Understanding Reciprocity and the Importance of Civic Friendship

This article aims to contribute to the existing literature on the virtues and challenges of political liberalism. It argues that the principle of reciprocity can only sustain political agreement under pluralism, if citizens share a relationship of civic friends, based on mutual recognition as equals (Lister in Anal Kritik 2011, pp. 91–112), a non-prudential concern for the interest of others (Leland and van Wietmarschen in J Moral Philos 14, 2017, pp. 142–167) and shared experiences that can foster interpersonal trust. Inasmuch as this thicker definition of civic friendship is sound, and breeds a successful ground for civic reciprocity, it is argued that this renders the concept of civic reciprocity culturally sensitive in at least four ways: how citizens commit to reciprocity, what political values and institutional arrangements they deem reasonable and how they choose to cooperate are all influenced by culture. While this makes the project of multiculturalism more challenging, it does not make it impossible. Rather, it reminds us that while the formal requirement of reciprocity is important, it is a relational value anchored in how citizens relate to one another. Therefore, for multiculturalism to be successful, policies that strengthen ties of civic friendship need to be implemented.


Introduction
In late 2022 Portugal discussed whether medically assisted suicide should be made legal. 1 A new bill was passed in the National Parliament and was sent to the country's president.He could then do one of three things: sign the bill off as a law, exercise his veto power or he could send it to the Constitutional Court.This is the most recent outcome of yet another debate on euthanasia in Portugal, and the third bill that the current government (majority of a centre-left party) has tried to pass through the Parliament.In what is mostly a Catholic country, and despite polls suggesting popular support for the bill, the debate about euthanasia has been a polarizing one.Those against it argue that euthanasia legalizes suicide and takes off the responsibility of government and individuals to ensure terminal care for those who need it.2Moreover, they argue that the movement to push the bill has been guided by the 'ideological blindness' of the left-leaning majority in Parliament, instead of a project supported by associations of health professionals and patients.
The debate on euthanasia is just one example of the difficulties of striking political agreement when it comes to issues of cultural pluralism.Will Kymlicka defines 'societal culture' as a culture 'which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres' (Kymlicka 1996, p. 87). 3 The debate on euthanasia shows the difficulties in political agreement in conditions of cultural pluralism.One can have different views on individual freedom ('should an individual have the right to end his own life?'), but also distinct values and views on collective responsibility ('should the state assist those who wish to end their lives?'),both tied to cultural membership and affiliation (Kymlicka 1996, p. 59).Hence, and because modern democratic societies4 are characterized by the fact of 'reasonable pluralism' where 'a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its culture of free institutions' (Rawls 2005, p. 441), one needs to understand what is required for political agreement.
As the example of euthanasia points out, under pluralism 5 people will tend to disagree.Hence, John Rawls discussed in Political Liberalism whether in such a context it is possible for people to accept and indorse principles of justice without Understanding Reciprocity and the Importance of Civic… the need for threats and punishment (Rawls 2005).For Rawls, a commitment to the criterion of reciprocity is a fundamental part of this process, namely because it is a feature of the virtue of reasonableness-and only reasonable citizens will be able to agree on a 'political conception of justice': citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception of political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms.The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position.(Rawls 2005, p. 446) Political agreement in Rawls is of a specific type.Citizens are expected to agree on a political conception of justice, which is based on political values, such as political equality, religious tolerance, or freedom of speech.Rawls defined these as 'great values (…) that govern the basic framework of social life ', 6 (2005, p. 139), and which are part of the 'political culture of a democratic society' (Rawls 2001, p. 34).Expressed through the principles of justice, these values set the standard of agreement, and justify when legitimate coercive power should be exercised and reasonably accepted by citizens.Therefore, they should be distinguished from the values inherent to moral or religious views, to avoid justifying coercive political power in favor of sectarian doctrines.As such, citizens might accept the principles of justice, 7 as both rational and reasonable, 8 not only because others will do so too, but also because their own comprehensive doctrines are not to be meddled with.erty; fair equality of opportunity; the values of economic reciprocity; the social bases of mutual respect between citizens' (Rawls 2005, p. 139).They are expressed in the two principles of justice.Besides the 'great values', Rawls also includes the 'values of public reason' which include 'the appropriate use of the fundamental concepts of judgement, inference, and evidence, but also the virtues of reasonableness and fairmindedness as shown in the abiding by the criteria and procedures of common sense knowledge and accepting the methods and conclusions of science when not controversial' (Rawls 2005, p. 139).  The two principles of justice read as: 'a.Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and.b.Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle)' (Rawls 2001, pp. 42-43). 8Reasonable people are defined by Rawls as those who are 'not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal can cooperate with others on terms all can accept' (Rawls 2005, p. 50).Rational is a different idea, which 'applies to a single unit unified agent (either an individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgement and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiar its own' (p.51).Rational and reasonable people are two key conceptions in Rawls.
