish to say it. A spoken utterance of “I am sorry” can be accompanied by a regretful tone of voice, facial expression, or gesture. A written inscription of “I am sorry” cannot. Thus, if a speech act must be accompanied by such nonverbal behaviors to count as an expression, then it would seem to follow that written language cannot be used to express our emotions at all. But, intuitively, we can express our emotions in writing, so there must be something wrong with my view.
In response, I contend that Perceptual Analysis, far from contradicting the possibility of written expression, in fact sheds light on how the written expression of emotion works. Although it is true that our facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice are not preserved in writing, we can nevertheless substitute for these nonverbal behaviors in a number of interesting ways. An obvious example involves the use of emoji. By inserting a smiley face into a text, we substitute for the real smile that would accompany a spoken utterance of the same words. More interesting are the ways in which we substitute for vocal prosody (tones of voice). We use (1) typographical styling, (2) punctuation, and (3) nonstandard spellings, among other techniques, to insert a dimension of tone into our writings. By italicizing a word, for instance, we substitute for the vocal emphasis that we deploy in speech. By ending a sentence with an exclamation mark instead of a period, we substitute for an emotionally excited tone of voice. And by using nonstandard spellings, we turn the reader’s attention to how something would be said in speech, beyond simply what has been said. Take the following line of dialogue from Huckleberry Finn: “Oh, Huck, I bust out a-cryin’ en grab her up in my arms, en say, ‘Oh, de po’ little thing! De Lord God Amighty fogive po’ ole Jim, kaze he never gwyne to fogive hisself as long’s he live!”’ We do not just read and understand Jim’s words; we imaginatively hear them being spoken with a particular accent, with particular emphases, and with particular affects.
Context also plays a crucial role, since these techniques will be more or less effective, depending on the context (Yigit 2005). Furthermore, context can influence how we read default sentences, or sentences that lack alternative stylings, punctuation, and spelling. In so-called “task-functional contexts,” where an author is interested in conveying information rather than expressing his or her mental states, readers do not read tone into default sentences. In so-called “socio-emotional contexts,” by contrast, where an author is interested in expressing his or her mental states rather than conveying information, readers do read tone into default sentences, thereby reading them as expressions (Yigit 2005). Much more on this topic needs to be said, and I am developing an account of written expression elsewhere. The take-away point is that, for writing as well as for speech, it’s not what one says that matters for expression, it’s how one says it.
It’s not the only place. Language is also used to “punctuate” expressions, or to call attention to how we say something. When I say “I’m sorry,” for instance, I call upon you to attend to my tone and facial expression, since it’s them, and not my words, that will ultimately convince you that I am indeed sorry.
Bar-On (2004, Chap. 6) also discusses the “articulation” of expressed mental states, but does not distinguish expression from articulation as starkly as I do. In particular, Bar-On claims that articulation is sometimes sufficient for expression (cf. Davis 1988, pp. 283, 284), a claim that I deny. Similarly, Mitchell Green (2007, pp. 13, 14) claims that self-expressions are translucent in the sense that they can convey both the type and the content of an emotion. However, this claim conflates what I am calling “expression” and “articulation.” Notice that we can use language to articulate the content of an emotion without at the same time expressing that emotion. When I stoically report that I have lost my job, home, and lover, I have informed you of why I am sad—i.e. the content of my sadness—even though I have not expressed my sadness to you. When I speak the identical words to you in a pitiful tone of voice, I express the same thing that I express by simply crying, namely sadness. Neither the tone of voice nor the tears express the content of my sadness. Motivating Green’s conflation, I believe, is a version of the familiar de re/de dicto ambiguity. The claim, “Anya expressed her fear of bunnies,” admits of two readings: Anya can de re express her fear of bunnies by expressing a type of emotion, namely fear, regardless of whether Anya also articulates the content of her fear. Anya can de dicto express her fear of bunnies, on the other hand, by expressing both the type and content of emotion, namely fear of bunnies. The arguments of this section support my conclusion that it is possible to express a fear of bunniesde re, but not to express that fearde dicto. What appears to be a de dicto expression is in fact a nonverbal expression of fear coupled with a verbal articulation of the content of that fear.
Although beliefs are dispositional states, whenever we express a belief we express an occurrent attitude toward the content of that belief. Thus, even though I may believe that Paris is west of Berlin without thinking about it, I cannot express the belief that Paris is west of Berlin without thinking about it. The expression of belief, like the expression of emotion, is an expression of an occurrent mental state.
One might also worry about the expressions of beliefs in writing and in sign language. My account of the written expression of emotion (sketched in note 27) applies to the written expression of cognitive states as well. We use a variety of techniques, within appropriate contexts, to substitute for the tones of voice and gestures that express cognitive states in speech, thereby expressing those states in writing. Similarly, although tones of voice are not typically deployed in sign language, expressive facial expressions and gestures are, and I maintain that a token sign expresses a mental state if and only if it is accompanied by an appropriate facial expression or gesture. In short, it’s not what one signs that matters for expression, it’s how one signs it.
If this claim turns out to be false, then we would have good reason to think that the expression of emotion is different, in principle, from the expression of belief (since the distinction between claiming to be in a state and expressing that state doesn’t hold for the expression of belief), in which case the fifth objection would lose its grip.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Rebecca Kukla, Nancy Sherman, Bryce Huebner, Mark Lance, and Andrea Scarantino for commenting on previous drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for Synthese, whose generous and thoughtful comments helped me to improve the paper dramatically.
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Glazer, T. Looking angry and sounding sad: The perceptual analysis of emotional expression. Synthese 194, 3619–3643 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1113-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1113-1