Abstract
A family of objections to theism aims to show that certain key theological doctrines, when held in conjunction, are incompatible. The longstanding problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom represents one such objection. In this essay, we provide the theist an epistemic approach to the problem that allows for the rational affirmation of both divine foreknowledge and human freedom (understood as the ability to do otherwise) despite their prima facie incompatibility. Specifically, we apply James Anderson’s Rational Affirmation of Paradox Theology model to the problem, arguing that the theist can stave off defeat that arises from a belief in the conjunction of both doctrines by appealing to paradox. In order to establish this thesis, we first define key terms as well as lay out the theological fatalist argument. Next, we explicate Anderson’s model and apply it to the foreknowledge and freedom problem. We conclude by addressing the objection that an appeal to paradox is simply special pleading for the theist, arguing that the naturalist can be found in a similar epistemic position.
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Notes
We have framed this debate as one between atheists and theists over that rationality of theism, however, it is equally as applicable to the in-house debate over how to adequately address the challenge of theological fatalism.
For an in-depth look at free will and moral responsibility see, Kane (2011).
It’s worth noting that many philosophers and theologians privilege the notion of free will as PAP given its central role in solutions to the problem of evil. As an example, see, Plantinga (1974).
Slightly modified version of Wierenga (2018)
Swinburne, for example, does not include future free actions within the scope of divine foreknowledge. See Swinburne (2016)
For example, see Boyd (2000)
For a prominent example see, Zagzebski (1991).
Vicens and Kittle (2019) have termed those who deny one or more of the premises of the argument as foreknowledge compatibilists (divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible) and those who accept the argument as foreknowledge incompatibilists (divine foreknowledge and human free will are incompatible). The arguments put forth in this essay agree with the incompatibilist (at least in principle) regarding the strength of the theological fatalist argument while at the same time providing an alternative argument for the compatibilist that circumvents the fatalist argument all together.
Broadly speaking, the argument we propose is similar in reasoning to the argument put forth by Byerly (2014a). Byerly argues that in order for the DFHF objection to be successful, there needs to exist some reason for believing that divine foreknowledge requires the existence of something that makes PAP unattainable. Byerly makes an inductive argument for the truth of causal determinism as the best candidate for meeting this condition. However, Byerly concludes “in spite of the power of this inductive argument, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge requires the truth of causal determinism. Since the truth of causal determinism is the best proposal we know of for that which is both required by divine foreknowledge and explains the absence of [PAP], we are not in a position to know that there is something that is both required by divine foreknowledge and explains the absence of [PAP]. Thus, we are not in a position to know that the foreknowledge argument is sound.” (Ibid: 38–39) While our proposal arrives at a very similar conclusion to that of Byerly, the underlying epistemic framework and methodology differs greatly. Thus, this paper should be seen as something that complements his work and not as something that is in tension with it.
For examples see: Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology; Gregory of Nissa, Against Eunomius II.
This summary is similar in vein to Dale Tuggy’s outline of Anderson’s view in Tuggy (2011).
For examples of where Anderson thinks the equivocation might lie see Anderson (2007: 226–229.).
See, Timpe (2016).
See, Plantinga (1990)
However, there are metaphysical upshots that come along with our proposed epistemic solution (above and beyond PAP and OMS). First, T. Ryan Byerly argues: “In order for a response R to constitute a successful response to the foreknowledge argument, it cannot be that R fails to threaten an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of the foreknowledge argument.” (Byerly, 2014b: 141.) Byerly points to the Boethian solution (appealing to divine timelessness as opposed to divine temporality) as an example of a solution that fails to meet this requirement, given that only a slightly modified version of the theological fatalist argument is necessary to overcome this move. In contrast, by making a case for a rational appeal to paradox, our solution stands firm against any re-formulation of the theological fatalist argument. Secondly, Florio and Frigerio show that solutions to the DFHF objection have implications as it relates to the metaphysics of time. For example, they argue (without getting into the details) that Ockhamism is incompatible with A-theories of time like Presentism. (Florio & Frigerio, 2019: 134.) Given that there are there possible incompatibilities of certain DFHF solutions with certain metaphysical positions of time, Florio and Frigerio state: “In general, any proposal to solve the problem of [DFHF] has a theoretical advantage in being compatible with more metaphysical options.” (Ibid) On our epistemic solution, one can hold to any view of time they see fit without having to worry about its conflicting with one’s DFHF solution (or vice versa).
For a survey of naturalistic paradoxes see, Cook (2020).
Ibid. 269.
We are thankful for the helpful feedback given to us by Jussi Suikkanen, Nikk Effingham, Greg Sadler, Jamie Collin, and Taylor Cyr.
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DeVito, M., McNabb, T.D. Divine foreknowledge and human free will: Embracing the paradox. Int J Philos Relig 90, 93–107 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09791-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09791-1