Hence, reciprocity plays an important role in the terms of agreement reasonable citizens propose to each other.But Rawls goes further, claiming that reciprocity works as 'a principle giving its content and as a disposition to answer in kind' (Rawls 2001, p. 196). 9Thus, it is also about the disposition to cooperate in a certain way with other citizens.Hence, it is worth pondering about the motivational aspect of such a disposition: how come citizens' sharing little in terms of their comprehensive doctrines, are to be disposed to 'answer in kind' to those who are alien, at least when it comes to their moral or religious values?It is also worth pointing out that Rawls discussed reciprocity as a disposition of a certain kind, namely one that 'lies between the idea of impartiality, which is altruistic (being moved by the general good) and the idea of mutual advantage' (Rawls 2005, p. 16). 10  This article starts off by questioning whether the criterion of reciprocity can play such a role in political agreement under cultural pluralism. 11It argues that the idea of civic reciprocity, as providing ground for political agreement, needs to be considered in tandem with notions of civic friendship.To establish this claim, I will first argue for a relational view of reciprocity (a.1.),calling it civic reciprocity, and discuss its implications, as deeming the mode of reciprocation conditional on the sort of relationship among those cooperating (a.2.).This will be done in 'Reciprocity as a Relational Value' section.
It follows from a.1.and a.2., that one then needs to determine the nature of the relationship that allows civic reciprocity to work as discussed in 'Reciprocity as a Relational Value' section.Hence, I will claim such a relationship is best embodied in current definitions of 'civic friendship' (b.1), and I will contribute to existing accounts (Lister 2011;Schwarzenbach 2009;Leland and van Wietmarschen 2017) by arguing that such a relationship should be defined by three main characteristics (b.2), namely that (i) citizens express a non-prudential concern for the interests of other citizens, a (ii) requirement of mutual recognition but also (iii) a solid ground of shared experiences between citizens.This will be done in 'Defining Civic Friendship' section. 10When arguing why the 'criterion of reciprocity' should be considered between self-interest and altruism, John Rawls looks at his two principles of justice: whereas in the second principle of justice-the difference principle-we can find an idea of fair reciprocity, considering how one's advantage must benefit those who are worst-of, this form of mutual advantageous exchange is conditioned by the first principle: in the sense that everyone will be entitled to a 'fully adequate scheme of basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all' (Rawls 2001, pp. 76-77). 11Such skepticism is animated by scholarly work about reciprocity.Reciprocity is often discussed as a pattern of exchange of goods and services that might mediate mutually gratifying exchanges, or negative and vindictive behaviors, which can be observed across societies (Gouldner 1960).As Bowles and Gintis have argued, a tendency to cooperate (homo reciprocans) is more widespread than that of the self-interest motivation (homo economicus), and therefore we can make a case for reciprocity as a universal norm (Bowles and Gintis 2000;Gouldner 1960).While the view of reciprocity as a universal norm is widely popular, such a disposition is also argued as being conditional on several variables, including cultural aspects but also the nature of the relationship among those cooperating.A topic which will be further elaborated in 'Reciprocity as a Relational Value' section and then again in 'Civic Reciprocity is Culturally Sensitive' section. 9Sociological work which discusses reciprocity as a universal norm could be an additional grounding justification for claiming that such a disposition is present in reasonable citizens.A topic discussed in 'Reciprocity as a Relational Value' section.

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Understanding Reciprocity and the Importance of Civic… By establishing both (a) and (b) in ( 2) and (3), I will move on to argue that civic friendship and civic reciprocity are culturally sensitive, which compromises the extent to which agreement and cooperation can take place under cultural pluralism.Finally, I will close by sketching out some implications of this view.This will be discussed in 'Civic Reciprocity is Culturally Sensitive' section.
This paper is animated by concerns shared by philosophers such as John Rawls and Will Kymlicka: in increasingly diverse societies, how can we ensure political agreement and stability?What can be the sources of unity in multination but also polyethnic states?In what follows I aim to argue that the value of civic reciprocity, anchored on a robust relationship of civic friendship offers a possible answer.Doing so provides three distinct contributions.
First, it highlights the limits of looking at the criterion of reciprocity solely as a formal requirement for political agreement in pluralism.Instead, I believe we should take the relational component of reciprocity seriously.For the principle of reciprocity to work as a mechanism for political consensus and cooperation, we need a thick conception of civic friendship.Secondly, instead of focusing on discussing civic friendship as a requirement for political consensus, I will focus on reciprocity.If our conception of justice was grounded on cooperation determined by mutual self-interest, and hence 'tit-for-tat' reciprocity, it would not be necessary to foster relationships of civic friendship.Hence, civic friendship is required because of the endorsement of a certain reading of civic reciprocity.Finally, I believe discussing the need for civic reciprocity to be anchored on a robust notion of civic friendship has important political implications.Namely the need to consider institutions and policies where citizens can have shared experiences, and hence build the fertile ground for civic friendship governed by civic reciprocity.

Reciprocity as a Relational Value
Through the influential work of John Rawls, reciprocity has been discussed as an important principle for political agreement between people with different comprehensive doctrines.Two notes are warranted on Rawls's take on reciprocity in Political Liberalism: First, the 'criterion of reciprocity' is not a criterion of economic reciprocity,12 as discussed in other Rawlsian work (Rawls 2001(Rawls , 2005)), or by Stuart White (2003).
The latter is about obligations of economic reciprocity, which demand that in a liberal society those who are able-bodied are required to contribute productively to the social surplus.These two accounts-of civic reciprocity and economic reciprocity-share the fundamental notion of reciprocity as a commitment among parties to uphold and abide by certain rules or norms, provided that other parties will do the same.However, they are distinct: one is about the content of the norm-one should contribute productively if he is so able, provided others who are also able will do the same; whereas the other is about the foundations of social cooperation-it is the 'norm itself'-one should cooperate by upholding the agreed-upon standard rules and obligations, provided others do the same.The rules of the latter might or might not include contributing to the production of goods and services. 13In this paper I am mostly focusing on civic reciprocity, while acknowledging that economic reciprocity is often seen as part of the fair terms of cooperation, and hence part of what is required by civic reciprocity.
Secondly, reciprocity is defined as a principle that 'lies between the idea of impartiality, which is altruistic (being moved by the general good) and the idea of mutual advantage' (Rawls 2005, p. 16).Hence, citizens are not only moved by selfinterest to cooperate, or the altruistic desire to do so. 14As R. J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen pointed out, the general framework of political liberalism assumes 'fair social cooperation', and hence we can infer that citizens have a 'non-prudential concern for the interest of their fellow citizens' (Leland and van Wietmarschen 2017, p. 160), as opposed to perspectives that see politics as an arena for self-interested cooperation.As Rawls himself put it, reciprocity 'appears both as a principle giving its content and as a disposition to answer in kind' (Rawls 2001, p. 196).Hence it determines how agreement takes place, but also its stability, by ensuring fair cooperation and thus promoting trust across time.Thus, citizens sharing little in terms of moral, philosophical and religious views, might look at the 'criterion of reciprocity' as a sufficient but also limited requirement for their agreement and cooperation across time.
I believe, however, that this reading of civic reciprocity implies defining it as a relational value.Reciprocity as a disposition in between our altruistic and selfinterested motives, indicates that we all take our interests, but also the interests of our fellow citizens into account.That is a demanding principle for citizens who do not share a view on philosophical, moral or religious matters, but most importantly for citizens who do not necessarily need to stand in relation to each other, or whose relationship is thinly defined as being based on an agreement on political values.It also seems at odds with existing sociological and anthropological work which contends that reciprocity as a norm is established and influenced by the type and nature of the relationship amongst those cooperating (Bowles and Gintis 2000;Beltran et al. 2021;Gouldner 1960;Sahlins 1972;Godelier 1999;Mauss 1990).It is 14 See footnote 10. 13 Oftentimes these two are discussed as the same, partly because the principle of criterion of reciprocity is said to require a general compliance with rules that include participation in the division of labor and/ or the production of the social surplus.This seems to be Rawls's belief (2001Rawls's belief ( , 2005)), as well as Andrew Lister's (2011).

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Understanding Reciprocity and the Importance of Civic… worth pointing out that philosophers such as Lawrence Becker have also discussed how distinct interpersonal relationships (e.g., married couples or friends) influence how the virtue of reciprocity can be catered to (Becker 1986), while Andrew Lister, in analyzing the role of reciprocity in Rawls has also contended that the principle should be considered in light of the relationship between citizens within a political community (Lister 2011).
Taking reciprocity as a relational value is analogous to considering the relationality of justice.In the latter, the sphere of justice, and its inherent principles, only applies to those who are cooperating.Hence, for most social contract theories, such as the Rawlsian view, the principles of justice apply only to those cooperating on fair terms.Justice is relational because it only applies when and until citizens agree to stand in a relationship with each other.Reciprocity as a relational value has the same implication.Its moral justification only holds for those who are in a relationship of a certain kind.Such a distinction is often echoed in discussions on principles of just distribution.Andrea Sangiovanni, for example, contends that a relational view of distributive justice holds that 'the practice-mediated relations in which individuals stand condition the content, scope, and justification of those principles' (Sangiovanni 2007, p. 5).A non-relational account, on the other hand, would argue that while relations can play a given role, they do not contribute to either the justification or formulation of the principles of distribution (Sangiovanni 2007, p. 6).Hence, a relational view of civic reciprocity will argue relationships contribute to how we justify the norm, but also to how it is formulated.Let us call this claim a.1.
Hence, a relational view of civic reciprocity implies that the relationship between citizens is what justifies the principle, but also conditions its content.While we tend to consider reciprocity as a straightforward principle that obliges us to return gifts that we have received, one can wonder whether this holds for every situation.A few examples illustrate the point: what if the person giving a gift is our enemy?What if it was our mother?And if it was a stranger in the middle of the street?What about if the gift received is quite expensive and/or rare-what should we return, if anything?What if we have received a gift a very long time ago: are we still obliged to return it?Would our answers differ for these two last questions considering whether the gift came from our mother, stranger or enemy?Looking at reciprocity as a relational value implies considering that the type of reciprocity is influenced by the relationship amongst those cooperating, a point made by Marshall Sahlins in his observations of modes of reciprocation mediated by social distance. 15Let us call this claim a.2. 15Marshall Sahlins, a French anthropologist, famously observed how reciprocity is tied in with 'social distance'.In tribal societies morality was linked to functions and roles in society, and hence someone's role as a stranger, enemy, family member or friend (having closer interpersonal relationship with the tribe and/or the person) would determine different ways to reciprocate gifts received (Sahlins 1972).Sahlins discusses how social distance allows us to analyze reciprocity and define exchanges according to a continuum: one of the poles, the positive one, is governed by 'generalized reciprocity' and is defined as 'the "solidary extreme" [which] refers to the transactions that are putatively altruistic, transactions on the line of assistance given, and possibly and necessary, assistance returned ' (1972, p. 418).Balanced reciprocity is considered the midpoint and 'refers to direct exchanges.In precise balance, the reciprocation is the customary equivalent of the thing received and is without delay.(…) Balanced reciprocity is "less personal" than generalized reciprocity.From our own advantage point, it is "more economic" ' (1972, pp.Hence, taking civic reciprocity as a relational value implies considering that its rules and principles apply only to those cooperating, and who share a certain relationship, hence functioning as a norm sustaining social interaction (a.1.);but it also implies that the nature of the relationship amongst those cooperating influences the mode of reciprocation (a.2.), determining, for example, whether returns always need to be proportional and timely, or whether unrequited, disproportional or indirect exchanges are to be permissible.
To engender and sustain political agreement under cultural pluralism, Rawls argued that reciprocity needed to be an idea in between our self-interest and altruistic motives.A relational account of civic reciprocity will thus ask what sort of relationship among citizens mediates exchanges in between impartiality and self-interest, thus allowing that citizens will be disposed to 'answer in kind'.It will consider that without defining such a relationship, one cannot demand a mode of reciprocation as the one mentioned above.In what follows, I will argue that the best candidate for such a relationship is the idea of civic friendship.

Defining Civic Friendship
As established through claims a.1.and a.2., the principle of civic reciprocity, as a relational value, seems to require that citizens share a certain relationship.There is a long tradition, spanning back to Aristotle's political thought, of looking at political relationships as constituting instances of civic friendship (Schwarzenbach 2009).These intend to convey the idea that in a political community we should express some form of care, concern and respect for our fellow citizens.In what follows, I will argue that civic friendship offers the best candidate for determining a relationship between citizens that can sustain civic reciprocity in cultural pluralism.
Rawls discussed how the purpose of the criterion of reciprocity is 'to specify the nature of the political relation in a constitutional democratic regime as one of civic friendship' (Rawls 2005, p. 447).A notion of 'deep reciprocity' is also expressed in the difference principle, since the better-off can only deserve more than others provided that they serve the benefits of the community as a whole and guarantee that the worst-off are left in a better situation than before (Rawls 2001, pp. 42-43, p. 49;Schwarzenbach 2009, p. 143).Hence, Rawls's discussion of civic reciprocity seems to acknowledge its relational value, namely its role in determining relationships of civic friendship.However, what sustains civic friendship in the Rawlsian account seems to be a formal reading of the criterion of reciprocity.It is characterized by the agreement and compliance with the principles of justice and the constraints imposed by public reason, which demand that citizens address each other with reasons they can understand (i.e., expressing public values instead of comprehensive 420-421).Finally, the negative pole is defined as 'negative reciprocity' and is reserved for those we are most socially apart, or even those we see as enemies, rivals, or threats: 'negative reciprocity is the most impersonal sort of exchange.(…) The participants conform each other as opposed interests, each looking to maximize utility at the others' expense ' (1972, p. 422).

Footnote 15 (Continued)
Understanding Reciprocity and the Importance of Civic… ones).I believe that this is a narrow view of reciprocity.Moreover, when claiming that reciprocity is both a principle and disposition, not much is mentioned on the grounds and motivation for such a disposition.I side with Sibyl Schwarzenback who believes that this is a weak justification for what motivates citizens to abide by the principles of justice (Schwarzenbach 2009, p. 144).Moreover, if one agrees with a relational reading of civic reciprocity as introduced above, one will need to offer a more detailed definition of the relationship between citizens.
Andrew Lister offers an additional reading of reciprocity, also focused on its relational nature.Lister believes that reciprocity expresses a relationship among equals: when citizens cooperate, provided others do the same, they initiate a relationship of mutual recognition.So, in his view, not complying with civic reciprocity means that we are not perceiving others as our equals (i.e., we might consider ourselves inferior or superior to others by not contributing).The point of reciprocity is therefore to constitute a relationship between citizens grounded on equality, and this in turn gives content to civic friendship.Hence, according to Lister, reciprocity demands timely and proportional returns, and should limit some duties of justice.He provides the example of the obligation to work: Lister argued that one should comply with such an obligation to be entitled to the fruits of social cooperation.Not doing so, he believes, implies denying that we are on a par with other citizens who work and contribute to the social surplus, and hence creates instances of misrecognition which should not be permissible.
While I side with Lister's point that unrequited exchanges can influence the nature of a relationship, I believe that his view is insufficient to account for the interaction between civic reciprocity and civic friendship.Namely because it focuses too much on how the nature of the return influences the relationship between citizens, and too little on how the relationship between citizens influences the nature of the return.The principle of reciprocity has often been narrowly considered as a principle of proportional and timely return of a gift.This is based on a view that exchanges need to be 'balanced' to promote equality, as opposed to exploitation (Godbout and Caillé 1998).Lawrence Becker pointed out the same, when arguing that 'fruitful relationships' are those which tend to be balanced.In Reciprocity, Becker explains how different relationships, namely between friends or spouses, cannot be unrequited for too long, since this can lead to the exploitation, resentment or even to negative reciprocity (Becker 1986).But this is somewhat distinct from what some anthropological accounts have documented (Sahlins 1972;Godelier 1999;Mauss 1990).Marshall Sahlins discussed in his observations of pre-capitalist societies that it is within socially close relationships that unbalanced exchanges tend to be accepted.He called this 'generalized reciprocity', 16 which is characterized by delaying or even withdrawing restitution.It is when intimacy and trust is solidified among those cooperating, namely between friends or relatives, that unbalanced exchanges are more tolerated, without jeopardizing the nature of the relationship.
Not only does reciprocity plays a role in nurturing and shaping relationships of equality or inequality, as Lister points out (Lister 2011).The nature of the relationship among those cooperating also determines which mode of reciprocity might 16 See note 15. be prevalent, considering different variables (e.g., trust, past record of interaction, degree of intimacy, norms and social roles).Take Lister's concern with equality.I believe that the mode of reciprocal interaction cannot establish equality among citizens per se (even if balanced exchanges can contribute to nurturing relationships of equality).Rather, from the onset, we might establish that a certain relationship is defined by equality, which then conditions the sort of reciprocal exchange that is conducive to guaranteeing the nature of that relationship.Assuming these are the same means naturalizing a certain way of reciprocating, instead of discussing the different shades of reciprocity that might exist and how these can coexist with the nature of different relationships, namely between citizens.Hence the reason why Lister's view obscures how a requirement of reciprocity can accommodate delayed and unrequited exchange, without necessarily jeopardizing equality among those cooperating.Moreover, it also dismisses how non-proportional exchanges can be a requirement for equality: Danielle Allen has argued that African Americans used 'sacrifice' and 'sacrificial exchanges' to demand equality and distributive justice along racial lines (Allen 2004).
Another reading of the relational nature of reciprocity can be found in the work of R. J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen.They found two justifications for how the principle of reciprocity in pluralism can be justified: the first is that reciprocity allows the expression of joint rule.The second is that it allows citizens to stand in a relationship of civic friendship.They argue that civic friendship provides a more convincing ground for the reciprocity principle than the idea of joint rule, since civic friendship provides a basis for a 'partially shared conception of one another's good' (Leland and van Wietmarschen 2017, p. 163).Hence, they believe it better favors a principle of reciprocity, than the idea of a shared interest in following a certain democratic procedure of joint rule, where citizens will comply with reciprocity because of wanting to have a formal mechanism for deliberation.Such a view is better aligned with the one I propose in this paper, by claiming that a certain relationship of civic friendship is a superior justification for why citizens would be motivated to agree and cooperate according to civic reciprocity.
This broader understanding of the principle of reciprocity acknowledges the possibility for accepting unbalanced exchanges, which seems to be in line with instances where both unrequited exchanges (e.g., if we think about distributive goods and services for those who are not able-bodied) or delayed returns (e.g., if we think about the case for reparations) are demanded by justice.But as pointed out above, this broader notion of what reciprocity demands, requires citizens to be socially close to some degree.The relationship between citizens can be analogous to perhaps a new friend with whom we are starting a relationship.If we are moved only by our self-interest, the relationship will likely be difficult to sustain.We will be considered selfish, and the new acquaintance might feel her attentions are unreciprocated.But if we are only moved by our altruism, we might be exploited, or neglected; or the new acquaintance might always feel a sense of discomfort borne of a perpetual sense of indebtedness.While in a specific political community, we might find ourselves closer to an end of the spectrum (i.e., more self-interested or more altruistic), relationships between citizens require both some level of balanced reciprocation, but also unrequited or disproportional exchanges to occur, allowing distributional 1 3 Understanding Reciprocity and the Importance of Civic… patterns that might be more conducive to equality and trust-building in the long run.Such a relationship is best expressed through an idea of civic friendship-Let us consider this claim b.1.
Before moving on to discuss in what way civic friendship and civic reciprocity can be deemed culturally sensitive, it is worth pondering on how to best characterize this relationship.While Rawls seems to argue that the reciprocal agreement based on shared political values, and expressed through public reason, is enough to constitute a relationship of civic friendship, for Leland and van Wietmarschen civic friends are defined by having a mutual non-prudential concern for other citizens' interests.Civic friends do not have to share the same comprehensive or partial doctrine, nor wish to impose their values on others.Instead, they should 'care for one another as friends', which 'involves citizens concerned to advance each other's interests, in ways that all parties regard as genuinely beneficial' (Leland and van Wietmarschen 2017, p. 159).Such a perspective is in line with Sibyl Schwarzenbach's proposal for a society that values care and ethical reproduction.In her book On Civic Friendship.Including Women in the State Schwarzenbach argues that civic friendship is a requirement of justice (Schwarzenbach 2009).Moreover, she presents an expanded version of what civic friendship requires.Civic friends have a 'general reciprocal awareness' of other citizens, but they are also characterized as having 'basic trust and good will between citizens, as well as a practical doing for one another' (Schwarzenbach 2009, p. 55).Hence, civic friendship is about a certain feeling of concern toward other citizens, but also daily actions that express a form of caring.Both accounts do not define civic friends as having shared doctrines or mutual acquaintances, and, as such, are compatible with plural societies.However, in what follows I will argue that both are insufficient in characterizing what sustains such relationships.To understand the point, let us reflect on how two people become friends.
The grounds in which friendships occur can be very distinct.Some friendships are based on shared worldviews: two people who share the same political ideology or the same religion.Others are based on similar tastes: they might like to listen to the same music, go to the same shows or they might enjoy the same food.Other friendships are based on similar values: maybe they feel the same way about what they value in a relationship but also on what they judge as being right or wrong.These could be seen as friendships based on some sort of comprehensive view.There are also other friendships based on shared acquaintances: maybe they belong to the same circle of friends, or they have partners who are friends with each other which 'push them' into a friendship of their own, thanks to regular conviviality.Finally, and this is in no way an exhaustive list on what can be the basis for friendships, some might be a result of shared experiences: maybe they have experienced the same past positive or negative events, or they have similar background stories, even if they have little in common today.These examples, seem to show that friendships can occur even when people share little in terms of religious, moral or philosophical views.Friends can exist because of and despite their individual comprehensive or sectarian views.Of course, in all these cases the solid ground for friendship is dependent on how cooperation takes place across time.And in this, Rawls's account of reciprocity as a key mechanism for trust and stability of cooperation17 seems to be right.A friend who never reciprocates my attentions, will lose my trust, and most likely will not remain a friend for too long.Similarly, a new acquaintance, who reciprocates my favors and offers her own, hence signaling that she can be trusted, might become a friend quickly.I will hold that this is also true for civic friends.
In many ways, this is a perspective closer to Leland and van Wietmarschen's claim on reciprocity being justified by citizens' having a 'non-prudential concern for others' interests', or Sibyl Schwarzenbach's idea that civic friends' need for a 'practical doing for one another'.Being concerned by other citizens makes us act accordingly to civic reciprocity, hence accepting balanced and sometimes unbalanced exchanges, which in turn promotes trust and encourages the flourishing of civic friendship.But both accounts seem to fail at explaining what citizens share-similar acquaintances, views, values or experiences-that might persuade them to care for others and be motivated to cooperate according to the principle of civic reciprocity.Such sharing seems to be required to build a solid ground for trust, so that the principle of reciprocity (Ostrom and Walker 2003) can sustain civic friendship.But interestingly Leland and van Wietmarschen reject in their account of civic friendship the premise that a key feature of friendships is that they often 'share a species of intimacy or familiarity, and they may also need to share projects or activities with one another' (Leland and van Wietmarschen 2017, p. 158), instead focusing on the idea of concern.While such a dismissal renders civic friendship in principle more compatible with pluralism, I believe civic reciprocity demands a thicker conception of the relationship between citizens.
If we take Will Kymlicka's account of how liberal theory has discussed cultural pluralism, it points to how political agreement and stability can be maintained through several mechanisms.The first, is the Rawlsian view of 'shared values', namely shared political values (Rawls 2005;Kymlicka 1996, p. 212), which can also accommodate Leland and van Wietmarschen's and Schwarzenbach's ideas of concern and care.A second perspective argues for 'shared identity', namely the sharing of comprehensive or partial doctrines (e.g., shared religion, or shared history or language) (Kymlicka 1996, pp. 213-214).A third discusses unity based on a commitment to 'deep diversity': if the political community values and is proud of the diversity it exhibits, it might be motivated to continue cooperating in a fair manner (Kymlicka 1996, p. 215).The third point might help illuminate what can be an important soil for nurturing civic friendship.In Sibyl Schwarzenbach's take on civic friendship as a 'practical doing good for one another' we find an idea of process.We are friends with people we have a past and present record of doing good for each other.It is not only about concern, but, as discussed above, it is about being 'socially close' to one another.But this 1 3 Understanding Reciprocity and the Importance of Civic… requires some form of 'coabitation' or 'coexistence' (physicial or constructed), and therefore I believe that it requires the acknowledgement that citizens need to have shared experiences.Such a concept does not necessarily demand shared doctrines, in which case pluralism would be rejected.But it does require a form of shared livelihood and the building of shared references (which might include shared values, but also a certain shared cultural membership) across time that can be enough to build trust among citizens.This might also help to nurture a commitment to 'deep diversity' as argued by Kymlicka.Hence, I believe, civic friendship should be defined as involving a (i) non-prudential concern for the interests of other citizens, as Leland and van Wietmarschen point out, that involves an ethics of caring, along the lines of what Sibyl Schwarzenbach argues for, (ii) requirement of mutual recognition (in line with Andrew Lister), but finally also (iii) a solid ground of shared experiences amongst citizens, as defined.It is (iii) that provides the necessary conditions for civic reciprocity and trust to flourish.Together, I believe that these three aspects offer a comprehensive picture of what is required of civic friendship to foster the sort of civic reciprocity that can promote and sustain agreement and fair cooperation in conditions of cultural pluralism (consider this the final claim b.2.).
However, the idea of shared experiences, as building a thin form of membership, can include feelings of patriotism or a certain cultural membership, hence making agreement under cultural pluralism challenging.Therefore, I will now discuss why I believe that incorporating the idea of 'shared experiences' in our view of civic friendship, alongside the general commitment to the principle of civic reciprocity, renders it culturally sensitive, before turning to some implications of this view in the Conclusion.

Civic Reciprocity is Culturally Sensitive
As argued above, if one agrees with a relational view of the principle of civic reciprocity, one needs to define the relationship of civic friendship that sustains such a principle.For civic reciprocity to work as a mediating relationship that stands in between self-interested and altruistic motives, civic friendship requires a set of dispositions that not only includes mutual recognition and mutual concern for the interests of others, but also a process of constructing shared experiences that can sustain trust and reciprocity.However, such a robust notion of civic friendship that can sustain civic reciprocity is partially sensitive to cultural membership in at least four ways.
(1) Rawls accepts that there are several reasonable political conceptions of justice to choose from, and that these do not always lead to the same conclusion (Rawls 2005, p. 479).However, he does not explicitly argue how this opens the possibility of looking at political conceptions of justice as culturally specific.Political values include a commitment to 'economic reciprocity or basic civil rights' (Rawls 2005, p. 139).Van Wietmarschen believes that values of efficiency or security can also be seen as political values (van Wietmarschen 2021).But one can think how these values are a result of historical events (e.g., feudalism or socialist movements), or are inherited from religious traditions (e.g., Christianity) or are part of technological and intellectual development (e.g., new ideas from the Enlightenment or the demands and changes from the Industrial Revolution).Take the obligation to work.Often it has not been extended to women, 18 or to those who have inherited wealth and live off their earnings.The value of efficiency might also be credited to the rise of the discipline of economics.
(2) Moreover, the commitment to a conception of justice is also mediated through social and historical narratives.Rawls calls them the 'roots of democratic citizens' allegiance to their political conceptions' and argues that these are rooted in citizens' respective 'comprehensive doctrines' (Rawls 2005, p. 463).As Rawls points out, religious tolerance, for example, is a necessary condition for his theory of political liberalism.Without it, the criterion of reciprocity cannot be met, and no reasonable political conception of justice can be agreed upon.This means acknowledging that part of what makes a reasonable political conception is a result of historical and social processes, often tied to historical membership.For example, ideas and notions of patriotism can be particularly important, such as the allegiance to a certain flag, statue or commitment to a certain narrative of a country's history.Considering the family as part of the basic structure can also be culturally specific.
(3) If 1 and 2 are true, it follows that the choice of the best institutional arrangement to satisfy a given conception of justice might be sensitive to history and a related culture.Whereas in certain western European countries the idea of liberal socialism can most likely figure in public debate, regardless of comprehensive moral, philosophical and religious doctrines, in the US such a discussion might be overridden, due to the historical, political and social legacy of the cold war.
(4) Finally, inasmuch as the concept of friend, family or neighbor is culturally sensitive, the concept of civic friend must also be.Hence, what it means to reciprocate as a civic friend might be culturally specific, in that in certain cultures reciprocation among friends might be closer to the altruistic side (e.g., socialized and communitarian ones), whereas in more individualistic settings it might be closer to the self-interested side of the spectrum, even if not totally motivated by egoistic purposes.In fact, empirical evidence seems to support the claim that how we reciprocate is influenced by our cultural background (Beltran et al. 2021;Simon and Benedikt 2009).One clear example of how culture mediates reciprocity to fellow citizens is the different institutional architectures of welfare states.The concept of 'strong reciprocity', 19 for example, might justify support for egalitarian policies, 18 I am disregarding how reproductive labor should be viewed as any other economic contribution, to make the claim that up until recently (and even not always now) the work done by women who were not formally employed was often not recognized nor compensated as employment, and hence not equated with other forms of productive work, which were considered as the appropriate form of return to satisfy the demands of economic reciprocity. 19Bowles and Gintis define strong reciprocity as 'a propensity to cooperate and share with others similarly disposed, even at personal cost, and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative and other social norms, even when punishing is personally costly.We call a person acting this way Homo reciprocans' (Bowles and Gintis 2000, p. 37).

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Understanding Reciprocity and the Importance of Civic… according to Bowles and Gintis, 20 provided the concept of deservingness is considered.But such a behavior is conditioned by contextual factors.On the one hand, it seems social distance remains a key factor, and hence segregation might shape reciprocal interactions (Bowles and Gintis 2000, p. 45).But what social distance means might also embody cultural norms, namely whether one is socially close to blood relatives, friends or neighbors.Both authors also credit a study that finds different evidence on how strong reciprocity might vary, depending on how kinship groups are organized and perceived in society. 21Frank Adloff and Steffan Mau, on the other hand, have investigated the connection between welfare states and reciprocity.They argue that how each society structures its social relations and endorses a certain reading of reciprocity helps determine the institutional structure of their welfare state (Adloff and Mau 2006, p. 114). 22Finally, Robin E. Goodin looked at workfare policies and discussed how the concepts of mutuality and reciprocity can be organized in different ways, hence producing different institutional models for welfare states, namely when it comes to structuring workfare policies (Goodin 2002).Hence, these examples help illustrate that while the norm of reciprocity, and our propensity to reciprocate might be universal (Gouldner 1960;Bowles and Gintis 2000), the way we do it might be a function of our culture, of how issues of need or deserts are perceived, and the degree of importance that is given to institutions of the basic structure, such as ideas on the family or other associations.
Hence, while it seems to be true that civic friendship is influenced by cultural membership, and that what we deem acceptable of civic reciprocity might also be culturally sensitive, focusing on shared experiences might be a key mechanism for agreement to be sustained within cultural pluralism.Multiculturalism thus requires institutions and policies that can promote shared experiences between citizens.Having universal access to hospitals, schools or neighborhoods, creates opportunities for shared experiences between citizens with distinct cultural backgrounds.It is in such contexts that 'deep diversity' can flourish, hence building shared references that can overcome the limits of the cultural sensitivity embodied in how agreement under 20 The authors believe strong reciprocity is a result of several hundred thousand of years of sharing, which created a propensity to reciprocate, as opposed to being guided mostly by self-interest motivations. 21In one of their article's footnotes, Bowles and Gintis mention one example of how differences in kinship groups' organization can have a direct impact in reciprocity: 'The only known exception to this statement concerns experiments run by the University of California, Los Angeles anthropologist Joe Henrich, a member of our research group who works with the Machiguenga Indians, a famously individualistic indigenous group living in a remote region of the Peruvian Amazon.In the ultimatum game, he found offers to be small, and even small offers were typically accepted.In the public goods game, contributions to the public account were very low.We believe the most likely explanation of this result is a peculiarity of the subjects: their basic social unit consists of closely related kin, with extra-kin social relationships being much weaker than typical even of simple societies' (Bowles and Gintis 2000, p. 45). 22Frank Adfloff and Steffen Mau discuss the welfare state as 'systems of transfer are seen here less as one-sided relationships of assistance, and more as a specific form of reciprocity between givers and receivers of assistance' (Adloff and Mau 2006, p. 113).The authors investigate Esping-Anderson typologies of welfare states and discuss how the institutional design of modern welfare states is associated with 'a correspondingly different repertoire of patterns of normative interpretation', and distinguish between 'generalized reciprocity, reciprocity of risk, an obligating reciprocity and balanced reciprocity' and defined them as 'autonomous logics of exchange within the framework of welfare state resource transfers' (Adloff and Mau 2006, p. 114).civic reciprocity can take place.Co-creating such references, allows citizens to have opportunities to get to know different cultures that are part of the political community, and their justification, in a way more conducive to generating trust and civic friendship.Moreover, institutions and policies that foster shared experiences are more than vehicles for built-in references for shared political values.They are essential moments for negotiating what civic reciprocity requires, so that people with distinct cultural backgrounds can agree on what is acceptable for governing their mutual relationship.It creates the moments for conviviality under cultural pluralism to take place, and tandem norm-building to occur, hence limiting the possibilities for our ethos of reciprocity to be informed only by our comprehensive doctrines.

Conclusion
This article aims to contribute to the existing literature on how the principle of civic reciprocity is justified through appeals to the idea of civic friendship.To do so, I propose a broader conception of the principle of reciprocity, by defining it as a relational concept that is both shaped by relationships among citizens and influences how such relationships can change across time.I believe that this is not only a broader account of civic reciprocity, but also potentially one that can justify the demanding functions attributed to the criterion of reciprocity in generating political agreement under reasonable pluralism.Without it, the principle of reciprocity is deemed to be too demanding to account for political agreement in a context of democratic pluralism, and instead we should appeal to the familiar ideas of justice as mutual advantage or what Allen Buchanan called 'justice as self-interested reciprocity' (Buchanan 1990).
However, civic reciprocity as defined demands that citizens share a relationship of civic friendship.Hence, I propose a thick definition of civic friendship, characterized by mutual recognition and concern for others, but also concerns with how citizens trust each other.The latter is the result of how citizens behave to one another daily, but it is also dependent on the idea of shared experiences across time.If civic reciprocity demands this robust notion of civic friendship, then we need to contend that both can be influenced by citizens' cultural membership.How citizens commit to reciprocity, what political values they agree to and how they choose to cooperate, are all influenced by culture, thus posing a challenge for multiculturalism.Hence, I close by arguing in favor of institutions and policies that can promote and encourage spaces and moments for citizens to have shared experiences.
Finally, the argument presented for civic reciprocity and civic friendship certainly deems the project for cultural pluralism more challenging: ensuring citizens have shared experiences under open borders and increasingly culturally diverse societies can be harder to achieve.However, I believe that this does not render the project of political agreement under cultural pluralism impossible.Rather, it forces us to focus on what sort of policies need to be put in place to promote the flourishing of civic friendship that sustains civic reciprocity, namely inclusive schools, public services and neighborhoods.Hence, grounding political consensus on claims of civic reciprocity and civic friendship should come hand in hand with claims for policies that